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
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
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
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








G. H. G.
Edwards



THE PRIVATE HISTORY OF A POLISH INSURRECTION

FROM OFFICIAL AND UNOFFICIAL SOURCES.

BY

H. SUTHERLAND EDWARDS

LATE SPECIAL CORRESPONDENT OF 'THE TIMES' IN POLAND.

'Remember, I pray thee, whoever perished being innocent, or where were the righteous cut off.'—ELIPHAZ the Temanite.

'I have heard many such things.....I also could speak as ye do. If your soul were in my soul's stead I could heap up words against you and shake mine head at you. But I would strengthen you with my mouth, and my words should assuage your grief.'—JOB.

IN TWO VOLUMES.

VOL. I.




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PREFACE.

THE point of view from which I look upon the Polish insurrection of 1863 is, perhaps, altogether wrong; for if Poland is destined some day to recover her independence, that result might have been retarded by even a temporary reconciliation between Poland and Russia. This was the argument of the extreme democratic party when Russia was making concessions, and Poland was divided as to whether they ought to be accepted or not. Nor is this party dissatisfied with the general result of the insurrection. It has always held that until every trace of the *corvée*, even in the form of rent, was abolished, the peasants could never be got to take part in a struggle for national independence; and the peasants are now freeholders. The farms were

Polish Land Register Co. - August, 1915.

made over to them, first of all, by the Polish National Government, with the view of gaining their support; and the transfer was maintained or renewed by the Russian Government with precisely the same object. But whether the endowment of the peasants with the land, for which they formerly paid rent, or performed task-work, be attributed to revolutionists or to the agents of despotism working with revolutionary weapons, in either case their position is much improved; and it is hoped that now, under more favourable circumstances than ever existed for them before, they will gradually become animated by the same spirit of patriotism which is so strongly felt by all classes above them.

The insurrection, too, has, of course, had the effect of keeping up and intensifying the national hatred of the Poles for everything Russian. As for destroying Poland—a country like Poland, with an independent and for the most part glorious existence of eight centuries * to look back

* Those who repeat the common assertion, that the ancient form of government in Poland was intrinsically and

to, is not destroyed so easily. If to insure its final ruin it were only necessary to execute its inhabitants by hundreds, massacre them by thousands, and exile them by tens of thousands; to confiscate the estates of its principal nobles, plunder its libraries, abolish its ancient places of education, and seek to impose upon its population the use of a foreign tongue,—then Poland would have ceased to exist long ago.

The last Polish insurrection was in some respects more formidable than any that have preceded it. For the first time, the working classes in the Polish towns took up arms of their own accord, without any active personal encouragement from the aristocracy—indeed, in the first instance, in spite of the aristocracy. For the first time, the irremediably bad, should remember that the Polish Republic lasted from the tenth to the eighteenth century, when the crown, from elective, was made hereditary by the Poles themselves. It was this all-important change that caused the second partition, which, being followed by Kosciuszko's insurrection, led to the complete dismemberment of Poland.

Poles, though not assisted, and though greatly injured by the diplomatic intervention of France, England, and Austria, seemed really at one period to have a fair chance of obtaining help from abroad. For the first time, moreover, a rising in Poland, instead of cementing the union between the three partitioning Powers, caused a breach between two of them—or, if the breach already existed, made it strikingly apparent, and widened it. It was a good sign for Poland, that while Prussia took part with Russia, Austria sided at once with France and England.

On the other hand, Poland has now no chance of regaining the complete administrative autonomy which the Marquis Wielopolski obtained for the kingdom just before the insurrection broke out. The insurrection may also be said to have cost Poland a considerable amount of territory. A great many estates in Lithuania and Ruthenia, which, though they had been confiscated by the Emperor Nicholas, were still administered for the Government by Polish agents, have now passed

definitively into the hands of Russian proprietors. It is, nevertheless, improbable that Russia will ever be able to establish a Russian landed aristocracy in any part of the Poland of 1772.

With regard to myself, after spending four months in the 'Kingdom,' Galicia, and Posen, during the agitated period which preceded the insurrection, I revisited Poland after the insurrection had broken out, arriving in Cracow just as the greater part of Langiewicz's disorganised army was hurrying to the Galician frontier. I saw in Galicia how the civil business of the insurrection was conducted, and how the detachments were formed; and I accompanied one detachment on an expedition against the Russians. From Galicia I went to the Kingdom of Poland; and remained as long as I was allowed to do so at Warsaw. From Warsaw I went through Grodno and Wilna (neither of which towns I was permitted to visit) to St. Petersburg; from St. Petersburg, through Moscow, to Kieff; and from Kieff, through the Ruthenian provinces (where I

found the peasants armed and empowered to stop and search all travellers, and to make 'domiliary visits' at the houses of the landed proprietors), back to Galicia. Two days after my arrival at Lemberg, the state of siege was established throughout Austrian Poland, and the passage of detachments to the Russo-Polish frontier rendered impossible. This, together with the political diversion caused by the invasion of Denmark, put an end to the Polish insurrection of 1863, and to all interest in affairs of Poland.

I must add, that nearly the whole of my second volume is made up of letters addressed to the 'Times' from Poland and Russia while the insurrection was going on, and that these letters are now republished by permission of the proprietors. In the first volume, which is entirely new, many statements are made, and several conversations reported, for which it may appear, at first sight, that I ought to have quoted my authorities. I can only say that, in all these cases, I have obtained my information from the best possible sources.

Those who take a particular interest in the organisation of conspiracies and rebellions, on the modern Polish, Italian, and Hungarian system, may be referred to Nos. 28 and 29 (August, 1865) of the Moscow political and literary journal entitled *Sovremennyi Letopis*, for an account of the formation of the Polish National Government or 'Junta' (*Rzond*), written from a Russian point of view, and based on Russian official documents. In my own account, which I consider to be written from an English point of view, I have been careful to mention no names except those of persons who are now beyond the reach of harm; but there was of course no reason why the Moscow journal should take any such precautions.

I had intended to spell the Polish names in these volumes systematically, as they ought to be spelt, but, on consideration, determined to spell the names of well-known personages as they are usually spelt in England. The Poles themselves, in writing their names for foreign eyes, frequently misspell them, in the vain hope that foreigners may not mispronounce them.

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Errata.

Page 30, line 2, *for* last autumn *read* in the autumn of 1863.

„ 154, „ 22, „ February „ January.

„ 158, „ 4, „ firstly „ finally.

„ 188, „ 17, „ Russian „ Prussian.

„ 228, „ 11, „ creating „ erecting.

„ 281, „ 7, „ establishment of the Uniate *read* reunion
of the Uniates to the Orthodox.

THE PRIVATE HISTORY
OF
A POLISH INSURRECTION.

CHAPTER I.

GENERAL VIEW.

THE POLISH INSURRECTION of 1863 originated as an armed movement, in the resistance of a portion of the population to the execution of a measure of recruitment, which had all the character of a proscription, and was directed against the younger inhabitants of towns, as against a class bent at all hazards on subverting the Russian dominion in Poland, and already, to a great extent, leagued together for that purpose, and bound by oath to a secret governing committee.

Nevertheless, the Russian official accounts represent the Poles as the aggressors; and, putting aside the military kidnapping as a detail without importance, say that the origin of the actual conflict was a treacherous massacre of peaceable Russian soldiers by fanatical Polish revolutionists. In fact, on the night of the 22nd January, eight days after the recruitment had been effected at Warsaw, and when it was about to be carried out in the provinces, the Poles in several villages and small towns rose by order of the central insurrectional committee, fell upon the Russian troops in their cantonments, killed some, disarmed others, and, in one place, set fire to a house from which three soldiers were defending themselves, who, refusing to come out and surrender, perished in the flames. This is the one 'atrocit  ' mentioned in the Russian official accounts of the outbreak*—unless the attempt made throughout the country to surprise the Russian troops be regarded in itself as such.

* See extracts from the *Journal de St. P  tersbourg*, given in the Correspondence on Polish Affairs, laid before Parliament.

In the histories of the insurrection fabricated for the benefit of the Russian people, and distributed gratuitously, or sold at nominal prices, in the villages and at the large fairs in Russia, great stress is laid upon this so-called massacre, without any mention whatever being made of the odious measure by which the attempt at a general rising was immediately provoked. The Russian government, moreover, the better to excite the hatred of the Russian peasantry, and of the Ruthenian peasantry belonging to the Russian Church, against the Poles, attributed to the Polish movement on behalf of national independence a special religious and propagandist character. 'Oh, what orthodox blood was shed that night by men calling themselves Christians!' says a passage, describing the first outbreak, in an address to the Ruthenian peasantry issued from Kieff;* while a pamphlet, published at Moscow under the title of 'Russian Truth and Polish Lying'† (the title printed in Church-Slavonian characters, with 'Lord have mercy upon us!' as an epigraph), sets forth that the intention of the Poles was to re-establish

* Appendix, No. 1. † Appendix, No. 2.

serfdom*, to convert the Russians by force to the Roman Catholic religion, and to introduce into the Russian Churches 'the abomination that maketh desolate, predicted by Daniel the prophet.' The Russian journals, all tuned to the same official note, cried with one accord that the true object of the Poles in rising against the imperial government was to regain exclusive privileges for the Polish nobility, and to re-establish the authority of the nobility over the peasantry.

The Russians cannot believe, or, at least, will

* The students of the university of St. Petersburg and Moscow were accused, in the same manner, of wishing to re-establish serfdom, when, in the autumn of 1861, they objected to some new regulations introduced by a minister of instruction, who seemed to have mistaken his functions for those of minister of police. The device did not answer at St. Petersburg, probably because the authorities were afraid to press the execution of their plan in a city inhabited by so many foreigners and by a foreign diplomatic body. At Moscow, where less ceremony is observed, peasants were armed with sticks, placed in ambush, and at a given signal, and immediately after a cavalry charge, fell upon the students and beat them unmercifully. I was myself at St. Petersburg, and afterwards at Moscow, during these disturbances.

not admit, that the Poles suffer from being subjected to the rule of a foreign and, in many respects, barbarous power, which year after year has marked out and seized all their most promising young men in the schools and gymnasiums, to bury them in the Russian army; which has closed their universities, carried off their libraries, forbidden the establishment of every useful and necessary institution, and, in a word, has systematically impeded the development of their country, with a view of rendering it too feeble for resistance; but they consider it quite natural that the Polish proprietors should wish to keep their peasants in a species of serfdom, and that the whole civilised population, or, at least, members of every class belonging to it, and especially the working men, should fly to arms, with death or exile as their reward in case of defeat— not to free Poland from Russian dominion, but simply to prevent any improvement being effected in the position of the Polish peasantry.

After circulating such a detestable calumny as this, what pity do the Russians deserve, when they complain that the West of Europe accepts all the

accusations brought against them by the Poles, without listening to anything they may have to say in self-defence?

The West of Europe knows that Russia is obliged to give a very bad character to the Poles in order to justify her occupation of Poland; and it naturally doubts the sincerity of those who attribute vices to an enemy, and then plunder him by way of punishment. As to the emancipation of the serfs, that measure, whatever may be said about it now, when it is too late to protest any longer, met, when it was first proposed, with strenuous opposition from a large portion of the Russian proprietors;* and the reproaches on the subject addressed by the Emperor to the nobility of Moscow were recorded at the time in the

* Nevertheless, it was not to the personal liberation of the peasant that so many of the Russian proprietors objected, but to the cession of land by which it was to be accompanied. The proprietors of the Russo-Polish provinces may also have objected to the arbitrary apportionment of their land by the government. But they at once accepted the principle of emancipation, with whatever consequences it might entail. Moreover, they were opposed to the insurrection until, by the force of circumstances, they were drawn into it.

Russian official journals, and republished in every newspaper in Europe. On the other hand, the thanks addressed by His Majesty to the nobles of the Polish provinces incorporated with the Russian empire, for their immediate and spontaneous assent to his proposition, have been recorded and republished in a similar manner.

The nobles of Moscow, when the emancipation scheme had become law, evinced their profound irritation by voting, with scarcely a dissentient voice, an illegal address to the crown, demanding, in pressing terms, a complete change in the system of government, and the immediate publication of a constitution, in the utility of which few beyond those who actually proposed it were suspected of believing.* The Russians seem to imagine that the more serious opposition offered soon afterwards by Poland, as a nation, proceeded, in a similar manner, from a wish to avenge upon the Russian government the benefits it had conferred upon

* The movement among the Russian nobility in favour of a constitution commenced three years ago (at the beginning of 1862). It ceased for a time when the Polish Insurrection broke out.

the Polish peasantry ; and that if the first object of the Poles was to liberate their country from foreign domination, their second was to replace their peasantry in a state of slavery. Although, if this argument be maintained at all, it must be maintained in the teeth of facts, it is much employed, both by Russians who are really ignorant of the facts, and by Russians who wilfully ignore them.

Now, as to the real cause and also the real object of the insurrection. Lord Russell—unable in a diplomatic despatch to state the simple fact that the Poles rise from time to time against the governments imposed upon them, because they abhor foreign rule *—was obliged, in his corre-

* There is not, and never has been, any party in Poland in favour of linking the fate of their country *permanently* with that of Russia, Austria, or Prussia. 'The Poles in general,' says the Hon. F. Lamb to Lord Castlereagh, in a letter dated Vienna, June 25, 1814, 'are pleased at the idea of becoming a kingdom attached to Russia *for the present*, in the idea that it will lead to their future independence. Some of the most reasonable look upon this as illusory, and flatter themselves that the day will come when Austria will espouse their cause, in order to wrest Poland from Russia. But it is remarkable that among all the Poles whom I see (and I see a great many) there is not one

spondence with the Russian government, to argue that the insurrection of 1863 was caused by the government of the Emperor Nicholas from 1831 to 1855. But the execrable system of Nicholas alone, without the relaxation of that system by which the accession of the present Emperor was followed, could not—whatever other evils it may have produced—have caused an insurrection; for no one dared rise against it. The peaceful attitude of the Poles during the Crimean war, when, for the first time, they found England and France united in arms against Russia, has been accounted for in various ways—by the material prosperity of the country,* most remarkable just

individual who is attached either to Russia or to any other power, but as they think that power may ultimately favour their views for the independence of Poland.' (*Castle-reagh Correspondence* x. 59). I have myself conversed with hundreds of Poles, of all classes and conditions, on this subject, and I can say positively that the views of the Poles now are precisely what they were in 1814. Sometimes, however, they *do* incline towards Russia, sometimes towards Austria; and it seemed to me that their only hope in 1861 lay in accepting peaceably from Russia whatever concessions they could obtain.

* A report from a former consul at Warsaw, written immediately after the Crimean war, and of which a few copies

then ; by the fact that the Poles were quite unprepared for war ; and finally, by a belief that the time of action had not arrived, and that if Poland waited, she would be appealed to and terms would be proposed to her by the allies.

In fact, the chief of the Polish emigration *was* sounded on the subject, when he informed the French government that the Poles would not stir unless the allies formally engaged to obtain a certain minimum of concessions for them as one of the conditions of peace. At the same time orders were sent to Warsaw to keep quiet—rather unnecessarily, I fancy, for Warsaw swarmed with police agents and spies, and was occupied by a large army. Russia, pressed as she was on the Baltic and on the Black Sea, yet found means to keep one hundred thousand men in Poland during

were printed for private circulation, calls attention to the increasing resources of Poland and expresses a belief that a new era of material prosperity has commenced for that country. This may account, to some extent, for the Poles having soon afterwards commenced their agitation against Russia. It should never be forgotten that material prosperity is only valued in Poland as a means towards an end. The ultimate object of the Poles is not to grow rich and fat, but to gain their independence.

the Crimean war. This seems to have been the chief reason why Poland gave no sign of life at a time when, had she risen, France and England could scarcely have avoided making her cause to some extent their own. She had been terrorized by the Emperor Nicholas to such a degree that she feared Russia, even when Russia had France, England, Turkey, and Piedmont to contend with.

The Emperor Nicholas being dead, and a sovereign of quite a different character having ascended the throne,* a reaction took place, and the Poles gradually proceeded from an attitude of defiance and menace to open insurrection; and without

* But the Poles, it may be said, have suffered as much from the government of the Emperor Alexander as from that of the Emperor Nicholas. Probably at this moment they have suffered even more. Nevertheless, when Alexander II. ascended the throne, if he did little to improve the legal position of the Poles, he at least ruled them with a light hand. This was not and ought not to be enough to satisfy the descendants of a free people; but the fact remains that the Poles were stifled during the last twenty-five years of the reign of Nicholas, and that they were able to breathe during the first five years of the reign of Alexander and until the regular organisation of the Warsaw demonstrations.

any promises, without any reasonable expectations even of foreign assistance, and almost entirely unprovided with arms and ammunition, engaged single-handed in a struggle with the whole force of the Russian empire.

In 1830, when they had thirty thousand of the best troops in Europe to begin their insurrection with, and when they had the whole country in their hands, with a peasantry to whom the Russians were really foreigners, and who had never, in a direct manner, felt the force of Russian rule, they adopted a dignified and, as much as possible, a conciliatory tone towards the Russians, and assured them that their war was with the Russian government, but that they had no hatred for the Russian people, who are Slavonians like ourselves.' For some months the insurrection of 1830 had purely a political character; nothing was said about separation from Russia, the Russians were spoken of as fellow-subjects, and the government of the country was carried on in the name of the Emperor Nicholas. At that time the Poles of the 'kingdom' had only been fifteen years under the Russian sceptre, and, though they had an

Emperor of Russia for their constitutional king, and a Russian Grand Duke for the commander-in-chief of their national army, they retained the complete direction of their own internal affairs. Indeed, in spite of many cases of individual persecution, the national life of the Poles had been very little interfered with, even in Lithuania and the other provinces (Volhynia, Podolia, and Kieff) acquired by Russia at the partition of the eighteenth century.

After the suppression of the insurrection of 1830, however, the Poles had to pass through a quarter of a century of unexampled and almost inconceivable oppression; and in 1863, though the Russians had certainly improved since the time of Nicholas, and, at least, had established a national administration and an excellent system of national education in Poland, the Poles rose with a feeling of intense national hatred, declared war against the Russians as a people, and lost no opportunity of representing them as savages, incapable by race and from their very nature of being civilised.

The system of Nicholas, then, if it did not

produce, at least prepared the way for the insurrection of 1863, which, however, was caused above all by a belief that Russia was exhausted, and that the power which had helped Italy to gain her independence would not abandon Poland in a similar struggle.

The Russians argue now that the concessions made to the Poles by the Emperor Alexander encouraged them to rise, and that but for the national administration introduced at the urgent solicitation of the Marquis Wielopolski the organisation on which the insurrection was based would have been impossible. The fact is, the reforms, whether sufficient or insufficient, were introduced at a time of great excitement, when it was too late to give them a fair trial, and when a small but desperate party had already resolved, at all hazards, to take up arms.

It was an evil resolution. It was not merely the *væ victis* character of the struggle that had to be dreaded, but also the terrible means by which alone it could be carried on. In 1830 the war was in one sense a civil war; but all Poland was in arms against Russia, the contest

was above-ground, and every Pole was the avowed enemy of every Russian.

In this last insurrection many of the chiefs fought under assumed names, and had deserted the Russian army—which, however, they had in the first instance been forced to enter. Numbers of insurgents were the sons of proprietors, who could not openly defy the government, or their estates would have been confiscated, and who had to plead compulsion when they were charged with having furnished supplies to their own countrymen. In the same family one brother would be fighting in the woods, while another would be working in some government office—unable, it is true, to leave his post, for the very fact of doing so would have exposed him to suspicion at a time when suspicion, accusation, and exile followed one another in close succession without the existence of proof being at all required. Officials nominally in the service of the Russian government were actually helping the insurrection—at the peril no doubt of their lives, but in violation also of their oaths. In short, thousands of Poles who had not only not declared

war against the government, but who still wore the government uniform, were fighting against it in secret, and could scarcely do otherwise; for how could they refuse to help their own countrymen against the Russians? The timid peasants, threatened, maltreated, and put to death if they assisted the insurgents, had to be treated with at least equal severity by the insurgents to prevent them from leaning too much to the Russian side. Then, as the Russians maintained spies, it was absolutely necessary to kill the spies, or the secrets of the anonymous government would have been discovered.

We all know that the Poles have no objection to open war when open war is possible; but what were they to do without arms, without a single town to themselves, and with their enemies spread over the whole face of the country? All that need be said is, that they were placed in most trying circumstances by a deplorable insurrection, which was not, and could not be, an insurrection of the whole country, though all the townspeople, together with every educated man in the rural districts, and every man habitually

brought into relations with educated people, prayed for its success.

But for those daring reckless spirits who were ready to risk an appeal to arms there were no arms to be had. The peasantry, who had their scythes, were for the most part neutral, and were even inclined here and there to take the side of the government, which they felt was the safe side in the long run. The great proprietors, though by no means neutral, had the fear of confiscation before their eyes, and could only aid the insurrection cautiously, secretly, and by means of money, which, when they had once joined the movement, they gave abundantly.

If, however, the Poles engaged in a desperate struggle, with the certainty of incurring the most terrible losses in case of failure, it must also be remembered that they had a great prize in view. They were fighting for the independence of their country as it existed before the partitions of the eighteenth century, and for the immediate liberation of all Russian Poland, as a first step towards that end.

Unfortunately the educated class is very small

in Poland, and in those provinces where the peasantry, intent only on cultivating their fields in peace, are very numerous, and where the proprietors and the inhabitants of towns are but few, no movement on behalf of national independence, unless supported by a regular army, can meet with even a momentary success. Indeed, in those parts of ancient Poland where the peasant was until quite recently a serf—that is to say, in the Polish provinces incorporated with the Russian empire, where emancipation has only just taken place, and in Galicia, where it dates only from 1847-1848—the peasantry are far more inclined to oppose than to support a national movement. They prefer safety and the existing order of things, under which they are free, to danger and a return to an ancient system, under which all they remember is that they were slaves.

With only a very small number of Poles ready to risk their lives on behalf of national independence, and with three great military governments ready to assist one another in crushing any such movement, how is it that Poland ever thinks of

stirring? Because, with the credulity of extreme misery, she trusts too much to her own strength, to the weakness of her enemies, and to the sincerity of her friends.

No one assisted Poland when she rose under Kosciuszko in 1794, immediately before the third partition.

If Napoleon assisted her in 1806, and out of the province from which the Prussians had been expelled formed the Duchy of Warsaw, he also drew from the Duchy an army of 100,000 men for his Spanish and other wars.

No one helped the Poles in 1830 against Russia, nor in 1846 against Austria, nor in 1848 against Prussia; and now they have been left once more to fight a hopeless battle against Russia, not without implied promises of help, but without any actual aid.

As regards this last insurrection, however, the Poles were far too ready to believe what their countrymen abroad were too ready to tell them as to the supposed chances of an intervention. The Polish national government, on the other hand, and the Polish newspapers misled the

West of Europe as to the importance of the insurrection. The Poles rarely, if ever, acknowledged that they had lost a battle, though, as every one of their very numerous detachments was in the end broken up, they must have been defeated altogether several hundred times.

The French, English, and many of the German newspapers were so anxious the Poles should be victorious that they readily and most willingly placed confidence in all accounts of Polish victories that reached them. If any one told the truth as to the hopeless character of the movement, and the terrible calamities it would inevitably draw down upon the Poles, he was looked upon as an illiberal, hard-hearted person, and a friend of the despotic governments, to which the Polish insurrection has been as much an advantage, as to Poland it has been a misfortune. In short, there seemed to be a general understanding in Europe to force Russia to strengthen herself, and to force Poland to destroy herself. When Russia was evidently strong no one would venture to attack her, and when Poland was evidently exhausted every one deserted her.

CHAPTER II.

OPINIONS AND MANŒUVRES OF THE REVOLUTIONARY
AND OTHER PARTIES IN POLAND.

THE art of getting up revolutions is as little understood in England as that of getting up joint-stock companies seems to be in most parts of the Continent. The reason no doubt is, that for the former kind of speculation a vast number of grievances are necessary, and for the latter a large amount of capital. The grievances must not be imaginary nor the capital fictitious, or neither enterprise can be set going, however much it may be talked about for a little while. But in England, except when money is unusually 'tight,' almost any industrial or commercial scheme can be started, if experienced speculators will only take it in hand; and in Poland, the richest of all countries in misfortune, a professional revolutionist can always get up an insurrection, except,

indeed, in such periods of 'tightness' as existed during the reign of the Emperor Nicholas, when grievances were locked up because it was dangerous to show them. The revolutionary speculators, like the commercial ones, are generally sincere, as far as a belief in the success of their own schemes is concerned, and as the former are not afraid of death, so the latter do not fear that milder form of dissolution, known as bankruptcy.

Admitting the object in view to be good, it is upon this question of success, or rather the antecedent probabilities of success, that the whole morality of speculation, whether based upon joint-stock companies, or upon secret political societies, must be held to depend. It is in vain for the getter up of companies to plead that an enterprise, in which, by his earnest representations, he has caused thousands to lose their property, was really a *bonâ fide* affair, if at the same time it never had any chance of prospering; and it is no use telling us that the sole object of the Polish revolutionists in urging their countrymen two years ago to take up arms was to relieve them from oppression, if it was evident from the first

that this object could not be attained by the means proposed, and that to attempt it would only render the position of the sufferers ten times worse than before. The failure of an insurrection against such a power as Russia does not mean simply defeat in the field, but the execution of hundreds, the banishment of thousands and tens of thousands, the depopulation of entire districts, the disorganisation of society, and the denationalisation, as far as possible, of the whole insurgent country.

It may be said that, after all, the probability of the Polish insurrection failing or succeeding was a matter of opinion, as it is also a matter of opinion whether a new flying-machine will answer, or whether a man, disabled, and without arms, can fight with advantage against a tiger. Speculators who make mistakes in such matters, and who mislead others, are very dangerous members of society, and some of our professed revolutionists have been doing this sort of thing all their lives.

There is another cause, in addition to the existence of permanent grievances, such as must

be felt by every man capable of the slightest patriotic feeling, which renders Poland a most promising soil for the schemes of revolutionists.

The Polish flag, whenever and by whomsoever hoisted, is sure to attract, not only those who fly to it at once from ungovernable enthusiasm, but also a great many others who dare not say positively that the time for hoisting it has not yet arrived, and who, however much they may object to its being raised inopportunistly, at least cannot help to knock it down. The Poles are highly sensitive; and they have so long been reproached with factiousness that if, at a given moment, an important part of the nation is opposed sincerely and conscientiously to a movement on behalf of national independence, it is afraid, nevertheless, to pronounce its opinion openly and before all the world. The extreme party does not hesitate to accuse of want of patriotism all who are unwilling to encourage it in hopeless attempts; and these accusations are so intolerable to the moderate party, and it is so impossible for this party to unite with a foreign government against any portion of its own countrymen, that the most extreme

men in Poland have only to begin to act, in order to be joined, one after the other, by numbers who have no faith at all in their projects.

In a free country one part of the nation may be for war and another against it. But in Poland, whenever there is any question of war against Russia, no men calling themselves Poles can say much against it without seeming to place themselves on the Russian side. This is one of the misfortunes arising naturally from the position of the Poles; but though it has proved a misfortune hitherto, it is at the same time an honour to the country that such a feeling should exist, and it may one day be found a source of strength.

This tacit understanding, that no foreign government is a government for Poles, is very general in all parts of Poland; and I have noticed curious examples of it among the working classes in some of the Polish towns. In Cracow, for instance, I saw a workman one evening beating another workman inside a shop, with the evident approbation of the lookers on. On inquiring into the matter, I found that the man who was getting the worst of it had been attacked by his

antagonist before on some private ground of quarrel, and that he had appealed for protection to the Austrian police. 'Why can't Poles settle disputes among themselves?' cried the combatant who had might as well as right on his side. 'Couldn't he have got a Pole to help him? . . . In any case, he had no right to call upon the Germans to interfere.'

The man who had sought Austrian aid against a Polish assault was, by general consent, voted a scoundrel, as I have no doubt he was; and the same opinion is entertained in Poland of any one who, for the sake of public order, or of personal protection, looks to the Russian, Austrian, or Prussian government for assistance.

This feeling as to the main question exists among all classes of Polish society, except the peasantry — that is to say, every man in Poland above the position of a serf detests the domination of foreigners; but very different opinions are entertained as to the best means of escaping from it.

Poland, as every one knows, is divided politi-

cally into three parts.* It should also be known that in each of these three parts the population may be divided into two sections—the recently emancipated peasantry, and the rest of the inhabitants. The first, and most numerous, of these sections either does not desire much, or scarcely desires at all, or positively objects to the re-constitution of an independent Poland, which it associates with serfdom; while the second desires the re-constitution of an independent Poland most ardently.

But that section of the Polish population, whether under Prussian, Russian, or Austrian rule, which desires the liberation of Poland is again divided into two parties, one of which has an aristocratic, the other a democratic character. The aristocratic party has no faith in insurrection unless supported by foreign intervention, while the democratic party has no faith in insurrection unless supported by the Polish peasantry. The two parties have, until quite lately, been sepa-

* Administratively, the Poland of 1772 is divided into four parts—namely, Posen, Galicia, the kingdom of Poland, and the Lithuanian and Ruthenian provinces, incorporated with Russia, and described in official language as the ‘Western Provinces’ of the empire.

rated, not only by what separates the 'extreme from the moderate party, the republican from the monarchical party, the party of action from the so-called party of reaction in Italy and Hungary, but also by a social question, or at least by an economical question of a social character. In Italy all traces of serfdom have long disappeared. In Hungary serfdom was abolished, and the land which the peasants had previously cultivated, on condition of working for it, left to them as absolute property, two years before the insurrection of 1848. In Prussian Poland (1815) and in Austrian Poland (1847-48) the peasantry had also become free proprietors of their little farms. But in the Polish provinces incorporated with the Russian empire the peasant remained a serf; while in the kingdom of Poland, though not strictly speaking a serf (for since 1807 he had not been attached to the soil), he had to perform task-work, and could be beaten if he did not perform it properly.

Such at least was the state of things on the great majority of the estates in the kingdom of Poland when the 'manifestations' began which ended in

the insurrection of 1863. This state of things the extreme party, consisting chiefly of non-proprietors, had long wished to abolish by making the peasants freeholders as regarded their farms; while the moderate party, consisting chiefly of proprietors, objected to this arrangement in 1831, when it might easily have been effected, but adopted it in principle, and on the basis of a system of redemption in 1861, by a resolution of the recently founded Agricultural Society.

Mieroslawski and other experienced revolutionists established abroad regarded this decision as a sign that the country was getting ripe for a general insurrection, inasmuch as the higher classes were ready to make sacrifices for the benefit of the peasantry, while the peasantry were about to find themselves in a position for which it would be really worth their while to fight. This was Mieroslawski's starting point in his insurrectionary programme, drawn up immediately after the decision of the Agricultural Society became known, and of which numerous copies, reproduced by photography on thin pieces of paper the size of a crown piece, were sent to

all parts of Poland. One of these programmes was found last autumn crumpled up and lying on the floor in a room in the Zamoyiski Palace, which the Russians had just taken possession of, in consequence of an attempt having been made upon the life of General Berg from the house adjoining it. A great deal was made of this discovery at the time, which, however, only showed that a curious document had reached some of the inmates of the Zamoyiski Palace as well as many other persons.

Mieroslawski was of opinion that with a little shaking from the Poles the edifice of the Russian empire would fall to pieces. But it was to be shaken gently and undermined quite gradually, until the time had fully arrived for its enemies to bring it down with a crash. The Polish officers and civil functionaries in the Russian service were to do all the preliminary work, aided by the agitation which was regarded as the inevitable consequence of the emancipation of the serfs. Public opinion abroad was to be prepared by continual attacks on Russia and by accounts of Russian atrocities real or invented.

This was the '*mentez hardiment*' principle of Voltaire, much used by revolutionists, though Mieroslawski is the first I believe who has been weak-minded enough to let out the secret in a formal programme. In the meanwhile the proprietors in Poland were to cultivate by all possible means the goodwill of their peasantry, arms and ammunition were to be introduced into the country, and at the last moment, when everything was ready, the proprietors were to call upon the peasants to take up their scythes and follow them into the field.

This scheme, if it only could have been persevered in for a sufficient length of time, would not on the day of action have failed. But were the Russians likely to wait until it was matured, and could such an excitable and demonstrative people as the Poles possibly keep quiet during the interval? Moreover, one part of the scheme could only have been carried out by a nation of scoundrels, another only by a nation of brave and generous men. Consequently it was, as a whole, impracticable, and so little came of it that, as a rule, neither peasants nor proprietors went into

the field at all, the class that took up arms consisting for the most part of townspeople.

Very different was the tone of the 'Address from the Inhabitants of Warsaw,' which, if not written, was at least printed and circulated throughout the country by Martin Borelowski, better known under the name of 'Lelewel,' which he assumed in memory of the celebrated Polish historian, when he went at the head of his workmen to meet the Russians in the field. He was one of the true heroes of the Polish insurrection, a man of the Kosciuszko stamp, without ambition, without deceit, and whose simple plan consisted in gaining the affection of the peasantry by kind treatment and by an amicable cession of the farm-land, in accordance with the plan of the Agricultural Society; in avoiding the Russian, Prussian, and Austrian service as a contamination; and in practising the most rigid economy in everything but the purchase of arms. 'Though the liberty of Poland concerns the whole of Europe, we must count on ourselves alone,' says one passage. * * * * 'But as for rising now, without reckoning our forces and

elaborating a material power, of that we must not think.'

Such a simple-minded, straightforward patriot as Lelewel must have been looked upon with something like contempt by the practised hands of revolution. His was the national and ideal programme, as distinguished from the cynical and equally impossible one of the revolutionary schemers. But in all impulsive popular movements those who go furthest take the lead and drag the others after them. Indeed, in a few months even Mieroslawski seemed to have been distanced; and when the Grand Duke Constantine and the Marquis Wielopolski arrived in Warsaw, with their bundle of reforms, nothing would satisfy the madmen of the extreme party but to fire upon one, and stab the other—as if to show that measures of conciliation were not wanted, and that their introduction would not be tolerated.

If there are two permanent parties in Poland radically different in their ideas and general

tendencies, there were in 1861, when I visited Warsaw for the first time, at least four parties—that is to say, two clearly defined sections of the aristocratic, and two less clearly defined of the democratic party.

On the extreme left of the democratic party, or party of action, were a few partisans of Mięrosławski (1), who proposed as long ago as February 1861 (almost before their chief had finished his programme) to commence the insurrection. The funeral of the five men shot in the massacre of February 27th was to be the occasion. It was known that the whole population of Warsaw, with a certain number of well-disposed peasants from the environs,* would follow the procession to the cemetery. The Russian troops, numbering only 5,000 men, had, in presence of the universal excitement, quitted the city, and it was thought by the extremest of the 'extremes' that they might be surprised in the citadel.

* Peasants in the neighbourhood of the towns, and of the great towns especially, are patriotic enough.

The great bulk, however, of the party of action (2), with such men as 'Lelewel' for their leaders, were convinced that without arms and without organisation it would be folly to make any such attempt.

On the other hand, the moderate and aristocratic party (3) were opposed to forcible measures altogether, and the recognised chief of this party, who exercised great personal influence among all classes, had pledged his word that, as regarded the funeral, it should take place without disturbance. This promise, given by Count Andrew Zamoycki on behalf of the whole population, was religiously kept. The funeral procession was followed to the grave in the greatest order by tens of thousands of Poles, while only three Russians were present in an official capacity—the Marquis Paulucci and two aides-de-camp.

In the meanwhile one member of the aristocratic party, with a small entourage (4), a man whom national adversity had hardened instead of softening, and who must be placed on the ex-

treme right of the moderate party, would hear neither of surprises, nor of preparations for a future rising, nor of 'manifestations' against Russia in the processional or any other form.

This was the Marquis Wielopolski, who had long been convinced that his country must lean either upon Russia or upon the west of Europe, and who had learned in 1831 the sad lesson that if she leaned upon the west of Europe she would be allowed to fall. The marquis is detested by his fellow-countrymen, who wish to save themselves not by means, but in spite, of Russia; and by the more ignorant portion of them is called a traitor. The Russians, on the other hand, regard him also as a traitor, because he obtained great advantages for Poland, which in their opinion would, had they been accepted by the Poles, have placed Russia in a very difficult position. Next to action against Russia, the marquis was opposed to total inaction; and he foresaw that if the moderate party—the great bulk of the aristocratic party—did nothing to support him it would in the end be dragged at the heels of the party of action.

After a certain amount of systematic agitation the party of action became tolerably united, and had one general plan. A rising was to be brought about in all parts of the country as soon as a sufficient number of arms could be obtained, and the aid of the peasants was to be secured by making over to them forthwith, in freehold, the land for which they had hitherto performed task-work or paid rent. This decision, with respect to the land, has to me a very revolutionary air, for it was arrived at without the consent of the proprietors—who, however, were promised an indemnity, payable after the country had recovered its independence!

The moderate party also formed a compact body, and took up an attitude of observation, unwilling to give its cordial support to the reforms introduced by the Marquis Wielopolski (though it could not but approve of the measures in themselves as far as they went), and unwilling, also, to join in the project of the revolutionary party, because (to mention no other reason) it considered the time for an armed rising had

by no means arrived. Some members of the moderate party did really support the marquis; but, generally speaking, the attitude of this party was one not of reaction, but simply of inaction.

CHAPTER III.

EVENTS FROM THE ACCESSION OF THE EMPEROR ALEXANDER TO THE BEGINNING OF THE WARSAW DEMONSTRATIONS.

THE agitation, which went on gradually increasing until, in January, 1863, it took the form of open war, first assumed a serious, and to good observers an intelligible form in 1860, when, on November 29th, the anniversary of the insurrection of 1830 was celebrated. There had been signs, however, of what was coming in 1858, when the funeral of General Sowinski's widow was made the occasion of a patriotic demonstration ; * and the Emperor

* Towards the close of the bombardment of Warsaw in 1831, the feeble garrison who defended the village of Wola concentrated itself in the church, when the commandant, Sowinski, made his troops swear on the crucifix not to surrender. After a heavy and crushing cannonade from two points the church was stormed, the Poles who occupied it were slain, and Sowinski himself fell, covered with wounds,

Alexander had already given the Poles to understand that they had nothing to expect from him in 1856, immediately after the conclusion of the treaty of Paris.

During the Paris Conference it had been proposed that, in settling the conditions of peace, some stipulations should be made in favour of Poland. To this Count Orloff, the Russian representative, had replied that if anything were asked for nothing could be given; that he could not consent even to discuss the Polish question; and that the liberal concessions which the Emperor intended of his own free will to grant to the Poles would lose all their effect if it should appear that they had been extorted from him by foreign powers.

The report that liberal concessions were to be made to Poland increased the hopes that the

at the foot of the altar. The Wola church is maintained as nearly as possible in the state in which it was the day after Sowinski and his immortal garrison were put to the sword. I visited it in 1861, and counted sixty odd cannon balls sticking fast in its desecrated walls.

Poles had already formed of the Emperor who had just ascended the throne, and when it was known that he intended to visit Warsaw the aristocracy resolved to give him a most cordial reception.

His Majesty reached Warsaw by way of Kieff, and at one point during the journey was met by Count Jezierski, through whose estate he was passing, and whom he honoured with a private interview. What took place is not known, except that Jezierski read a paper.

I must here mention that this Count Jezierski was one of two delegates (the other being Prince Lubecki) sent by the Polish Diet, immediately after the outbreak of 1830, to propose terms of peace to the Emperor Nicholas. They demanded what Krukowiecki demanded nine months afterwards, when Paskiewicz was preparing to storm Warsaw; what Kosciuszko had asked of the Emperor Alexander I. as the one condition of his support in 1815; what the Polish aristocracy, through Count Andrew Zamoyski, represented as an indispensable preliminary to any concurrence on

their part in the reforms undertaken by the Grand Duke Constantine in 1862—namely, the union of the polish provinces seized at the partitions of the eighteenth century to the Polish kingdom of 1815, under a constitutional government. The Emperor Nicholas replied to Jezierski's and Lubecki's propositions that the insurgents must lay down their arms, and trust to his forbearance and generosity; but that if they failed to do this, and persisted in seeking to redress their grievances by means of war, he would crush them, and they must expect no mercy at his hands. Jezierski and Lubecki returned to Warsaw convinced that the Emperor, in one case or the other, would keep his word; and stating this opinion frankly, and advising immediate submission, they were, of course, looked upon as traitors. Lubecki left Poland altogether, and has since resided at St. Petersburg. Jezierski remained in Warsaw four days, to be able to answer any questions or reproaches that might be addressed to him, and then went abroad. He returned to Poland after the war, and when the Emperor Nicholas visited Warsaw in 1836 was sent for by his Majesty and

treated in a very friendly manner. This must have rendered Jezierski still more unpopular with his own countrymen, but it was only natural that the Emperor Nicholas should be well-disposed towards a man who had endeavoured to avert a war which, if fatal to Poland, was disastrous also to Russia, and which quite put an end (at least for a considerable time) to Russia's plans for conciliating her own Polish subjects, with the view of attracting those of Austria and Prussia.

What passed between Jezierski and Alexander II. in 1856 has not been made known; but it is certain that Jezierski submitted some scheme which his Majesty did not approve of.

On arriving at Warsaw the Emperor was received with the greatest enthusiasm, and among other entertainments offered to him was a ball, given, not to order, but voluntarily and spontaneously, by the nobility of Poland. No pains had been spared to render this ball fully worthy of the occasion—the first on which an Emperor of Russia had met his Polish subjects in the true

character of a guest, since the insurrection of 1830. The Emperor seemed delighted with his reception, and when he retired it was announced that the nobility could wait upon his Majesty the following day at the palace of Lazienki.

The next day the Emperor thanked the nobility for their magnificent ball, and assured them that he had the welfare of all his subjects at heart, and that he should not forget the manner in which he had been received at Warsaw. This was all very well and would have been enough; but after a slight pause the Emperor (urged, I am told, by Prince Gortchakoff,* who stood by his side) began again, and uttered the following harsh and insulting words, which he seemed to address especially to Jezierski. At least, those who were present declare that he looked particularly at Jezierski as he pronounced them:—

‘But, above all, no dreams,’ said his Majesty; ‘I shall know how to restrain † those who give

* The late Prince Michael Gortchakoff, then Lieutenant-Governor of the kingdom of Poland.

† According to one version, ‘*je saurai sévir* ;’ according to another, ‘*je saurai contenir*,’ &c. I have adopted the milder of the two.

themselves up to them. . . . What my father did was well done, and I shall maintain it. My reign will be the continuation of his.'

This language chilled the heart of every Pole who heard it. The 'dreams' were indeed dispelled, and the nobility went away from Lazienki reflecting only that the reign of Alexander II. was to be a continuation of the odious reign of Nicholas I.

In the passage, 'what my father did was well done, and I shall maintain it,' the Emperor in all probability referred to the substitution of a Russian for a Polish administration in the Polish provinces incorporated with the Russian empire—a far more important, and for the Poles injurious, measure than the abolition of the constitution in the kingdom of Poland. In any case, the matter and the tone of the supplementary speech were such that they changed the loyalty of the listeners forthwith to disaffection. The new Sovereign had made a bad beginning with his Polish subjects. He had gone out of his way to offend them, and had wounded them at the very time when they seemed disposed to accept whatever he might have to

tural Society permission to discuss the peasant question.* In 1859, also, a new law on the subject of recruitment was published, and the system of conscription by designation was replaced (in the book of laws) by the French system of conscription by ballot.

A certain number of reforms, then, had really been introduced in Poland during the four years that followed the accession of the Emperor Alexander, and it is said to have been the intention of his Majesty to make some fresh concession every year to the Poles, and ultimately to replace them under a constitutional system. It was thought necessary, however, to postpone this last step until the settlement of the peasant question and the formation of provincial assemblies in Russia, as well as in Poland, had prepared the way for it; and it was considered of the highest importance that no rights or privileges should be given to

* The emancipation of the serfs had now been finally decided upon in Russia, and the Russian nobility in each province had already been invited to prepare detailed projects on the subject for presentation to the government.

the Poles which were not at the same time extended to the Russians.

I believe in all this, and in the general good intentions of the Russian government, from the accession of the present Emperor to the outbreak of the Polish insurrection. At the same time, if the Russian government is to be praised for having allowed an Agricultural Society to be established in Poland in 1858, it must be blamed for having dissolved it in 1861. If it was a meritorious act to introduce a new and equitable law of recruitment in 1859, it was a very culpable one to treat it as if it had never existed in 1863.

I once knew a man who reformed his habits very much as the Russian government reforms its laws. He drew up an elaborate programme of conduct, and posted it up in his bedroom, that he might think of it morning and night. According to this programme my friend was to rise in the summer at five. From five to six he was to take his bath, say his prayers, and dress; at six, coffee; from six to nine, original composition; from nine to ten, on horseback; from ten to half-past, break-

fast; from half-past ten to three, study—and so on throughout the day, and until eleven at night, when, according to the programme, he was to retire to rest. But if I called on this leader of a model life at eleven in the morning I generally found him in bed, and I never remember him studying anything except novels and his own costume. I do not know at what time he retired to rest, but I came across him now and then at one in the morning. Inconsiderate persons called this man an impostor, but when he drew up his programme he had every intention of observing it. The Russian government would also, I think, like to reform its laws; only unfortunately it has never had habits of legality, and seems incapable of making a fair beginning. It has introduced many good laws of late years both in Russia and in Poland, but it has never hesitated to violate them when it has suited its immediate purpose to do so.

In the meanwhile, putting written law on one side, the rule of Prince Gortchakoff, the Emperor's lieutenant in Poland, had really not been severe. Indeed, it had been unprecedentedly mild.

Moreover, there had been no recruitment since the Crimean war,* no one had been exiled, and when the demonstrations which ended in the insurrection of 1863 first began there was not a single political prisoner in the Warsaw citadel. I must also mention that the government had done away with the old restrictions on travelling, and had reduced the price of foreign passports from something like 600 or 700† roubles to 10 roubles. This induced a large number of Poles to visit foreign countries who under the old system would have been unable to leave Poland.

The Emperor Nicholas knew that if the Poles went abroad they would talk about their intolerable position, that they would meet with sympathy, and that they would come back exasperated more

* During the reign of the Emperor Nicholas there was a conscription or proscription every year; but as it was not followed by an armed insurrection it excited no interest in the West of Europe. The recruitment, however, was effected in a purely arbitrary manner; and every school-boy who distinguished himself by energy and ability was marked down for the army.

† It was difficult to get a passport for abroad at all, and most of the money paid for the privilege went in the shape of bribes to officials.

than ever at the recollection of their country's wrongs. There was, above all, the direct influence of the Polish emigration to fear. But in the present day if the Poles are prevented from travelling, how are the railways which connect Warsaw with Vienna and Berlin to pay their expenses? It must be a source of great annoyance to the Russian government to have the Poles on the western instead of the eastern frontier of the empire. But there they are, and it is really very difficult to connect Russia with the west of Europe and, at the same time, keep up a separation between the west of Europe and Poland.

Moreover, as it was the settled policy of the Emperor Nicholas to deprive the Poles of everything, and to keep them constantly guarded, and, as it were, imprisoned, it is impossible now to do them the slightest amount of good, to show them the slightest amount of mercy, without in the same measure strengthening them and enabling them to some extent to resist their oppressors. Poland during the reign of the Emperor Nicholas was in the position of a prisoner with both arms

chained. The present Emperor loosened one arm, upon which the prisoner, being a brave and desperate man, endeavoured to liberate himself altogether—at the risk of being half murdered and chained up again.

There had already been one unmistakeable ‘demonstration,’ in 1858 (on the occasion of Madame Sowinska’s funeral), when, in 1860, the Emperor Alexander paid a fifth visit to Warsaw, —not this time in order to meet the nobility of Poland, but for the purpose of holding council with the Emperor of Austria and the King of Prussia, in the capital of the country which Austria, Prussia, and Russia had dismembered. The object of the interview was supposed to be the formation of a league against France and against the Italy which had just been liberated.

This was more than the Poles could bear. All the principal families left Warsaw. Those who did not take their departure resolved not to show themselves at any entertainment that might

be got up by the Russians in honour of the allied Sovereigns; and ultimately the general feeling on the subject became so strong that before the chiefs of the partitioning powers arrived almost every noble family had gone away, and only the officials, the shopkeepers, the work-people, and generally those who were kept at Warsaw by their occupations remained.

At the theatre a 'gala representation' was given, when the after-piece announced was the ballet of *Robert and Bertrand, or the Two Thieves*.

'Those who go to the play to-night will see, not two thieves, but three,' was remarked, and the word 'three' was substituted for 'two' in the play-bills exhibited at the doors. The few Poles who attended the performance had their clothes burnt with vitriol, and the atmosphere of the theatre was rendered intolerable by means of *assafœtida*, offered by the students of the Medical School, in lieu of incense, to the allied Sovereigns. The Polish officials who attended the reception at the Belvidere Palace were hooted,

and even pelted. Finally, the imperial fêtes had their festive character so entirely spoilt that they were brought abruptly to a termination, and the three monarchs returned prematurely to their respective capitals.

This took place at the end of October ; and the success of the demonstration against the despotic trio had been so complete that it was resolved to repeat it in another form. Moreover, the liberation of Italy by means of France had now inspired the Poles with a belief that their turn would come next, and that Poland would ere long be helped to recover her freedom by the armies of Napoleon III.

The pupils of the School of Fine Arts organised a grand patriotic manifestation for November 29th, the anniversary of the outbreak which preceded the insurrection of 1830. An immense crowd assembled, a procession was formed, at the head of which standards exhibiting the white eagle of Poland were carried, the national hymn, *Boze cos Polske*, destined soon afterwards to acquire a world-wide celebrity, was sung in gene-

ral chorus ; and all this in open day, and in the principal streets of Warsaw. The troops did not interfere, but many arrests were made in the evening, and the lieutenant, Prince Gortchakoff, telegraphed to St. Petersburg for instructions.

‘Manifestations’ on a small scale now took place daily, and the Russians found themselves in a difficulty, which became greater and greater, until at last they stood face to face with armed insurrection. If they repressed the manifestations by force they excited general indignation, not only in Warsaw, but throughout Europe. On the other hand, if the manifestations were allowed to continue they grew and multiplied of themselves. The policy adopted by the government was, as far as possible, that of prevention. They stationed patrols of cavalry outside the churches, with orders to allow no processions to be formed ; and detachments of infantry were marched up and down the streets to keep the principal thoroughfares clear. ‘This display of force,’ says a Polish writer of the revolutionary party, ‘had a result which the authorities had not foreseen. The men of action who desired a conflict, and

also those who were in favour of merely pacific demonstrations, accustomed themselves to elbow the soldiers, and to be brushed against by the detachments of cavalry stationed in the streets—so much so that, after three months of these demonstrations on the part of the soldiers, the patriots resolved to celebrate February 25th, the anniversary of the battle of Grochow.*

We now come to events with which the English public are more familiar. The procession in honour of the battle of Grochow—the first great battle fought between the Polish insurgents of 1830 and the Russian troops—was dispersed by force. The accounts of this affair given by the Poles of the extreme party agree with those published by the Russians, and differ in some very important respects from the versions generally circulated in France and England. In the pamphlets published by the Poles of the moderate party, or by their friends and coadjutors abroad,

* *Précis Historique sur la Pologne, rédigé sur les Notes du Comte Ladislas Stroynowski. Genève, chez les principaux libraires.*

the Warsaw 'massacres,' of which that of February 25th, 1861, was the first, were unprovoked on-slaughts made by ferocious soldiers on harmless and unresisting crowds. This, however, is what I find on the subject in the memoirs of Count Stroynowski, already referred to above :—

'The patriots who carried the torches at the head of the column refused to withdraw ; they continued to advance, making use of the torches to keep off the horses of the gendarmerie and open a passage for the procession up to the Alexander Place. The troops then used their sabres ; the patriots fought as well as they could, some with the torches, others with the standards carried at the head of the procession—for none of them had arms. At the same time the crowd sang patriotic hymns. . . . The gendarmes urged their horses towards the people, but they could not be got to approach the torch-bearers. The torch-bearers occupied the first rank, and directed the flames towards the horses' nostrils, who thereupon either turned back or reared and threw their riders.'

When the torches went out the troops attacked

and sabred many persons in the crowd. A nominal list of the wounded was circulated in the town the next day. It was not asserted at the time that any one had been killed, though the affair of the 25th was afterwards spoken of and generally regarded as a 'massacre.'

On the 27th a funeral service was celebrated in the church of the Bernardins. A crowd had assembled outside, and was being watched by the troops, who did not know whether or not a demonstration was intended. This time there was no thought of provoking a conflict; but no sooner had the procession left the church to proceed to the cemetery than it was set upon and attacked by Cossacks. Then, as it did not break up, the Cossacks were called back and a detachment of infantry sent forward. The infantry loaded their muskets in presence of the people, and, without further warning, fired upon the unarmed crowd.

Five bodies were taken possession of by the Poles, and it was found that two members of the Agricultural Society, one workman, one student,

and one Jew had fallen. The Agricultural Society had taken no part in previous manifestations; but the fact that in the massacre of the 27th every class in Poland had lost one or more of its members made a deep impression in Warsaw, and it was resolved that the funeral of the victims should be attended by the population of the whole city.

The five bodies were carried to the Hôtel de l'Europe, and laid out in two adjoining rooms on the second floor. Some hours afterwards, in the middle of the night, a number of police agents, bringing with them five stretchers, came to the hotel. The officer who had charge of the party demanded admission, and stated that he had come to take away the bodies and have them buried. The door was not opened, and the officer was told, in answer to his summons, that the bodies would not be given up, and that the friends of the deceased would see to their interment. The officer demanded admission a second time, and receiving no reply, gave orders to break the door in. At that moment an aide-de-camp of Prince Gortchakoff arrived and informed the officer that the bodies were to be left at the hotel.

A deputation from the Agricultural Society having represented to Prince Gortchakoff that any attempt to stop the public funeral would inevitably be followed by grave disturbances, the Prince had telegraphed to St. Petersburg for instructions; and an answer had arrived in the middle of the night directing him to allow the funeral to take place.

Three days afterwards, March 2nd, every house in Warsaw was closed, and black cloth was hung before all those by which the funeral of the five victims was to pass. The clergy of all denominations, Catholic, Protestant, and Jewish, marched at the head of the procession, in which the whole population of Warsaw joined, and which extended from the Hôtel de l'Europe, in the heart of the city, to the cemetery beyond the barriers, a distance of nearly three miles. The ceremony lasted from eleven in the morning until late in the afternoon, and when the foremost of the mourners reached the cemetery, at two o'clock, the last in the long line had not yet left the town. The Russians had been assured that there should be

no disturbance, and all passed off in the greatest tranquillity. The Marquis Paulucci, who, during a long residence in Poland, had acquired a knowledge of the Polish character, asked, as a favour, that no speeches should be delivered over the graves of the victims. A promise to that effect was made to him, and he knew that it would be kept. He then said that he had with him his report already prepared, stating that the funeral had taken place in the most orderly manner, and that at the conclusion of the ceremony the people had quietly dispersed to their own homes. He asked whether he could sign it in all confidence, and was assured that he might do so. The marquis then left the cemetery, accompanied by his aides-de-camp, convinced that he could trust to the Poles, and that all danger for that day had passed.

A small knot of the extreme men among the party of action had advised that on the occasion of the funeral the population of Warsaw should provoke a conflict with the troops, who at that time numbered only 5,000 men. They argued

that the garrison of Warsaw would never be smaller than it was at that moment, and that, the funeral giving the population of a city of 150,000 inhabitants a pretext for appearing in a mass, advantage should be taken of it to disarm small bodies of soldiers, attack the others with the weapons thus procured, and, proceeding rapidly from one operation to another, rush to the citadel, and take it by a *coup de main*.

This proposition was scarcely less unreasonable than the project of insurrection executed two years afterwards, when the Russians had become infinitely stronger. But the troops were kept under arms all the day of the funeral, every preparation had been made at the citadel, and any attempt at a general rising would undoubtedly have been suppressed in the most bloody manner. Nevertheless, the 'moderate,' 'aristocratic,' 'reactionary' party are now reproached by the extreme party with having restrained the popular enthusiasm at a moment when, had it been allowed full play, it would (say the 'extremes') have carried everything before it. The fact is, the moderate party wished to avoid

an appeal to arms in January 1863, as well as in March 1861. In reference to that point its views did not change; but, at last, circumstances became too strong for it and forced it into the insurrection in spite of itself.

CHAPTER IV.

LIFE AND DEATH OF THE AGRICULTURAL SOCIETY.

AN Agricultural Society can have no political importance in countries like England, where there is a Parliament. Neither can it in countries like Russia, where neither Parliament nor Parliamentary traditions exist. But the Poles had a representative government and enjoyed habits of free discussion for eight centuries before the destruction of their country by the surrounding despotisms; and it is only since 1830 that the little kingdom of 1815 has been altogether deprived of its constitutional rights. Accordingly, the passion for political life is so strong in Poland that every assembly of Poles, for whatever purpose formed, is sure, sooner or later, to assume a political character. Such was the fate of the Agricultural Society of the kingdom of Poland—and this in spite of the care

with which some of the principal members endeavoured to guard against the danger, knowing, as they did, that it had only to go a step beyond the sphere assigned to it to be at once dissolved.

Count Andrew Zamoyiski had long wished to form an Agricultural Society, and when, on the representation of M. Muchanoff, the Minister of the Interior, permission to establish one was obtained, the nucleus of it already existed in the shape of a committee of shareholders directing an agricultural review. This review had been started by some of the principal proprietors of the kingdom, and was edited by Count Andrew Zamoyiski and M. Louis Gorski. Its directors invited fifty proprietors, and among them the Marquis Wielopolski, to join them in forming a new committee. On the day fixed for the first meeting the marquis did not appear, but sent his son, Count Sigismund, to take his place. The other proprietors were offended at this. They refused to receive the son in lieu of the father, and neither of the Wielopolskis took part in the founding of the Agricultural Society.

The meeting elected sixteen of those present to form the committee of the Agricultural Society, with Count Andrew Zamoyski as President, and M. Ostrowski as Vice-President. All proprietors, great and small, could become members on payment of an annual subscription of 100 Polish florins (2*l.* 10*s.*). Before long the number of members amounted to as many as 4,000, and the Society acquired a peculiarly national character from the presence at its annual meetings of delegates from the Agricultural Societies of Lemberg, Cracow, and Poſen.*

The Society was divided into sections, on one of which devolved the task of awarding premiums, while another discussed and prepared reports on the breeding of cattle, a third devoting itself to the consideration of farming operations in general, and so on. From the year 1859 one section occupied itself specially with the condition of the peasants, and with plans for the conversion of

* In 1860 there was a fair prospect of an Agricultural Society being established at Wilna. This seems little enough to us, but it would have been a great deal to the Poles of Lithuania, to whom every kind of national institution had long been denied.

their dues, payable in labour, and to a certain extent in produce, into rent. The meetings of sections took place in the morning, and the general meetings, when the reports of the sections were brought up, in the evening.

The committee, the governing body of the Society, had eighty-six correspondents in the various districts into which the kingdom of Poland is divided. These correspondents were elected in the localities to which they belonged, and it was their duty, each in his own district, to carry out the instructions and communicate the general notifications received from Warsaw.

The scheme for endowing the peasants with their plots of land, which has often been spoken of as the great work of the Agricultural Society, was not brought forward by the committee, who were for the most part opposed to it, nor by the President, who was notoriously opposed to it; which, however, did not prevent his being a liberal and enterprising landlord. But the aim of Count Andrew Zamoyiski was not to cover his estate with a number of petty freeholders, un-

able, from want of capital, to improve or even keep up the cultivation of their land, and very likely at the first opportunity to sell it to the Jews or to German speculators: his object was to encourage as much as possible the formation of a good class of farmers; and with this view he had divided nearly the whole of his estate, on the English system, into large farms, and leased them to the peasants on very easy terms. For this Count Andrew Zamoyski has been called an Anglo-maniac by those who know some little about England, and a 'feudalist' by those who know nothing about the feudal system. Suffice it to say that he did not recognise any absolute right of property on the part of the peasant in the land assigned to him on condition of his working for it or paying rent; that he thought it unjust and inexpedient to make over the land to him as a gift; and that he considered it undesirable, moreover, under any circumstances to increase the number of penurious peasant proprietors.

Doubtless Count Andrew Zamoyski was right in the abstract. He may have been right, too, in

all respects, in an agricultural, and yet wrong in a political, point of view; for, however weak the claim the peasant of Poland may have to the peasant-land cultivated by him and by his ancestors for centuries, it is quite certain that he holds to this claim, and that it has suited the Prussian and Austrian governments to allow it in Posen and Galicia. Accordingly, however fatal such an arrangement might be to the introduction of the English system of farming (of which the Marquis Wielopolski, as well as Count Andrew Zamoyaki, was a warm partisan), it might yet be highly politic to conciliate by far the most numerous class of the population by making over to them, on easy conditions, the land which, rightly or wrongly, they regard as their natural inheritance.

Many of the Polish proprietors, and the great majority of the Poles as a nation, are convinced that the Diet made a great mistake in not solving this question of the peasant's property-right in his plot of land in 1830-31, when the Poles had their country to themselves; and it was Count Thomas Potocki, one of the heroes of the 1830

war, who proposed a solution of it to the Agricultural Society in 1861. Count Thomas Potocki (a brother-in-law, by the way, of the Marquis Wielopolski) was only a private member of the Society : but, from his age, his personal character, his services to his country, and his reputation as a political writer, his opinion carried particular weight. The veteran, who had received fourteen wounds at the battle of Grochow, and had recovered from them, was now suffering from an incurable spinal complaint, under which he soon afterwards sank. He spoke without rising from his seat, and, using the arguments already familiar to the readers of his 'Evenings at Carlsbad,' showed that the 'peasant question' was the most important of all questions in Poland, and that the interest of the peasant was the interest of the whole country. Finally, he proposed a resolution, approving the endowment of the peasants with the portions of land for which they had, until that time, performed task-work or paid rent; the proprietors to be indemnified by letters of credit from the Polish Landed Bank, to the extent of four-fifths of the land thus ceded, and the peasants to contribute towards a special redemption

fund, in connexion with this bank, by a series of payments extending over a term of years.

The Agricultural Society had, of course, no power to make laws on this or any other subject; and its opinion, however formally expressed, would have had no more value than that of a debating club, had it not been for the fact that here was a body of landowners agreeing to a solution of a great social question by which landowners alone were to lose. They did not, however, and could not, bind themselves to carry out their decision, which was only important in so far that it might be looked upon as an express invitation to the government to adopt it as the basis of a legal enactment. In point of fact, the resolution passed by the Agricultural Society led to nothing. Its observance by the whole body of proprietors could not be enforced, and individual proprietors did not care to make sacrifices for the good of the peasants without being sure that they would be made generally. The resolution on the peasant question was adopted on February 21st.*

* According to Prince Czartoryski (*Statement of Polish Affairs*, etc., 1863-4), it was adopted on the 20th, the day

On the 25th the Agricultural Society was still sitting, when the first collision between the people and the troops took place.

The same evening eight members were appointed to prepare an address to the Emperor on the state of affairs.

The day afterwards general mourning was decided upon — no one can say by whom; but it was generally adopted. To enrage the Agricultural Society, and draw it into the movement which now, under the direction of the extreme party, was becoming more important every day, a report was industriously spread that the Emperor was about to thank it for having taken no part in the patriotic demonstration of the 25th. The notion that, in the form of a compliment, a reflection on their patriotism was about to be addressed to them so stung the members that many of them resolved to show at once whether on which the public proceedings for the year commenced; according to L. Stroynowski, on the 27th, the day on which they were closed; according to the Russian author of *Fictions et Réalités Polonaises*, on the 5th March. It was adopted on the 21st February, new style, which the Russian author has mistaken for the 21st February, old style.

they were really loyal to their country or to the foreign power by which it was ruled. The false rumour had the desired effect, and made the Agricultural Society much more inclined than it had previously been to look with favour upon street demonstrations.

On the 26th, the day on which the word passed through the town, as if by electricity, that mourning was to be adopted, two men stationed themselves on the staircase of the Agricultural Society's Hall, stopped every member or visitor as he went out, took his hat from him, and brushed it the wrong way. This was understood to signify mourning on the part of the men. As for the women, they dressed entirely in black—wearing nothing else for nearly three years, until at last, at the end of 1863, they were compelled by brute force to adopt colours.

The unanimity of all Poles capable of national feeling of any kind in presence of the acts of ferocity* committed by the Russians was shown

* It is only fair, however, to explain that these acts were not worse than those committed under similar circumstances

not only in the adoption of mourning, but also in the wearing of Polish mementoes, the abandonment of dancing and of public amusements of all kinds, and in the crowded attendance at the churches whenever a service was to be performed in honour of some Polish patriot, or in commemoration of some great day in the history of Poland. If all this was contrived by the men who aimed only at bringing about an appeal to arms, it was certainly contrived most cunningly. Not only the national sentiment in general, but the actual disposition of the national mind at that particular time was appealed to in a manner that could not fail to elicit a response. Every one was sad and wanted to wear mourning. No one wanted to dance or to go to the theatre. There was a general presentiment of a coming crisis, and the churches were attended quite naturally by many persons who at less solemn times did not go to church at all. Finally, the patriotic hymns were the prayers specially suited for such a period of trial.

by French, Russian, and Austrian troops. The military and despotic governments of Europe have only one way of dispersing a crowd that refuses to move.

Millions of sincere Poles prayed, sang, dressed in black, and abstained from all amusement, without any precise thought as to what all this was to lead to. But others knew, and had carefully reckoned that if the Polish ladies wore nothing but mourning, and lived economically in other respects, avoiding parties, theatres, and all entertainments, then immense sums of money would be saved, which their husbands would be able to give towards the expenses of the meditated insurrection.

The black clothes, moreover, the crucifixes, the symbolical chains worn as the only appropriate ornaments for the wives and mothers of Poland, the solemn religious services for those who in former contests had died for their country, the plaintive and touching hymn sung on all possible occasions, with its refrain—

Deign, O Lord, to give us back our free country—

could not the effect of this on the most impressionable people in Europe be calculated—a people who, with all their levity, have certainly the most intolerable grievances to complain of; grievances so hard to bear that even those of their

friends who blame them the most severely for not supporting them would perhaps after all, think worse of them if they did so for any length of time?

That there might be no mistake as to the feeling of the Polish aristocracy on the subject of the demonstrations, and the manner in which that of the 25th had been put an end to, the Marshals of the Nobility* waited upon Prince Gortchakoff to protest against the violence of the troops. On their return they were sharply attacked for not having profited by the occasion to say a great deal more. In consequence of these reproaches the Marshals wished to resign,

* ' Marshal of the Nobility ' is a Russian office instituted by the Empress Catherine, through the charter which first settled the position of the Russian nobility and recognised their titles to the hereditary possession of their estates. The Marshals have the right of representing to the Sovereign the wants of the nobles of their province or district ; but they are exiled or imprisoned if they exercise it (as in the case of the Marshal of Tver in 1859, the Marshal of a district in Mohilew in 1861, and all the Marshals of Podolia in 1862). The office of Marshal was introduced into the kingdom of Poland by the Emperor Nicholas ; with what object is not very clear.

but they were requested by their constituents, and ultimately consented, to retain their offices.

I cannot but admire the Polish nobility resolving in a serious and dignified manner to call Prince Gortchakoff to account for the violence committed by his troops, just when the Russians were flattering themselves that the street demonstrations were of no importance, because they were not supported by the very class which immediately afterwards protested solemnly against the Russian mode of dispersing them. But Poland resents every cruelty or injustice that may be practised on a Pole, whether it be a workman shot in a demonstration, or a prelate sentenced to death for defending the sanctity of his church against the inroads of the Russian soldiery, or a nobleman sent into exile because he is felt to be in the way. Not many months after the first attack on the people at Warsaw the university students at Moscow were treated as barbarously as the Poles, and upon infinitely less provocation—in fact upon no provocation whatever; but no Russian in any official capacity had a word to say against the young men being sabred by cavalry and gendarmes when they had

simply gone in a body (and in the most orderly manner) to submit a petition to the governor-general, which the governor-general had consented beforehand to receive. The Moscow Marshal could not be prevailed upon to transmit to the Emperor the remonstrances of those members of the Moscow nobility who, as students, had come in for their share of the outrages, and had been either wounded by the soldiers or violently beaten by the police.

So that the Pole, with all his wrongs and all his sufferings, is still a freer man than the Russian. His soul is free, and in certain supreme cases he will, without reference to the innumerable *ukazes* and *prikazes* directed against him, do what in accordance with his liberal traditions of a thousand years he feels to be just and proper. The Russian, on the other hand, feeling that in his country there is not and never has been any such thing as legality, dares not and, morally speaking, cannot take his stand even upon such rights as are plainly given to him by the written law.*

* I know as well as any one that there are exceptions to this rule; but they are rare; and those Russians who, in

On the 27th, at mid-day, while the commotion was taking place which ended in the slaughter of five unarmed persons, the proceedings of the Agricultural Society were brought to a close.

The same day the eight members of the Society commissioned to prepare the address to the Emperor met, for that purpose, the principal members of the municipality, the heads of the clergy of all denominations, and other notabilities of the capital. Permission having been obtained from Prince Gortchakoff to send the address to St. Petersburg, it was drawn up and signed on the 1st of March. It asked for nothing, but simply set forth that 'a nation which had been governed for centuries by liberal institutions had for the last thirty years endured the most cruel sufferings, and, being deprived of every legal means of laying its grievances and wants at the foot of the throne, was reduced by violence to make its voice heard through the cries of martyrs sacrificed daily in the cause of patriotism.' 'A country once on a level with the civilisation of its Christ-dealing with the government, stand upon their rights are treated in a manner not calculated to encourage other Russians to do the same.

tian neighbours cannot,' continued the address, 'grow morally or materially, so long as its church, its legislation, its public instruction, and its whole social organisation are forcibly subjected to foreign innovation, and withdrawn from the national influence.'

Some members of the extreme party were of opinion that the address should have contained explicit demands, and that it ought to have been presented as coming not from the kingdom of Poland alone, but from Russian Poland in general. To send such an address, however, would have been as useless as it afterwards was to draw up the celebrated one entrusted to Count Andrew Zamoyski, which, though never presented, is known to have contained a demand for the annexation of the Russo-Polish provinces to the Polish kingdom.

The Marquis Wielopolski, on his side, was also in favour of explicit, but at the same time moderate and, so to say, legal demands. Already in 1860 he had prepared an address, in which the re-estab-

lishment of the constitution of 1815 was expressly petitioned for. After the withdrawal of this constitution the Emperor Nicholas had published an 'Organic Statute,' which, however, was not put in action; and the marquis is understood to have suggested that the constitution of 1815, having never been replaced in practice by the statute intended to supersede it, might still, though in abeyance, be regarded as the law of the country. Count Thomas Potocki, at whose house the delegates charged with the preparation of an address to the Emperor met, had too much political discernment not to recommend the adoption of the one already drawn up by the Marquis Wielopolski. Here something positive was petitioned for, something that there was a chance of the Emperor's granting; something, moreover, that the constantly increasing constitutional party in Russia would at that time have been delighted to see granted. It was rejected, however, partly because it expressed regret for the insurrection of 1830, and partly also because it made no mention of the Polish provinces incorporated with the Russian empire, which since the insurrection of 1830 had been

governed as belonging, in a national as well as in a political sense, not to Poland, but to Russia.

Ultimately the vague complaint, the petition without a prayer drawn up and signed by the deputies from the Agricultural Society, by the Catholic Archbishop, the President of the Evangelical Consistory, the Chief Rabbi, and all the principal men of Warsaw, signed also by hundreds of private persons of all classes,* was forwarded, on the part of the whole nation, to St. Petersburg.

The Emperor replied that the address proceeded from 'a few individuals,' and that he ought to treat it as if it had never existed. Nevertheless, he promised certain reforms, and Prince Gortchakoff, the Foreign Minister, despatched a circular to the various foreign governments explaining in detail what they were to be. It may be stated briefly that they included the formation of a Polish Council of State and of elective district and municipal councils. About the same time the Marquis Wielopolski was appointed Minister of

* Copies of the address, after the original had been sent to St. Petersburg, were signed by tens of thousands.

Worship and Public Instruction, and also Minister of the Interior. As for the Agricultural Society, it was dissolved, and its dissolution was attributed by public opinion to the agency of the Marquis Wielopolski, who was reported to have said that, having gone quite beyond its sphere, it had now become an *imperium in imperio*, and as such could no longer be allowed to exist. This, however, was mere supposition.

The address to the Emperor had nothing to do with the dissolution of the Society, as the address was not the exclusive production of that body, nor adopted and signed until after its debates had been closed. The resolution on the peasant question, *per se*, had also nothing to do with it. An official document was published, assigning as the cause of the dissolution the impossibility of permitting such an organisation to exist and exercise pressure during the approaching elections of members for the newly-constituted district and municipal councils. This in itself was a fair excuse; but there were two other reasons, not mentioned in the published justification, which had very great weight in deciding the fate of the Agricultural Society.

1. The committee of the Society had published and printed circular instructions to their correspondents in the country (eighty-six in number), commenting on the resolution passed, and desiring agents and members to impress the peasants with a due sense of the benefits to accrue to them from this new measure. The priests were to assist in this work.

2. The members of the Society had met in their various districts, and had elected new correspondents or agents of the central board, and these elections had resulted, as the government well knew, in favour of persons far more advanced,* in their opinions, than the former correspondents.

The dissolution of the Agricultural Society (April 6th) caused great indignation at Warsaw; and no sooner did the news become generally

* Let me once more explain that I never knew a Pole who did not hate the Russian government. But some thought that it was impossible to attack it with advantage; others thought that for the present it was impossible to do so; others, again, thought that everything ought to be sacrificed merely on the chance of being able to overturn it. This last was a very 'advanced' opinion.

known than (April 7th) an immense number of persons went in a body to Count Andrew Zamoy-ski's house to make a formal protest against it. From Count Zamoy-ski's the crowd proceeded to the hall of the Society, and covered it with mortuary garlands.

Prince Gortchakoff had already been enjoined from St. Petersburg to tolerate no further disorders, and at a council of war held on the morning of the 7th it had been decided, in case of fresh demonstrations taking place, to fire on the people. The Prince, however, was still unwilling to adopt this cruel measure. When the demonstration of the 7th was at its height he called upon the crowd to 'go home.' Some of the leaders replied that it was for him and his Russians to 'go home,' for that they as Poles were at home already. This argument—which, like a great many other Polish arguments, though true in the abstract, was by no means to the point—met with great success; and, as the Russians still did not fire, the demonstrations lasted some considerable time.

The Emperor's contemptuous reply to the very moderate address forwarded to his Majesty by the

principal persons in Warsaw had no doubt a great effect in increasing the irritation caused by the dissolution of the Agricultural Society, and which again manifested itself on April 8th. On that day an immense mass of persons went, with national banners and with various religious emblems, to the graves of the men who had fallen in the massacre of February 27th. The procession, after leaving the cemetery, made its way to the Sigismund Square, and there stationed itself in front of the palace occupied by the Imperial Lieutenant. The national hymn was sung; newspapers containing the Emperor's reply to the Warsaw address were burned; the crowd, summoned by several officers and called upon and entreated by Prince Gortchakoff himself to withdraw, refused to move; and, ultimately, when full warning had been given—but also when no act of violence had been committed—the Russians fired upon the unarmed people, and from time to time renewed the slaughter until at last the square was evacuated. On this, as on so many other occasions of the same kind, the utmost fortitude was displayed by the Poles. Very few left the square in obedience

to the summons of the Russian officers. The vast majority remained, knelt down, and sang the patriotic hymn. The leaders of the manifestations exhorted the timid to be firm, and here and there joined hands to prevent their departure. Some were actually attracted to the spot by the first discharge. Among others, a Jewish student named Landé joined the crowd after the firing had begun, and was raising a wounded man * from the ground when he was himself struck to the heart. Thus the people of Warsaw protested with terrible earnestness against the dominion of Russia in Poland.

This was the third, the most bloody, and also the last of the massacres committed in Warsaw during the stormy period which preceded the insurrection of 1863. For five weeks before, from March 2nd until April 7th, the city had been given up entirely to the Poles, and order had been preserved by the exertions of a body of Polish special constables. But tranquillity had prevailed

* This man is said by some to have been a priest; by others (whom I believe to be better informed), a leading member of the party of action disguised as a priest.

in consequence, above all, of a general belief that the Emperor of Russia would make important concessions to Poland. When his Majesty's answer to the address was received, and the order destroying the Agricultural Society was made known, the demonstrations began again in full force, and it was impossible now to persuade the party of action that anything was to be gained by remaining quiet and laying the grievances of the nation before the Emperor. The moderate party lost all influence, and the first result of the renewed agitation was the massacre of April 8th, and a renewed occupation of the streets of Warsaw by Russian troops, whose numbers had now been increased from 5,000 to 13,000.

The general who at the battle of the Alma had led in person the charge of the Vladimir regiment, which lost 48 officers and 1,300 men* in the course of the action, and who at Warsaw had ordered his soldiers to fire volley after volley upon an unarmed, unresisting crowd, did not long survive his disgrace. The grief which had preyed upon Prince Gortchakoff was visible in his last

* Todleben's *History of the Crimean War*.

instructions. He gave orders on his death-bed that his body should be carried from Warsaw, and buried in the town of Sebastopol, which he had defended to the last extremity, and where it would have been well for him had he fallen. He lived to be placed in a position which no man of honour could occupy with advantage, and where the Russians charge him with having invited a revolt by his excessive mildness, while the Poles accuse him of having provoked it by his harshness and cruelty.

CHAPTER V.

THE ARRIVAL OF THE GRAND DUKE CONSTANTINE
AND THE EXILE OF COUNT ANDREW ZAMOYSKI.

PRINCE GORTCHAKOFF was succeeded at Warsaw by General Soukhozanet, who was succeeded by Count Lambert, who was succeeded by General Luders, who was succeeded by the Grand Duke Constantine. Before Count Lambert's nomination, and immediately after the communication of the Emperor's reply to the Warsaw address, the division between the two parties, the moderate and the extreme—otherwise, in common parlance, the white and the red—had become more clearly marked than ever, and the publication of all the details of the project of reform, by which the arrival of Count Lambert was heralded, gave rise to an animated discussion between them. *What am I to do with these Concessions?* was the title of a pamphlet issued from the secret press of the

'reds,' in which it was maintained that the concessions already granted amounted to nothing, and, moreover, that no concessions ought to be accepted for the kingdom of Poland which were not at the same time extended to the Polish provinces incorporated with the Russian empire. The 'whites,' on the other hand, argued in their clandestine journal, the 'Watchman' ('Strajnica'), that, such as they were, the reforms or concessions offered to the kingdom of Poland ought not to be rejected. The result of the discussion was that the elections for the district and municipal councils took place. The extremest of the extreme party protested in vain. They even sought to intimidate the electors, and at Warsaw it was only through the exertions of 'Lelewel'*—a man of action, but also a man of sense—that the voting could be proceeded with. 'Lelewel' was present, with some hundreds of the men who were afterwards to form his insurgent band, and it was they, under his direction, who kept order in the crowd and restrained the more violent and precipitate of the 'action' party.

* i. e. Borelowaki, the iron-worker.

The following were now the views of the four parties or sections of parties in Warsaw :—

1. The men who wished to hasten the insurrection, and who thought it had already been too long delayed, regarded the concessions made by Russia as unsatisfactory, and indeed as illusory, and not worthy even to be taken into consideration.

2. The men who were preparing for the insurrection, but who also did not wish to be premature in resorting to arms, regarded the concessions as unimportant, though, at the same time, they thought it their duty not to separate from the moderate party.

3. The plan of the moderate party consisted in accepting whatever little reforms the Russians could be got to yield, and in pressing them continually to yield more and more.

4. The Wielopolski party was still very small, but there were a certain number of men, chiefly among the large landed proprietors, who really believed in the utility of the new reforms, and were opposed to all agitation in favour of further concessions, at least for the present, as useless and, moreover, dangerous.

The municipal elections took place at Warsaw on September 22, 1861. Men of all classes and conditions were chosen, from Count Andrew Zamoyski to Hiszpanski,* the bootmaker. So far the counsels of the moderate party had prevailed, though no sooner had the municipal councillors been chosen than a protest, drawn up by the extreme party, and setting forth that the slight reforms granted by the Emperor to the kingdom of Poland alone were insufficient, was handed to Count Andrew Zamoyski by the student Leon Frankowski. The demonstrations—sure, sooner or later, to lead to another collision— recommenced immediately afterwards. On October 10th the union between Poland, Lithuania, and Ruthenia † was celebrated at Horodlo, on the

* Hiszpanski was highly esteemed as an honest man, a good bootmaker, and an exile who had suffered in Siberia under the Emperor Nicholas. When I was in Warsaw for the first time, in 1861, Hiszpanski had many Russian officers among his customers. It was considered 'liberal' to buy boots at his establishment.

† 'Ruthenia' is the name given by the Poles to the south-eastern division of ancient Poland and south-western of modern Russia, comprising the provinces of Volhynia, Podolia, and Kieff, in which the peasant population is

Bug, by an immense concourse of persons from all parts of the territory of the old Polish republic.

At the same time the manifestations began again in Warsaw. The state of siege was proclaimed. The day afterwards, October 15th, religious services were performed in the principal churches of the city in memory of Kosciuszko. The government had forbidden the celebration, and at ten o'clock, mass having been commenced, the churches were surrounded by troops. Eighteen hours afterwards, during which time a strict siege had been maintained, the soldiers, at four in the morning, entered the churches, seized several thousand persons, and carried them off to the citadel.

‘The deeds of profanation committed yester-

Ruthenian, or, ethnologically speaking, Russian—but not Great Russian, or ‘Muscovite.’ Lithuania is the north-eastern division of ancient Poland and north-western of modern Russia, comprising the provinces of Wilna, Kovno, Grodno, Minsk, Mohilew, and Witepsk. In Lithuania the peasant population is Ruthenian, mixed with Lithuanian. But the civilisation of both Lithuania and Ruthenia is entirely Polish—as that of Brittany is French, that of Wales English.

day,' said the Vicar-General of the diocese, the day following, in a letter to the Emperor's lieutenant, 'have filled the inhabitants of the entire country, to whatever religious denomination they belong, with indignation and horror. *Acts such as these are beyond the reach of language, and carry us back to the times of Attila.*'

It would be impossible to characterise the conduct of the Russians on this occasion more justly than in the words of the Vicar-General. To mark their sense of the outrage that had been committed, and to guard against the possibility of its being repeated, the Consistory ordered that every church in Warsaw should be closed. The Russian government replied, in its own peculiar style, by sentencing the Vicar-General (Bialobrzewski) to death. His punishment was afterwards commuted to imprisonment in Siberia. After the arrival of the Grand Duke Constantine in Warsaw, as the Emperor's lieutenant, he was recalled from Siberia; and he was again arrested and imprisoned by General Berg after the Grand Duke's departure. By what law he was sentenced to

death, by what law exiled, by what law re-imprisoned after his return from exile, it would be difficult to say.

In the meanwhile Count Lambert, himself a catholic, had had a violent altercation with General Gerstenschewig, the military commandant, by whose directions the churches had been besieged, invaded, and cleared. The end of the dispute—as to the exact nature of which very little is known—was that General Gerstenschewig blew his brains out. Count Lambert went away from Warsaw, and even from Europe, and General Luders was nominated in his place.

The reds had now their regular organisation, as well as the whites. The organisation of the white party was based on that of the late Agricultural Society. It had groups of members among the landed proprietors of every district in the kingdom, and its affairs were directed by a committee of three, sitting at Warsaw. This party had already considerable funds at its disposal, including the subscriptions received from the members of the Agricultural Society, the proceeds of various collections made after religious

celebrations in the churches at Warsaw and in the provinces, as well as contributions from other sources.

It was not until after the municipal elections, and the triumph of the moderate party, that the extreme men of the party of action resolved to count their forces, to appoint leaders, to levy taxes, and to establish a national directing committee, which ultimately undertook, and really performed, the functions of a regular government. The first meeting of the chiefs of this party had been fixed for October 15, 1861, the very day on which the churches were besieged. The chiefs were to have assembled at the Leipsic Hotel at twelve o'clock, immediately after the service in memory of Kosciuszko. When the time came very few of them arrived, the others being shut up in the churches, whence they were conducted the next morning to the citadel. Of the three or four thousand persons arrested, however, the greater number, including all the women, were set free the same morning. Many of the others were let out after a short detention, and on the evening of the 17th the meeting at the Leipsic Hotel took

place in the rooms of Count Ladislas Stroynowski, and was attended by eighteen of the most energetic members of the party of action. Among those present who afterwards played a prominent part in the insurrection I may mention Leon Frankowski, one of the first chiefs captured and executed by the Russians, and Stephen Bobrowski, who signed with his own name the first proclamation issued by the national government after the defeat of Langiewicz, and who soon afterwards fell in a duel, of which the nomination of Langiewicz to the dictatorship was the cause.

At the meeting of October 7, 1861, it was resolved to organise a 'national committee,' which was the origin of the 'Central National Committee,' which, after the appeal to arms, united with the directing committee of the moderate or 'white' party, out of which combination the first 'national government' was formed. A plan was drawn up in writing, in which it was specified that the committee should be divided into three sections—one for the propagation of patriotic ideas, and for making known the general decisions of the committee; a second for financial matters, and

for the preparation of circulars and addresses; a third for enrolling and arming intending combatants. Each of these sections was directed by a chief, to whom an assistant was attached, capable, if necessary, of replacing him.

The first section started a secret journal called the 'Awakening,' which, in spite of the efforts of the police to stop it, found its way into all the towns and even villages in the kingdom.

The second section collected subscriptions, and sent out stamped papers asking for them in the name of the National Committee. The stamp (which was afterwards adopted by the National Government) displayed the arms of the ancient Polish republic; the White Eagle of Poland and the Horseman of Lithuania appearing side by side. It was not until after the insurrection that a third shield was added between the two others, representing St. George of Ruthenia.*

* There are several millions of Ruthenian peasants (i. e. of the Russian, but not of the Great-Russian or Muscovite race) in Lithuania, and also in the eastern portion of Galicia, and in Hungary. But what the Poles in the present day generally understand by 'Ruthenia' is (as I have before observed) the three south-eastern provinces of ancient Poland or south-western provinces of modern Russia, i. e. Volhynia, Podolia, and Kieff.

The third section did what it could in the way of making enlistments for the bands and arranging for the purchase of arms, which, for the most part, had to be ordered from abroad.

On October 17, 1861, when the formation of the National Committee was first decided upon, the party of action, which the committee was to represent, had only a sum of from five to six hundred pounds at its disposal. Of this, a little more than half had been collected after a religious service ordered by some government officials * in memory of those who fell in the massacres, and the remainder after two similar services ordered respectively by the association of hackney-coachmen and the association of house porters. The Polish insurrection of 1863 has been called an aristocratic movement; but the porters and cab-drivers of Warsaw were getting up subscriptions in furtherance of the insurrection at a time when the pru-

* I need scarcely say that these officials were Poles. The administration in the kingdom of Poland has always been Polish, as regards the persons employed; and this (except indeed in the superior offices) even when Polish had ceased to be the official language.

dent landed proprietors were doing all in their power to stop it.

When the financial section had once commenced its labours, money soon came in; and after some months' propagandism, in the month of May 1862, the National Committee felt itself in a position to impose a general tax, payable in the month of November—when it was in fact levied.

In the meanwhile, the members of sections had met from time to time to report progress to the chiefs and sub-chiefs remaining at Warsaw. At the first meeting of all—on the evening of October 17th, or rather morning of the 18th, 1861—it had been decided that two months afterwards a second general meeting should be held; and on December 18th the eighteen members of the National Committee re-assembled at a house close to the terminus of the Warsaw and Cracow Railway. From the reports of the delegates sent into the provinces, it appeared that no further propagandism was required in the 'kingdom,' where, according to general testimony, public opinion was everywhere prepared for the insurrection. In the early part of the year 1862 provincial committees

were formed in communication with and under the direction of the National Committee, which then became in fact the 'Central National Committee.' It adopted this name in the month of October; or rather in that month the 'National Committee' was dissolved and a 'Central National Committee' reorganised in its place, and on a wider basis.

As soon as the National Committee issued its stamped papers summoning all Poles to recognise its authority and contribute by payment of a fixed tax to the expenses of the coming insurrection (end of May and beginning of June 1862), the Russian Government, which had made no recruitment since the year 1856, resolved to execute a forced levy and to carry off to the army all Poles suspected of being implicated in the conspiracy which evidently existed, though the police were quite unable to discover the chiefs or indeed to gain precise information of any kind respecting it.

Leon Frankowski, the most active of all the revolutionary agents, and a Swiss named Baume-gard, governor of the young Count Starzynski,

now made it their special business to warn the country of the danger which menaced it, and of which information had been conveyed to the committee through a secret channel. According to some members of the committee, the only way to escape the blow was to take up arms before it could be struck; and it was decided that in any case the execution of the forced recruitment must be regarded as the signal for a general rising. These views were expressed in a short paper entitled 'National Appeal,' which bore the stamp of the Warsaw Committee, and was circulated throughout Poland.

The police did their utmost to discover the authors, printers, and distributors of this warlike summons, and somehow or other got on the track of Baumegard, who was staying with Count Starzynski at Hrubieszow. Officers and soldiers had entered the place and were about to seize him, when the young Count, who was much attached to his tutor, drew a revolver and shot down three of the party. During the confusion produced by this sudden and vigorous attack, the Count urged and entreated Baumegard to make

his escape, but in vain. Baumegard, from a feeling of personal dignity, would not leave the young man. Then, seeing there was no hope either for himself or for his tutor, Starzynski, in despair, blew his brains out. Baumegard was arrested, marched off, and thrown into the citadel.

That same summer the fortress of Modlin is said to have been nearly falling into the hands of the intending insurgents. It contained an immense quantity of arms and ammunition, and if the leaders of the extreme party could have gained possession of the place, the signal of the insurrection would have been given at once.

One thing is certain, that a conspiracy of some kind was discovered among the officers of the garrison, and that two of them, Arnold and Sliwicki (one a Finlander, the other a Pole), together with a Polish non-commissioned officer, were shot. A large number of officers and sub-officers, concerned or suspected of being concerned in the plot, were sent to Siberia.

Immediately after the executions, General Luders, commander-in-chief of the army, and acting for the time as lieutenant of the kingdom,

was fired at and wounded, the ball shattering his jaw in the most horrible manner. The period of assassination had now begun. Not only were spies and officials who had rendered themselves odious in the discharge of their functions stabbed openly in the streets, but when the Grand Duke Constantine arrived in Warsaw, on what was known to be a mission of pacification, a poor fanatic who had placed himself at the service of a clique of unscrupulous revolutionists was put forward to take his life, and succeeded in wounding him with a pistol shot. The fanatic, Jaroszinski by name, did not attempt to escape, nor did he for one moment deny what he had done. He was hanged, though the Grand Duke is said to have been personally desirous that the capital sentence should be commuted.

It was mentioned in favour of Jaroszinski, that he abstained from firing on the Grand Duke on the occasion of his entry into Warsaw, out of consideration for the Grand Duchess, who was with her husband in the same carriage. The man seemed to be inspired by no feeling of hatred ; but he had asked in what manner he could best serve

his country, and his criminal advisers had replied, that he must shoot the Grand Duke Constantine—who had come to Warsaw to re-establish the university, which had been closed for thirty years, to increase the number of gymnasiums in the kingdom from five to thirteen, to found schools for the peasantry, to restore publicity of trial in the tribunals, and to apply the principle of autonomy so strictly in the administration, that not one Russian was allowed to remain a member of it. The whole administration was not, it is true, changed from Russian to Polish, for it was almost entirely Polish before; but three Russians acting as civil governors were replaced by Poles, and about eighty such changes were made in minor offices.

The kingdom of Poland is rich in functionaries, and possesses, according to the official *Year-Book*, upwards of 7,000. The entire number, however, counting clerks not recognised as belonging to the public service, amounts to about 11,000, and nearly all of those were Poles before the arrival of the Grand Duke at Warsaw. Nevertheless, the Russian notion on the subject is that the Marquis Wielopolski, the author of the reforms, and their

proposer and advocate at St. Petersburg, got rid of an immense number of Russian officials, that he did so in order to prepare the way for the Polish National Government, and that in this he was countenanced by the Grand Duke Constantine. The Grand Duke is accused of having trifled with the interests of Russia, just as the Marquis Wielopolski is charged with having sacrificed those of Poland. In these contradictory and irreconcilable accusations, we can read the fate of any man who, either on the Russian or on the Polish side, seeks to act as a mediator between Russians and Poles.* The Polish Marquis was looked upon as a traitor, and so was the Russian Grand Duke. Each lost reputation among his own countrymen, and neither gained the goodwill even of his country's enemies. If (as the Russians said) the Grand Duke wished to do so much for the Poles at the expense of the Russians, the Poles, nevertheless, could not perceive it. If (as

* I found, in my own humble sphere, that because I endeavoured to take, I will not say an impartial, but a just view of what was going on in Poland, the Polish newspapers regarded me as a Russian apologist, while the Russian ones described me as a Polish enthusiast and fanatic.

the Poles said) the aim of the Marquis was to attach the kingdom of Poland more firmly than ever to the Russian Empire, the Russians thought he went a strange way to work, and that the ultimate result of his measures would be something very different indeed.

On the whole, the Russians, as well as the Austrians, and above all the Prussians, understood the importance of the Wielopolski reforms much better than the Poles. Those Russians who attached an extreme importance to them saw that Poland would be separated from Russia by its government, and did not believe that it could ever become attached to it by ties of sympathy, or even by a feeling of common interest. They also perceived that the kingdom of Poland, with its Polish administration, its Polish university and gymnasiums, its Polish Council of State, and district, and municipal councils, would soon become a centre of attraction to the Poles of the Polish provinces, incorporated with the Russian Empire, and would help to develop and strengthen the Polish or civilised element in those provinces.

The Prussians thought that the 'kingdom,' under the Wielopolski system, would exercise too much influence on Posen, and, from the very beginning of the agitation in Warsaw, advised the Russian Government not to make concessions, but to assume a decided attitude, and restore order by military means.

As to the Austrians, I remember an Austrian general, well versed in the politics of eastern Europe, saying to me some time after the Poles had taken up arms: 'The Poles think they know their own interests, but we also think we know ours; and when we found that Wielopolski's scheme was rejected, we could not contain ourselves for joy. If the system devised by the Marquis had been adopted by his countrymen, the "kingdom" would have become so intensely Polish, and would have exercised such an irresistible attraction on all the other portions of ancient Poland, that in a few years Galicia, aided by the Poles of the kingdom and by the Russians, would have been lost to Austria.'

In England, though the state of Poland was being constantly discussed in and out of Parliament, the Wielopolski reforms were scarcely ever mentioned ; or if by chance they were alluded to, they were undervalued or even misrepresented. Speakers in Parliament little knew the harm they were doing to the Poles by indirectly, and no doubt unintentionally, encouraging them to maintain a defiant attitude towards Russia—instead of urging them to accept whatever Russia had to offer, and impressing upon them above all that if they appealed to arms they would be left, as far as England was concerned, to fight alone. This would have seemed heartless at the time, but it would in reality have been less heartless than the course that was pursued. It was imagined, I believe, that by dwelling with more or less eloquence on the sufferings of the Poles, it might be possible to shame the Russians into making very important concessions to them. With that idea many well-meaning men delivered speeches on the subject of Poland when they had really nothing to say. It was considered a good thing, however, to

let the Russian Government perceive that the eyes of Western Europe were upon it.

What the Russian Government must also have perceived was that, as regarded Poland, the West of Europe had eyes, but saw not ; and it concluded that the West of Europe, as represented by the parliamentary assemblies of France and England, did not wish to see ; and that it was simply animated by a blind hatred of Russia, and a desire to weaken her by irritating as much as possible the seemingly incurable Polish wound.

Now England has no special policy in respect to Poland. In 1814 Lord Castlereagh declared that it was the earnest desire of England to see Poland re-established as an independent state, with the limits of 1772 ; and that England was willing to make sacrifices in favour of such a result. But he did not think it was the duty of England (and certainly not her interest) to go to war on the question, provided always Russia would give up a certain portion of Poland. It was only in the event of Russia insisting on keeping the whole that Lord Castlereagh was ready to declare war,

in conjunction with France and Austria, and on behalf of European civilisation.*

Russia's position in Poland having been definitely pushed back, the only aim of the English Government in connexion with Poland was that

* In spite of the British Radicals' belief that Lord Castlereagh admired Russian despotism, and was fascinated by the Emperor Alexander, the fact is, Lord Castlereagh, whatever he may have thought of the Emperor's personal qualities (which, however, were not likely to make much impression on that clear-headed, high-minded, and quite unsentimental statesman), regarded Russia as an essentially barbarous power, which is certainly not the opinion of our utilitarian Radicals in the present day. 'If,' wrote Lord Castlereagh on November 11, 1814, from Vienna, to the Chancellor of the Exchequer in London, 'His Imperial Majesty shall change his tone and make a reasonable arrangement of frontier on the side of Poland; if he shall allow the other European arrangements to be equitably settled, including those of Holland, and alter his tariff besides; then, my dear Vansittart, I must come upon you for my pound of flesh; or, if I do not stop his power on the Vistula and it breaks loose and carries everything before it to the Meuse, I cannot answer for the consequences. I only beg you will believe I shall do my best to save your purse. The engagements with Holland shall be no obstacle to this, as I had rather give the Prince of Orange something more to defend and fortify the Low Countries than assist the credit of a Calmuck Prince to overturn Europe.'—*Castlereagh Correspondence*, x. 200.

the condition of the Poles under their foreign governments should be rendered as tolerable as possible; and since the re-arrangement of the Russian frontier by the partition of the Duchy of Warsaw, the whole of which, during the French retreat from Moscow, had fallen into Russian hands, neither England nor France has ever maintained that Poland ought to be restored by force of arms to her ancient independence, but only that she ought to be ruled in accordance with the principles laid down in the treaties of 1815—principles, by the way, that Prussia, Austria, and Russia have all equally violated. Accordingly, it was the duty of English statesmen, knowing what our policy is, and also what it is not, to welcome and applaud any approximation on the part of the Russians towards good government in Poland. And it was anything but their duty to celebrate and praise the Polish manifestations which, however interesting in themselves, were sure, sooner or later, to lead the Poles into a danger from which *we*, at least, were not likely to rescue them.

Now, how did it happen that the Poles themselves, who must be allowed to know something of their own affairs, could not bring themselves to accept the reforms procured for Poland by the Marquis Wielopolski? The Poles of the extreme party say plainly that they desired an insurrection. Such being the case, they naturally detested the Marquis, who wished above all things to avoid a conflict with Russia, and who had managed to persuade the Russian Government to make valuable concessions to the Poles, in the hope of conciliating and appeasing them.

But the so-called 'moderate' Poles, who were glad to receive permission to found an agricultural society in 1858; who presented an address in vague terms, more of lamentation than of petition, on behalf of the kingdom of Poland alone in 1861, but who in 1862 could only support the government on condition of the Polish provinces incorporated with the Russian empire being detached from Russia in an administrative sense, and united to the kingdom of Poland under a Polish constitutional system—how was it that *they* were unwilling to give support to the Marquis,

when by withholding it they virtually encouraged the men who were hurrying the country as fast as possible towards a fatal rebellion ?

To understand this it is necessary, I fancy, to be a Pole, and to have felt what the Poles have felt under the government of foreigners. The small substantial good offered to them was nothing compared to the shadowy prospect of national independence, which since the liberation of Italy had haunted their vision more than ever. The Italians of Lombardy had looked for nothing, had asked for nothing, from Austria ; and in due time the sovereign whose supposed mission it is to raise up suffering nationalities in all parts of Europe had set them free. How was it possible that he should forget the Poles, and that at the proper moment he should not strike a blow in favour of Poland ? To accept the Wielopolski reforms fully and frankly would have been to abandon this chance ; and as far as I can make out, that was the essential reason why they were received with so little favour.

That there were faults on the Russian side it would be superfluous to add. Russia's rule in

Poland has been a series not of faults but of crimes. From the accession of Alexander II., however, until the breaking out of the insurrection, the intentions of the Government, and of Russians generally, towards Poland were, at least, not what they had been during the previous reign. But, unfortunately, Russia did not make all the concessions she intended to make until it was almost too late to make any at all. The massacres in the streets of Warsaw, the besieging of the churches, the constant arrests, the number of persons sent into exile—all this could not be forgotten because a Russian Grand Duke had arrived in Warsaw to introduce administrative reforms, to found Polish assemblies, and to re-establish the Warsaw university. ‘Your father suppressed three universities,’* the Poles might have said to him, ‘and for a quarter of a century endeavoured systematically to abolish Polish education.’

The Grand Duke felt this himself. He had read in the works of Polish authors the history of the war of 1830, and of the mode in which the

* The universities of Warsaw and Wilna (Lithuania), and the High School of Krzemeniec (Volhynia).

Poles were afterwards governed, and he observed, as he was conversing with a Pole, soon after the attempt made upon his life: 'I understand why they fired upon me. It was not for anything I had done, for I had only just arrived in Warsaw.'

It is not at all clear to me that hatred of the Emperor Nicholas alone caused the attempt; and I am inclined to think that the small party of determined revolutionists who directed it wished it simply to be understood that reconciliation between Russia and Poland was impossible, and not to be thought of. By the great majority of the Warsaw population the crime of Jaroszinski was of course disavowed and deplored, and every man of any position in Warsaw went to the castle to enquire personally after the Grand Duke's health.

The attempt on the Grand Duke's life was followed by no special measures of repression, such as were taken by Louis Philippe after the attempt of Fieschi, and by Napoleon III. after that of Orsini; and his Imperial Highness published a proclamation, in which he assured the Poles that he did not consider them responsible for the acts of an individual malefactor, but at the same time

called upon them to support his government, and directed their attention in emphatic terms to the critical position of the country.

It was resolved to reply to the proclamation, and between 300 and 400 of the principal landed proprietors met, and drew up an address, in which they assured the Grand Duke that they did not refuse their support to the new institutions given to the 'kingdom,' but that they must be extended to the Polish provinces incorporated with the Russian Empire. If these provinces were united to the kingdom of Poland,* under a Polish administration and with a constitution, the address

* Let me once more remind the reader that the Polish provinces incorporated with the Russian empire, otherwise north-western and south-western provinces of Russia, are the provinces seized at the first, second, and third partitions of Poland; and that the so-called kingdom of Poland is the Napoleonic Duchy of Warsaw annexed to Russia in 1815, *minus* a large fragment (Galicia) thrown as a sop to Austria, and a smaller one (Posen) thrown as a sop to Prussia. The astonishing discovery was made, during the reign of the Emperor Nicholas, that the provinces seized by Russia at the three partitions of the eighteenth century were not Polish at all, but Russian. Neither the Emperor Alexander I., nor the Emperor Paul, nor the Empress Catherine II., had the least suspicion of this.

promised that the Poles would loyally and cordially cooperate in the government of the country. Otherwise they would be unable to take part in it, 'for as Poles they could only love their country in the limits given to it by God, and consecrated by history.' The address recognised the dangerous position of affairs, and predicted great calamities, which could only be averted by the adoption of the above measures.

This address was taken to Count Andrew Zamoyski, who was invited to present it to the Grand Duke as an answer to his proclamation. Count Zamoyski refused to do anything of the kind. He at last, however, agreed to accept it, on the understanding that he might make whatever use he thought fit of the contents; but he never agreed to present to the Grand Duke a formal demand for the annexation of the Polish provinces incorporated with the Russian empire to the kingdom of Poland.

News had reached the Grand Duke that an address had been entrusted to Count Andrew Zamoyski for presentation, and its contents had even been communicated to him. Now the

Grand Duke had nothing whatever to do with the Polish provinces, and could only listen to suggestions made to him with respect to the government of the kingdom. That the Poland partitioned in the eighteenth century was thoroughly Polish by its civilisation, and remains so to this moment (with the exception of some towns and districts in Prussian Poland where Germans have penetrated and settled, but without Germanising the original inhabitants), is undoubtedly true. It is true, also, that by the treaties of 1815 the Poles of all the provinces composing the Poland of 1772 are promised 'national and representative institutions;' that the Emperor Alexander assured numbers of Poles that it was his intention to unite the Polish provinces under his rule to the newly formed 'kingdom;' and that in order to be in a position to do so, with the consent of Europe, His Majesty caused a clause to be inserted in the Act relative to his title, by which he 'reserved to himself the right of giving to this state, enjoying a distinct administration, the internal extension (*l'extension intérieure*) that he might think proper.' That is to say, he reserved

to himself the right of enlarging his constitutional kingdom of Poland by joining to it the Polish provinces contiguous to it on the Russian side.*

But it is useless for the Poles to appeal either to their natural rights, or to the rights guaranteed to them by treaties, or to promises made to them by Russian sovereigns, whether positively or only by implication. Treated justly, they would never have been partitioned; treated justly, the effects of the partition would, as far as possible, be effaced even now. This is not what the Russian Government desires. Its great aim is by fair or by foul means to keep the Poles quiet in the central 'kingdom of Poland,' and it seems to me that the Poles would have done well to take what was offered to them in a conciliatory spirit two years ago. It was good in itself, it was

* Our Foreign Office has taken the trouble to translate this document, and, not understanding it, has translated it wrong. It renders 'extension intérieure' by 'internal developement.' But the French word '*extension*' means 'extension,' not developement; and in this particular instance meant territorial extension, and could mean nothing else. (See the translation of the French documents in the correspondence on Polish Affairs laid before Parliament, last page).

far more than they had ever had for thirty years before, and it was the utmost that they were likely to get, at least for a time, and until the complete restoration of tranquillity. Moreover, a benefit to one section of Poland is a benefit to Poland in general, and all Poles would have profited directly or indirectly by the new Polish life that would have been awakened in the kingdom. It would surely have been better to have this little Poland, which at some more or less distant day would have grown bigger, than to have no Poland at all.

In the meanwhile the Grand Duke Constantine had sent for Count Andrew Zamoyski, and an animated conversation took place between them on the subject of the address, which the Grand Duke maintained it was Count Zamoyski's intention to present, though as has been already explained, he had only accepted it for himself under certain conditions, and with the understanding that it was not to be presented at all.

At a previous interview the Grand Duke had asked Count Andrew for 'some notions' in reference to the government of Poland, and on the

latter replying in general terms (as, for instance, that the Grand Duke before taking any new measure should ask himself whether it was likely to benefit or to injure the Poles), had pressed him for 'details.' Count Andrew, also, I believe, called the attention of His Imperial Highness to the fact that a Cossack whipping his way through the streets, sometimes along the pavement, was a sight peculiar to Warsaw, or at least to Poland; and expressed his conviction that His Imperial Highness could have seen nothing of the kind in other European cities. It may be fairly said that the Grand Duke was willing to receive suggestions, as he was most certainly anxious to obtain support, from the principal men in the kingdom of Poland, provided these suggestions related to the kingdom of Poland alone. But to propose the annexation of the Polish provinces to the kingdom was in Russian eyes a treasonable offence—an offence, moreover, of which there had lately been two examples in the provinces themselves,* and which the govern-

* The nobility of the district of Rogaczew in the 'government' of Mohilew, and the nobility of the whole 'govern-

ment had in each instance condemned 'as a project for the dismemberment of the Russian Empire.' For being suspected of intending to present an address in favour of this project, Count Andrew Zamoyski, in accordance with instructions received by telegraph, was ordered to proceed to St. Petersburg to give an account of his conduct to the Emperor. He was accompanied to the Russian capital by a military escort, and on his arrival was summoned to an interview with the Emperor, which lasted some hours.

On this occasion Count Zamoyski did not fail to press upon his Majesty with all possible earnestness the acceptance of this proposal contained in the address. He entreated his Majesty to do justice to the Poles, and make himself a name in history by his magnanimity. The Emperor entered into an historical discussion with Count Andrew as to the real claims of the Poles upon the disputed provinces, arguing that if in the

ment' or province of Podolia, had petitioned for annexation to the kingdom of Poland; in consequence of which the Marshal of Rogaczew and all the Marshals of Podolia were imprisoned.

eighteenth century they belonged to Poland, they for the most part belonged four centuries before to Russia. The Count replied that in the fourteenth century no 'Russia' existed, but only a number of duchies or principalities, which though inhabited by a Russian population, in an ethnological sense, were bound together by no political ties, and formed no political unity deserving the name of a state.*

A political question of pressing and vital importance can scarcely be settled by historical arguments extending over a period of five centuries; and the historical discussion between the Emperor Alexander II. and Count Andrew Zamoyiski led to no political result. Nor was it to be expected that any political result would be

* These principalities were governed by chiefs of the same family; and the head of the family ruled first at Kieff, then at Vladimir, then at Souzdal, then at Moscow. During the Tartar invasions the western duchies, for the most part, became united to Poland, either through their own chiefs or through Lithuanian conquerors, but always on terms of perfect equality with the more civilised nation; while the grand duchy of Moscow, founded among a half-Finnish population, and developed under the supreme government of Tartar chiefs, grew into a semi-oriental despotism.

arrived at. Alexander II. would doubtless never have planned the partition of Poland. It was equally certain that whatever his own historical and other convictions might be, he would not undo the work of his predecessors, and in spite of the advice of his ministers, the feelings of his people, and the traditional policy of his empire, give back to the Poles provinces which, though still retained under the Russian sceptre, would have been lost to Russia by being openly acknowledged to belong, in a national sense, to Poland.

The end of Count Zamoyski's interview with the Emperor was that he was recommended to go to the west of Europe, not by way of punishment, or his destination would have been eastward. Indeed Count Zamoyski had not been, and could not be, charged with having committed even an illegal action. He was told, however, that he was being put forward as the agent of a party, and that it would be better for him and for his country that he should remain for a time away from Poland.

CHAPTER VI.

THE MARQUIS WIELOPOLSKI AND THE CONSCRIPTION.

AFTER Count Zamoyski's exile the party of action was joined by many who had previously belonged to the moderate party ; and Poles of the moderate party declare now that had Count Zamoyski been allowed to remain in Warsaw his influence would have been sufficient to prevent the insurrection taking place at all.

That Count Andrew Zamoyski *did* possess great influence among all classes in Poland is quite certain ; but I also believe that he would have lost it had he tried to exercise it on behalf of the Wielopolski government. The Russian Minister of the Interior, in his secret report to the Emperor,* on the state of the 'western provinces' (i. e. Polish provinces incorporated with the Russian empire), mentions that on the

* See Appendix, No. 3.

occasion of Count Andrew Zamoyiski's visiting one of the family domains in Lithuania, he was met by a crowd, composed of persons of all classes, who welcomed him with cries of 'Long live Zamoyiski, the first gentleman in Poland.'

Count Andrew is known to all his countrymen as the worthy descendant of the Zamoyiski who, as Grand Chancellor of the Republic, refused to sign and never did sign the treaty of partition. To him there is no Poland but the Poland of 1772; and I have always heard it said of Count Andrew Zamoyiski that his name and the history of his family rendered it impossible for him to take part in any government of Russian origin in Poland—except, indeed, on such conditions as Russia will positively not accede to. Count Andrew Zamoyiski was of course opposed to the insurrection; but he was also opposed to the only man who, had he been adequately supported, might have given a new direction to affairs, and have rendered the insurrection impossible. It is in vain, however, to struggle against a strong national feeling. The Poles would make no compact with Russia; and long

before the arbitrary conscription had been decided upon, the Marquis Wielopolski was hated because his constant endeavour was, on the one hand, to gain concessions from Russia, and on the other to get these concessions accepted by the Poles. Ultimately the Russians are believed to have said to him : ‘The more we give, the more the agitation in Warsaw increases, and the more inevitable the threatened insurrection seems to become. The Emperor does not object to make the further concessions which you still ask for, but first of all we must have tranquillity re-established in the country, and towards this you make no advance.’

In the meanwhile a certain number of Poles, chiefly, if not exclusively, among the large landed proprietors, *did* enter into the Marquis Wielopolski’s views, and endeavoured to give the government of the Grand Duke Constantine at least a chance. A full and, as I have been told, very admirable memoir, drawn up by M. Wenglinski on the condition of the kingdom of Poland, was submitted to the Grand Duke, who had afterwards several interviews with M. Wenglinski on the subject. M. Wenglinski was one of

the ablest members of the Council of State, and had previously been one of the most distinguished members of the Agricultural Society. He was opposed to all insurrectionary projects, and was spoken of by his countrymen as an 'arch Conservator'—which did not prevent General Berg from exiling him after the Grand Duke's departure,* without the slightest evidence and by a mere administrative order, as a member of the National Government!

With the exception, however, of the members of the Council of State, the chief functionaries and a certain number of the principal landed proprietors, the new system had very few adherents. The Marquis Wielopolski was completely misunderstood by the great body of his countrymen, as the Czartoryskis were misunderstood when they were pursuing a similar policy immediately before the first partition of Poland. In each case, however, it was necessary not only not to attack Russia, but to lean upon Russia for support; and to this the feeling of the country is as much and indeed more opposed now than it was a hundred

* Autumn of 1863.

years ago. The extreme party who, I fancy, *did* understand the Marquis's policy naturally detested it. Even among the moderate party there were many who disliked the Marquis personally, while others, who had nothing to say against his measures as far as they went, declared nevertheless that the Marquis was not the man to get them accepted by the nation. For in Poland it so happens that when a few concessions are asked for on behalf of the Poles (as at the Conference of Paris in 1856), Russia will not grant them. When Russia offers them (as in 1862), then the Poles will not accept them.

It also happened that the man who had at length succeeded in obtaining from the Russians reforms of a certain importance—of great importance when it is considered how they might have been developed, for give the Poles one inch of liberty and they will know how to stretch it to an ell—it so happened that this man was the very one who, above all others of the same rank, had no influence with his fellow-countrymen. He was unpopular among his own class, while the small nobility, the public functionaries as a body,

the Warsaw tradespeople, and the working men generally, mistrusted him—and indeed regarded him as nothing less than a traitor.

The Marquis Wielopolski was as ardent a patriot as any five-and-thirty years ago, and during the insurrection of 1830 believed it was possible for the Poles, aided by France and England, to recover their independence at the point of the sword. But are the Poles to expose themselves periodically to massacre, exile, confiscation, and all the horrors that are the sure consequences of an unsuccessful insurrection on the mere chance of France and England, or France alone, coming to their rescue? The Poles have long declared, and declare now, that the West of Europe will not and cannot abandon them. But what has the West of Europe done hitherto? When the insurrection of 1830 broke out, the Polish aristocracy (who were opposed to the movement as inexpedient until it was too late to stop it, and who then took the direction of it into their own hands) thought that Austria, England, and France might be induced to aid the Poles so as to raise up in Poland a barrier against Russia. This view may

have been based to some extent on general considerations, but was founded chiefly on the fact that in 1814 Austria, England, and France signed a secret treaty binding them to make war upon Russia, and to furnish each 150,000 men for that purpose in case Russia should persist in retaining *the whole* of Poland.

But Russia did *not* persist. In 1815, the Emperor Alexander accepted the frontier pressed upon him with so much earnestness by the three allies, and the Polish question, regarded as a European question, was looked upon as settled. In 1830, when it was again brought forward by the Poles themselves, the territorial settlement of 1815 was still all that the western powers really cared for. The Marquis Wielopolski had the opportunity of convincing himself of this when he came to London as the envoy of the Polish Government, and found that England would not go beyond diplomatic representations in favour of Poland, —while France was willing to go as far as England, but no further.

The only change in the attitude of England was that, whereas in 1814 and 1815 she had ob-

jected to the formation of a constitutional kingdom of Poland under the Russian sceptre, she now, in 1830, objected to the kingdom of Poland being deprived of its constitution, and with it, of its army, its national administration, and of all that since 1815 had given it at least the outward appearance of a separate state. It was feared in 1814 that the title of King of Poland would be a source of great strength to the Emperor of Russia, and that his Polish kingdom, with its diet, its army, its national colours, would form a centre to which the Polish subjects of Austria and Prussia would find themselves irresistibly attracted. Such at least was the opinion of Lord Castlereagh—though Prince Hardenberg, the representative of Prussia at the Vienna Congress, foresaw that a constitutional Poland would be a source of great trouble to a Russian despotism, and that his Polish would be hated by his Russian subjects on account of the exceptional privileges granted to them.*

Prince Hardenberg's anticipations were completely realised; and to me Russia's determination to withdraw a constitution which made the

* See Appendix, No. 4.

Russians jealous without conciliating the Poles seems natural enough. It is also very intelligible that England should not have cared to fight in 1831 for the maintenance of a state of things which she did not wish to see established at all in 1815, though the insurrection that had just broken out showed that the fears entertained in 1815 were not well grounded.

England wished well to Poland, no doubt; but not to the extent of going to war on her behalf. France wished well to Poland, and would go any length to assist her, provided always that England would accompany her—which she knew England would not do. Even Austria protested that she had never meant any harm to the Poles; and Count Andrew Zamoyski, who was sent to represent his country at Vienna when the Marquis Wielopolski was sent to London, had received assurances that Austria would always be ready to give up Galicia to an independent Poland, though never to a Poland governed by the Russians.

The Marquis Wielopolski seems to have lost all faith in foreign intervention in 1831, when, the opportunity presenting itself, no one could be

got to intervene. But there is no reason for supposing that he ceased to believe altogether in the possibility of a successful insurrection until after the total and immediate failure of the Galician attempt in 1846, when the Galician serfs, to the surprise of no one so much as of the Poles themselves, not only refused to join the projected national rising, but rose on their own account against their masters, whom they massacred to the number of many hundreds.* The serfs had been excited on the one hand by the emissaries of the Polish democratic party abroad, who promised them freedom and land as the price of their co-operation; and on the other by the Austrian officials, who represented the national movement as equally hostile to the peasantry and to the Austrian Emperor, and who rewarded the peasants in money for each proprietor killed or captured by them. It was then that the Marquis Wielopolski wrote his celebrated *Letter from a Polish gentleman to Prince Metternich*, in which, after setting forth in indignant terms the atrocious

* One thousand, according to the moderate computation of M. Bismarck von Schönhausen. (See Correspondence relating to the Affairs of Poland, part 1, p. 41.)

conduct of the Austrian Government, he called upon his countrymen to think no more of receiving assistance from the west of Europe, or of engaging in hopeless and ruinous contests with enemies who cared not what infamous means and what foul weapons they employed against them, but to extend the hand of friendship to Russia, when Russia, he maintained, would cease to persecute them, and would even aid them and help to rescue them from their German oppressors. Thus the *integrity* of Poland would be restored, and though Poland would not be independent, she at least would occupy an important position in the Russian empire, and would no longer be the most miserable and tormented country on the face of the earth.

The Marquis Wielopolski's letter met with a favourable response from the Galicia nobility—not that they loved Russia, but because they hated and abhorred the Austrian Government; and for some time afterwards there was a strong leaning on the part of the educated classes in Galicia towards Russia, and the idea of a united Poland under the Russian Government. In addition to the

political reason, it was imagined, I believe, that landed property was safer under the Russian than under the Austrian Government, which, after the murderous doings of 1846, had rewarded the Galician serfs by making them freeholders at the expense of the nobility. It was considered impossible, moreover, that a Russian sovereign could ever tolerate such scenes of anarchy and disorder as had been deliberately got up by the Austrian officials in Galicia;* and the Marquis Wielopolski had said that the Emperor Nicholas was 'too much of a gentleman' to inflame the passions of peasants against their proprietors.

On the whole, however, the Poles were not very anxious to throw themselves into the arms of Russia, and Russia, on her part, did not seem at all inclined to open her arms to receive them; indeed Russia has already more Poles in her embrace than she can conveniently hold.

In the meanwhile, the Marquis Wielopolski lived

* In Cracow, where the Poles, having the management of their own affairs, had abolished the peasants' task-work, and where, until the annexation of Cracow to Austria, there were no foreign officials, peasants and proprietors lived on perfectly harmonious terms.

conduct of the Austrian Government, he called upon his countrymen to think no more of receiving assistance from the west of Europe, or of engaging in hopeless and ruinous contests with enemies who cared not what infamous means and what foul weapons they employed against them, but to extend the hand of friendship to Russia, when Russia, he maintained, would cease to persecute them, and would even aid them and help to rescue them from their German oppressors. Thus the *integrity* of Poland would be restored, and though Poland would not be independent, she at least would occupy an important position in the Russian empire, and would no longer be the most miserable and tormented country on the face of the earth.

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political reason, I was surprised to find the landed property was still under the American Government. The murder of the Galician was a result of the expense of the war, and the Government was unable, moreover, to ever tolerate the situation as had been the case. The officials in the Government had said that the Government had much of a feeling of personal regard for the

On the other hand, very serious of Russia, and all inclined to regard indeed Russia as a force that should be

In the present

* In the case of their own and when these

in retirement on his own estate, appearing only in public from time to time to conduct a law-suit, of which he had several on hand, and in all of which he pleaded his own cause with remarkable energy and ability.

He thus required a litigious reputation—which, however, could scarcely have troubled him, as no one cared less than he seems to have done for the opinion of his fellow-countrymen. Probably no one in Poland has less of the ordinary Polish character than the Marquis Wielopolski. The Pole, generally speaking, is passionately fond of society; he is warm-hearted, demonstrative, and communicative even to indiscretion. The Marquis, on the other hand, shunned society. He was cold, haughty, reserved, and never conversed except with his most intimate friends. According to common report (which, however, always exaggerates), he scarcely received with ordinary politeness—certainly not with Polish politeness—the visitors who occasionally presented themselves at his house. He rarely, if ever, paid a visit himself, but lived shut up in his library, reading perpetually, and studying law, politics, history,

and at one time astronomy. He was so great a reader and mixed so little in real life that people said he was a mere theorist, and that he knew nothing of Poland or of politics but what he had learnt from books. That, after all, was something. He at least knew that the Poles ought not to count on foreign aid, and that even their own peasants would not help them in a struggle for national independence. He knew, moreover, that task-work existed in Poland, and that it was essentially necessary to abolish it; that there were no universities for the sons of rich Poles, and no schools of any kind for the children of the peasants.

At the same time, in a country where there is an immense deal of good-fellowship and where people do not willingly take offence, the Marquis certainly possessed the art of making himself disliked. This, as I have before remarked, in no way grieved him. Indeed, when immediately after his arrival in Warsaw with the last batch of reforms, he was told that he was at length becoming popular, he replied, with an air of surprise, 'What folly have I committed, then?'

Probably the Marquis Wielopolski talks as much as a great many Englishmen, but among Poles he passes for a marvellously silent man. On one occasion his countrymen relate in his favour that he kept silence for a quarter of an hour while some high Russian official read him a report in the Russian language. The report finished, the Marquis simply said, 'I do not understand Russian,' and turned his back.

It is also told of him that when he was at St. Petersburg and was about to figure at a state reception, the master of the ceremonies was in some doubt as to what place ought to be assigned to him. The Marquis was not in the army. He was not in the Russian civil service, and held no official rank of any kind. How then, and in whose company, was he to enter the Imperial presence?

'Leave him to himself,' the Emperor is reported to have said, 'and he will know what to do.'

The Marquis, at the last moment, went gravely over to the body of foreign diplomatists, and appeared before the Emperor as if he, a Polish

minister, had no more to do with Russia than Lord Napier or the Duke of Montebello.

This last story is well known at Warsaw, but not at St. Petersburg, and I have reason to believe that it is apocryphal.

But both the anecdotes that I have just told serve to exhibit the Marquis in a character in which he certainly did appear, and which convinced some of his countrymen that after all there were good points about him, and that a man who was so determined to have everything thoroughly Polish in the kingdom of Poland could not after all be a very fervent admirer of the Russians. Meditating on this matter, some went so far as to see in the Marquis a living repetition of the Lithuanian patriot, who, when his countrymen were suffering from the persecution of the Teutonic knights, contrived to enter the Teutonic order; and having arrived at length at the dignity of chief, led the army to certain destruction, and only at the last moment, and when he was about to die, revealed himself in his true Lithuanian character. But Mickiewicz's 'Conrad Wallenrod' is well known and thoroughly understood in Russia; and the

idea that the Marquis Wielopolski could only be supporting the Russian Government in order more surely to betray it was entertained there to a far greater extent than in Poland—where, indeed, it seems to have crossed the minds of only a very few. That the Marquis Wielopolski could be loyal to the Russian emperor and faithful to his own country; that he could seek to benefit Poland without wishing to destroy Russia—this is what scarcely any one in either country could be got to believe.

The first measure introduced by the Marquis Wielopolski was a very simple and excellent one for the abolition of task-work, by which a day's labour was made legally replaceable by its value in money. In other words, if the peasant did not like to work on the proprietor's land, he could pay a sum fixed by law instead; and thus the service ceased at once to be a hardship, for on very easy terms it could be avoided. Of the administrative and educational reforms which the Marquis introduced I have already spoken. These latter were scarcely noticed by the extreme party, but the law relating to the position of the

peasant was regarded by them as infamous, because it required him to pay rent.

The extreme party, as the reader is aware, proposed to give the peasants their holdings for nothing, by way of inducing them to join the insurrection; and some months before the insurrection broke out, emissaries were sent into the country to inform them of the favours that awaited their acceptance. The revolutionists showed the utmost liberality in giving away land that did not belong to them, and this caused the Marquis to declare that the movement which was in preparation, and which he had now resolved at all hazards to stop, was more of a socialist than of a truly national character. At least, however, it must be admitted, that it was not for themselves that the revolutionists wished to take the proprietors' land; and that according to popular tradition, as interpreted by Kosciuszko, and by Mickiewicz*—names to which no others need be added—the plots of land cultivated by the peasants

* See Kosciuszko's letter to the Emperor Alexander, and Mickiewicz's *Les Slaves*; quoted on this subject in the *Polish Captivity*, i. 311.

in Poland for their own use, are theirs inalienably. The problem the revolutionists had set to themselves was this: *How to make the peasant fight for his country*; and their solution was — *By giving him his plot of land in freehold, and telling him to defend it.* But if the peasants' task-work was to be, not redeemed, but absolutely abolished, would it not strike the peasant that it had hitherto been required from him unjustly, and by a usurpation of his rights; and was not such a doctrine, preached to him as it was by the emissaries of the Warsaw committee, far more likely to lead to a massacre of the landed proprietors, than to a general rising against the Russian Government?

It was a very fortunate thing for the kingdom of Poland when the insurrection did break out, that by the Wielopolski law of May 1861, the peasants' task-work had for nearly two years been convertible, on easy terms, into rent. Otherwise, with the revolutionists exciting them on the one side, and the Russians on the other, the peasants would in all probability have risen against their taskmasters, without in the least troubling them-

selves about the question of national independence, and of course without injuring the Russians, whose policy, up to a certain point, is identical with that of the revolutionists themselves.

To the extreme party, the Marquis's persistent endeavours to avert the insurrection and to crush the revolutionists who were bent on bringing it on seemed at last so comic, that a caricature was published, representing Wielopolski on horseback in the attitude of Sobieski—wielding a bundle of reforms in lieu of a sabre, and trampling under foot the Turks of revolution. The caricature expressed the truth. The Marquis Wielopolski did, indeed, wish to put down revolution by means of reforms. But the extreme party would not be trampled upon. They would have all or nothing; and the Marquis, knowing well that if they tried this alternative they would have nothing, and worse than nothing, resolved to anticipate the experiment, and seriously prepared, according to Lord Napier's expression, to 'kidnap the opposition.' It was not an ordinary opposition, however, that he meant to kidnap. It was an armed opposition which had already published its plan

of campaign, and which was about to draw down upon an unfortunate and unprotected country the most terrible calamities.

At that time, say a few weeks or even months before the conscription was executed, it was probably quite impossible to avert the catastrophe that had long been approaching. This was the situation. On the one hand was a powerful tyrant, who had been greatly, however deservedly, provoked, and could bear no more provocation. On the other, a helpless victim who had been injured and insulted even while attempts were being made to conciliate her, and who, it was evident, would not be conciliated, and would never be consoled for her loss of freedom. There was a mediator also, who had not the entire confidence of either side, and whose chief object now, for the sake of the weaker, was at all hazards to prevent an open rupture between the two.

The measure resorted to by the Marquis Wielopolski in this difficult position is well known, and has been universally condemned. It is not for me to justify it, but I think it is possible to explain it. To begin with ; it is unintel-

ligible, and cannot be admitted, that the Marquis Wielopolski was careless about the sufferings of his own countrymen. His aim was to save his country from ruin—from the natural consequences of a hopeless contest with Russia. To prevent the beginning of a conflagration which, when the torch had been once applied, it might be impossible to check, he determined to seize the incendiaries. They were about to set the house on fire in order to clear it of vermin. If there had been the least reason to hope that by this measure the vermin could be driven away never to return, then it would have been the work of a bad inmate to stop its execution. But all that was certain in the matter was, that the house would be terribly, perhaps irreparably, injured, and that the vermin would remain, and would be irritated to fury by the flames.

We all know what the Marquis Wielopolski ought *not* to have done. Now what *ought* he to have done? A British minister finding his position untenable, resigns; but for the Marquis to resign would have been to confess that his scheme for governing Poland by means of the

Poles was impracticable. It would have been to deny his own ideas, and to desert the Grand Duke, who had come to Warsaw to see them carried out. It would have been an invitation to the Russians to return at once to their old system of military rule.

Ought he to have let things continue as they were going on? That, undoubtedly, was his proper course. The outbreak still would have come, but the entire responsibility would have been thrown on the revolutionary party, and the world would have seen that, at least, the Marquis had not struck the first blow. The Russians, however, were making him promise that there should be no insurrection, just as the intending insurgents were receiving promises from the Central Committee that there should be no conscription, and that it should be rendered impossible by a general rising.

The conscription had long been threatened, and since the beginning of October had been officially announced with full details as to the manner of carrying it out. The law of conscription by lot, published in 1859, was declared not yet in

vigour, and on this occasion, and by exception, the old system of conscription by designation was to be followed. Under the old system, every man in town or in country who did not belong to the nobility was liable to be taken for a soldier. If he belonged to the nobility, he was liable of course to be sent to Siberia. Everybody, in fact, was liable to every kind of arbitrary punishment at a moment's notice, on suspicion of any sort of political offence. Nevertheless, and though suspicious or suspected persons were seized wherever they were found, yet as a rule, so many recruits were taken from the country, and so many from the town districts.

In making the recruitment of 1863, it was resolved to take as many townspeople as possible, and to take, above all, those who were known to the police as active members of the extreme party, or in other words, as intending insurgents. The Marquis on assuming office had formally promised that, whatever might be done under his administration, at least nothing illegal should take place; and he now endeavoured, in the true

spirit of a lawyer, to give to an illegal measure a legal form. Instead of saying that the conscription was to fall exclusively on the inhabitants of towns, he announced that all landed proprietors (as of old) were exempt; and that the privileges of the territorial nobility in regard to recruitment were extended for the present, and in consideration of the changes introduced by the new rural law, to the newly-formed class of peasant proprietors.

The Marquis had further insisted (still for the sake of legality) that the manner in which the conscription was to be effected should be announced in the official journals of Warsaw; and the modified law, or rather the new edict, was published some months before any attempt was made to put it in force. No one approves of the measure now; but there were plenty of Poles at Warsaw who, when it was about to be executed, thought, by reason of the pressing danger, that it was unavoidable, and only wished that, having been finally decided upon, its execution might provoke no resistance. There was something not by any means noble, without doubt, in Poles

consenting to seize and hand over to the Russians other Poles, whose crime consisted in a determination to attack the Russians. But as a matter of calculation it seemed better to give up a few thousand Poles to serve in the Russian army, than that through their rashness and recklessness the whole country should be given up to fire and sword. This sort of argument served very well with a number of rich Poles, Poles who had lost all illusions, and Poles who reasoned more than they felt. But Poland is not a rich country. It has more poetry than prose in its literature; and the Poles, as a nation, are far more remarkable for strong feeling than for reasoning power. Accordingly, the execution of the arbitrary measure of conscription was followed by one general cry of indignation, in which the voices of a few apologists, and a still smaller number of advocates, were soon drowned; and the fact of having put such a hateful measure in execution, seemed to show that the Marquis Wielopolski, if he knew his country, did not indeed know his own countrymen.

The great mistake in the Marquis's calculation,

was that he looked upon men of flesh and blood as though they were wooden pawns or arithmetical figures. 'I have so many for me, so many on neither side, and so many against me. Take away so many against me, and so many will remain with whom I shall be able to work.' The political algebraist had counted without human nature, and in endeavouring to solve his problem found his figures all going over to the wrong side, and all his positives turning in the most inexplicable manner into negatives. If he had allowed the problem to find its own solution, or go unsolved, this would not have happened. The problem was to prevent the insurrection. All the Marquis did was to give the intending insurgents a legitimate excuse for taking up arms, and to cause the whole country to sympathise with them.

Believing that the time for action had now fully arrived, eleven of the most advanced members of the extreme party held a meeting on February 1st, at Gluchowek (an estate near Warsaw, belonging to Count Stroynowski), at

which it was resolved to commence the insurrection on the 15th. The Central Committee, which, since the exile of Count Zamoycki, had been strengthened (or as some thought weakened) by the adhesion of a certain number of men who had previously belonged to the moderate party, was opposed to precipitate action, and wished to postpone the rising until the preparations for it were more complete.

The moderate party, as represented by the White Committee, had long been losing ground; and as the crisis drew near its attitude of indecision became impossible. Many of the members declared themselves in favour of the Marquis Wielopolski's government. Others inclined to the views of the extreme party as represented by the Central National Committee. The plan of the moderate party, the party of landowners, had been to maintain an attitude of reserve towards Russia; to accept whatever concessions might be offered to them, but to accept none as final; and not to break with Russia until some really favourable opportunity presented itself, and the co-operation of some foreign power

could be secured. The time, however, was coming when circumstances would oblige it to take part either for or against the Russian Government.

Among the eleven men who were in favour of an immediate appeal to arms, and who held that the delay which had already taken place had been far more profitable to the Russians than to the Poles, were some members of the first committee formed by the extreme party in October 1861, and which was afterwards reconstituted under the title of 'Central National Committee,' and some officers of the 'Central National Committee' holding mandates as provincial commissioners. I may mention by name among the eleven Ladislav Yeska, Count Ladislav Stroynowski, Edward Rolski and Leon Frankowski. The name of Yeska has already been published as that of one of the envoys sent to Paris to offer the dictatorship to Mieroslawski, at the very beginning of the insurrection. Stroynowski, Rolski, and Frankowski are all beyond the reach of harm. The first fell into the hands of Cossacks when he was already mortally wounded. The second was killed in action. The third,

wounded and disabled, was taken prisoner, and as soon as he was convalescent, hanged.

At the meeting of January 1, an address to the Central National Committee was adopted, in which an endeavour was made to impress upon that body the necessity of hurrying on the warlike preparations, and 'of not allowing the country to fall into a state of calm, which would enfeeble, if not its patriotism, at least its actual disposition to make a supreme effort to drive out the invader.'* It appears, then, that there were only eleven men in all Poland who were absolutely determined, in January 1863, to decide the fate of their country by an immediate appeal to arms. The revolutionary eleven were ready to play a match against all Russia. If it had been cricket, they would have taken care to be provided beforehand with bats and balls; but as it was only war they were about to engage in, the question of instruments and means did not trouble them much.

Nevertheless, they 'begged' the Central National Committee to present themselves in a body to discuss the situation of the country.

* Stroynowski's Memoirs.

They 'invited' the committee to make known the military and financial resources at its disposal.

Firstly, they 'demanded' from the committee a reply as to whether it approved of the insurrection being commenced on the 15th; and they added that the insurrection would be commenced on the 15th whether the committee approved of it or not.

There were still, then, at the last moment, four parties in Poland, of which the one that went furthest ultimately took the lead. First, there was the Committee of Eleven, who wanted to begin fighting on the 15th; secondly, there was the Central National Committee, who wanted to wait until a large supply of arms had been procured; thirdly, there was the moderate and undecided party who neither favoured the insurrection nor supported the government; and fourthly, there was the party that supported the Marquis Wielopolski.

On the morning of the 3rd, the address from the Committee of Eleven was presented to the Central National Committee by three of its own

commissioners—Leon Frankowski and two other delegates. After a discussion which lasted all day and until midnight, the delegates came away without having gained their point. Sigismund Padlewski (afterwards taken prisoner and shot) was the only member of the Central National Committee who approved of the proposition made by the Committee of Eleven to commence the insurrection at once, and without waiting for the conscription to carry off some thousands of their best men. Some of the other members blamed the Committee of Eleven very severely for wishing to act without the permission and authority of the Central National Committee, and threatened to withdraw the powers with which many of them, including the three delegates, were entrusted.

Finding their pressure was useless, and that the Central National Committee would not give the order for commencing the insurrection on the 15th, the Committee of Eleven were hesitating what to do, when, on the night of the 14th, the forced levy was executed at Warsaw, about 2,000 men being taken.

The Russians, the Poles of the moderate party,

and, generally, those who knew nothing of the projects of the Central National Committee, thought the next morning that the danger had passed. The conscription had been executed at Warsaw, and there had been no resistance.

But in the evening the Central National Committee held a meeting, at which it was decided to order a general rising for the 22nd. Couriers were sent out in every direction, and in spite of the great number of persons engaged in preparing the outbreak, the secret was so well kept that on the night of the 22nd it took place simultaneously in all parts of the country. At Warsaw the soldiers were to have been surprised in the guard-houses and barracks, and with the arms taken from them the citadel was to have been attacked. This plan of action was attended with success when tried on a small scale in some of the little country towns, but it could not be carried out in the capital, though, according to the Russian official journals, the attempt was made. Persons who were living in Warsaw at the time can tell me nothing about it, nor do the official reports from the British Consulate say anything on the subject. If the

attempt was ever made at all, it must have been in some of the less frequented quarters of the city, or more probably still, in the suburbs. In any case, the plan could not possibly have been executed. There were now some 50,000 soldiers in and about Warsaw.

The most advanced members of the party of action thought with regret of the time, nearly two years before, when they had first proposed to commence the insurrection, and when the Warsaw garrison numbered only 5,000.

CHAPTER VII.

DIFFICULTIES AND HESITATION WITHIN. ENCOURAGEMENT FROM WITHOUT.

THE Polish insurrection of 1863 was, then, originated entirely by the extreme party. The men of property and men of intelligence were, as a general rule, quite opposed to it—perhaps because they did not want to be ruined themselves, but also because they did not want their country to be ruined. The men who had nothing to lose, and also a few of ardent enthusiastic men who had a good deal to lose and did not mind losing it, were the real authors of the insurrection. The large landed proprietors did not, as a class, support it, even with their money (they never assisted it in person), until it had been going on for many weeks.

The Russians called the insurrection an aristocratic movement, because they wished to deprive

it of the sympathy of the liberal party throughout Europe. But it was in its origin a democratic and revolutionary movement, and the first public act of its directors, after the appeal to arms, was to give the peasants their holdings in freehold without the consent of the proprietors, to whom they were legally bound to pay rent.*

One of the first insurgents to learn practically how far the peasants could be counted on to assist the insurrection was Count Ladislas Stroynowski, who, with the other members of the party of action, held that the co-operation of the whole mass of peasants must and could be obtained. On the morning of the 23rd, Count

* Many French writers have said, that the decree of the Central National Committee on the peasant question was based on the resolution passed on that subject by the Agricultural Society. I find a passage to the same effect in Prince Czartoryski's 'Statement of Polish Affairs, &c., addressed to the Members of both Houses of Parliament.' According to the resolution of the Agricultural Society, however, the peasants were to pay, by a series of instalments, four-fifths of the value of their land. According to the decree of the Central National Committee (which had no regard whatever for the decisions of the Agricultural Society), they were to pay nothing for it. The difference must have seemed important to a Polish landed proprietor.

Stroynowski, who had received from the commissioner of the central province or palatinate of Mazovia the command of three districts, assembled a band of volunteers and started with Count Tyszkiewicz * to attack the town of Rawa. Tyszkiewicz, however, was called away by a direct order from the Central National Committee to assist Colonel Czachowski ; † and Stroynowski, before making his attack, was obliged on his part to seek reinforcements. Riding along he overtook a carriage in which sat a priest, with whom he entered into conversation. 'The priest was a patriot, and the count rode by his side until, in passing through the village of Rokitno, they were

* 'As we passed the churchyard, I observed busy preparations being made for the interment of several of those who had already died of their wounds [after the battle of Kobylanka, fought May 6 on the Galician frontier]. In one house a *chapelle ardente* was just being lighted up in a room where the body of young Count Tyszkiewicz was lying in state. I shall not easily forget the calm beautiful expression of his face, on which not the faintest trace of his having passed through the death-agony could be read.' *Polish Experiences*, by W. H. Bullock.

† Afterwards killed in the Lublin palatinate, near a hilly position, where he had held out for many months.

assailed by eleven peasants, who had been gorged with brandy by the Russian agents in order to excite them against the patriots. Some of them had received guns from the police of the district, who told them to kill the insurgents, or that they themselves would be slaughtered by them. The peasants were completely duped by this calumny. Excited by the fear of being slaughtered as much as by the alcohol, they wished to kill the two travellers, beginning with the priest. An old woman came by chance to the rescue of the latter. The count now remained alone. He had been knocked off his horse and could not escape, and he was without arms.*

To save himself from the bullets of the peasants, Stroynowski seized one of the party and held the man before him as a shield. Ultimately, after a desperate struggle, he got away from the village without being hit, ran after the priest, who had escaped with his carriage, but was unable to overtake him, and at last fell down exhausted from fatigue. Three of the peasants who had attacked him in the village found him lying in a field by

* Stroynowski's Memoirs.

the side of the road, and beat him and wounded him with their heavy sticks 'until at last they left him bleeding, unconscious, and almost without life.'

So much for the patriotism of the Polish peasantry, even in the kingdom of Poland. The man who was thus attacked was their friend, their partisan, and would have made any sacrifices for them; yet it required only the word of a Russian agent and a glass of brandy to make them believe that he wished to 'slaughter' them. The peasants were still more ready to believe this absurd accusation in other parts of Poland; and throughout Polish territory the peasantry have so little confidence in the proprietors and all who have to do with the proprietors, and indeed so mistrust them, that to count upon their aid in the year 1863, was a mistake so grave as to be almost criminal.

Another lamentable thing in this, as in all Polish insurrections, was that even the civilised portion of the nation could not decide whether to fight or to leave it alone. That the Poles love their country, and with no ordinary love, is not to be disputed. They are bound together by a com-

mon bond of suffering, and they would be wanting in all the most essential qualities of manliness if they did not hate the foreigners who have broken into their home and marked their presence there by robbery, insult, and murder. The Poles, with the exception of their truly uncivilised peasantry (for they are not citizens, and have no notion of the duties of citizenship), are unanimous in detesting foreign rule ; but they are not at all agreed as to the best mode of escaping its hardships. They all 'row in the same boat,' but some pull in one direction, some in another, and naturally they don't make much progress. The moderate party, of course, blame the party of action for having precipitated the country into the last contest. The party of action, on their side, throw the whole responsibility of the failure on the moderate or 'reactionary' party ; arguing that if the landed proprietors had prepared their peasants for the insurrection, and had themselves, individually and in person, given to the peasants their holdings in freehold, instead of taking no notice of the decree to that effect issued by the Central National Committee, they might have led them,

armed only with their scythes, against the enemy, and have made short work of the Russians in the kingdom of Poland.

The landed proprietors certainly placed themselves in a dilemma on one point. They accepted or appeared to accept the decree endowing the peasants with their holdings. They thus lost the peasants' land (for it was certain that the Russians would not, and indeed could not, take it back from them); while, at the same time, the support of the peasants was not secured.

But *could* it have been secured? The members of the party of action maintain that it could; and if every landed proprietor had occupied himself as a sort of political missionary for some years before the insurrection; if he had agreed of his own free will to receive no rent; and if at the last moment he had called the peasantry on his estate to arms, then who can say but that the peasantry might not have been got to fight for their native land?

Under the actual circumstances of the outbreak, however, the support of the peasantry could not be counted on. Their neutrality was the most that could be expected, and this may be said, as

a general rule, to have been secured by the gift of land, and by the consequent refusal of the proprietors to receive rent. But the comparatively favourable, because neutral, attitude of the peasantry may also be regarded as the natural result of the *corvée* having been put an end to two years before by the Wielopolski law, and to some extent also by the fact that in this part of Russian-Poland the peasants for upwards of a half a century have been free, and have only performed task-work in virtue of their own agreement to do so.* The peasants, moreover, in the 'kingdom' are of the same religion and race as the proprietors; and the insurrection, too, was a much more serious and formidable affair in the kingdom than in any other part of Russian-Poland, and was therefore less likely to be resisted by the peasants. Finally, in the 'kingdom,' the administration, from the civil governors downwards, was exclusively Polish,

* They were liberated when the Grand Duchy of Warsaw was formed by Napoleon out of Prussian Poland in 1807. But the law which rendered them free to leave the proprietor's estate at the end of each year, gave them no land; and, practically, their position was not much improved.

and the officials, naturally, would do nothing to excite the peasants against the insurgents.

In Volhynia and the Polish Ukraine, where the peasants, at the instigation of government agents, behaved with the greatest ferocity to all insurgents who fell in their way (after the armed bands had once been dispersed by the troops), the *corvées*, though convertible since 1861, had not been generally converted into rent. There, too, the inhabitants are of Little Russian or Ruthenian race, and with the exception of a small educated class (perhaps a tenth part of the whole population) speak a Little Russian or Ruthenian dialect, which, though intelligible to the Poles, is yet not Polish. Moreover the majority of the population, and indeed all except the aforesaid Polish tenth and the Jews, profess the Russian religion. The peasantry of Volhynia and Podolia were, it is true, converted to it by force; but the conversion of a portion of them took place so long ago as the reign of Catherine.

In some parts of the kingdom of Poland the peasants, in spite of the endeavours made to gain them over to the national side, were induced or terrified into assisting the Russians. This hap-

pened often enough to make the national government decide at last to form bands of gendarmerie, who were sent into the villages to apprehend and hang the worst of the offenders ('to encourage the others'); and some of the very men who talked so much beforehand about the possibility of getting up a peasants' insurrection, were among those who afterwards appointed these hanging bands, or who, as chiefs of detachments, distinguished themselves by their revolutionary severity towards peasants as well as proprietors. I think it may be admitted that a Polish government representing national interests and willingly obeyed by the greater part of what really constitutes the Polish nation, has a right to punish isolated acts of treachery or of simple hostility to the national cause. But if it finds itself called upon to exercise this right, very often the propriety of such a government existing at all becomes more than questionable.

When the great step had been taken and could not be retraced, some of the members and agents of the Central Committee (such as Padlewski,

Frankowski, Lelewel, &c.) went into the country to take the command of detachments; emissaries were sent to Paris—not to solicit French intervention, which was never counted on by the *originators* of the insurrection, but to offer the dictatorship to Mieroslawski; and three members remained at Warsaw to watch and direct the progress of affairs. Overtures were now made to the moderate party, or, in other words, to the landed proprietors, without whose aid very little could be done. But they were still positively opposed to the insurrection, above all now that the revolutionist and reputed socialist * Mieroslawski had been invited to

* A man is not a socialist because he holds with Kosciuszko and Mickiewicz, that the Polish peasant has an inalienable right to his patch of land. But he is a revolutionist if, like Mieroslawski and his adherents, he wishes to dispossess the *legal* proprietor by threats, by force, and by raising up the peasantry against him. The poor peasant, if he was courted on both sides, was bullied on both sides also. If the Polish National Government and the Russian Anti-national Government vied with one another in making him presents of land at the expense of the proprietor, there was also a struggle between them as to which should give him the severest lesson with the view of keeping him on the side which each thought became him best. Ultimately the peasants, as a class, were enriched by the insurrection,

place himself at its head ; and, speaking generally, they would have nothing to do with it until some time afterwards, when all Europe had encouraged it by its applause, and prospects had been held out of foreign intervention. The whole country, however, had long been playing with revolutionary fire, and among the moderate party there were many who had helped to prepare the conflagration, though they were alarmed by the flames when they actually burst forth.

I have endeavoured to show that there were scarcely a dozen men in Poland who really wanted and ardently desired an insurrection in January 1863. The Russian Government, the Grand Duke Constantine, and the Marquis Wielopolski could not want it at all. The party of action, as a body, wanted it in the spring, and not before they had introduced a sufficient supply of arms into the country. The moderate or aristocratic party wanted it in two or three years, or still later ; but, for through it they became landed proprietors ; but they had a bad time of it while it lasted, and large numbers of them, certainly many hundreds, were hanged by the Poles. Many also were sent to Siberia by the Russians.

at all events, not until the fullest preparations had been made, until the peasant question had been settled definitively, and until the state of affairs in Russia and abroad should seem to give the rising a fair chance of success.

The insurrection was not desired by the French Government, which was allied with Russia at the time, and which had just proved its Polish sympathies by arresting Polish agents in Paris, and stopping the supplies of arms intended for the future insurgents.*

As for the English Government, its representative at St. Petersburg heartily approved of the system introduced by the Marquis Wielopolski,

* 'The Central National Committee had prepared everything to prevent the recruitment, but it met with impediments that it was impossible to foresee; especially on the part of the French Government, which condemns our movement and opposes to it the same kind of obstacles that are thrown in its way by the Russian gendarmes. It prevented the importation of arms in sufficient numbers to enable us to effect an immediate rising. The Committee, not allowing itself to be stopped by these obstacles, was thinking of other means, when the recruitment suddenly took place in the middle of the night.'—*Proclamation of the Central National Committee*, dated January 18, 1863, the day after the recruitment.

which, indeed, could only be objected to by Prussia, Austria, and such Poles as were resolved at all hazards to prevent even a temporary reconciliation between Poland and Russia. 'The humane and intelligent order of things recently inaugurated in Poland,' Lord Napier calls it in a despatch dated January 26, 1861. In a later despatch (February 27) he writes—'Ever since I made the acquaintance of Marquis Wielopolski I had been firmly persuaded of the sincerity and patriotism of that statesman, and all my aspirations were for his success in the arduous task of improvement and conciliation.'

The English Consul-General and Vice-Consul at Warsaw were also of opinion that the Poles would best consult their own interests by accepting the reforms introduced by the Marquis Wielopolski, and they have been severely censured by persons who knew nothing of the real state of affairs or of opinion at Warsaw for the blame cast by them in their despatches of the month of January on the projects of the revolutionary party.

A full month after the insurrection had begun,

it appears from a despatch of Colonel Stanton, dated February 25, that 'a paper purporting to be a programme of the moderate party had been promulgated, which calls upon the insurgents to disperse and return to their homes, as at present it is impossible for them to obtain any permanent advantages over the superior forces of the Russian empire, and stating that it is the duty of the aristocracy of the kingdom to abstain from taking part in the insurrection, so as to be in a position to act as a mediator between the government and the insurgents.'

The government cared nothing for such mediation, which, if given at all, should have been offered in support of the government measures when they had a conciliatory character, and before the outbreak had become inevitable. But the moderate party (which, however just in its demands, was yet not 'moderate,' though it was opposed to violent action as a means of obtaining them) had declared itself unable to support the government unless it united the Russo-Polish provinces to the kingdom of Poland, and granted to the new Polish state a national administration

and a free constitution. This party had been earnestly appealed to for support by the Grand Duke the day after the attempt was made on his life by a fanatic put forward by the extreme revolutionary faction, and its *non possumus* had been duly pronounced.

One month, then, after the insurrection had broken out, the moderate party, including all the men who, from their possessions, their social position, and their superior education, ought to exercise influence in the country, were isolated and powerless—unable conscientiously to join the insurrection, which they still regarded as a fatal movement; unable to check it, and unable also to make terms for the insurgents. Prince Gortchakoff had complained to Lord Napier on February 19th, that the moderate party ‘dared not give the government any active support;’ and Colonel Stanton wrote to Lord Russell on March 4th, that the pressure applied by the revolutionary committee on the nobles and others of the moderate party had become so great, that ‘the utmost firmness was required by them to resist joining the movement openly.’

It had been expected that the anniversary of the accession of the Emperor (March 3) would be made the occasion of offering a general amnesty; but, although the Polish members of the Council of State, and among them the Count Poletylo, whose mansion had been pillaged by the troops a few weeks before, attended the Grand Duke's levée, not the slightest notice was taken of them. It was in spite of 'the most violent opposition of many, even of the moderate party,' that the members of the Council of State had taken this step at all, which proved as useless as it was humiliating.

In the meanwhile the official journals of France had declared that the signing of the Prussian convention gave the Polish question a European character, and France and England had already remonstrated with the Prussian Government on the subject. It was known, too, that combined representations were about to be made to the Government of St. Petersburg by England and France, if not by England, France, and Austria. What effect could such representations have if the Polish nobility kept aloof from a movement

which, once proved not to be national, lost all importance?

The Russian ministers maintain that the 'cosmopolitan revolution' caused the Polish insurrection. It would be more correct to say that the diplomacy of France and England (and not of France alone) first gave it a serious character. The impatient, desperate, reckless men in Poland planned the rising. The execution of the plan was definitively provoked, or at least hastened, and in the eyes of the whole world justified, by the conscription; a shameful measure, no doubt, but in extenuation of which it may nevertheless be said, that it had already become a mere question of time as to whether the revolutionists should attack the government or the government the revolutionists. I mean by 'revolutionists' those unscrupulous agitators, who, by violent and revolutionary means, were resolved to force their country into insurrection in spite of itself. The insurrection grew by the enthusiasm of the townspeople, and of the young men of all classes; but the general sanction and cooperation of the landowners, without which it could not

possibly have lasted, were not secured until the intervention of Poland's traditional friends (and also traditional betrayers) took away from the struggle that character of utter hopelessness which it had at first presented.

An order published in the official journal of Warsaw on March 6th, calling upon the peasantry to assist in re-establishing tranquillity, and empowering them to arrest all 'suspicious' persons living in or passing through their villages, looked too much like an invitation to commence a jacquerie for the most moderate of the moderate party to give their countenance any longer to the acts of the government. The independent members of the Council of State (that is to say, all except the members sitting *ex-officio*) resigned their seats, and the one institution of political value that had been granted to the Poles in a scheme which contained important administrative and educational reforms virtually ceased to exist. 'Of what use were the reforms,' asked Lord Russell, looking at the question very practically, 'if under them such a measure as the recruitment could be put in

force?' They had their value nevertheless, as a crust of bread and a ragged coat have their value to a famished and frozen man.

The independent members of the Council of State resigned on March 10th, partly for the reasons above given, and partly, I believe, in consequence of a direct recommendation received from Paris. Negotiations between the representatives of the moderate and those of the extreme party had (as we shall afterwards see) been entered upon some time before, and their termination in a complete union was coincident with the publication of the appeal to the peasantry in the Official Journal. On the 10th the two great parties in Poland were united for action, and the publication of Langiewicz's manifesto as dictator on that day caused a thrill of delight through the entire nation.

CHAPTER VIII.

EVENTS WHICH LED TO THE DICTATORSHIP OF
LANGIEWICZ. .

LONG before the insurrection broke out, the extreme party, as represented by the Central National Committee, had been in correspondence with Mieroslawski, who offered to place himself at the head of the movement, on one condition. He demanded the absolute and entire direction of affairs.

The Warsaw Committee, however, thought it inexpedient to place so much power in the hands of a man who knew so little of Poland by his own personal experience. It resolved, therefore, while confiding to Mieroslawski the chief military command, to reserve to itself the political supremacy. To this Mieroslawski would not consent; and all relations between him and the Central Committee were for a time broken off, though he appears to

have still remained in communication with some of the members.

At this time much was expected from the promised co-operation of an indefinite number of Russian officers who had signed an address to the Grand Duke Constantine, complaining of the treatment to which the inhabitants of Warsaw were subjected, and pointing out that the time might soon come when they, the Russian officers, would be unable to execute the orders issued to them. These officers did not speak of resigning their commissions, nor, indeed, could they have done so without compromising themselves very seriously. Of course, the address was not sent to the Grand Duke. It was forwarded for publication to Mr. Herzen, the editor of the Russian paper published in London under the title of the *Bell*, and was in due time printed in that journal—as may be supposed, without signatures.

The projects of the revolutionary party in Poland were warmly supported by the contributors to the *Bell*; and the Central National Committee despatched an agent to London for the purpose of arranging a plan for Polish and Russian revolu-

tionists to carry out in common. I can scarcely believe that the Central National Committee ever expected to receive much aid from Russians against the Government of Russia. But such support as was offered to them they of course would not reject. The Polish agent in London informed the editors of the *Bell* that Mieroslawski, who had already entered into correspondence with them on his own account, had no authority to speak in the name of the Central Committee; and the letters interchanged on the subject between Mieroslawski on the one hand, and M. Bakounin, as representative of the *Bell*, on the other, were published in London in the Russian language towards the end of 1862. It appeared from the collected letters that Mieroslawski still claimed the right of speaking in the name of the Central Committee. Bakounin, on the other hand, declared that the Central Committee had disavowed him, and that it had requested the editors of the *Bell* to treat with some one else.

However, when the insurrection prematurely broke out, the insurgents found themselves without a head. In this difficulty the directing Committee

despatched two of its members or associates, Yeska and Danilowski, to Paris, empowering them to offer the dictatorship to Mieroslawski, on the understanding that he at once entered Poland at the head of a large band. It was also stipulated that he should make a position for himself before the 10th of March. If by that date he had done nothing to justify his appointment, the entire direction of affairs was to be resumed by the Central Committee. When, towards the end of the insurrection, Mieroslawski published what was put forward as an explanation of his conduct and position, he omitted to explain this, and replaced the conditional clause by a line of asterisks.

Towards the end of February, Mieroslawski arrived at Posen, disguised as a commercial traveller in the champagne line. Several officers, some of them foreigners, the others and the greater part Polish refugees, were waiting for him near the frontier; and a band was soon formed in the woods on the other side. While Mieroslawski was preparing for action, he fell in with the detachment of Mielencki, which had already been

some time on foot. The commander-in-chief wished to unite Mielencki's band to his own, but the latter refused to surrender the leadership of the detachment which he himself had formed. Mielencki was a proprietor from Posen, where Mieroslawski is said to be very popular with the peasantry, but where it is far more certain that he is detested by the landowners. Moreover, Mielencki had heard nothing of Mieroslawski's appointment, and did not choose to recognise his right to take the command of every detachment he met with. Either Mieroslawski or Mielencki was wrong in this affair, and perhaps both were to blame. As regards Mielencki, however, if he did not acknowledge the authority of the Central National Committee, why did he join the insurrection at all—*que diable allait-il faire dans cette galère?* It was the Central National Committee that set it going; and to refuse obedience to its commands was to establish, not empire within empire, but anarchy within anarchy.

Mieroslawski was beaten in his first battle, fought at a place called Krzywosondz, and imme-

diately afterwards recrossed the frontier. According to an account published in the *Ruski Invalid*, the insurgents, under his command, possessed a certain organisation. They manœuvred regularly, and threw out their sharp-shooters skilfully. They, moreover, knew how to form in squares and repulse the charge of the Cossacks. 'Nevertheless,' says the writer, 'they cannot resist the charge of our infantry, although their knowledge of the ground gives them a decided advantage. I must in justice say, however,' he adds, 'that their deficiency in resistance does not arise from want of courage or energy; for withstanding the incessant firing of our riflemen, the insurgents approached within thirty yards of our line of battle. Their great want is fire-arms; the greater number being armed with scythes only.'

From the frontier of Posen, Mieroslowski made his way to Cracow, where, according to the extreme party, are the head-quarters of the aristocratic and reactionary Poles. At all events, Cracow was not the place for Mieroslowski, and the attempts he made there to form a new detachment on a large scale ended in nothing.

In the preceding chapter I have endeavoured to show how after a time several causes combined to induce the moderate party to support the insurrection, which at the outset they had regarded as a hopeless and ruinous experiment. But, weak as it might be, the insurrection was yet so strong that the Russians seemed unable to suppress it. Moreover, instead of seeking to conciliate the landed proprietors who had, as yet, held aloof from the movement, the Government issued instructions to the peasantry giving them power to watch and arrest at their pleasure anyone whom it might suit them to regard as a suspicious personage. Finally, the insurrection, not much admired by good judges in Poland, was exciting the greatest enthusiasm abroad, while the signing of the Russian Convention had caused the official journals of France to declare solemnly that the Polish question had now become a European question. The situation was such, that if the Polish aristocracy and the moderate party generally had abstained any longer from supporting the insurrection, they might afterwards have had to reproach themselves with having by their ex-

cessive prudence caused an important national movement to miscarry. But the movement still owed its importance to the fact that it had elicited expressions of sympathy from men in power in England and in France. It was certain that an intervention of some kind would take place, and owing to the indignation caused by the signing of the Prussian Convention, it seemed likely enough that it would be an intervention of a very serious character.

The *Constitutionnel* published its article declaring that, through the signing of the Prussian Convention, the Polish question had become a European question, on the 17th February; and three days afterwards, February 20th, Prince Ladislas Czartoryski telegraphed* from Paris to Warsaw that the insurrection must be kept up. The word *qu'il fallait durer* passed from mouth

* Telegrams in cipher are not received in Russia, except from Embassies and Consulates; nor was it likely that they would be received in Poland during an insurrection. The Poles, however, by a system of corresponding words, contrived to telegraph to and from Warsaw whatever they wished, until at last private persons in Poland were forbidden the use of the telegraph altogether.

to mouth, and it was understood that, if the insurrection lasted long enough, France would support it by force of arms. A positive promise to that effect would beyond doubt have caused every Pole above the position of a serf to join the insurgents. As it was, thousands of young men who had nothing to do with the extreme party, and who, in the first instance, had regarded the appeal to arms as a deplorable error, were now ready to sacrifice their lives in order that there should, at least, be no pretext for saying that the Poles were too lukewarm in their own cause to deserve assistance from foreigners.

‘How long?’ is a question the unhappy Poles have often to ask. How long are they to suffer without rising? How long, when they have risen, are they to continue fighting against overwhelming odds, while their friends in the West of Europe are considering whether to help them or not? The longer the insurrection lasted, the worse would it be for the country if, in the end, the Russians gained the victory. On the other hand, a competent authority had declared that

French aid might be expected, the one condition being that the insurrection should not be allowed to collapse.

During the Crimean war, the chief of the Polish emigration in Paris had declined to be instrumental in getting up a diversion at Warsaw, unless positive assurances were given that at the making of peace the Poles would not be abandoned to their fate.* A distinct promise should also have been required in 1863. A promise, however, was at least implied in the recommendation, transmitted by Prince Ladislas Czartoryski—transmitted *through* him I may as well say—to maintain the struggle; and the Emperor Napoleon certainly wished to help the Poles at the time, provided always that he could secure allies for that purpose. ‘Keep up the fighting, and I will do my best for you,’ was what the advice given to the Polish leaders in Paris really amounted to; and considering all the circumstances; considering that the insurrection was growing naturally of itself; that the Russians were behaving most feebly though at the same time very cruelly in their

attempts to suppress it; that the Austrians were scarcely guarding their frontier at all, and were allowing detachments to be formed in the Galician woods, and arms and ammunitions to be conveyed from Galicia into the kingdom of Poland; that sympathy for the Poles was being loudly expressed in England as well as in France, and that both the English and French Governments were about to engage in diplomatic representations on behalf of Poland: considering all this, the moderate party could scarcely hold back any longer without causing their moderation to be mistaken for want of courage and want of patriotism.

The white or moderate party were, at the last moment, obliged by circumstances, and induced by the hopes held out to them, to join the insurrection. Some of the more moderate of the red or extreme party had already made overtures to them with the view of obtaining their co-operation, and on the 4th of March a meeting was held at Cracow, at which a union between the two parties was brought about.

It was effected in this manner. The white party of the kingdom of Poland had sent a de-

puty to Cracow to enter into relations with the local committees of Posen, Cracow, and Lemberg. A deputy had also been sent to Cracow by the red party; and on the 4th of March a meeting took place, at which were present Count Adam Grabowski, representative of the Central National Committee; a representative of the White Committee; a representative of the Posen Committee; a representative of the Lemberg Committee; two members of the Cracow Committee; and a representative of General Wysocki, who had been appointed by the Central National Committee to command on the right bank of the Vistula.* The object of the meeting was to unite the forces of the two parties, to abolish the white and red committees, and to place the direction of the movement, now about to assume a national character, in the hands of a central power. It was agreed to establish a dictatorship, and to

* Mieroslawski's nominal command included the kingdom as far as the Vistula. Wysocki commanded (or was to command) the insurgent forces in the palatinate of Lublin (kingdom of Poland) and in Volhynia, Podolia, and the Ukraine—where, however, no insurrection of any importance took place.

appoint to it the man who had distinguished himself most in the field. The representative of the Posen Committee said that this question had already been discussed at Posen; and that Langiewicz, who had been in the country since the beginning of the insurrection, was there looked upon as the man best fitted to take the chief command.

Langiewicz was naturally a member of the party of action. He was a Garibaldian, and had held a professorship at the Polish military school of Cuneo—which was broken up when the Emperor of Russia made its dissolution the condition of his recognising the newly formed Italian kingdom. It could scarcely be said, then, that in appointing him to the dictatorship the white party were naming one of their own men. As to his fitness in a military point of view there could be no question. By this time (March 4th) he had acquired a name throughout Europe, and Europe would certainly have been astonished if anyone but Langiewicz had been placed by his countrymen at the head of the insurrection. He had made himself the chief man in Poland by his own exploits.

The proposal to nominate Langiewicz to the dictatorship was unanimously agreed to. Count Adam Grabowski, however, as representative of the Central National Committee, explained that Mieroslowski had been appointed dictator for a term which did not expire until the 10th of March. Thereupon it was decided that Langiewicz should be asked to assume the dictatorship from that date. A deputation was sent to Goscza, near the Galician frontier, where he was then encamped, to make the proposal; one member of the deputation being Count Adam Grabowski, whom Langiewicz recognised as having belonged to the Central National Committee. He did not hesitate to accept the position offered to him by the united whites and reds. This position was not that of absolute dictator. Langiewicz was to command only in the field, and the general direction of affairs was to be entrusted to a civil government, which was to act in his name and under his responsibility. Two secretaries of this government were to be attached to Langiewicz's person, and were to countersign all decrees submitted to and approved of by him. Thus when the insurrection

first assumed an important character, there was no thought of directing it by means of an anonymous and irresponsible body. At least the dictator and the two secretaries of the government would have been public agents.

It had been decided that the civil government acting in Langiewicz's name should be composed of four departments—war, interior, finance, and foreign affairs. Each department was to be directed by a chief and a general secretary, capable, if necessary, of replacing him. All these officers, as well as the two secretaries attached to Langiewicz's person, were appointed by the representatives of the various committees at the meeting held in Cracow on the 4th of March. General Wysocki, who had already been appointed by the Central National Committee to an important military command, was made chief of the war department. A member of the Central National Committee was entrusted with the department of the interior. An active member of the extreme party (which the Central National Committee, when it was first formed, represented exclusively) was appointed to the direction of the finances: and the only depart-

ment which was placed in the hands of the moderate party was that of foreign affairs.

This, it may be observed, was a department which the extreme party had never cared for. They had no belief in the intervention of foreign powers, and the mere notion of entering into relations with foreign courts was distasteful to them. The moderate party, otherwise the aristocratic and reactionary party, is also known among the reds as the 'diplomatic' party; and the reds maintain that diplomacy has been the ruin of Poland—the object of foreign powers, in face of a Polish insurrection, being, as they allege, to keep it within bounds until at last, unaided from abroad and paralysed at home by the very endeavours made to deserve foreign assistance, it naturally dies out. Indeed, if the Poles say they are fighting for their independence, they are told that there is nothing about their independence in the Treaty of Vienna. If they merely demand that the stipulations of the Treaty be fairly observed, it is explained to them, after an agonising period of delay, that the Western Powers have the right to enforce their observance, but that a right is not an obligation.

The foreign department, then, was abandoned to the moderate or aristocratic party. The Director belonged to the kingdom of Poland, the General Secretary to Posen. Both were men who might have occupied similar positions in an independent Polish state.

Of the two secretaries attached to Langiewicz's person, one was a member of the Berlin Parliament, the other a member of the Central National Committee.

After the formation of the civil government for the maintenance and guidance of the insurrection, a commissary was chosen from each of the local committees of Posen, Cracow, and Lemberg, whose duty it was to correspond with and receive instructions from the central government. The local committees, while retaining the management of their own internal affairs, supplied the central government with funds, and formed and directed the entry of insurgent bands in conformity with its orders. A resolution was passed at the meeting of May 4th discountenancing all suggestions for extending the insurrection to the Polish provinces of Prussia and Austria.

All was going well at Cracow and at Goscza, and the day for proclaiming Langiewicz as dictator was approaching when, on the 9th March, an agent of the Central National Committee arrived at Cracow to protest against the appointment. He went to Goscza, where he had an interview with Langiewicz, who maintained, however, that Grabowski had been empowered to act as the representative of the Central National Committee, and that the decisions of the Cracow meeting must be carried out.

This visit had been caused by the representations of Mieroslowski, to whom the proceedings at the Cracow meeting had been reported, and who had sent alarming accounts to Warsaw of what he called the 'reactionary intrigue,' having for its object the replacement of Mieroslowski by Langiewicz.

On the 10th, however, the proclamation nominating Langiewicz Dictator of Poland was issued in the camp and reprinted in the journals of Cracow, Lemberg, and Posen. The same day the general secretary of the foreign department sent a despatch to Prince Ladislas Czartoryski, at Paris,

enclosing the proclamation, commenting upon it, and giving a full explanation of the cause and purpose of the insurrection. Prince Czartoryski had, at this time, no official relations with the Polish insurgents. Nevertheless, he took the despatch to M. Drouyn de Lhuys, read it to him, and *left a copy* in the recognised official manner, as between Government and Government. Some passages from this despatch combating the assertion of the Russian Government that the Polish insurrection was a socialistic, and not a national movement, were quoted by M. Walewski (of course without formal acknowledgment) in the debate on Polish affairs, which took place in the Corps Legislatif in March 1863. The despatch itself has never been published.

In spite of this formal union between Whites and Reds, news of which was at once telegraphed to the journals of France, England, and Germany (where few people knew who the 'whites' and the 'reds' were), a great number of the reds were by no means satisfied with the arrangement, and persisted, like Mieroslawski himself, in regarding it as the result of a 'reactionary intrigue.' The

'aristocrats,' it was said, had now got the direction of affairs into their hands, and Langiewicz had been made dictator under conditions which would prevent him from displaying that 'revolutionary energy' essential to the success of the Polish insurrection. The immediate followers of Mieroslawski never ceased to speak in this strain; and when Langiewicz, hemmed in by Russian troops, broke up his army, and on passing the Galician frontier fell into the hands of the Austrians, the extreme party generally took up the cry. All the harm, it was said, had come from appointing Langiewicz dictator; while some fanatics asserted that the 'aristocrats,' fearing the effects of a popular insurrection, had nominated him for no other reason than that he might be defeated. Who, it was asked, had ventured to sanction his appointment on the part of the Central Committee?—and all sorts of charges were made against Count Adam Grabowski, who had acted as its representative.

Stephen Bobrowski, already known to the reader as one of the first and most active promoters of the insurrectionary movement, and who after the fall of Langiewicz signed the order by which

the Central Committee took back the power that had been confided to the dictator, was foremost among Grabowski's accusers. Grabowski, under these circumstances, applied for the appointment of a court of honour to inquire into his conduct, and the result was his complete exculpation from all the charges made against him. He then offered his hand to Bobrowski, requesting him, at the same time, to retract all that he had said to his disadvantage, and to express his acquiescence in the decision of the court. Bobrowski refused to do anything of the kind, upon which an altercation of so serious a nature took place that, although every endeavour was made to avoid it, a duel became inevitable. The meeting took place in Silesia, and Bobrowski was mortally wounded.

It was now for the 'Central National Committee, acting as the National Government,' to carry on the insurrection. There was no question of appointing a new dictator. On the contrary, any person venturing to assume dictatorial power was declared beforehand to be a traitor, and the direction of affairs was left entirely to an anonymous body. It had been recommended, I believe, at Paris, that a

Pole whose name would have inspired his countrymen with full confidence should place himself at the head of the movement; and it, of course, was remarked, as the insurrection went on, that, as far as could be seen, the men of illustrious family in Poland kept well out of it—until, at last, its direction fell entirely into the hands of the extreme party. But as no formal promise of recognition and aid could be obtained, the men who had most stake in the country were not disposed to risk everything upon a mere chance. If the Polish agents in Paris and London had been told plainly that under no circumstances would war be undertaken on behalf of Poland, the insurrection would probably have collapsed after the fall of Langiewicz. As it was, the aristocratic class gave money, and here and there a victim, though their general attitude was still one of reserve. They waited to see whether there was to be a foreign intervention. If no intervention took place, all they had to hope was that the Emperor of Russia might be induced to grant important political reforms; and in that case it was necessary that they should not have compromised themselves personally, or they would

be unable to take any part in carrying them out. In any case it was better that the burden of fighting should, for the present at least, fall upon those who had little more than their lives to lose; for it is not by killing off the Poles, it is by seizing and confiscating Polish estates that the most irreparable injuries are done to Poland.

This abstention on the part of the landowners, as far as actual fighting was concerned, was sanctioned by the National Government, and indeed expressly recommended by it. It had one good effect which, I believe, was not thought of at the time. It quite convinced the peasantry in the kingdom of Poland that the contest against Russia was not being carried on, as the Russians asserted, with the view of re-establishing the *corvée*. On the other hand, it might be said (and the argument was often made use of by members of the democratic party), that if the territorial nobility had not a sufficiently good opinion of the national movement to join it in person, it could scarcely be expected that the peasants would prove themselves more patriotic than their masters, and rush into the field in defiance of the example set them

by their natural leaders. It seems to me certain that the only thing to do was—what was done—to leave the peasants alone. If their masters had called upon them and urged them to fight, they would have felt obliged to declare for or against the Government; and their natural timidity might have led them to take part with the stronger side. But there was little or no chance of any such experiment being made. The land-owners well knew that their *only* chance of beating the Russians lay in the intervention of foreign Powers.

CHAPTER IX.

THE FRIENDS OF POLAND.

How did the fall of Langiewicz affect the intention of Poland's friends in the West of Europe? In no way. Langiewicz was made prisoner by the Austrians on the 19th of March. But before the news of the capture reached either Cracow or Warsaw, the 'Moniteur' of March 16th had been received in both those cities, containing M. Drouyn de Lhuys' first despatch to the Duke de Montebello in reference to the Polish question. The same paper contained a despatch to the Baron de Talleyrand on the subject of the Russo-Prussian Convention, a despatch to the Duke de Grammont on the attitude of the Austrian Government in Galicia, and a circular to the French diplomatic agents, setting forth that the signing of the Russo-Prussian Convention being an international act, had given to what was at first

but a local question a general European character.

This was quite enough to convince the Poles, what they were already so eager to believe, that France had taken up their cause. It was known also, that Lord Russell had sent a despatch (dated March 2nd) to St. Petersburg, reminding the Russian Government through Lord Napier that the stipulations of the Treaty of Vienna in respect to Poland had long ceased to be observed, and advising that a national Diet and a national Administration be introduced into Poland, as the best means of pacifying the country. Lord Russell had addressed a circular to the English representatives abroad (dated March 5th), enclosing a copy of his despatch, and directing them to recommend 'a communication of similar views by the representatives at St. Petersburg of the Powers who were parties to the treaty of June 1815;' and of this the Poles were also aware. To endeavour to procure them 'a national Diet and a national Administration' was not much, especially as they had a national Administration already. But to propose such a thing at all was,

at least, a good beginning; for as it was not likely that the proposition would be acceded to, there was no saying to what it might not lead at last. Indeed Lord Russell would seem to have foreseen, at this very time, the effect which his despatches, if persisted in, could not fail to produce on the Russian Government. 'It is fortunate,' he wrote to Lord Cowley, on March 5th, in reference to the Russo-Prussian Convention, 'that the Governments of France and England have not roused in the Prussian Government a spirit of offended dignity, and thus created obstacles to their own success by presenting formally an identic note requiring a formal reply.'

'Her Majesty's Government are of opinion,' he continues in the very next sentence, 'that the next step to be taken is to invite all the chief Powers who signed the Treaty of Vienna to concur in advising Russia to recur to the stipulations and to revert to the policy of the Treaty of Vienna in regard to Poland.' In other words, to rouse in the Russian Government that 'spirit of offended dignity' which it was so fortunate not to have roused in the Government of Prussia.

The first representations, however, that were made to Russia did appear to have produced some good effect. Prince Gortchakoff gave only a verbal reply to Lord Russell's despatch of March 2nd, but it was a far more satisfactory one than the written reply elicited four months afterwards by the presentation of the celebrated six points. Moreover, though not given in writing, it was written down by Lord Napier, and the draft of the despatch containing it submitted to Prince Gortchakoff at his own request, when, after a few alterations, it became, in Lord Napier's own words, 'an authentic record of His Excellency's expressions.' It promised the maintenance of the institutions recently granted to Poland (which Prince Gortchakoff dignified with the name of a 'Constitution'*), and without promising an amnesty, as if in consequence of Lord Russell's recommendation to do

* He said truly, however, that 'the kingdom of Poland enjoyed an absolute administrative independence. Even the department for Polish affairs in the Russian capital had been abolished. The only institution common to the two countries now was the army. . . . The Imperial Government, in restoring the educational establishments of the kingdom, had offered to the people the resources of intellectual culture and satisfaction.'

so, yet announced that 'it had always been the intention of the Emperor to grant a large measure of amnesty to his revolted subjects after the cessation of resistance.'

On the 12th of April, three weeks after the defeat of Langiewicz, and five days before the presentation of the first set of despatches from the Governments of France, England, and Austria, an amnesty was in fact published, in which the Emperor offered 'a free pardon to all those of our subjects in the kingdom implicated in the late troubles, who have not incurred the responsibility of other crimes and misdemeanours committed on service in the ranks of our army, and who may before May 13th (new style) lay down their arms, and return to their allegiance.' As to the new institutions, 'while still maintaining these institutions in all their integrity, we reserve it to ourselves' (said the manifesto), 'when they have been tested by practice, to proceed to their further development in accordance with the requirements of the time and those of the country.' To have obtained for the Poles nothing but an amnesty, and the maintenance of the Wielopolski system, would have

seemed at the time a very poor result, though M. Klaczko, writing two years afterwards on the subject in the '*Révue des Deux Mondes*,' points to this as a minimum which the Western Powers might and ought to have insisted on. It would not have satisfied the Poles in 1863, who regarded the Marquis Wielopolski with the same distrust and animosity with which he had also inspired the Russians; nor would it have quieted public opinion in France and England. But it would have secured to the Poles an administrative autonomy, which there is no prospect of their regaining now; and it would have saved them from the horrible vengeance of the Russians, who, in striking at Poland, felt that they were also striking at the Powers who, through Poland, seemed to be menacing Russia.

Poland's chance of retaining a national Administration did not last long. The amnesty had scarcely been published when the Russian nobles began to vote addresses to the Crown, promising unbounded support, but asking at the same time that no concessions be made to the rebellious Poles at the dictation of foreign Powers. When Count Berg arrived at Warsaw, in April, to take

the command of the army, he became convinced that Russia could not govern Poland through a national Administration. He wrote a private letter to the Emperor declaring (in contradiction to the official theory on the subject) that Russia had not one supporter in the kingdom, but that all the Poles, whether in the Government service or not, were leagued together against the Government; and he ended by declaring that the system of autonomy introduced into Poland was quite a mistake, and could never be tried again. When the tone of the foreign despatches had become sharper, when the insurrection had become formidable in the old Polish provinces, and when the national feeling of Russia had been fully roused, then for the Russian Government to make terms with the Poles was really impossible.

Some months afterwards the notion was started, and was generally adopted in Europe, that the utter failure and worse than failure of the negotiations on behalf of Poland was attributable in a great measure to Lord Russell's having prematurely declared that England would not under any

circumstances go to war for Poland. But when Lord Russell, in answer to a question from Lord Grey, who thought it cruel to delude the Poles with false hopes, stated positively, that Her Majesty's Government had no intention of declaring war, the negotiations were already virtually at an end. Prince Gortchakoff's reply to the proposition of the six points had already been drawn up, approved by the Council of State and sanctioned by the Emperor. The debate in which Lord Russell stated that England would not go to war for Poland, took place on the 13th July, when Lord Russell knew that Prince Gortchakoff's reply had, after much deliberation, been finally decided upon, and that it would leave St. Petersburg the next morning. It was delivered to Lord Russell in London on the 18th July. If Lord Russell had waited to make his declaration until the reply had reached him, it might have been said that it had influenced him in arriving at his peaceful determination. If, too, he had needlessly delayed it he might have been accused, and at least would have had to accuse himself, of having allowed the Poles to believe in the possibility of receiving assistance from Eng-

land, when there was no longer any reason for concealing the fact that no such assistance would be forthcoming. When Prince Gortchakoff's despatch, rejecting the six points, and advising his counsellors to attend to their own affairs, was resolved upon, a new levy of ten per thousand was ordered throughout Russia, and every preparation was made for war. There was indeed nothing left for England to do now but to press her demands at the point of the sword, or escape from the negotiations in as little undignified a manner as, under the circumstances, was possible. The evil was in getting into the quarrel at all, since no intention was entertained of 'bearing' it in a becoming manner.

What the Russians thought of the Polish insurrection and of the interference of the Western Powers on behalf of the Poles is a question about which we did not trouble ourselves much in England in the spring of 1863. If by abusing the Russians (I of course am not speaking now of the Government) we could have liberated the Poles, Poland would now have been free. The Russians, no

doubt, deserved a great deal of the harm that was said of them, but their great fault, after all, consists in this, that they hold Poland; and with the exception of Lord Stratford de Redcliffe in the House of Lords, and Mr. Horsman in the House of Commons, no one occupying a political position in England has proposed that they should be driven out of it.

I can understand a man admiring the Russians for such merits as they really possess, and yet thinking it intolerable that the Poles should be the only people in Europe to whom all national life is denied, and to whom it often happens that in the same family one member is required to be a Prussian, a second an Austrian, and a third a Russian. Some exaggerations have, perhaps, been published as to particular acts of cruelty committed in Poland, but I do not think that anyone who has not lived in the country can have anything like an adequate notion of the humiliation to which the Poles are constantly and systematically subjected in every part of their native land. Their material sufferings are only the natural consequences of the moral sufferings which prompt them at every

possible opportunity to rise against the foreign Governments imposed upon them.

‘ Why cause them these moral tortures ? ’ it may be said ; but if they are not subjected to cruel restraints they will be still more certain to rebel, and will have more chances of success in their favour. If a horseman is quite convinced that he cannot ride his horse without a very severe curb, he had better use one at the risk of making the animal rear now and then, than leave it comparatively unchecked and get run away with. Such, at least, is the principle on which the three partitioning Powers have governed Poland, above all since 1830 ; and we all saw, at the time of the Crimean War, that Poland was powerless in their hands. We have also seen that when the Russian rule was relaxed, after the accession of the Emperor Alexander II., the Poles profited by it to organize demonstrations against the Russian Government, to which the invariable musical accompaniment was a hymn praying for the restoration of Poland ; and that the end of all this was an insurrection in that very part of the country (i.e. the kingdom) where alone the civil government,

from the chief to the smallest official, was exclusively Polish, and where serious endeavours had been made to conciliate the inhabitants by means of concessions, which were perhaps insufficient, but which are now regarded by all Russians as having been excessive.

If, then, the Poles are really to be assisted, they must be rescued; and there are plenty of good reasons, moral and political, for wishing to raise up Poland. But no representations on the part of Western Europe can induce Russia to give the Poles increased facilities for rebellion, and the Russians are convinced that, for the present at least, and for a long time to come, it will be impossible to conciliate them. Consult any Pole on this latter point, and he will, willingly or in spite of himself, bear testimony to the correctness of the Russian view.

Those friends of Poland who when the Poles ask for arms give them speeches against Russia and diplomatic notes based on the Treaties of 1815, are unjust to both sides; and they might be ranked among Poland's worst enemies were it not for their undeniable 'good intentions'—with which,

as M. Klaczko well observes, '*le véritable enfer*' now existing in Poland is paved. They give the Poles what they call 'moral support'—than which nothing can be more immoral; for after irritating the tyrant against the victim and urging on the victim against the tyrant, they look on, while the murder they have themselves helped to provoke is being committed. Nor do they get more credit by their feeble conduct than they deserve; for while the Poles despise them for their hesitation—which to a small nation fighting almost without arms against a great military Power must in this latest instance have appeared surprising—the Russians do not believe in their sincerity. The Russians looked upon the intervention on behalf of Poland much as we should regard an intervention on behalf of Ireland. They considered that it was prompted not by any real sympathy for the Poles, but simply by a desire to weaken Russia. If our object in intervening was simply to keep up the diplomatic tradition as to Poland's legal position under the Treaties of 1815, was not a formal representation on the subject made to Russia in 1831, and would not a renewal of that representation, or indeed a

mere reference to it, have been sufficient in 1863? If the aim, however, was to benefit the Poles, we had nothing to do but to get such terms for them as the most friendly recommendations in their favour might procure, or go to war on their behalf.

If then an inquest could be held on the mangled body of Poland, what would the verdict of an impartial jury be? That she has committed suicide, or that Russia has murdered her? And what opinion would the jury express as to the conduct of the by-standers who made no effort to restrain Poland, but on the contrary did their best to encourage her in a perfectly hopeless struggle, and then abandoned her in her despair to take her chance of breaking her own head, or getting her head broken by her enemy? If it be suicide for an unarmed man to attack armed soldiers and throw himself headlong upon their bayonets, it was something very like self-murder for exhausted Poland, alone, unarmed, and without force of any kind, to provoke a conflict with the army and people of the whole Russian empire. But it was only a wild—a maddened—minority that com-

menced the impossible struggle, and but for prospects of foreign aid, the majority of the nation would have kept out of it. Or I should rather say the majority of the educated classes, for the majority of the whole population took no part in it as it was.

Once roused, Russia most certainly sought, and is now seeking, to destroy Poland—not merely to crush the insurrection, but also to break up the social organisation of the country, and so to weaken the civilized element as to do away with all possibility, at least for some considerable time to come, of any fresh movement of a patriotic kind taking place. But with all her ferocity it is not Russia alone that should be held answerable for the present sufferings of the Poles. The West of Europe entered into a combined diplomatic demonstration the object of which was to terrify Russia into making concessions to Poland. Russia was *not* terrified, but she was alarmed. She stood upon her guard, prepared to defend herself, and in the meanwhile hastened, no matter by what barbarous means, to root out from the heart of the country the rebellion which seemed to have been

made the pretext for threatening her with a European invasion.

‘Who knows,’ thought the Russians, ‘but that this time the friends of Poland will *not* desert her at the critical moment? In that case we shall be attacked at all points, and just at a moment when, bent only on accomplishing a great internal reform, we have neglected our military establishment, and allowed our army to dwindle down to less than half its regular numbers. We are called an invading people, but Russia, of all the European Powers, is the only one that for six consecutive years has made no recruitment, and has kept her army on the lowest possible peace-formation. Now we have our reward. Poland rises, and the Western Governments, speculating on our supposed inability to fight, call upon us to make concessions which not one of them would dream of making to subjects of its own in a state of revolt—concessions, moreover, which, for the most part, we had actually made before the insurrection broke out, and without which it, perhaps, would not have broken out at all.’

‘*Tout comprendre c’est tout pardonner*’ is a

saying (of Chateaubriand's, I believe) which, like other witty sayings, is true only up to a certain point. Nevertheless, a vast deal of blame is always misapplied, because it is so much easier to condemn an offender outright than to study the actions by which he has offended, together with the motives that may have prompted them, the provocations that may excuse them, and the circumstances of various kinds that, from *his* point of view, may have rendered them necessary. 'I must live,' said the thief in the very old anecdote, when he was called upon by the tribunal for his defence. 'I don't see the necessity,' replied the judge who condemned him to death; and in the same way Poland does not see the necessity of Russia, as now constituted, continuing to exist, and, could she act as Russia's judge, would have her executed forthwith. It is intelligible enough, however, that Russia should not wish to die; and I do not think this point has been sufficiently considered in connection with the recent Polish insurrection. I do not say that Russia does not herself richly merit the fate she seeks to inflict upon others, but only that it is quite natural she should desire to

avoid it. Lord Russell thought he could tell the Russian Government how to pacify Poland and satisfy the Poles without destroying the Russian empire. Give them a few things that they already had, and a few more that they didn't want, and not one particle of what they asked for, and Lord Russell was quite sure that they would be contented.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys and Count Rechberg were, or affected to be, of the same way of thinking as Lord Russell, and all three drew upon themselves the replies addressed to them by Prince Gortchakoff—justifiable rebukes as they were, addressed to mediators who in the name of peace encouraged a hopeless insurrection which the Prince knew that they would abandon, and that he would crush. The Prince was at least in earnest, and could not fail to adopt a tone of superiority in replying to counsellors who, in an affair of life and death, must have seemed to him to be enacting either a mere farce or a very immoral 'comedy of intrigue,' and who, considered merely as advocates, had undoubtedly not given themselves the trouble to study the case of the client whom they ultimately betrayed.

I had heard when I was in Poland of Prince

Gortchakoff's popularity among his countrymen, but it was not until I went to St. Petersburg and Moscow that I discovered how great it really was, and understood on what it was based. In the West we all thought that since every State in Europe of the least importance (with the single exception of Prussia) had written a few lines to St. Petersburg in favour of the Poles, the least Prince Gortchakoff could do in reply was to testify some respect for European opinion—or, in other words, show that he was really sensible of the 'moral pressure' that was being exercised upon him. He showed, however, that he did not care one jot for the 'moral pressure' of Europe, knowing very well that he had only to resist it for a moment to feel it no more. Now, cruel and cynical as the Prince may seem to us from our point of view, he appeared to his own countrymen in the light of a struggling man suddenly menaced by three big bullies with a number of lesser bullies in their train, none of whom had any right to interfere with him, and all of whom he utterly disconcerted, first putting them off with evasive replies and requests for further explanations, and at last, when

he had made his preparations, telling them, with a plainness which irritated them and delighted all Russia, to do what they pleased.

In our eyes the Prince was guilty of duplicity, and it seems to be thought that if he meant to do nothing for the Poles he should have said so at once, so as to give the intervening Powers an opportunity of attacking Russia before she was in a position to defend herself. In Russian eyes his conduct was that of a prudent and brave traveller, who, being suddenly called upon to stand and deliver, hesitates, gets up a conversation, fumbles in the meanwhile in his pocket, and ends by producing a pistol, which at once frightens off his assailants. One thing is quite certain, that Prince Gortchakoff, speaking in the name of Russia, said precisely what Russia desired him to say, and that in his celebrated replies he represented the Russian people quite as faithfully as he did the sovereign to whom alone he is responsible. Accordingly in every Russian print shop, under every archway where 'pictures for the people' are to be found, at every railway book-stall where photographs of living celebrities are offered for sale, there the clever, intelligent,

by no means unamiable but decidedly not frank physiognomy of Prince Gortchakoff is to be seen. Let us be just to him. If I were a Pole I should detest him. As an Englishman, I wish very much that our policy had not been formed only for disgraceful failure, and that the Poles could somehow or other have profited by the representations made to Prince Gortchakoff in their favour, though I never could see how that was possible. But as an Englishman I must also admit that our opponent fought skilfully and well when he was attacked by greatly superior numbers. It was not his duty as a Russian minister to encourage the Polish insurgents by making concessions which the Poles had never asked for, and which their intervening friends only proposed because they felt ashamed not to propose something, and could think of nothing better.

It is unfortunate for the Poles, for Russia, and even for the two Powers who come forward on every possible occasion as the friends of Poland, and who desert their protégé as soon as they are plainly told to attend to their own affairs, that the international obligations of Russia in respect to Poland are not clearly defined, and that there is

no thorough understanding between England and France as to what the future position of Poland ought to be. It is a popular fallacy in France and England that these two Powers, in 1814 and 1815, finding they could not save Poland from the grasp of Russia, stipulated that at least a portion of Polish territory should be formed into a kingdom*—under Russian sovereignty, since that seemed unavoidable, but with a Constitution, a distinct Administration, and a national army.

Russia, it is true, bound herself to these conditions, but they were never stipulated for—except indeed by Russia herself. Russia, at the Congress of Vienna, desired most ardently not only that the kingdom of Poland should enjoy a Constitution, national institutions, and all possible advantages short of complete independence, but also that this novel position for a conquered people should be guaranteed by the whole of Europe.

To understand the real meaning of a treaty, as of an ordinary contract, it is above all necessary to understand under what circumstances it was

* See Appendix IV.

concluded. Now, anyone who will take the trouble to turn to the 'Castlereagh Correspondence,' or to the papers relating to the negotiations at the Congress of Vienna that were laid before Parliament last year, will see that the British representative at the Congress did not at all object to Russia's annexing to her empire the greater portion of the Napoleonic Duchy of Warsaw *as a province*, but that he objected most positively and persistently, until the very last moment, to Russia's creating the newly acquired Polish territory into a 'kingdom' with or without a Constitution. Ultimately, Russia having consented to the territorial arrangement proposed to her, the other Powers represented at the Congress consented, most reluctantly, to the formation of a constitutional kingdom of Poland under the Russian Crown. The last thing Lord Castlereagh did in the matter was to enter a species of protest predicting terrible misfortunes to Europe from the reunion of such a warlike nation as Poland to such a powerful empire as Russia. It was feared at the time that Russians and Poles would become friends. Now that it appears very im-

probable indeed that they will ever cease to hate one another, the forced union of Poland to Russia may be a disgrace, but it is certainly not a danger to Western Europe—at least not for the present.

Probably the West of Europe would still fight Russia on the territorial question—the question on which England, France, and Austria prepared to go to war with Russia in 1814, when the Emperor Alexander seemed resolved to annex the whole of Poland to his dominions. The absorption of Cracow by Austria in 1846 was an evident breach of the Treaty of Vienna, but neither France nor England cared very much about it (though both protested as a matter of form), because it did not increase the power of Russia. If, however, Russia should attempt in earnest to carry out a Panslavonian policy, and should begin by endeavouring to get possession of Eastern Galicia, which is inhabited by a Ruthenian peasant population, and seems to be regarded now by all true Russians as legitimately belonging to Russia, then, perhaps, the West of Europe would have something serious to say on the Polish question. But the object of the Polish arrangements of 1815 was to keep back the

Russian frontier,* and as long as no attempt is made to push it forward, the Poles may be certain that the West of Europe will not quarrel with Russia for omitting to grant them a separate Constitution, which, until it was found very difficult to maintain it, no one except the Russian Emperor wished them to possess.

What, then, will be the future of Poland? Will it be crushed between Germany and Russia? If not, it can only be raised up by Germany in opposition to Russia, or by Russia in opposition to Germany. A small party in Poland believes that the fate of the country, for many

* If the European Powers had thought of the interests of Poland alone, in 1814, instead of considering the interests of Europe, they would have consented to the Emperor's project of uniting all Poland, as a constitutional monarchy, to the Russian empire. But even the stipulations in favour of the nationality of the Poland of 1772 were not inserted in the Treaty of Vienna for the sake of the Poles, but from a well-grounded fear that Prussia would endeavour to Germanize her Polish subjects (an attempt she had already made even in Warsaw, between 1795 and 1806), and that by doing so she would drive them into the arms of Russia. We must remember that, in 1815, Russia was regarded, not as the oppressor, but as the tempter of Poland.

years to come at least, is indissolubly bound up with that of Russia; while another party believes that a union between Russia and Poland is impossible, and that, sooner or later, Austria, assisted by France, perhaps even by France and England, will liberate Poland, and raise up the old barrier between the West of Europe and the invading 'Muscovites.' As long as Germany and Russia remain united there can be no hope for Poland; and considering that the Poles, as a nation, hold Russians, Prussians, and Austrians in about equal aversion, it cannot be supposed that they will, of their own accord, incline towards either of their persecutors, except as circumstances may seem to render it politic to do so.

In Poland we find not only political, but also historical, and, above all, ethnological theories changed from period to period to meet the views of the moment. At one time it is evidently Poland's destiny to unite with Russia and to oppose the Germans, the eternal enemies of all Slavonians. At another, the Russians are not Slavonians but Mongols (as during the last insurrection), and Poland being connected by history,

religion, and race with the Aryans on this side of the Dnieper, can never have anything to do with the uncivilisable Touranians on the Muscovite bank.

The Czartoryski family was opposed to the Napoleonic influence when the Duchy of Warsaw existed, and held with Russia until 1830.

The Marquis Wielopolski was himself opposed to Russia in 1830, and it was not until after the Galician massacre of 1846 that he became pro-Russian, simply because the cruelty and perfidy of Austria had made him violently anti-Austrian.

General Dembinski, who played such a prominent part in the Hungarian insurrection of 1848, wrote a letter while the last Polish insurrection was going on, counselling the Poles above all things to abstain from trying to incite the Hungarians against the Austrian Government.

Circumstances change, and the Poles change with them ; but in whatever direction they move, it should be remembered that they have always the same ultimate goal in view.

There are so many ways of solving the Polish

question, that it is evidently a very difficult one indeed to solve. Ultimately it may solve itself in an unexpected manner. In the meanwhile, seven distributions and redistributions of Polish territory have been made since 1772, and there have been about as many Polish insurrections great and small, and the Polish question is by no means at an end. I have contented myself with observing it as it stood when the Polish insurrection of 1863 broke out—of which the most important internal effect has been to create a new middle class of peasant proprietors, who, I believe, understand that they owe the free possession of their farms not to any love that the Russians feel for *them*, but simply to a determination on the part of the Russian Government to injure and weaken the Polish nobility.

In the next volume a somewhat confused account will be found of the very confused state of things existing in Poland while the insurrection was going on.

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APPENDICES.

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APPENDIX I.

[THE following is an official version of the circumstances which led to the rising, and of the manner in which it was kept up, prepared for the instruction of the peasants in the Ruthenian provinces (Kieff, Podolia, and Volhynia), and read to them in all the churches. It was intended as a reply to the proclamations of the Polish National Government offering land, liberty, and (I am sorry to say) cheap brandy to all peasants in these provinces who would take up arms on behalf of Polish independence:—]

I have long desired to talk with thee, thou good orthodox Russian people (*Ruski**) living in these countries and communes, but I knew not how so that you might all hear my speech. Now I have determined to talk with you in a manner by

* The epithet *Ruski* is applied by the Russians to the Russian race everywhere. The Poles confine it to the Russians, or 'Ruthenians,' inhabiting Poland and Hungary.

no means strange; that is, I will utter all that God may put into my heart and mind, and share with you all that I know and that may be profitable and necessary for you to hear. But where shall I begin my talking with you, my good people? My soul is burdened with much that I would gladly say to you; but I must adjourn doing so till other and more peaceable times. By God's help we shall soon be able to talk about these matters at length; but now we will discuss what at the present moment old and young, learned and simple, men and women, what all Russians, in short, are thinking of. The people's proverb says, — 'Always on the tongue is the cause of grief,' and to-day we all feel but one grief, from the Czar to the subject. What pain is that? you will ask. It seems to me that many must already suppose what I am going to speak about. They guess the grief; but lest any should have failed to imagine the nature of the sore, I will call it by name. It is the revolt of the Poles against our father, the Czar, our deliverer, our defender, our benefactor. Of this I intend to speak to you, my good fellow-countrymen, and I feel it my duty

to speak to you about it because this revolt is now in the mind and mouth of everyone in all parts; among Russians, and also among the French and Germans; and it is my desire to show you some means by which we may get rid of that disease—that is, of the Polish revolt.

This very country of Russia had from time immemorial been under the rule of Russian princes descending from St. Wladimir, and formed one great family with the Northern, so called Great Russia. But after the invasion of the Tartars this orthodox Russian country, together with Lithuania, fell under the sway of the Poles, from which Chmelnicki first of all delivered Little Russia. The rest of our Russian countries were restored to our Russian family by the Empress Catherine II. How much suffering your forefathers had to endure, how our faith, our language, were oppressed by the Catholic Poles, I will tell you in detail another time. The Poles hated the Russians of old because they were Russians and orthodox; and since the never-to-be-forgotten Czarina Catherine recovered this country to Russia, they have lost no opportunity

of doing ill to Russia, and have sought to tear away this country from the government of the Russian czars, and to bring it under the old tyranny and extravagance of the Polish lords. Since then, whoever has been at war with Russia has been aided by the Poles. But special assistance was given by them to Bonaparte, the French Emperor, who in 1812, without any cause, invaded our orthodox Russia with all his subject nations. After the fall of this Bonaparte and his dismissal into banishment in the Island of St. Helena, Poland's neighbours, to whom she had done many evils, divided her into three parts among themselves. To Russia fell Poland Proper, or the Polish kingdom. Hence that chief nest of the restless and rebellious 'Lechs.' Since that time nearly fifty years have elapsed. In the course of that half-century the Poles might have lived in peace, and more happily than they ever lived before. The protection of the Czar saved them from their neighbouring enemies, checked them in their own domestic disorders, filled their poor land with Russian bread and gold, introduced order into their administration, and defended the weak

among them against the mighty. It would seem that nothing more could have been wished for.

But no; the Pole was never fond of peace and order, and he gnashed his teeth at being obliged to obey the Czar, and at not being allowed to maltreat the serfs like beasts, to mock the orthodox religion; to let the Russian churches on lease to Jews, as the Poles did formerly; to take away poor men's property at will, to hang or shoot with impunity—in a word, to live here on Russian soil like a savage in the woods. Having been unrestrained by the excessive mildness of the Emperor Alexander I., and having gained strength under his gracious protection, the Poles revolted in 1830: but the late Emperor Nicholas I. punished their outbreak as it deserved—destroyed their bands, took their capital by assault, delivered them over to Russian law, divided Poland into governments, diminished the power of the lords over the peasants, and established in Poland half the order that reigns in Russia. The Poles bowed before him, but the more proud, extravagant, and unmanageable among them retired into foreign countries, telling lies and calumniating Russia,

and the orthodox Russian Czar, as they alone can do, and stirring up envy and hatred against him and against all Russians. And although the Poles had deserved no mercy, nevertheless the boundless grace of our Czar, Alexander Nicholaievitch, the most kind father of all his subjects, dismissed the past in Christian forgetfulness, and gave to Poland many rights and privileges, thinking, 'Perhaps by grace I may bring them to live in brotherhood with me and with Russia; I will overcome their hatred by love, compassion, and great-heartedness.' By no means! The more the grace of the Czar was multiplied, the more were the 'Lechs' ungrateful and seditious; and when the tender Czar, loving his subjects as his children, and considering them as his brothers in Christ, granted the Polish peasants freedom from the arbitrariness and oppression of their lords, then their anger against him grew greater than ever. As they had not learned to labour and live in comfort without the blood and sweat of their serfs, whom they always treated like cattle, they determined to grasp the Russian people once more into their power, and thereupon commenced a revolt against

your magnanimous redeemer, beloved of Jesus Christ!

At first the revolt glimmered like a spark in the ashes, almost imperceptibly. The Poles put on mourning, chanted seditious hymns against Russia, murmured in the streets, conspired secretly, gathered among themselves and extorted from the peasants money for the rebellion, excited the nation to rise against the beneficent Czar, the redeemer, and calumniated him, and even the gift of freedom granted by him to the people. In his presence, on the contrary, they calumniated the people, while they caressed and followed him, promising him various fair things, which they never meant to do, just to bring him on to their side, and to sow discord in the Russian family. They fired at their appointed chiefs in the Polish kingdom; killed like assassins several persons who, mindful of their oath, would not take part with the rebels; excited to mutiny our faithful, orthodox, devout soldiers; and narrowly failed to murder the Czar's brother the very day after his arrival in Warsaw, when they could not know how he would govern the Polish kingdom, and purely from brutal hatred.

Meanwhile the plot grew incessantly, and bands of conspirators multiplied. The chiefs of the revolt—Polish fugitives who had been concealing themselves abroad—gathered money, commanded risings, spread among foreign nations falsehoods and calumnies against us and against the Czar, saying he oppressed them, and endeavoured by tears and other tender deceptions to arm against us those who envy us.

Finally, when the chiefs of the rebellion thought they had friends enough abroad and that enough bands of rebels had been collected, then, on the hell-memorable night of the 10th and 11th of January [Old Style], they fell throughout the whole Polish kingdom on the sleeping Russian soldiers, and stabbed, slew, and strangled them. Those who defended themselves in houses were burnt alive. O my God, how much innocent, orthodox blood was shed by men calling themselves Christians! How many of our brothers perished that night by the hands of impious, hateful assassins! It was long since the world had heard of such brutal, ferocious murdering. Such fury is not known even among savage cannibals, and, hark! in Poland

it rages for the third time in the space of seventy years.

The slaughtering thus ordered by the Poles still continues. They are hanging our soldiers by the entrails, flaying the bodies of unarmed generals whom they have killed, falling upon peaceable inhabitants, forcing to revolt the Polish common people who love our Czar and repulse with all their might the rebellious nobles, and very often drag them captive before our military commanders. But when the rebels have force on their side, they compel others to follow them into the woods, arm them as they can, and encountering our military, place them in the front to meet an inevitable death, the rebels themselves, as their forefathers used to do, flying into the thicket. Those, on the other hand, who, fearing God, will not join in rebellion with them, are killed without mercy. The Polish priests not only do not check, in the name of Christ, this abominable slaughter, this revolt against the Czar, chosen of God, but, on the contrary, in spite of their calling, provoke it. They murder unarmed women, kill their own friends, change the

temples of God into dens of robbers, into workshops for every sort of weapon, lead on the bands of rebels, and in their sermons delivered in the churches demand from the tender Jesus the most varied and horrible means for the extermination of the orthodox.

But let us turn away our eyes from these Polish murderers and look around us. I have already told you that the Poles endeavour to ingratiate themselves with the people, whom not long ago they oppressed, and whom they would devour alive if they could. They attempt it in every manner, pretending to be the people's friends, and promising to them freedom and the distribution of land, and delivery from the recruitment, and cheap brandy, and the education of their children after their fashion, and all other things. Shut your ears, my brethren, to their insidious promises! Fly from their Judas-like embraces and kisses, from their perilous Catholic teaching! I conjure you by God not to trust to the words of these men, to whom an oath is a joke, and murder virtue. If they really wished to do you good, they had plenty of time for it,

and no one prevented them. Meanwhile remember how they treated you ten years, and especially forty years ago. At that time you had no property, neither wife nor daughter, nor labour nor fortune. Now, if such was your existence when the Russian Czar adopted you into his Russian family—when he, with all his strength, sought to protect you against the arbitrariness of the nobles by the inventory law, in which it was clearly laid down how many of you, for how many days, and in what manner, were to labour for the landed proprietor,—a law which the landed proprietors scarcely ever observed,—then, what sort of life did you lead 100 years ago, and still further back?

As to that, your bitter life, I will speak to you another time; but now I conjure you again and again, in the name of Christ God, not to believe in these promises of the Poles, to look on all their promises as the bait by which they think to catch your simplicity, that they may afterwards treat you as they please, that they may fetter you unarmed into eternal slavery—farm, as of old, your churches to the Jews—drive you like cattle, and take from you with impunity all your property,

and even your lives. Do not forget the Russian proverb, 'Pat the horse till you have him in the harness.' Bear in mind the Polish proverb, 'Promises and caresses are the delight of fools.' Remember that the lords are fighting for their arrogance, and not for your freedom. More freedom than you enjoy now is the portion of no one on the globe. You govern yourselves; you labour two days in the week for your land, or pay a small interest for it, and the rest of your time and all the fruits of your labour are yours.

May you profit by your freedom through the help of God, and may it become you well; but also say prayers to God for the orthodox Czar, our never-to-be-forgotten benefactor. Do not believe in the grants of lands by which our enemies, the foes of our Church, Czar, and country, seek to ensnare you to themselves. If they really give you some bit of barren soil, you will water it with your tears, and you will be imposed with such taskwork for it, that, as it was in old times, you will never have a free holiday. While your other Russian brethren, young old, men and women, will go on holidays to pray

in the church, you will be drenching yourselves with sweat and tears at haymaking in the field. And if they give you anything, they will take it back the first year that they no longer want you. Did anyone ever hear of the '*panowie Lachowie*' (Lechite or Polish gentlemen) keeping their words? A very different thing is the word and promise of our orthodox Czar. If he says anything, so it must be. As he told you that he would ransom the soil for the people from the landed proprietors, so he has done it unalterably. The waters of the Dnieper will turn back before the word of the Czar will remain unfulfilled. Do not believe, my brethren, that, having overpowered you, the lords would free you from recruitment. Where would they get their soldiers, a great number of whom they would require with their tumultuous dispositions? When the nobles, now on our soil with swords at our throats, lead your brethren into the woods in order to teach them to rebel against their Czar, what would they do if they could drive you like oxen, treat you like some dead thing, when there would be nobody to defend you?

With cheap brandy, the orthodox Christian can only be tempted by the devil, the Lech, or the poor Jew. We know very well whither tends the cheapness of that accursed brandy. The lord would place a Jew in his inn; the Jew would suck the sweat and blood of the orthodox, would deprive him of his last cow, his last bite of fruit, and his last ten eggs, of his home and happiness, of his health and life. Let us not endure such a diabolic invention; and so we shall be happier, richer, and shall live longer. For that reason brandy is not cheap in our country, in order that the people may feast less and sin less, that they may think more of God, and be more prosperous and more healthy, and that drunkenness may not remain unchecked, the cost of which is devoted to the support of the army, the redemption of the soil, the education of the people, and so on.

As to the education which the Catholic Poles would force upon your children, it is not worth speaking of. It is their design to transform your children into Catholic Poles, to tear them away from the orthodox confession; but as for

teaching them any good, that they never dream of. In general, think as you will of these baits presented by the rebellious and revolt-exciting nobles—these baits are but falsehoods and treachery, leading to sin, robbery, apostacy, and perjury. Look, my orthodox Russian brethren, with both eyes—look sharply around, and do not allow yourselves to be led away by various liars, rebels, and vagabonds, who, with you or without you, prowl about in divers hiding-places. As soon as you perceive any of these gentlemen beginning to approach you, lurking like a fox, beginning to speak against our Czar and the authorities, against our Russian brethren, against our wardens, our orthodox priests, then strike them on arm and leg, and bring them to the authorities. But, for God's sake, do not go beyond bounds and rise against the landed proprietors; and whatever you have agreed to and confirmed by your signature in the lawful deed of contract [the *gramota* of the Emancipation Act], that do exactly and conscientiously without needing constraint. This is required of you by conscience and justice, and is commanded by God and man. Even among

the Polish lords there are many good men who formerly neither wished nor did you wrong. When, by the grace of God, either you grow richer, or the merciful Czar ransoms the soil for you, they will then be good neighbours to you, and will willingly assist you with their intellect, advice, protection, and in cases of necessity with their fortune; helping you with loans and other such services as neighbourly obligations.

I am obliged now to address some words to you as to one particular effort of the rebels. They perceive that they cannot attain their bad designs without the country people; therefore, beside those deceptions by which they have sought to ensnare the peasants, and about which I have already spoken to you, they have calumniated you not only before foreign monarchs, but also before our Russian Czar. They have declared that you all desire a union with Poland—to be separated from your Russian brethren, from the orthodox Czar, your redeemer. A formidable, Satanic calumny! But, as to that, our Czar did not believe it; he is conscious of his people's fidelity, of their love for the faith of their forefathers; he knows that

an orthodox Russian will never betray either God or the Czar, that he would rather die than become an apostate, a Judas, such as sold Jesus Christ. Yet his soul suffered when his faithful people were calumniated; and the foreign monarchs have believed the calumniators' words, and, expecting that you will aid the Poles in their rebellion against the Czar, are ready to take up arms against him and our beloved Russia. But let them dare, and they will see that among the Russian people there are no traitors such as would sell Christ; and we will not be terrified nor troubled, for God is with us, who confounds the wicked and helps the work of right. One feeling will move us all—one full, unchangeable love for the Czar, the orthodox confession, and our native land. No foe is formidable to us. Fifty years ago we repulsed the whole world. Our God will not forsake us now!

APPENDIX II.

RUSSIAN TRUTH AND POLISH LYING.*

ORTHODOX CHRISTIANS,—It is known to the whole world that lately the Poles have behaved with great treachery. They have been guilty of perfidy to our great Czar, Alexander Nicholaievitch, Emperor of all the Russias and King of Poland. For all his good they have returned evil. They have made riots and risen in insurrection.

They want Poland to be an independent kingdom. But Poland, alone, is not a large country. Out of Poland alone it is impossible to make a strong kingdom, with a separate king, as of old.

* The pamphlet or pseudo-historical sketch published at Moscow under the above title was distributed gratuitously or sold at the nominal price of four copeiks (less than twopence). In London or Paris, where paper and printing cost much less than at Moscow, a pamphlet of the same dimensions would have been sold for as many shillings or francs.

Accordingly they wish to take, in addition to their little Poland, nine Russian governments,* and the very holy city of Kieff, which they would turn into a Polish city. The Poles wish to rule where the Apostle Andrew, the First-called, planted the cross; where Saint Vladimir, the Equal of the Apostles, baptized the Russians in the orthodox faith; where numbers of saints sleep in the caverns of the Petcherskaia Laura. In the sacred city of Kieff, in the Jerusalem of Russia, instead of the churches of the Holy God, the Poles wish to establish Roman Catholic churches, and in the Cathedral of St. Sophia, in the Laura of Kieff, and in other holy places, to introduce 'the abomination that maketh desolate' spoken of by Daniel the Prophet.

The Poles want to root out the orthodox religion in these nine governments, and to convert the Russian people living there to the Latin religion; that they may no longer regard Jesus Christ but the Pope of Rome as the head of the Church; that in the sacrament they may not take the blood

* i.e. The Polish provinces seized at the three partitions of the 18th century, now incorporated with the Russian Empire.

of Christ, but unleavened bread alone; that they may not believe in the saints of the Eastern orthodox Churches who shine in holiness, but may accept as saints those who have appeared in their impure Latin Church. In one word, the Poles want Russians and orthodox Christians to forsake the customs, laws, and glory of their fatherland, and wickedly to follow the priests of the Roman Catholic religion.

The Poles wish to break the new law established by our orthodox Czar Alexander Nicholaievitch, so that bondage may exist as formerly, and that orthodox Russian Christians may live in terror of the Polish nobles of the Latin religion. That is what the Poles desire, that is why they are so turbulent, and that is why they began their insurrection immediately after our great Czar had liberated the peasants.

In their spite against the Russians, the Poles say that our Holy Catholic and Apostolic Church, our orthodox religion, is heretical. They do not even regard us as Christians. They call our holy religion *chlopska vera*, that is to a say, a boorish [or slavish] religion. But what did the Poles do

with the orthodox when they were in power? How they used to torment and tyrannize over the Russians, how they used to pollute God's churches and give them on lease to Jews, is known to every one. Whoever reads the old books, the religious books of Cyril (?) and others, must know how the Poles behaved to the Russian people. In Little Russia, White Russia, and the Ukraine, the people know without books how their grandfathers and great-grandfathers were treated by the Poles. The Poles are now returning again to their old customs. They hang the orthodox, they torture the Russian priests and martyrise them. They beat their families, rob and burn their houses, and rob and burn the orthodox churches. And at the heart of all this are those Latin popes, who are priests in their way. These priests leave the cross of Jesus and go about Russian territory with guns and swords, killing the orthodox, and even their own Catholics, if they will not rise against the Czar.

They hang the people with their own hands, and then with the same hands serve the mass. The Latin priest receives confessions and also hangs those who remain true to their sovereign. Not

long ago our soldiers caught such a one. This Latin priest had already hanged eighteen persons, and the nineteenth was confessing with the noose in his hand. At that moment the priest was caught.

It is known to the whole world that we Russians are of Slavonian race, that our language is the Slavonian language, and that the holy Gospel is read by us and God's service performed in that same Slavonian tongue in which it was performed a thousand years ago when our first teachers, St. Cyril and St. Methodius, translated the books of the Church from the Greek. Without regarding that, the Poles, intoxicated with rage, tell and assure foreigners that we Russians are not Slavonians, but Calmuks or Tartars; that we are savages and do not know God; that the Russian Czar should not rule such a large empire; and that the Russian people should not live where they do live, but should be sent to Siberia, and the Russian land given up to the Poles, because they are Poles and true Slavonians. The Poles are really Slavonians by origin, but having subordinated themselves to the Pope of Rome, they forgot

the Slavonian tongue long ago, and now sing their prayers in the Latin language, which they don't understand.

Listen, orthodox Christians, as to how the Poles got up this insurrection. Our orthodox brothers who live in those nine* governments—that is to say, in Lithuania, White Russia, and in Kieff, Volhynia, and Podolia—were at one time in the power of the Poles. These countries were from time immemorial Russian, when, six hundred years ago, for our sins, with the permission of God, the Tartar Batu-Khan overran our land, &c. &c.

[The writer goes on to argue that the Lithuanian and Ruthenian provinces fell into the power of the Poles during the Tartar invasion, and that when (four hundred years afterwards) Russia, by joining in the partition of Poland, regained possession of them, she only acquired what lawfully belonged to her. The writer insists throughout that the great object of the Poles in rising against the Russian Government was to re-establish serf-

* There are three 'governments' in Lithuania Wilno, Grodno, and Kowno; and three in White Russia—Mogileff (in Polish, Mohilew), Witepsk, and Minak.

dom and to destroy the Russo-Greek religion, and he gives horrible and revolting accounts of acts of cruelty which he accuses the Poles of having committed towards defenceless Russians.]

APPENDIX III.

[THE following memoir was never intended for the public eye. But it is only from documents *not* intended for the public eye that the truth can be known as to what the Russian Government really thinks of the difficulties of the Polish question. Thus in documents prepared for publication the Russian Government loves to quote statistics with the view of proving that in the Polish provinces incorporated with the Russian empire, the Poles form only an insignificant minority. In his private report the Minister of the Interior points out that if the Russian Government has the ignorant masses on its side, every man of the slightest education is opposed to it. In public documents great stress is laid on the fact that the great majority of the inhabitants of these provinces, and nearly the whole of the rural population, belong to the Russo-Greek Church. In the minister's private report, it is explained that many millions of the

Greek-Uniate peasantry, having been converted to the Russo-Greek religion against their will, and 'without understanding that they were returning to the religion of their forefathers,' have still a leaning towards the creed in which they or their parents were born; and, moreover, that the Roman Catholic religion being the religion of the noble, the wealthy, and the educated classes generally, is still, virtually, the dominant religion. The peasantry of the Russo-Polish provinces (*i.e.* of Lithuania and Ruthenia) were, for the most part, converted to Christianity by the Eastern Church. But, at the end of the sixteenth century, when the political union between Poland and Lithuania was formed, the Lithuanian and Ruthenian bishops of the Eastern Church formed a union with Rome. They accepted the doctrine of the double procession, and acknowledged the supremacy of the Pope. On the other hand, they were allowed to retain their ritual in the old-Russian or Slavonian tongue; and the priests of the new 'Greek-Uniate' Church were still allowed, as in the Eastern Church, to marry.

After the partitions of the eighteenth century,

Catherine II. forced some two millions of her new subjects to forsake the Greek-Uniate for the Russian Church. The Emperor Nicholas, after the insurrection of 1830, simply abolished the Greek-Uniate Church in the Polish provinces. The chief members of the higher clergy were gained over. The priests were called upon either to join the Russian Church or to become Roman Catholics—which for married priests was not easy. Many priests were sent to Siberia. Many more, having a wife and family to maintain, entered the Russian Church. The nobles who still belonged to the Greek-Uniate Church were also allowed, and at the same time compelled, to adopt either the Russo-Greek or the Roman Catholic religion. Unfortunately for them, in a national if not in a religious point of view, the great majority of the landed proprietors had long before joined the Church of Rome, thus separating their future from that of their peasantry, whose church though in union with that of Rome was yet not the same church.

In connecting the peasantry of the Greek-Uniate Church with the Russo-Greek Church, no ceremony was used, but only compulsion. Some

of the more obstinate among them were exiled, others adopted the doctrine of the double procession after being flogged; but only a few thousand, out of as many millions, remained Greek-Uniate, or relapsed, after the general conversion, into Greek-Uniatism. These backsliders were driven into the Russian fold during the present reign. The driver was General Stcherbinin—a civil functionary with a General's rank, whose proceedings were formally approved of by His Majesty the Emperor. In justice to General Stcherbinin, I must mention that he used no physical violence, but only persuasion accompanied by menaces.

It will be seen from Mr. Valouieff's secret report that the system of forcible conversion practised in the Polish provinces has not been attended with the success anticipated. As the lawyer has one language for the court and another for his client, so a Russian minister has one language for the public, at home and abroad, and another for his own sovereign. He may not tell the whole truth even to his sovereign; in the case of Poland it would be disrespectful to do so. He cannot say that every civilized person in the provinces seized

by Russia at the three partitions of the last century is still a Pole, and that every Pole hates Russia; nor that the Poles, as a nation, sigh for their ancient independence. He is obliged, moreover, to speak of the agitation which culminated in the insurrection of 1863 as the work of professional revolutionists acting in Poland only because other countries were closed to them. But, as far as he can do so with propriety, he gives a fair picture of the political, social, and religious condition of Lithuania and Ruthenia just before the outbreak of the insurrection; and he points out the iniquitous measures by which alone Russia can maintain her hold on provinces entirely Polish by civilization.

Mr. Valouieff is known to be one of the most intelligent and also one of the most liberal of His Imperial Majesty's ministers, and he has been an active supporter of every reform introduced into Russia during the present reign. In Poland, however, and in the Polish provinces, the one problem is—how to keep the country?—and it is only by raising up class against class, and by destroying every vestige of existing civilisation, that the Russians

can maintain their position. In annexing foreign provinces, as in appropriating another man's ideas, '*quand on vole il faut tuer ;*' and if Russia retains her Polish provinces permanently, it is only by a murderous perversion and misapplication of the Voltairian precept that she will be able to do so. She may brutally destroy such life as they now possess. She has no power to infuse new life into them, and so transform them.]

Memorandum on the general Progress of Affairs in the Western Provinces from the early part of 1861 to the present time, drawn up by Mr. Valouieff, Minister of the Interior, from documents in possession of the Ministry of the Interior and the 3rd Section of H. M.'s Chancery (Secret Office). (Presented to the Committee on the Western Provinces in Oct. 1862.)

HISTORICAL SKETCH OF EVENTS.

The revolutionary movement, long nurtured in Germany, energetically suppressed in France, and so strikingly successful in the Italian Peninsula,

soon spread to the principal component parts of ancient Poland, to Posen, Galicia, and the present kingdom. But while Galicia and Posen, restrained by the systematic and decisive action of the Austrian and Prussian Governments, confined themselves to feeble manifestations of sympathy with the events occurring in the south-west of Europe, Warsaw, the capital of the kingdom, emboldened by the mild rule of Prince Gortchakoff, entered upon an open struggle with its legal Government. Having distinguished their opposition by the novel appearance of an unarmed insurrection, the leaders of the insurrectionary movement in the kingdom of Poland strove hard to strengthen their position abroad, by enlisting the sympathies of the Western Powers through the instrumentality of the foreign press and by accusations against Russia, and in the interior of the empire by developing a revolutionary propaganda and attracting to it, in particular, the inhabitants of the Western Provinces—Lithuania, Volhynia, Podolia, Kieff, and White Russia. However well history may have disproved the pretensions of Polish nationality to the provinces above mentioned, and however limited their

population of purely Polish origin, the propaganda immediately directed towards that minority, composed as it is of the most educated classes of society—of the nobility, the clergy, the officers of Government, of the teachers and the taught—that propaganda had a rapid success. Soon after the events at Warsaw of the $\frac{1}{2}\frac{3}{8}$ and $\frac{1}{2}\frac{4}{7}$ February, a certain sympathy became apparent at the principal points in the Western Provinces. The earlier symptoms of that state of feeling were—a feverish excitement of the public mind, especially observable in the Polish youth; a sudden haughtiness on the part of the Poles in their bearing towards Russians; a strained attention to the events passing in Poland, and an anxious expectation of news from that quarter; lastly, an ill-concealed joyfulness at the success of the opposition to the Government. In the meanwhile the leaders of the movement, taking advantage of the excited condition of the public mind in Lithuania, and in the Western Provinces generally, increased their endeavours to inflame the popular passions. It has been ascertained, that about this time the country began to be invaded by the revolutionary proclamations of

Microslawski and Czartoryski; by calls to oppose the authorities, and invitations to sympathize with the movement, and to imitate the scenes of Warsaw. The inhabitants were called upon to devote a certain portion of their income to the liberation of their common fatherland; funds were transmitted by secret channels to evil-disposed persons abroad; and the necessity of a good understanding between the educated and the lower classes, and principally with the villagers, began to be agitated, with the view to engender a hatred towards Russians and disaffection to the Government. Mourning and emblems of national grief gradually came into general use. Revolutionary verses, speeches, and proclamations of every kind—frequently even fictitious ones, such as the letter attributed to Archbishop Fijalkowski—soon made their appearance. These proved the existence of a moveable printing-office.

Political demonstrations increased, and took diverse forms; such as funeral services for those killed at Warsaw, the singing of patriotic hymns in churches, the celebration of anniversaries, and the glorification of the principal

events and leaders in former revolutions in Poland; the wearing of mourning, and the compulsion of others to do the same; noisy and numerous processions, disrespect to the authorities, disobedience of their orders, and insults to the military. These manifestations were all the while accompanied by the raising of funds for criminal objects, by an increased activity of the secret press, by a strained effort on the part of the educated classes to draw closer towards the people, with the decided object of destroying their allegiance to the Government, by means of false interpretations of such legislative measures as immediately concerned the interests of the peasantry. These endeavours went in some localities so far as to cause numbers of the higher orders of society to mix in crowds of the lower orders; ladies were seen to dance with drunken or only half-sober peasants, and gentlemen with peasant women. In these cases deep mourning was replaced by the most vivid colours. On separating, the common people were presented with revolutionary proclamations, verses, songs and hymns, and with emblems of grief, to be here-

after constantly worn. There were even cases of numerous and noisy meetings prepared with a manifestation of violent intent, in order to force the Government to shed blood, and thus rouse the people. Taken separately, the development of that system of political demonstration and organised opposition to Government proceeded in different degrees of intensity, and there were periods in which the movement either rose or fell. In Wilno, the first demonstration after the events at Warsaw was made by Tyszkiewicz, district marshal of nobility. On the report of the late Minister of the Interior, H.I.M. was pleased, in accordance with the recommendation of General Nazimoff, to discharge Count Tyszkiewicz from the office which he held. That measure led to a special demonstration on the part of the nobles who had assembled in June, at the invitation of the Governor-General, to elect another marshal. The nobles presented an address of thanks to Count Tyszkiewicz, supported by forty-six signatures, in consequence of which General Nazimoff refused to confirm the new election, banished to various parts of the empire four of the

nobles who had been most active in the matter, and dismissed from the service the clerk who had been charged with the preparation of the address.

Another demonstration was produced in the district of Bielostock, in the Government of Grodno, by the temporary stay there of Count Andrew Zamoyiski. The crowd assembled on his departure took off their hats, threw bouquets of flowers, and shouted 'Hurrah for Zamoyiski, the first nobleman of Poland.'

The singing of hymns, the celebration of funeral services, and the wearing of mourning were continued during the months of May, June, and almost the whole of July, in several parts of the Governments of Wilno, Kovno, Grodno, and Minsk.

A solemn funeral service had already been celebrated in the month of April at Minsk, at the instigation of a district marshal of nobility and on the invitation of Archbishop Fijalkowski.

In the province of Kieff, according to a report of the Adjutant-General, Prince Wassilitchkoff the Governor-General, dated 5/17 December, 1861, the excitement produced by the events at War-

saw towards the end of February had entirely ceased by the month of May. The measures adopted in Warsaw towards calming the public agitation exercised a favourable influence on the Poles of the Western Provinces. Then the Imperial reprimand to the Provincial Marshal of Volhynia and the District Marshal of Zitomir for their participation in funeral services for the repose of those killed in the riots at Warsaw; the banishment to provinces of Russia Proper of the nobles who had taken an active part in those services; the exile to Omsk of a priest who had preached a revolutionary sermon; the severe warning and reproof addressed to the priests who had performed funeral services, and generally the rapid and increasing prosecution of persons who had participated in demonstrations, produced the desired effect, withheld the evil-disposed, and cooled the imagination of those who were being led away.

Although a few persons were found to be badly disposed, yet their actions were only special and desultory manifestations, possessing no common character or connection. By the month of August 1861, the position of affairs in the south-western

provinces had undergone no change, and the occasional Polish demonstrations were apparently of no great importance. Up to that time the action of the Government had been confined to the above-mentioned measures of precaution and administrative prosecution. The Governor-General of Kieff, as will appear from the forejoined, found other measures necessary, and the Governor of Podolia, in reporting to the Ministry of the Interior (Report of Actual State Councillor Braunschweig to the Minister of Interior, June 4/16, 1861) the state of the provinces confided to him, and the arrangements which he had made for the preservation of order, insisted with the view of definitely pacifying the country on the necessity of developing the Russian element in all the phases of social life; i.e. he recommended a series of measures involving many considerations, necessitating a lengthy execution, and promising only a remote result. The Governor-General of Wilno was equally silent on the adoption of any other measures except those of an administrative character for the restoration of tranquillity in the provinces committed to his care. But in the mean-

while the third section of H.I.M. Private Chancery (Secret Police) and the Ministry of the Interior had almost simultaneously taken up the question of the discovery of other means for suppressing the Polish movement in the Western Provinces. These departments were chiefly prompted by a consideration of the inconvenience which attended an exclusive recourse to administrative penalties inflicted at the discretion of the local authorities, and of the evident insufficiency of such measures for the attainment of the object desired; for, notwithstanding the successive adoption of those measures, the revolutionary propaganda and accompanying demonstrations had not been interrupted. The third section and the Ministry of the Interior adopted the idea of legal prosecution of political disturbances whenever the publicity of the actions of the participators permitted the possibility of such a course. Early in July projects for the establishment of special police courts for such cases were drawn up. The acting ministers of the Minister Valouieff informed the Governor-General of Wilno and Kieff by telegrams of the proposed institution of such courts.

The following replies were received:—1. From Prince Vassilitchkoff: 'I also find the proposed measures useful, but the most of inflicting penalties prescribed, permitting however in extreme cases recourse to existing special measures.' 2. From Adjutant-General Nazimoff: 'If you consider judicial police measures better adapted for suppressing demonstrations than administrative measures, I concur. I shall, however, transmit my opinion by post.'

General Nazimoff then requested permission to visit St. Petersburg on matters relating to the service, which was accordingly granted to him.

Events soon confirmed the necessity of adopting new measures for the preservation of public tranquillity. On the approach of the 31st July, the anniversary of the union of Lithuania with Poland in 1569, the leaders of the political movement in the Western Provinces prepared fresh demonstrations for the solemn commemoration of the fusion of the two countries. In the town of Rossieny, on the 31st July, a crowd of young men, women having taken some banners from a church, proceeded, with singing of hymns, towards a cross near the town, on the road to Kovno, and

then returned to the church. A similar procession was to have taken place at Kovno, with the participation of the inhabitants of the kingdom of Poland. After communicating with the military commander of the Government of Augustowo, in order that he might take the measures which depended on him to prevent the breaking out of a riot in the village of Alexoff (?), the Governor of the Province of Kovno, on his part, caused to be withdrawn the floating bridge across the Niemen, which separated the village from the town of Kovno, and placed along the banks of the river a platoon of Cossacks and a company of the garrison battalion. Notwithstanding these preparations, the inhabitants of Kovno of both sexes assembled on the morning of the 31st July in the Augustine Church, and thence formed into a procession, numbering about 5,000, and carrying crosses, banners, and images, accompanied by the clergy, proceeded towards the Niemen. A similar procession was at the same time approaching the river from the village of Alexoff (?) in the kingdom of Poland. Mass was performed on either side of the river, and then the crowd, having pushed back

the Cossacks, began to put up the bridge. Notwithstanding the warnings of the authorities, the priests and the people obstinately announced their intention of crossing the river at all hazards. In order to prevent bloodshed, now becoming unavoidable, Vice-Governor Koretsky, in charge of the province, who had no special directions for such a contingency, ordered the Cossacks to fall back. The crowd then crossed the river on the bridge, which they had re-established, and with solemn chants proceeded to the village of Alexoff,* returning to Kovno the same evening.

The same anniversary was celebrated in the town of Minsk on the 31st July. The ceremony was marked by the numerous attendance of the people in the church, by the ladies wearing coloured dresses instead of mourning, and confederate caps instead of bonnets, and also by the men wearing the national costume. The 31st July was similarly kept in other towns and places in Lithuania. Revolutionary hymns were even sung on that day in the churches of Lepel and Drissa, districts of the province of Vitepsk. On the 6th August a

* In my MS. translation the last syllable of this word seems to be incorrectly written.

religious ceremony was performed with extraordinary solemnity at Caswich, in the district of Lepel. After service, some of the landed proprietors, dressed in white robes, carried the banners round the church, and after the procession the whole crowd went down on their knees and sang a revolutionary hymn.

After that, under the plea of a report in circulation at Wilno, to the effect that in the early part of August a procession was to reach the town from the Kingdom, in which the inhabitants of Vilna were to take part, a crowd, composed of persons of every condition, began to assemble daily, from the first days of August, in the Pogulianka suburb of Wilna, and repeatedly sang revolutionary hymns over the grave of the criminal Konarski. In the evening of the 7th August, a crowd of about 5,000 persons proceeded from the town towards Pogulianka. Having at the town barrier met a company of infantry and two hundred Cossacks, a part of the crowd halted, while the other fell upon the foot-soldiers with the evident intention of disarming them and passing the barrier. Stones taken from the pavement, and brought up by the women in their pockets and

the skirts of their dresses, were showered upon the troops. The men began to arm themselves with pikes taken from a neighbouring fence. The Cossacks then dispersed the crowd by force. Having been put to flight, the crowd proceeded to the image of the Holy Virgin of OSTROBOMA (?), sang a revolutionary hymn there, repeating the chant before a crucifix, and then went home.

In the meanwhile, towards the end of July, special councils were held by order of H.I.M. to deliberate on the measures to be adopted in view of the state of affairs in the kingdom of Poland and the Western Provinces. They were attended by General Count Lambert, who had been appointed to fill the office of Lieutenant in the kingdom, and by General Nazimoff, who had arrived from Wilna. The latter pointed out the inimical tendency of the Roman Catholic clergy, and explained that, at that very time, many legislative enactments were naturally calculated to excite, not only among the clergy, but also among the whole of the local population professing the Roman Catholic faith, a feeling of disaffection and opposition towards the existing system of govern-

ment, especially in regard to the regulations connected with ecclesiastical matters. General Nazimoff pointed out, at the same time, some legislative acts which were humiliating to the Roman Catholic Church ; such, for instance, as the ecclesiastical procession in commemoration of the establishment of the Uniate Confession performed on the same day as the procession of the Roman Catholic Church in honour of the Corpus Domini, and the direct subjection of one religion to the other, as conveyed in the prohibition to construct Latin Churches without the concurrence of the orthodox (Russian) diocesan authorities. Several other questions were submitted to preliminary discussion at the councils; such as the establishment of police courts, and the placing, if necessary, in a state of siege districts where disturbances assumed very large proportions.

At this time the Imperial Government received the first intelligence of the demonstration at Kovno and other places, and a despatch from the Governor of Minsk reporting the spread of disorder in the provinces under his charge. Count Keller advised the disarming of the inhabitants, as

in 1848. His Majesty the Emperor, after a preliminary discussion in the Imperial presence of the several measures proposed to be adopted in the North-Western Provinces, and extended thence, in case of need, to the South-Western Governments, was pleased to confirm, among others, the following proposals :

[Here follow proposals to increase the number of troops in the provinces in question ; to disarm the local population by means of announcements from the police authorities, and without at first taking measures of a compulsory character ; to prohibit demonstrations in the open air ; to take no compulsory measures with reference to church demonstrations in the churches themselves, but to prosecute and punish such of the clergy as may be found guilty of favouring them or of offering no resistance to them ; the known leaders of such movements to be arrested after the crowd has left the church, and in a 'circumspect and sudden' manner, so as not to increase the general agitation by such arrests. It is further recommended that 'the reasons for which such measures are adopted be announced in

circumspect and temperate language.' The other propositions, of which there are altogether as many as twenty, are to the effect that officials not to be relied upon be removed, and those absolutely under suspicion brought to trial 'according to due process of law;' that the state of siege be proclaimed where it is thought necessary; and finally—this being the twentieth and last proposition—'that certain questions relative to the Roman Catholics in the empire be examined at the Ministry of the Interior.' The memoir states that in fact 'certain administrative arrangements were made with reference to questions connected with the Roman Catholic Church,' but without specifying them. All the repressive measures above indicated were adopted and carried out.]

On the 29th August, [continues the memoir,] Assistant-General Nazimoff telegraphed to His Majesty the Emperor at Livadia in the Crimea, that the Western Provinces were tranquil; but on the 24th, he had already declared in a state of siege the towns of Wilna, Grodno, Bielostock, Bielsk, Brest-Litewski, and the province of Kovno,

with the exception of the Novo-Alexandrovska district. In the province of Kieff, the town of Zitomir was placed in a state of siege towards the end of September. The disarming of the population, which had hitherto been considered unnecessary by Prince Vassilitchkoff, was, at the same time, extended to the South-Western Provinces. The adoption of these measures was necessitated by the continuation of the ill-affected propaganda in all its previous forms, and by the repetition of various political demonstrations. The most important of these were—

1. A procession formed at Grodno on the 14th August by the deacon Maiewski, notwithstanding the prohibition of the Governor and Governor-General, and which was only stopped on its way to the Niemen (over which it intended to pass in order to enter the kingdom) by being surrounded by the military; and,

2. The erection on the night of the 20th–21st September, on the cathedral square of the town of Zitomir, of a black cross with the inscription, ‘To the memory of the Poles murdered in 1861.’ This cross was removed by the police; but a turbulent

crowd led by ladies demanded its restoration, and the chief of the province was obliged to call in a company of infantry and gendarmes, which dispersed the crowd. Although at first, after the declaration of the state of siege, outward demonstrations became less frequent and were more cautiously conducted, yet the condition of affairs underwent but little change.* Mourning and national dresses continued to be worn. Even in the provinces of Mogileff and Witepsk the same anti-governmental movement which had embraced the rest of the Western Provinces, although in lesser proportion, became apparent. The youths of schools everywhere took an active part in political demonstrations, and the university riots at St. Petersburg and other towns, in the autumn of 1861, showed that even beyond the limits of the Western Provinces, many men of Polish origin systematically cooperated with other agitators, and were in close relations with the secret leaders of the movement.

* General Nazimoff wrote to the Minister of the Interior, in Dec. 1861, that 'the excitement had not decreased in the least.'

In the meanwhile the Government adopted some measures supplementary to the original regulations against disorders in the Western Provinces, or of a character to remove opportunities for further rioting. In conformity with the view of the Governor-General of Kieff, it was considered inconvenient to prevent the meeting of the members of the Agricultural Society of the province.

On the 23rd August, His Majesty ordered that whenever the Governor-General in the Western Provinces should consider it necessary to place any particular locality in a state of siege, the persons whose conduct had been the principal cause of the adoption of such a measure should be tried by martial law, and the sentence carried into effect without loss of time. Later, on the 21st October, the Governor-General of Kieff was permitted to adopt the following measures without the previous declaration of a state of siege :

- a. To dismiss functionaries in all branches of the service ;
- b. To establish in extraordinary cases military commissions for trial by martial law ;
- c. To adopt for the preservation of order at

his, Prince Vassilitchkoff's discretion, the measures laid down in the regulations proposed by the committee, and confirmed by His Majesty on the 5th August, 1861.

On the 22nd October, Prince Vassilitchkoff was authorised to dismiss from the university such Polish students as had been observed to participate in demonstrations, and whose conduct had been unfavourably reported by the police and university authorities, and to deport them under the surveillance of the police.

In answer to a question raised by Adjutant-General Nazimoff, His Majesty authorised on the 28th October the Governor-General to be invested with authority to remove even the members of the nobility in localities declared in a state of siege. On the report of the Minister of the Interior, dated 19th October, His Majesty the Emperor was pleased to write the following resolution: 'My immutable will to be again made known, that whenever a state of siege is declared, it is to be enforced in all its severity without any relaxation.' A military governor was appointed to Minsk, owing to the increase of disorders in that

province. At different periods Imperial orders postponed the nobility elections in the provinces of Wolna, Kovno, Grodno, Minsk, Witepsk, and Volhynia. [The nobility of Podolia had just petitioned for that province to be annexed to the kingdom of Poland.] Police courts were also ordered to be introduced in Mogileff and Witepsk and in some of the towns of the South-Western Provinces where they had not been previously established.

By order of General Nazimoff, a heavier house-tax on landlords of the Roman Catholic persuasion was now imposed at Wilna. That tax gave rise to complaints, and was a subject of correspondence between the Minister of the Interior and the Governor-General, who declared that he considered it necessary to continue the tax until the 1st October of this year.

Lastly, besides the authority of the police courts, an activity which produced results varied by localities, and in addition to the action of the military-judicial commissioners, the local authorities adopted administrative measures in the shape of penalties against persons guilty of political disturbances. A considerable number of those

persons were deputed to places of residence within the empire, more or less remote.

THE PRESENT STATE OF THE COUNTRY (*i.e.* in Oct. '62).

It has already been stated that after some localities had been declared in a state of siege, demonstrations became less frequent and were more cautiously conducted. But except during the period which immediately followed the adoption of these measures, while the order and means of their execution were not practically demonstrated, the diminution of the outward signs of discontent cannot be ascribed to the effect of the state of siege. Other circumstances contributed to produce an appearance of greater tranquillity, such as the lateness of the season, the infliction of administrative penalties, the action of the police courts; and further, the participators in the riots had grown tired in some localities of making demonstrations, or perhaps had begun to act under other instructions secretly received from the chiefs of the movement. If the outward signs of discontent grew more feeble, the propaganda in the interior of the country acquired a relative strength. The late revolutionary appeals

to the people advise them to abstain from further demonstrations. Lithuania and the South-Western Provinces, these addresses say, have sufficiently shown to Europe their fixed determination to throw off the Russian yoke and to be united to Poland with its ancient boundaries. They recommend the people to wait for a more favourable opportunity—for events in Italy and Hungary, or for the revolution preparing in Russia. In the meanwhile, the national strength should be directed to the concentration of mutual measures in the work of liberation; to bringing the rural population over to the cause; to placing the Jewish element on an equality with the rest of the nation; to the dissemination among the lower orders, by means of education, of Polish ideas and traditions; to the promotion of a love of Polish history and national amusements; lastly, to the elevation of the popular mind, with a view to future events.

The priests, as usual, in order to render nugatory the action of this law, instructed the people at the confessional to commit perjury at the police courts, and actively instigated them to counteract the views of the Government. The

landed proprietors now secretly consulted whether it were possible by territorial sacrifices to gain the favour of the peasantry towards their cause. A sudden movement to establish schools for the people in which the Polish language should be taught was also observable, and the Ministry of the Interior was obliged in the spring of this year to direct the local authorities in the North-Western Provinces to these attempts. In the Southern governments the schools for the people had already been the object of the special solicitude of the Governor-General. [Which means, that those who established them were prosecuted, and fined or imprisoned.]

At last, revolutionary proclamations and sheets of a criminal character began to be circulated in all shapes and in every local dialect. They were scattered along the roads, left at houses, sent through the post-offices; while none of the distributors have ever been discovered.

It is impossible not to observe a general connection in all that is done in the Western Provinces. If in some respects Lithuania, White Russia, and the Ukraine act separately, and even

differently, as for instance in the preparation of projects respecting land-banks, still it is in every case evident that all that is done in the north is at once and fully known in the south, and *vice versa*; and that, in other respects, there is a systematic unity between the acts of the Polish party in the north and south, and in White Russia. There is everywhere the same tendency towards organised associations under the plea of forming rural or benevolent societies; everywhere absentees from the country of greater or less importance; everywhere, even on the shores of the Baltic, the celebration of certain anniversaries; everywhere the wearing of mourning, even in the capitals: in fact, a general desire to manifest an attachment to Polish nationality and to protest against an immediate dependence on Russia. Thus in the affair of Bogusz, the Marshal of Rogaczeff, the nobility of White Russia showed a tendency to unite with Lithuania on the basis of the restoration of the Lithuanian statute and the official recognition of the Polish language; in the project of the north-western land-bank, the use of the Polish language was recommended in the

transaction of the business; and lastly, at the provincial assembly of the nobles of Podolia, pretensions to union with Poland, and the separation of the whole of the Western Ukraine from the administrative unity of the empire, were openly manifested in the form of an address to H.I.M.

The outward tranquillity of the country, and the cessation to some extent of demonstrations in the streets and churches, present the important advantage of rendering more difficult any action on the feelings of the masses, and of placing the Government less frequently under the necessity of having recourse to legal indictments and administrative penalties. The state of siege was raised at Wilna on the 1st October. In the Government of Minak and Mohilew it was considered possible to permit the convocation of the provincial assemblies of the nobility, the first in the month of November, the second in January 1862. But the decrease of outward signs of perturbation can only be temporary. The events at the election of Minsk may necessitate arrangements similar to those which were made in the case of the Podolian assembly [*i.e.* imprisonment of the marshals of the nobility]

and another adjournment of the election of Mohilew. In fact, notwithstanding all the absence of sympathy on the part of the masses of the rural population towards the Polish agitation, *it is still to be feared that even amongst those classes an anti-governmental movement may in time be produced.* It became expedient to profit by experience, and to discuss anew the measures to be adopted in order to ensure the safety of the empire in the West. H.M. accordingly ordered the re-appointment of the 'Western Committee.'

Up to the present time experience has given us a series of facts which deserve attention.

Neither the state of siege, nor the action of police courts, nor the latitude given to the local authorities with regard to administrative penalties, has as yet afforded the benefits which had been anticipated. Positive results were expected, and only palliative results obtained. No firm consistency or certain mutual agreement can be traced in the actions of the several authorities. Views have been liable to change and to diversity. Circumstances have not been faultlessly anticipated. Attention has been, and is still, directed

towards modes of action which the Government have long contemplated, or towards such as do not promise the desired effect, or which require a process of time inadmissible under present circumstances.

In the Western Provinces the Government have on their side only the masses of the rural population, which cannot be utilized without the effusion of blood, without the destruction of the general principles of civil order, and without the danger of disturbing those principles in the neighbouring [*i.e.* Russian] provinces, and thence even in other portions of the empire. It is of course possible to raise the peasantry against the proprietors. The well-known scenes of Galicia would put to flight those nobles who now so haughtily call these provinces Lithuania or Poland. But can we determine on the use of such measures? Will it be possible to arrest their effect at an ideal line, separating one district from another? The nobility, clergy, citizens, the scattered gentry (*szlachta*), are more or less inimical to us, or, at all events, indifferent observers. The Jews have not joined the movement, but they cannot be said

to have opposed it. They see the advantage of neutrality, they ask for fresh privileges, and by that position certainly afford a negative advantage to the Government. But we can scarcely find in them the power of any influence on the settlement of the question. With regard, however, to the orthodox clergy, and to the upper and middle classes of the Russian inhabitants of the provinces, their small numbers and the manner in which they are scattered, and particularly the absence of any signs of independence, have prevented those elements of the local population from acquiring any real importance.

Lastly, throughout the empire in the oldest provinces of Russia, even in Little Russia, where the ancient hatred of the Poles has been preserved in all its force, *there exists a striking indifference towards the struggles in which the Government is involved against the revolutionary pretensions of the Poles. Nowhere, either by word or deed, has the slightest sign of sympathy been shown towards that struggle and towards the preservation of the interests of the unity of the State.* A few newspaper articles are of no account in this case. In

order to be convinced of the spirit in which those are chiefly written, we have only to turn to the *Den (Day)*, where it treats of the Podolian address. The pretensions of the Podolian nobles are certainly not admitted, but that non-admission is based entirely on the theory of nationality; there is no reference to Russia as a state, and when the Government is mentioned it is only to give expression to an opinion that the Government could not satisfy the wishes of the Poles, even if it desired to do so, because the days of the Vienna Congress have passed. The above facts require some explanation.

The state of siege, as it was practically applied, especially in the Lithuanian Provinces, was scarcely deserving of the name. Practically it was confined to a greater severity of police regulations, and the institution of military courts whose verdicts were either not in accordance with martial law, or not carried into execution when founded on it. Michalowski, the proprietor, in the Government of Kovno, at whose house several dozens of muskets were discovered after that province had been disarmed, together with several pounds of

powder, was only kept in custody during the enquiry, and then sent to reside on his estate under the surveillance of the police. Others were banished to distant governments, or, as in the Kieff government, drafted into the military service. The governors of provinces generally acted with perfect independence in the confirmation of the verdicts of the military courts and in the infliction of administrative penalties. They banished to distant provinces, without any previous reference to the Minister of the Interior as to the place to be selected for such residence, and they brought the exiles back at their own pleasure after the expiration of a greater or less period of banishment. Thus, in the province of Wilna, some priests were recalled after five months' banishment who had been the chief promoters of local religious demonstrations. Recently, when the Minister of the Interior proposed to Adjutant-General Nazimoff the expulsion of some other priests who had taken part in the funeral services for the assassins executed at Warsaw, General Nazimoff replied (20th Sept. 1862), that banishment was attended with considerable expense for post-horses, and that it would

be convenient for the punishment of the guilty to select a few monasteries to which they might be sent under surveillance.

The police courts have likewise proved inoperative, owing to the manner in which they have been conducted by the local authorities. The instructions issued by the Ministry of the Interior prescribed to the court to prosecute chiefly, not the singing of hymns of a suspicious character, but rather the compelling of others to join in such singing, and the insulting of persons who did not wish to join in it; that in case of the irregular acquittal of an accused person, the prosecution should be carried to the next court of appeal, and that any irregularity on the part of the district judges and advocates should be reported in the proper quarter. Notwithstanding these instructions the prosecutions in the police courts were generally accusations of singing hymns in churches; appeals were made but rarely, and no representations were ever made of the improper discharge of duties by judges, advocates, and others, although the unsatisfactory conduct of these officers was sometimes reported in general

terms. In the same manner, attention was not equally or properly bestowed by those courts on the latitude which had been allowed to them with regard to the infliction of penalties. Thus it appears that in the Government of Kieff 298 persons were condemned in fines amounting to more than 20,000r. (3,000l.); whereas in that of Wilna 27 persons were fined to the amount of 716r. (107l.), and in Minsk and Mohilew 52 persons to the extent of 900r. (135l.). Nor are the reports of the police courts forwarded to the Ministry of the Interior at proper intervals according to their instructions. In the province of Witepsk, not a single case has been brought before the police courts, but the Government several times recommended the banishment and dismissal of Korsak, the President of the Civil Court, who had been at the head of several demonstrations. The Ministry of the Interior addressed the Minister of Justice on that subject, and in May last President Korsak was relieved of his duties, and, by the order of the Home Ministry, expelled from the province.

The extensive correspondence of the Ministry

of the Interior with the local authorities testifies to the cooperation which has always been afforded by the ministry, and its attention to their representations, and the extreme care with which the forms of the law have been observed in cases of divergence of opinion. The results of such relations cannot, however, be said to have been satisfactory. It is only fair to state that the relations between the Ministry of the Interior and the Governor of Kieff presented fewer difficulties than those with the Governor of Wilna; but even in the southern districts events were frequently at variance with the anticipations of the local authorities, or took them sometimes unawares. Thus the Governor of Podolia, one of the most able and active lieutenants in the whole of the Western Provinces, reported with reference to the nobles of the province, that the most important and influential section of the Polish population, the great landed proprietors, had always been distinguished by their conservative principles and by their abstinence from manifestations of sympathy with Polish nationality.

[In conclusion, the author recommends the

adoption of the following measures 'in order to counteract the effect of the Polish propaganda and to retain possession of the Western Provinces.']

1. To establish in the Western Provinces a purely Russian administration; i.e. to replace by Russian officials, or by those who are devoted to Russia, such Polish employés as have no sympathy with the views of the Imperial Government.

2. To endeavour to Russianize the peasantry by every possible means, and first, by establishing a considerable number of popular schools in which the Russian language should be exclusively taught.

3. To place these schools under orthodox priests.

4. To defray the expenses of such schools by a tax on the land to be paid by the proprietors.

5. To maintain constantly the antagonism between the nobles and the peasantry, and to prevent by every possible means any union of those classes.

APPENDIX IV.

THE ARRANGEMENTS OF 1815.

At the end of the campaign of 1812-13 Russia found herself the mistress of the whole of ancient Poland. After it had been vainly proposed by Austria and Prussia on their own behalf, and by England on behalf of Europe, that the Emperor of Russia should consent to the reconstruction of the Poland of 1772—a proposition never seriously pressed—Lord Castlereagh declared himself ‘compelled in this the fourth instance of Russian aggrandisement within a few years, by a sense of public duty to Europe, and especially to His Imperial Majesty (Alexander I.), to press for a modification, not for an abandonment, of His Imperial Majesty’s pretensions to extend his empire farther to the westward.’* At this time

* Correspondence relating to the Negotiations of the years 1814 and 1815 respecting Poland; presented to the House

Austria and Prussia had lost all their Polish territory, and it did not appear probable that they would ever get any important part of it back again, without going to war. This explains their sudden disinterestedness in respect to that Poland which not many years before they had helped to destroy.

Although it had been settled by the Treaty of Kalisch (February 28, 1813), to which Austria, Prussia, and Russia were parties, that the Duchy of Warsaw should be divided and partitioned between Austria, Prussia, and Russia, 'according to arrangements to be made by these three Powers, without any intervention of the Danish Government,' * 'it is nevertheless understood,' writes Lord Castlereagh to the Earl of Liverpool, 'that His Imperial Majesty the Emperor of Russia considers himself entitled to dispose of the whole Duchy of Warsaw, with all its fortresses, on the ground that his troops first occupied the Duchy; that, however, as matter of grace and favour, of Commons by command of Her Majesty, in pursuance of the address dated May 15, 1865, page 7 (Letter to Emperor Alexander).

* Correspondence, &c. page 3.

he means to assign to Prussia the city and territory of Dantzic, and a district necessary for connecting Ancient Prussia with the other Prussian territories: and it is further understood that it is the intention of His Imperial Majesty to connect the residue of the Duchy of Warsaw with the Russian provinces which were allotted to Russia by the former divisions of Poland, and to erect them into a separate monarchy, to be governed by His Imperial Majesty as King of Poland, under such arrangements as may be judged suitable for reviving the kingdom of Poland under the Russian dynasty. And this measure is alleged to be necessary, on the principles of moral duty, in order to produce a due improvement in the government of His Imperial Majesty's Polish subjects, and of the people of the Duchy of Warsaw, who are at present subject to him, by His Imperial Majesty's military occupation of the duchy. The contemplation of this measure has necessarily created great alarm and consternation in the Courts of Austria and Prussia, and diffused general apprehension throughout the European States.'

The 'arrangements judged suitable for reviving the kingdom of Poland under the Russian dynasty,' included, of course, the establishment of a constitutional government in the new kingdom. On this point Lord Castlereagh, who desired the revival of a kingdom of Poland apart from Russia, but not the revival of a kingdom under the Russian dynasty, wrote to the Emperor of Russia as follows:—

'I must also entreat, Sire, if you find me opposed, in a certain extent, to your Imperial Majesty's pretensions on the Duchy of Warsaw, that you will not therefore consider me indisposed to witness, even with satisfaction, that your Imperial Majesty should receive a liberal and important aggrandisement on your Polish frontier. It is the degree and the mode to which I alone object.'*

And again:—

'I should press these considerations with the more reluctance if I did not feel persuaded that there is a course open to your Imperial Majesty to pursue, which will combine your beneficent

* Correspondence, &c. page 6.

intentions towards your Polish subjects with what your allies and Europe, Sire, claimed at your hands. They desire not to see the Poles humiliated or deprived of a mild, conciliatory, and congenial system of administration. *They desire not that your Imperial Majesty should enter into any engagements restrictive of your sovereign authority over your own provinces.* They only wish you, Sire, for the sake of peace, to ameliorate gradually the frame of your Polish administration, *and to avoid, if you are not prepared for the complete reunion and independence of Poland, that species of measure which, under the title of higher import, may create alarm both in Russia and the neighbouring States ;* and which, however it may gratify the ambition of a few individuals of great family in Poland, may in fact bring less of real liberty and happiness to the people than a more measured and unostentatious change in the system of their administration.' *

Here it is plainly set forth that no one wished His Imperial Majesty 'to enter into any engagements restrictive of his sovereign authority over

* Correspondence, &c. page 7.

his own provinces.' More than that, the Emperor of Russia, struck by Lord Castlereagh's suggestion that he should ameliorate gradually the frame of his Polish administration, replied—

'As regards the concern which I owe to my own subjects, and my duties towards them, it is for me to be aware of them; and it is only the uprightness of your motives which could have made me change the first impressions which the reading of this passage of your letter produced upon me.'*

Ultimately the best plan for the Western Powers to adopt seemed to be to let the Emperor of Russia form his constitutional Kingdom of Poland, on condition of his giving up Posen to Prussia, and Galicia to Austria. This was called 'yielding on the political if His Imperial Majesty' would yield on the territorial question.' The discovery is due to Prince Hardenberg, that to join a constitutional kingdom of Poland to Russia, would be to weaken, not to strengthen, that empire; and that Poles and Russians, placed under the same sceptre, instead

* Correspondence, &c. page 12.

of uniting and endeavouring to regain the Polish territory, which it was now proposed to cede to Prussia and Austria, would fight among themselves. This view is set forth in the following passage, extracted from a confidential memorandum communicated by Prince Hardenberg to Lord Castlereagh:—

‘Plus j’y pense et plus je suis du sentiment que de notre côté nous devons céder sur la question politique, parceque j’y vois beaucoup plus de profit que de danger pour le repos de l’Europe en général, et pour les voisins de la Russie en particulier. Je vois la force et la puissance de celle-ci plutôt affaiblie qu’augmentée par ce nouveau Royaume de Pologne sous le sceptre du même souverain. La Russie proprement dite perd des provinces très-considérables * et fertiles. Combinées avec le Duché de Varsovie, elles auront une constitution tout-à-fait différente, et beaucoup plus libérale que celle de l’Empire. Les Polonais jouiront de privilèges que les Russes

* It is known that the Emperor Alexander proposed, in 1814 and 1815, to include his Polish provinces, now falsely called Russian provinces, in his new Polish kingdom.

n'ont point. Bientôt l'esprit des deux nations sera tout-à-fait en opposition, leurs jalousies empêcheront l'unité, des embarras de tout genre naîtront, et un Empereur de Russie, en même tems Roi de Pologne, sera moins redoutable qu'un Souverain de l'Empire Russe, réunissant à celui-ci la plus grande partie de *ce pays qu'on ne lui dispute pas, comme province*. Je ne crains nullement que les sujets anciennement Polonais de l'Autriche et de la Prusse, tendant sans cesse à se joindre à leurs compatriotes, donnent lieu à des troubles. Une administration sage et paternelle obviéra facilement à toutes les appréhensions de cette nature. En un mot, la conviction la plus intime s'est formée dans mon esprit, qu'en voulant empêcher l'Empereur de rétablir un Royaume de Pologne sous son sceptre, nous travaillons contre notre propre intérêt, tant par les raisons que je viens d'exposer que parceque nous nous ôtons le meilleur moyen de négocier sur les frontières.' *

Lord Castlereagh, however, was still of opinion that the effect of forming a constitutional king-

* Correspondence, &c. page 29.

dom of Poland under the Russian Crown would be to attract the Polish provinces of Austria and Prussia to Russian Poland. 'I am convinced,' he wrote to Lord Liverpool, January 11th, 1815, after the partition of the Duchy of Warsaw between the three Powers had been decided upon, 'that the only hope of tranquillity now in Poland, and especially of preserving to Austria and Prussia their portions of that kingdom, is for the two latter States to adopt a Polish system of administration as a defence against the inroads of the Russian policy.' *

For no one, in 1815, thought Russia was likely to oppress and attempt to denationalize the Poles. It was her interest and object at the time to conciliate and make once more a nation of them. Such, at least, were the views of the Emperor Alexander personally. Lord Castlereagh afterwards recommended the three Powers to 'take an engagement with each other to treat as Poles, under whatever form of political institutions they may think fit to govern them, the portions of that nation that may be placed under their re-

* Correspondence, &c. page 41.

spective sovereignties.'* 'Experience' he wrote, 'has proved that it is not by counteracting all their habits and usages as a people that either the happiness of the Poles or the peace of that important portion of Europe can be preserved. A fruitless attempt, too long persevered in, by institutions foreign to their manners and sentiments to make them forget their existence, and even language, as a people, has been sufficiently tried and failed. It has only tended to excite a sentiment of discontent and self-degradation, and can never operate otherwise than to provoke commotion and to awaken them to a recollection of past misfortunes.'

This was written, not, as is now sometimes supposed, for Russia, but specially for Prussia, under whose government endeavours had been made to Germanize even the city of Warsaw. The Prussians had introduced a German administration and the German language into all their Polish provinces, and Lord Castlereagh probably thought that this in some measure explained the readiness with which the Poles of Prussian Po-

* Correspondence, &c. page 43.

land had risen in 1806 to throw themselves into the arms of France.

About a month afterwards, February 1815, a distinguished Polish nobleman, Prince Radzivil, called on the Duke of Wellington at Vienna, 'and,' says the Duke in a letter to Lord Castlereagh, 'after adverting to the promises made by the Emperor of Russia to the Poles, and reading the Constitution according to which His Majesty had promised they should be governed, said that he was apprehensive that His Majesty would be under the necessity of departing from his promises to please his Russian subjects; and that even if the system should be completely carried into execution in the Duchy of Warsaw, it would not be extended to the Polish provinces which had been under the dominion of Russia before the war; and that in the meantime the Prussian and Austrian Governments, but particularly the latter, showed but little inclination to adopt the liberal principles in regard to the Poles recommended by your Lordship to those Powers. Under these circumstances, Prince Radzivil expressed a wish that the subject should be taken

up again in the Conferences of the five Powers, and that I should propose that the Emperor should take upon himself the title of "King of Poland," and should govern all his Polish subjects according to the Constitution His Majesty had promised them, and that the other Powers should conform to the same as far as was practicable. I could not discover, from what he said, whether Prince Radzivil had or not been sent by the Emperor; but I told him that I could not again revive the subject of Poland, nor could I repeat unnecessarily what your Lordship had entered upon the Protocol of the Conferences of the five Powers regarding that kingdom. That it would be highly satisfactory to us to find that the Poles were well governed by the different Powers under which they were placed, and we should applaud any liberal system according to which any of the Powers should announce to the world that they intended to govern their Polish subjects; but that it was *impossible for us to propose such a system*, or to go further than your Lordship had done.' *

* Correspondence, &c. page 45.

Finally, the following article was presented at the Congress by the Russian plenipotentiary, and approved by the other plenipotentiaries :—

‘Le Duché de Varsovie, à l’exception de la ville libre de Cracovie et de son territoire, ou des provinces dont il a été autrement disposé en vertu des articles ci-dessus, est réunie à l’Empire de Russie. Il y sera lié irrévocablement par sa Constitution pour être possédé par Sa Majesté l’Empereur de Toutes les Russies, ses héritiers et ses successeurs à perpétuité. Sa Majesté Impériale réserve de donner à cet état, jouissant d’une administration distincte, l’extension intérieure qu’elle jugera convenable. Elle prendra avec ses autres titres celui de Czar (“Roi”) de Pologne, conformément au Protocole usité et consacré pour les titres attachés à ses autres possessions.’

Fifteen years afterwards Russia (as Prince Hardenberg alone had foreseen) having failed to conciliate the Poles, the insurrection of 1830 took place. On its suppression, England, which in the first instance had objected so strongly to the formation of a constitutional kingdom under the Russian sceptre, insisted on the maintenance of

this kingdom with all its constitutional rights. In point of law, an agreement is no doubt an agreement, and must be observed in its integrity, even though the party who demands the execution of certain clauses may in the first instance have objected to their introduction. Nevertheless, it is a fact that the Polish Constitution of 1815 was granted spontaneously by the Emperor of Russia, notwithstanding the opposition of the Western Powers; and this, no doubt, explains to some extent why Austria and Prussia did not complain of its being withdrawn, and why England and France only complained very faintly, at the suggestion of the Poles themselves, and without feeling directly aggrieved in the matter. If the West of Europe ever goes to war for Poland, it will not be with any absurd intention of conquering a constitution for the Poles, but with the more simple and intelligible view of liberating Poland, as Greece and Belgium were liberated through the aid of England and France, and as Lombardy was liberated by France and Sardinia.

END OF THE FIRST VOLUME.

THE PRIVATE HISTORY
OF
A POLISH INSURRECTION

FROM OFFICIAL AND UNOFFICIAL SOURCES.

BY

H. SUTHERLAND EDWARDS

LATE SPECIAL CORRESPONDENT OF 'THE TIMES' IN POLAND.

'Remember, I pray thee, whoever perished being innocent, or where were the righteous cut off.'—*ELIPHAZ the Temanite*.

'I have heard many such things.....I also could speak as ye do. If your soul were in my soul's stead I could heap up words against you and shake mine head at you. But I would strengthen you with my mouth, and my words should assuage your grief.'—*JOB*.

IN TWO VOLUMES.

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THE PRIVATE HISTORY
OF
A POLISH INSURRECTION.

CHAPTER I.

CRACOW : MARCH, 1863.

NEVER since the coronation of the last Polish king, who was crowned in this once royal city, has Cracow been so full as it is now. Instead of the deserted look which it generally presents, all the principal streets are as crowded as those of London on a general holiday. The hotels are 'crammed to suffocation,' as theatrical managers say, and visitors in search of rooms have to inscribe their names on the books, and to wait an indefinite time for their turn to be admitted. Numbers of

young men leave Cracow every day, or rather every night, on business which is evidently of a very urgent nature; but there still remains an immense surplus population for which no accommodation can be provided, and which somehow or other contrives not to sleep in the streets. The Austrian police create vacancies in the hotels from time to time by their system of midnight arrests; otherwise new comers would really have no chance of getting a decent room in Cracow, for those who take their departure of their own accord name their successors before leaving.

This unprecedented influx of visitors is not to be attributed to the break-up of Langiewicz's army alone, but is caused by the general state of things in Russian Poland. Thus some 1,500 proprietors from the kingdom, with their families, have taken refuge here. When Langiewicz was close to the frontier, Cracow was quite as full as it is now; many of the insurgents kept on their rooms at their hotels, and after a good day's fighting in the kingdom of Poland came back to Cracow to supper, telling the waiter, when they went to bed, to call them the first

thing in the morning that they might be in time for an early battle.

The Austrian Government certainly endeavours to prevent insurgents from passing hence into the kingdom, and Austria will not be in the least to blame if several new bands make their appearance in a few days on the other side of the frontier. Most of the hotels in Cracow have been visited by the police during the past week, and in these cases it is generally thought necessary to arrest some one. If, however, the Austrians were to carry off 1,000 men, or even 10,000, they would not prevent the insurrection from spreading. The upper classes (who are naturally a little sensitive on the subject of confiscation) are now joining in the movement more and more every day, while the working men are as eager to fight as ever. What the Poles want is not soldiers but arms, or money to enable them to make arms, which is said to be cheaper than to import them through Austria, and have four cases out of every five seized. Austria is friendly to the insurrection to a certain extent. She is willing enough to keep up a slow fire in Poland, so as to

consume a certain number of Poles and Russians for the benefit of Germany, but does not wish to see the whole country in flames, knowing well enough that sooner or later they would spread to Galicia. About a month ago, when Langiewicz was near the frontier, it was remarked by the railway officials that an immense number of 'candles for churches' were being received. They were apparently altar candles, for they were as long as Minié rifles, and in a single week enough had been sent for furnishing all the sixty-five churches of Cracow with a dozen each. The director of the railway is said to have applied to Vienna to know what he was to do; whether he was to examine the cases of 'candles for the Church,' or to let them pass. The reply sent to him was that no objection whatever could be made to the importation of 'candles for the Church,' and that only firearms and ammunition were prohibited. The director had manifested *trop de zèle*, and 'candles for the Church' continued for some time to be delivered in Cracow without being profaned by the inspection of either Custom-house officers or police.

At present every suspicious-looking case or packet that arrives, whether from Breslau or from Vienna, is opened, and the contents carefully examined; and the police have during the last few days entered several private houses to search for arms. However, by far the greater portion of the weapons carried by Langiewicz's troops were not brought back to Galicia at all. They were left in places of safety in the kingdom. At this moment hundreds of them lie buried in the ground, but they will soon rise again. Out of the eight or nine hundred insurgents who fell into the hands of the Austrian police only eighty carried firearms—of various kinds. Scarcely one rifle was lost, and the insurgents even brought in their artillery such as it was. It consisted of two pieces which as they had been borrowed from an old Polish castle, may have possessed some archæological value, but could have been of no utility in the field.

There is no use to explain what for the present is inexplicable. I have no doubt but that at an immense distance from the scene of action many persons know why Langiewicz quitted his army

secretly, without addressing a word of farewell to his troops except in the 'Order of the Day' which he left behind. The Russian account has the advantage of being simple, but the disadvantage of being false. The Imperial troops are said to have 'issued from Pinczow, beaten the insurgents at Busk, and driven them across the frontier;' but we are not told how the insurgents got to Busk (to which place they followed the Russians after beating them at Zaposcie, near Chroberz); nor why, if they were put to flight at the last great battle, it took them nearly four days to run to the frontier, when they could have crawled there in two. I have spoken to Poles, Hungarians, and Frenchmen who were present at Langiewicz's last battles—officers, privates, and military surgeons—and their accounts all tally and are perfectly intelligible up to the night of the 18th, when the council was held at which it was resolved to change the character of the war and break up the army into detachments. Here the enigma begins for which two or three solutions are offered, but which the best informed persons declare themselves unable to solve. Some few are

not ashamed to accuse Langiewicz of perfidy—a favourite charge in Poland, which, at some time or other, has been brought against almost every great man the country has produced. His friends and admirers, who are not numerous now that the clouds have gathered about him, content themselves with saying that appearances are against him, but that they have the most implicit faith in his patriotism and honour. It is difficult to understand how he can ever account for the capital error he committed in abandoning his army, and all persons are agreed that it was a mistake to form a corps of nearly 4,000 men, on account of the impossibility of victualling it, except from the Austrian frontier, which since the 15th of March had been closed. Langiewicz, however, may be excused for not having foreseen that his supplies would be stopped just as he was beginning to march into the interior; and finding himself with very little ammunition, and almost without food, he had really no course open to him but to divide his force into detachments not too numerous to be able to subsist on what they could get from the villages.

It may also have been a good idea for Langiewicz to quit the scene of his recent operations in all haste, and suddenly make his appearance in the province of Lublin. This would have confused the Russians and created a powerful diversion in favour of the troops he had just left; for it had become evident that the great object of the Imperial government was to seize the Dictator, or at least destroy his *prestige*, and that wherever he went he would be followed by a powerful foe.

But why disappear in the night without addressing the army—a step which was sure to produce a feeling of discouragement among all, except the few who were in the secret of the Dictator's plans? The reply is that for the plan to succeed it was essential that the Russians should have no suspicion of its existence, and, therefore, that it should not be talked about in an army composed of some 3,500 men. The Russians were suddenly to have been struck with amazement by the news that Langiewicz had issued a proclamation calling the whole population of Lublin to arms, and that he had already taken the command of a formidable body of insurgents in that pro-

vince. The plan was so nearly being executed that Langiewicz (thanks to a false passport) succeeded in satisfying the authorities at the frontier of Galicia, and was allowed to proceed on his way to Tarnow, when some Austrian gendarmes, whose suspicions had been raised, seized him and conducted him to that town in custody; otherwise he had horses waiting for him at Tarnow, and relays at all the stations on the road from Tarnow to Janow, in the Lublin country.

Even up to this point there is nothing strange in Langiewicz's conduct, if we once admit that he did right in quitting his army without assembling the troops and addressing them by word of mouth. He should either have done this or, better still, should have sent off the detachments to their various destinations before quitting the camp. The best proof that this latter was the proper plan to adopt is, that it was tried on a small scale and succeeded. The two detachments of some six or seven hundred men each, which held their ground in the mountains of St. Cross while the rest of Langiewicz's army was retiring to Galicia, received their orders to march from the Dictator

himself, and did not even know that he was in a difficult position. Bodies of a few hundred men can get food from the villages at fair prices, whereas an army of 3,500, or even of a far smaller number, shut out from all the towns, must cause a famine in the thinly populated country wherever it appears.

When, however, we come to the departure of the superior officers who accompanied or followed Langiewicz, a real mystery begins. As far as I can judge from accounts given to me by persons entitled to speak with authority, the council of war was not creditable to those who took part in it—not even to Langiewicz himself, who ought to have insisted on his orders being obeyed. It is said that, having resolved to break up the army into detachments, he appointed certain officers to commands, which they refused to accept; and that finding he was determined to leave the camp with the view of proceeding to Lublin, they declared they would follow him. Another account is that they did not follow the general until, his departure having been made known, the army, already sadly in want of ammunition and food, became

demoralised, and could no longer be kept together.

The most popular version of the misunderstanding of the council of war is, that it was caused by the intrigues of some partisans of Mieroslawski. I believe that this is to some extent true; but everything that goes wrong is now laid to the charge of Mieroslawski. Indeed, the Russian revolutionary party disavowed him, and told him, through M. Bakounin, that they knew him not to be the man chosen by the Poles before the insurrection broke out. The Poles, or at least the great mass of the Polish nobility, regard him with aversion and alarm, believing that his personal assistance would be as fatal to Poland as that of Mazzini would probably be to Italy.

Finally, the Central Committee, in the fourteenth number of its organ, called *Ruch* (the 'Movement'), after publishing the proclamation of General Langiewicz on assuming the dictatorship, announced that it resigned its provisional power into his hands, and called upon the whole nation to obey him. Consequently, the assertion of Mieroslawski, that he was the chosen one of the Central

Committee, is erroneous. If we accept his statement, that he was appointed Dictator on certain conditions, we can only conclude that those conditions were not fulfilled. The conditions were that he should distinguish himself by some brilliant feat of arms, calculated to inspire the nation with confidence, before the 10th of March.

On the 11th of March, Langiewicz having proved himself the best man out, and Mieroslawski having done nothing, the former was called upon to proclaim himself Dictator. He did so, and his dictatorship was at once accepted by the whole nation, and had the effect of uniting the Red party, who might have tolerated Mieroslawski if they could have obtained no one else; and the White party, who would no more have accepted his leadership than the educated classes in England could accept that of a Cuffy, or a Feargus O'Connor. The existence and gradual extension of the insurrection sufficed to unite the two parties, which had been separated only by a difference of opinion as to the advisability of resorting to arms; and the expression of this union was the dictatorship of Langiewicz. From that moment

there was an end to the counteracting influences of White Committees and Red Committees. Whites and Reds were agreed as to endowing the peasants and indemnifying the proprietors; and since the insurrection was already a fact, the Whites could not allow the Reds to fight out the battle by themselves. The struggle has now become a thoroughly national one, though Mieroslawski has done his best to make people believe the contrary by coolly setting up himself, supported by himself, against Langiewicz, who was supported by all Poland.

Hitherto I believe Rochebrun is the only leader who has had any foreigners under his command, unless Czachowski's (not Langiewicz's) female aide-de-camp, Mademoiselle Pustovoytova, who is the daughter of a Russian colonel, is to be regarded as such. Among the Polish Zouaves there were three or four Frenchmen, three or four Italians, and a couple of Hungarians. What has become of them I don't know, except that one of the Hungarians, who, with sixty men, had to defend a pass at Grochowitza, through which the Russians could have got to the rear of the Polish position,

fell, after holding his ground until nearly the end of the battle. Out of the sixty men about ten are said to have come out of action untouched.

As for Rochebrun himself, though constantly exposed, he has not yet had his skin grazed by lead or steel. When he returned to Cracow the other day, after the council of war at which it had been decided to break up the army of Langiewicz into small detachments, it was observed that he limped, and a report was spread that, like Garibaldi, he had been wounded in the foot. He was only suffering however from a sprained ankle, caused by a fall from his horse at Grochowitza. At the very beginning of the action, as he was leading the vanguard, composed of Zouaves, Chasseurs, and Kossynieri, against a numerous body of Russians, who had taken up their position in a wood and were keeping up a most destructive fire, Rochebrun suddenly dropped from his horse as if shot. His surgeon, who was by his side, picked him up, and found that he had not been touched, but was completely exhausted. He had not had a moment's rest since the morning of the previous day. In a few seconds, however, he was in his saddle again.

The excitement of the battle revived him, and all his energy and enthusiasm were required to urge on the troops, who hesitated for a time before the deadly fire to which they were exposed, and which they could not return with any effect, though ultimately they replied to it by entering the wood at the point of the scythe and bayonet and driving the Russians out.

Rochebrun did not serve in the Crimea, as has been stated in some of his memoirs. He took part in the Italian campaign and in the expedition to China; after which he left the French army and accepted an engagement as governor in a Polish family at Cracow. He had only lived five months, however, in Cracow, where his intelligence, liveliness, and good humour soon gained him a host of friends, when the insurrection broke out. The temptation was, of course, too great for the soldier turned pedagogue to withstand. When the young men of Cracow began to arm, and were seen walking about the streets with rifles on their shoulders, Rochebrun, the 'governor' of little boys, threw away his books, and was once more Rochebrun, the commander of the Zouaves.

He continued to teach French, however, in so far that he taught the young Poles how French soldiers were in the habit of conversing with their enemies.

Used not Bouffé to play the part of a retired ballet-dancer who, though he has become the mayor of a village, cannot resist the impulse he feels, as soon as his ancient choregraphic passion is awakened, to burst into an operatic *pas*? Did not Liszt, the pianist, think he had tamed a Hungarian gipsy; and find, nevertheless, after he had had him a dozen years in his house, and had taught him to wear shirts, cravats, and cloth clothes, that nothing could prevent him from joining the very first gipsy tribe he met with? So the voice of Rochebrun's nature spoke when the rifles were brought out at Cracow, and firing was heard on the frontiers of Galicia.

Looking at the photographs of the most distinguished of the insurgents who have been killed in battle, it is astonishing how many of them are very young men, and lamentable to reflect that in a war in which personal heroism plays so large a part, and in which, as a rule, every man acts for

himself, those who think more of attacking the enemy than of sheltering themselves are sure to fall the first. Ségur says of the Poles who served in the army of 1812, that they engaged very lightly to do exceedingly difficult things, but that they kept their word; and so, in the present day, you may hear insurgents of eighteen and nineteen boast that they will be the first of their detachment to touch the Russians; and, indeed, when the time comes they throw themselves upon them at any odds.

As regards the officers, I am told that it is absolutely necessary they should distinguish themselves in some brilliant manner, in order to justify their appointment and cause their authority to be fully recognised by the rank and file, who in many cases know as much and as little about the art of war as their leaders. Rochebrun owes entirely his reputation and his present high position to his great unexampled personal daring. His former pupil, the son of Count Moszynski, a Siberian exile of the year 1825, who since that time has suffered personally and through his family by every calamity which has fallen upon Poland, had

laid the foundation of a similar renown when he was mortally wounded at the head of his company inside Miechow. It was strange that he should be there fighting under the orders of a French man who had come to Cracow for no other purpose than that of directing his studies, and it would appear strange in the extreme to English parents—not accustomed, like the Poles, to look forward to a violent death as the probable end of any one of their children—to hear the father speak with admiration of the preceptor, and refer with more pride than pain to the fate of his young son.

Another chief of insurgents whose portrait is in every shop window, is Boreisza, who was killed in battle at an age when in England he might have been just thinking of entering a military school. He looks, in his picturesque Polish costume, more as if he were going to a fancy dress ball than to a war against savages,* and has rather the face of

* I have a much higher opinion of the Russians as a nation than is entertained by most Englishmen. Nevertheless, the Russian soldiers behaved like savages during the Polish Insurrection, especially at the beginning. The regiments stationed in Warsaw had been much irritated by

a timid, or at least a gentle young girl, than of the intrepid warrior which he proved himself to be in presence of the enemy.

The hospital surgeons say that the young men who are lying wounded are so eager to get back to their detachments that their minds are never at peace, and that their restoration to health is delayed in consequence. I can understand this from the painful anxiety with which many of

the manifestations of the two preceding years, during which, in spite of occasional outbursts, they had been kept strictly within bounds. At the last moment they were let loose, and were even deliberately excited by official publications against the Polish insurgents, to whom, if left to themselves, they would have shown no mercy. Those officers who endeavoured to restrain them could not get their authority respected, and it was only by threatening their own men with the revolver that they in some instances succeeded in saving the prisoners from being massacred. In the case of Count Poletyllo and his friends (related in the Correspondence, &c. laid before Parliament, p. 49) no such attempt was made. In the case of L. Finkenstin and four Polish prisoners (referred to in Correspondence, &c. p. 126, and which was reported upon by the Secretary of the British Embassy at Vienna), the attempt was made, but in vain. Some of the Tartar troops who were employed against the Poles, were as much savages as the hordes who overran a portion of Europe in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries.

them ask for news of the insurrection, and above all of the proceedings of the intervening Powers.

A Polish proprietor, in the kingdom, was summoned not long since before a Russian general, charged with having rendered assistance to the insurgents, and solemnly cautioned against doing so again. The proprietor explained his position. 'If,' he said, 'the insurgents come to my place and ask for horses, carts, and corn, I must give them what they want, or they will hang me. If, on the other hand, I let them have anything more than I am actually forced to give, you will hang me. However, if *they* hang me my son will never find a wife in Poland nor my daughter a husband, and fifty years after my death people will turn their backs upon my grandchildren. If *you* hang me monuments will be erected to my memory. On the whole, then, as a mere matter of prudence I cannot refuse to assist the insurgents.'

In this case, I believe, the Russian general tacitly admitted the validity and reasonableness of the Polish nobleman's argument.

Proprietors continue to arrive in Cracow from

the kingdom. They have no choice but to leave their estates for the present, or join the insurrection, and run the chance of losing them altogether. If they remain they know that as Poles they are suspected, and that any peasant who may have a grudge against them can give them up to the police, and gain five roubles by the transaction. Thus if they escape the Russian soldiers, they may fall victims to the denunciations of their own peasants. This state of things, at the first glance, seems but little creditable to the Polish proprietors, but it must be remembered that the 'peasant' in Poland is neither a farmer nor a labourer. He holds a certain portion of land from which he cannot be ejected, and for which he is or was supposed to pay rent. He believes—and has been encouraged in this belief both by the government and by the Polish 'reds'—that the rent is extorted from him by the 'noble,' whom the government at the same time affects to regard, and for its own purposes does regard, as the absolute owner of the whole of his estate. Let the British Government send officials into Ireland to inform the small tenant-farmers day

after day and year after year that their farms belong to them inalienably, and that it is a great shame to make them pay rent, and the attitude of the peasant towards the proprietor would be infinitely more hostile in Ireland than it is at the present moment in the kingdom of Poland.

I hear Polish proprietors, and Poles of all classes, congratulating themselves on the fact that in spite of the provocations and inducements held out by the Russian Government, the Galician massacres of 1846 are not being imitated in the kingdom. The Polish peasant, being a degraded animal, has, in some cases, seized his landlord and sold him for so many roubles to the police—who imprison as an insurgent every one brought to them and denounced as such. But the Polish peasant is only degraded to a certain point. He must know that his landlord wishes him no harm, and he is not prepared to take his life in order to curry favour with the Russian Government. Robbery without, or, if absolutely necessary, with violence, is more in his line: he has gone so far as that, but has not hitherto steeped his hands in blood. However, all persons are agreed

that it is dangerous, and even ridiculous to venture across the frontier, inasmuch as every one who wears a black coat is considered fair game by the peasants, and looked upon as a good five roubles' worth. Some sanguine-minded Poles still endeavour to persuade themselves and others that the peasants of the kingdom are inclined to take part with the insurrection, though they have given up numbers of insurgents to the authorities, and while volunteering to inform the Russians as to the movements of the Polish troops, have seldom been prevailed upon to communicate any intelligence whatever to their own countrymen as to the position of the Russians.

On the other hand, the labourers, farm servants, domestic servants of all kinds, and generally all who have been brought under the personal influence of the proprietors, sympathise with the insurrection, and in numerous cases have joined it. I fancy there has not been a single instance of a peasant-proprietor taking part in the national movement. It is even considered a grand thing for one peasant of this class to have made successful efforts to defend his landlord's house from

pillage, and an honest rustic named Ukraini, who distinguished himself in this manner, has become so popular that his photograph is to be seen in all the print-shops of Cracow.

Formerly the Russian officers, who in some cases (a minority, no doubt, considering the smallness of the educated class in Russia) are as good as the officers of any other army, could count on the implicit obedience of their men; but the bonds of discipline have now all been loosened. The soldiers have been warned against their commanders, and have been invited to watch the conduct of subalterns, and report upon it to their superiors. In other words, a real revolutionary feeling has been created in the ranks in order to check the supposed revolutionary feeling which may or may not have animated a certain number of the officers. The consequence is, that the officers now find themselves commanding mere hordes of savages. Some imitate the conduct of the savages, while others do their best to check it.

‘We were told that the Russian officers had turned revolutionists and communists,’ said a

Polish proprietor to me the other day. 'But it is the soldiers who have turned communists. They rob and plunder wherever they go, and we have often had to thank the officers for protecting our property against their thoroughly communistic instincts.'

It is, in fact, the so-called revolutionists of the Russian army—or, in other words, the men who are heartily sick of the barbarous and demoralising old system, and do not know how to change it—that have endeavoured to keep order in the ranks. Now that they see what revolution really means, they have to oppose it with revolvers. It is only their superior personal courage that saves them from being murdered by the majority, as the educated classes in Russia will infallibly be murdered if the long-talked-of peasant insurrection should ever take place.

CHAPTER II.

CRACOW : APRIL, 1863.

THE most important news received here for some time past is to the effect that the peasants have burnt the Russo-Greek churches in various parts of Lithuania. It had long been known that the Catholic peasantry in Lithuania were favourable to the insurrection, and had joined it in large numbers. No positive proof could be given that the former Greek-Uniates sympathised with the ancient co-religionists of the Roman Catholic Church, rather than with the actual co-religionists of the Church of Russia. It was difficult to tell whether or not the peasants regretted the religion which the Emperor Nicholas compelled them to abandon a quarter of a century ago. The Poles always maintained that such was the case.

The Russians persisted in declaring that the peasants scarcely knew the difference; that they had been forced by their bishops to adopt the union with Rome in the sixteenth century, and that there was therefore no harm in other bishops leading them back to the religion called 'orthodox' in the nineteenth; finally, they argued that whether the measure of 1839 was right or wrong, the Lithuanian and Ruthenian peasantry had, at last, become thoroughly reconciled to the Russo-Greek Church, and that it would be impossible again to separate them from it.

In the sixteenth century, however, the head of the Russian Church was not the Czar, but the Patriarch of Moscow, so that the three million peasants converted by violence in 1839 were driven into a fold which was not only not their own, but which had never at any time been that of their ancestors. One may imagine the Lithuanian peasant attending religious service week after week without troubling himself as to whether the Pope or the Emperor of Russia was the head of his Church, and it is quite certain that the only

doctrinal difference between the system of the Uniates and that of the Oriental Christians would be beyond his comprehension, and that he would not understand whether his ancestors, as represented by their bishops at the Council of Brest, were for or against the heretical and never-to-be sufficiently condemned tenet of the procession of the Holy Spirit from the Father *through* the Son, instead of from the Father *and* the Son. But the rituals of the Russo-Greek and the Greek-Uniate Churches, though originally the same, were no longer identical in 1839; and the mere fact that the communion is received in the one standing and in the other kneeling is enough to show that appreciable differences exist between the two services, which the peasant converted by violence would be sure to notice. Indeed, variations of form would be the very ones which would strike an ignorant man. In the Greek-Uniate Church, moreover—still maintained under the Austrian government in Eastern Galicia, and under the Russian in two districts in the kingdom of Poland—the priests shave; whereas in the Church called orthodox by the Russians, and schismatic by the

Poles, they cut neither hair nor beard. Finally, the iconostasis, which in the Russian 'orthodox' churches divides the building in two, and behind which the priest performs a portion of the service, does not exist in the church of the Ruthenian Uniates, constructed in all respects like those of other Catholics. Accordingly, the new form of the churches in Lithuania and Ruthenia, as rebuilt by the Russian Government to suit the new faith imposed upon the unhappy peasants, would be calculated to irritate both the old ones, brought up openly from their youth as Uniates, and the young ones, who, though inscribed as 'orthodox' in the books of the Russian police, have also, according to the Poles, been reared secretly in the belief of their fathers. The news, then, of a dozen Russian churches having been burnt in Lithuania points to the possibility of a religious war, in which several millions of Lithuano-Polish peasants might be found fighting against the Russian Government, and making common cause with the Polish nobility and middle classes. It is curious to remark the wonderful ingenuity with which Russia has created enemies for herself in

Poland. The Lithuanian peasants took no very active part in the insurrection of 1830-1. Thereupon the Government—forgetting that no serious appeal had been made to the peasantry in any part of the country by the aristocratic and military chiefs who directed the movement—took it for granted that the great mass of the Lithuanians might easily be turned into perfect Russians in a religious as well as a political sense. They were commanded to change their religion, and forced to obey; and since the persecutions of 1839 the Russians have always congratulated themselves that in Lithuania at least they were firmly established, whatever might be the case in Poland Proper. It now appears that, owing to these very persecutions, Lithuania is the only part of the ancient republic in which a comparatively large number of peasants have made common cause with the upper classes.*

* As to the political and religious inclinations of the Lithuanian peasantry, see Mr. Valouieff's report in the Appendix to vol. i. It seems certain that the Roman Catholics are all on the Polish side, and that those Russo-Greeks whose ancestors were never in union with the

A private letter from an excellent source gives details of the atrocities committed by the Russian *raskolniki*, or sectarians, in Livonia. The first most striking thing in this horrible affair is, that here we have a number of Russian colonists whose ancestors were expelled from Russia for their religious opinions and found refuge in Poland, turning against the descendants of the very men who protected them, and without a shadow of reason assassinating them and burning their houses down. The great majority of the *raskolniki* have only existed as such since the time of Peter and the reform of the Russian Church by the Patriarch Nikon. These are the 'old believers,' who believe in old and hideous *eikons*; in an old mode of making the sign of the cross with two fingers, and without the index, which, being the great snuff-taking finger, is held impure; in the old fashion of not shaving (for man was made in the image of God); and of not smoking (for 'not that which goeth into the mouth, but that which cometh out of the mouth

Roman Catholics, are sincerely attached to Russia. On this subject see also page 229 in this volume.

defileth a man'). Some of the Russian sectarians have great faith in 'purification by fire,' or incendiarism as we should call it, and take a religious pleasure in tearing up passports, which they regard (with some reason) as 'marks of the beast.' Others mutilate themselves; others perform rites which may be traced to Paganism, and are as fanatical as the greatest fanatics of the Mahometan East. I do not know to what particular form of the Russian *raskol* these murderous tribes settled in Livonia belong; but, whatever their favourite superstition, it may be safely assumed that they have been led to believe it in danger from the Polish movement, and that the Government has excited their fanaticism as it rouses for similar purposes the fear, envy, and cupidity of the Polish peasantry. It is not difficult to get up massacres in Turkey by whispering to the Turkish 'old believers' that their religion is threatened by the Christians, and similar means have doubtless been resorted to in Livonia to awaken the rage of the *raskolniki* against the Poles, with whom they had previously lived in peace and amity ever since the first establishment

of the colony in Poland. One can easily imagine the plausible way in which the alarm may have been given to them:—‘The Poles are burning the Russian churches in Lithuania’ (a barbarous kind of protest on whichever side made). ‘All Russian churches are the same to them; they will burn yours next.’

It appears that the *raskolniki* went about like madmen, bearing hammers and axes, with which they attacked all the Poles they found in their way. They broke into country houses, and after plundering them set them on fire. Fourteen mansions were robbed ‘so completely that not a lock was left on the doors, nor a piece of tapestry on the walls,’ and several were burnt to the ground.

These religious banditti were led by regular commanders, and plundered and murdered most zealously and, as they themselves called out, in the name of the Emperor. The proprietors were in many places defended by their peasants, as at Count Moll’s, Prince Mirski’s, and M. Urban Benislawski’s. The authorities made no attempt to prevent the outrages, and numbers of Livo-

nian gentlemen are kept in prison at Dunaburg simply because the enraged *raskolniki* thought fit to seize them, tie their arms, and forward them to that town under escort.

CHAPTER III.

CRACOW: MAY, 1853.

STRANGELY enough, the favourable attitude of Austria, as compared with that of Prussia, towards the insurrection is in some respects a disadvantage. A Polish insurgent knows that there is no hope for him if he falls into the hands of the Prussians, who, if they do not deliver him up to Russia, will at least treat him as a criminal on their own account. The Austrians, however, do not make any extraordinary exertions to catch insurgents who take refuge in Galicia, and when they are almost obliged to take them, treat them, as a general rule, with as little severity as possible. Some of the Poles seem to think that Austria ought to allow Cracow to be turned into a Polish citadel, and permit armed bands to go backwards and forwards between

Galicia and the kingdom without taking any notice of their proceedings. This would be all very well if Austria had declared war against Russia; but under existing circumstances, it seems to me that the military authorities at Cracow behave with remarkable fairness and moderation to the insurgents, and that their conduct ought not to be confounded for a moment with that of the police, who commit vexatious, arbitrary, and grossly illegal acts every day. A few weeks ago I was at a place near the frontier, where the Austrians had just fired upon a body of insurgents in marching order, and with such good aim, that though they were close to them, they contrived not to hit one. They pursued them, however, and took eight prisoners, who passed me as they were being escorted to the railway station, with their hands in their pockets and cigars in their mouths. Only two were not smoking. The others seemed to have nothing to complain of, except, of course, the simple, unavoidable fact that they were not free. Recently, again, a detachment of Hungarian hussars who were conducting a soldier belonging to their own regiment to the

castle, fired upon a crowd which had endeavoured to liberate the prisoner, and pelted them with stones. No one was hurt, unless, indeed, some of the stones took effect on the hussars, and no one was arrested. Certainly, the crowd would not have got off so easily in Russia, Prussia, or France.

It appears that the Hungarian whose situation excited so much sympathy on the part of the Cracow public, was one of several who, after watching a fight between insurgents and Russians near Sice, for a time, could at last stand it no longer, and rushed over the border to strike a few hard blows on behalf of the weaker side. A non-commissioned officer and three men distinguished themselves, I believe, in this manner.

The Hungarians quartered here had shown before that they had by no means forgotten 1849, and that they were ready to take the earliest opportunity of fighting the Russians. Some Cossacks who were obliging enough to show themselves on the wrong side of the frontier, near a station where the hussars were posted, were charged by those troops, and driven back with a

joyful alacrity, which could have left no doubt on the minds of the enemy as to their willingness to repeat the operation as often as it might be necessary or even possible.

A Polish officer, too, in the Austrian service, had actually the pleasure a few weeks since of directing an attack of *kossynieri* against a party of Russians by whom they had been followed on to Galician territory. The scythemen had laid down their arms and formally surrendered, in spite of which the Russians continued to pursue them. Thereupon the Austro-Polish officer called out to the insurgents in their native language to take up their scythes and charge the 'Moskali,' and, though the fugitives were much exhausted, the effect of the command given in Polish by a man in the uniform of authority was such, that they seized their weapons, and, throwing themselves upon their assailants, put them to flight.

The most curious passage of the frontier, however, was one which was effected by some twenty scythemen immediately after the break up of Langiewicz's army. They had been stopped by about a dozen Cossacks, who appeared on the

other side of a little stream just as they were going to wade through it. A parley took place, in the course of which it was proposed that the insurgents, who were all farm-servants or workmen, should pay toll, lay down their arms, and go on in peace. This thoroughly Cossack notion was accepted by the Poles in principle, but the sum demanded as passage-money was thought exorbitant. The representatives of 'Holy Russia' wanted three roubles, and the 'enemies of Russia's greatness,' weak as they were from hunger and fatigue, said they would rather fight than pay such a sum. Diplomacy, however, and the interests of peace triumphed at last. The *kossynieri* made up a purse of four florins, which the faithful children of the Czar were kind enough to accept; the scythes were laid down, and the Cossacks kept their bargain, and allowed the rebellious foe to proceed towards Cracow.

A new rumour, too, or rather an old rumour newly circulated, is abroad, to the effect, that the insurrection has broken out in Volhynia and Podolia. If so, we may expect to hear of such scenes in these provinces as were witnessed in

Galicia during the massacres of 1846, and of which the first example was given in Poland by Catherine II. just before the first partition. In the three southern or south-eastern provinces of the ancient kingdom (Volhynia, Podolia, and Kieff, or the Ukraine), the Ruthenian peasants may be very good Poles, but they are not of the same religion; and if the Russian Government assures them that the Poles wish to convert them to Catholicism by force, and to deprive them of their land, it is probable enough that, with a little encouragement, they may be got to assassinate the proprietors and seize all the communal land as their own. Russia will do a good deal to keep the Congress-kingdom, and still more to keep Lithuania; but she will not give up the provinces of Volhynia, Podolia, and Kieff under any consideration, and will regard any means as good that may enable her to retain them. I find proprietors from these provinces by no means anxious to see the insurrection extend to them; for they are not at all sure of the favourable attitude or even neutrality of the peasants, and are quite convinced that the Government would

resort to all possible measures for raising them up against their landlords. The Government may go a little too far in this direction, and ruin Russia while intending only to ruin Poland; but it is perfectly unscrupulous, and would certainly not hesitate to do with the Ruthenian peasants of the south-eastern provinces what it has already done, on a small scale, with the Russian settlers in Livonia.

CHAPTER IV.

CRACOW: MAY, 1863.

IN estimating the forces at the disposal of the Polish National Government it would be a great mistake to count those insurgents only who are actually in the field. At present every one who joins a detachment organised by the National Government, becomes a soldier of the Polish national army, and must obey orders, not only as long as his detachment remains in the field, but as long as the insurrection lasts. If the corps to which he belongs is driven in he has to report himself at head-quarters, and to hold himself in readiness to start again for the frontier at the shortest notice. The soldiers of the insurrection receive regular pay (if they happen to want it), and owe the same obedience to their chiefs which would be required from them in any other army.

A national police,* too, has been organised, and is said to have been found very useful in the kingdom.

Besides its police, properly so called, the National Government employs a body of commissioners for collecting taxes and giving and receiving information of various kinds. The war tax amounts to 10 per cent. on clear income, and is, or ought to be, paid by every one except the peasants, who are not allowed to pay anything to anyone, and who are so petted by both Governments—national and anti-national—that they would be quite spoilt were they not already far beyond the possibility of spoiling. Will the Russians succeed in making the Polish peasant fight against his late master, or will his late master succeed in making him fight the Russians? Probably, after taking what he can get from both sides, he will remain quietly at home, doing no work, paying no rent,

* A most pernicious institution, as it afterwards turned out. If anyone says that without 'national gendarmes,' to terrify Russian spies, and to teach patriotism to Polish peasants by hanging them, the insurrection could not have been maintained, then that in itself is a condemnation of the insurrection.

and enjoying himself after his own fashion. The proprietors are convinced that he will never take up arms for the Russian Government, whatever inducements it may offer him; and hitherto he has certainly not given the slightest sign of an intention to strike a blow in its favour. He has here and there shown himself ready enough to earn a dishonest penny by selling his countrymen to his country's enemies, but, as a rule, he has carefully abstained from armed interference on either side. In no instance, however, has the Polish peasant been persuaded to do battle for the Russians, whereas in certain districts and on particular estates he has really fought well for his own people. If, as many persons seem to imagine, the *kossynieri* were all peasants there would be thousands of peasants already under arms—not only in Lithuania, but in the kingdom itself; but the *kossynieri* are, for the most part, farm labourers (not to be confounded for a moment with the class of peasant proprietors), workmen, and domestic servants. When a commander has not rifles enough for all his men he arms a portion of them with scythes; if there were

an adequate supply of proper military weapons we should probably hear of no scythemen at all.

Letters from Wilna are full of details respecting the death of Narbutt, which is said to have caused the most intense grief throughout Lithuania. 'The loss of Nelson was not more keenly felt in England,' says one writer, 'than that of Narbutt is among us.' This, the most illustrious of all the Lithuanian chiefs, was also one of the youngest. But he had lived long enough to suffer for many years from the persecutions of the Russians, having first incurred their displeasure when a boy at school. In his last action he was leading on his men when he was struck in the foot by a rifle bullet, and fell. He would not allow himself to be carried from the field, but called upon some of the friends who were standing around him to raise him on their arms and bear him again to the front. A shower of bullets fell upon the group as it moved forwards. Narbutt was shot through the heart, and all who surrounded him, to the number of a dozen, were also mortally wounded. The insurgents were now quite discouraged, and retreated precipitately, leaving the body

of their chief in the hands of the Russians. The Russian general (Timofieieff) sent the corpse to the insurgent camp, and it was buried with the highest military honours, and in great state, an immense concourse of persons following it to the grave.

There can be no doubt now as to the insurrection in Volhynia and Podolia having broken out in earnest, and news has arrived to-day of a rising in the Ukraine (Government of Kieff). The peasants of the Polish Ukraine, annexed to Russia at the second partition in 1793, were reduced to serfdom by that notorious Liberal, and eminent writer on the advantages of serf emancipation, Catherine II.; and there are said to be plenty of old men in the province who remember the day when their fathers were 'assigned' to land which they had inherited as free property. But if the peasants of the Ukraine were enslaved, to whom were they subjected? Not to Russian, but to Polish proprietors; and it may therefore be doubted whether, in the midst of their indignation against the Government which first deprived them of their liberty, they do not feel some ani-

mosity towards the nobles who kept them without it. We know that Schevtchenko, the peasant poet of the Ukraine, was one of the bitterest enemies the Poles ever had; and, as far as can be judged from the literary organ of the Little Russian party, the general feeling in the Ukraine, however hostile it may be to Russia, is certainly not friendly to Poland. Nevertheless, letters from Volhynia and Podolia say that throughout the adjoining province the peasants are calling out for a return to the 'Polish times,' and the cry, we are told, is gradually becoming universal. In Volhynia and Podolia it was expected by many of the proprietors that in the event of an insurrection the peasants would, at most, remain neutral; and it was feared that, with a little encouragement, they might be induced to assume the part performed by the Galician peasantry in 1846. But in Galicia, in the year in question, everyone thought until the insurrection had actually broken out that the peasants would be on the same side as their masters. On the other hand, many persons were of opinion only the other day that in Lithuania the peasants could not be counted on

at all, whereas in many of the Lithuanian districts they have joined the insurrection with one accord.

A curious instance of Polish popular superstition, and of Russian military abruptness in checking it, is mentioned by one of the correspondents of the *Czas*. A portion of the over-excited and feverish population of Warsaw having persuaded itself that it had seen a fiery cross in the air, the news spread through the city that the sign of victory, so discouraging to the Constantine of Warsaw, had shown itself, and an immense crowd collected at a spot thought to be advantageously situated for viewing the phenomenon. It may be interesting to some future writer on miracles to know that an official personage—the Commissary of the fifth and sixth police quarters of Warsaw—made a formal report on the subject of the supposed aerial cross, saying that it was to be seen ‘just over a pear-tree in front of the house No. 2,487,’ and that it had caused a crowd to assemble, whereby the public peace was likely to be disturbed. The Russians, finding that some inti-

mate connection existed in the popular mind between the pear-tree and the miraculous symbol, ordered the former to be destroyed, and the tree, which is said to have been in full bloom, was cut down. This appears really to have had the effect of dispelling the apparition; at least, no more was heard of it, and the crowd broke up, lamenting only the fall of the pear-tree.

Poles arriving here from Breslau, Posen, and even from the 'Kingdom,' bring rumours of an intended occupation of the kingdom of Poland by Prussian and Austrian troops; the Russians to retire to the fortress and large towns, the Prussians and Austrians to hold the country, and require the insurgents to lay down their arms. The occupation to last until a Congress of the European Powers shall have agreed among themselves and with Russia as to the future government of Poland.

These rumours, though they cannot be clearly traced to any really good source, are beginning to find general credence here, and by some few are connected with a scheme for 'pacifying' Poland by means of a fresh partition. By this eighth

re-distribution of Polish territory the provinces between what is now called Prussian Poland and the Vistula would go to Prussia; the frontier of Austrian Poland would be advanced some distance to the north, so as to take in the whole of the ancient 'palatinate' of Cracow; and a portion of Eastern Galicia would be incorporated with the Russian Empire. Russia would profit immensely by such a change as this, and the pride of the Russian nation would be more flattered by the gain of all or part of Eastern Galicia than injured by the loss of the western and some of the southern districts of the kingdom of Poland. It forms no part of the historic policy of Russia to absorb the kingdom of Poland, besides which the utter impossibility of any such absorption being brought about has now been plainly demonstrated. On the other hand, it is an essential part of the historic policy of Russia to absorb Eastern Galicia, which was governed at one time (how many centuries ago is not of the slightest consequence) by Russo-Norman princes of the house of Ruric, which in old times formed one province with Podolia, and which is inhabited by a race of peasantry

called 'Ruthenians,' 'Ruthenes,' or 'Russines,' in the west of Europe, but who are 'Russians' in the eyes of Russia, and, though nominally Greek Catholics in union with Rome, have long been under the influence of the Russian Church, and are constantly reminded that Kieff was formerly their religious metropolis. It is an article of faith with strictly educated Russians that Eastern Galicia is Russian territory, and that the Russians sooner or later must claim it. The Russian school histories simply state that at the third partition of Poland in 1795, Russia took back *nearly all* the provinces naturally belonging to her. The province or district alleged to be still missing is that of Eastern Galicia; and on the Novgorod monument the Russo-Norman dukes who ruled in the city of Lwow or Lemberg are represented as belonging to the same empire as the Czars of Muscovy. A portion of Eastern Galicia was actually ceded to Russia by France in 1809, after the conquest of all the province by Poniatowski's army, and the district of Tarnopol remained Russian until the sixth partition of Poland, in 1815.

The great object of Russia, Prussia, and Austria is not that the Poles should be made happy, but that they should be kept quiet. It is thought that Prussia might safely take charge of a couple of million more Poles than she oppresses now; that she would like to have them, and would be grateful to Russia for ceding them to her; that Austria could manage another million, and that Russia would be infinitely less unpopular among the Ruthenian Greek Catholics who inhabit the Galician districts adjoining Volhynia and Podolia (and which lie between the extremities of those provinces like a wedge) than she always must be among a purely Polish race belonging to the Church of Rome. If you ask Poles what they imagine the West of Europe would say to such an arrangement as this, they reply that England and France would, no doubt, protest against it, as they protested (in several despatches) against the annexation of Cracow in 1846; but if Russia cannot possibly govern the kingdom of Poland as now constituted on any legal system, and England and France really object to her ruling by fire and sword, she must get rid of a portion of her Polish

subjects, and revert to the well-calculated balance of tyranny established by the partitioning Powers among themselves in 1795. Prussia and Austria could give their new Polish subjects 'representative institutions' (for would they not be represented in the Prussian Chamber and in the Austrian Reichsrath?), and Russia might publish some sort of 'organic statute' for her old ones.

This solution appears very horrible, but unless at least a portion of Poland be rendered independent it may be difficult to find any other. If the Western Powers could prevail upon Russia to restore the constitution of 1815, neither Russia nor the Western Powers could prevail upon the Poles to accept it, unless indeed, having been thoroughly beaten, they were obliged to submit to it, as they might in that case be made to submit to any other arrangement. It is not likely that Russia will consent to any part of Poland being made independent, or that she will give back the constitution of 1815 with or without an army (supposing even that such a concession would pacify the Poles, which it certainly would not); nor is it probable that the West of Europe

would allow the new partition scheme to be carried out. But can any solution be thought of which is probable or even possible? Poland wants everything, Russia will give nothing, and the intervening Powers propose half-measures, which Russia and Poland will equally reject.

CHAPTER V.

GALICIAN-VOLHYNIAN FRONTIER : JUNE, 1863.

THE Poles seem to be more and more convinced that the sentiments of the Volhynian peasants towards them have changed during the last few weeks. Without being able to say positively, though it would not be difficult to guess, what part the Ruthenian peasants would have taken in Volhynia had the Government left them entirely to themselves, I may mention that every day I hear of their brethren in Eastern Galicia demonstrating voluntarily, and in an unmistakable manner, their hostility to the Polish insurgents. A friend of mine was arrested, a fortnight ago, by a party of peasants going home from their work, just outside Lemberg. Most of the young men, and a good many of the middle-aged ones, now in Lemberg, are insurgents wait-

ing for orders; but there is nothing in their appearance to prove that such is the case. They might be there for a race or a ball, if such entertainments took place now in Poland. Nearer the Volhynian and Podolian frontier, the peasants play everywhere, and quite systematically, the part of volunteer spies. They do not have the chance of seeing many insurgents in the villages or on the public roads, but if they notice a few extra horses coming out of a stable, or hear that there are a few strangers staying at a country house, they lose no time in running off to the nearest district town to inform the police that such and such a proprietor is making preparations to assist the insurrection.

The stories circulating in the villages on the subject of the insurrection are of the most astounding character, and can only be compared to the marvellous semi-Oriental tales told in Russia when the emancipation of the serfs was first spoken of, about the measures of offence and defence taken by the nobles against the Emperor, and by the Emperor against the nobles. A poor Ruthenian peasant woman (according to one of these legends)

had lost everything she possessed except her cow, which she took to market and sold that she might pay her debts. When she had paid all she owed she had only three *gulden* left, and as she was taking the money home with a heavy heart she was stopped in the middle of a wood by a Pole, who was an insurgent. The insurgent asked her why she looked so sad, and, hearing that it was because she had only three *gulden* in the whole world, robbed her of that sum, beat her, and went away. The poor woman ran as fast as she could towards her home, but had not gone far when she met another Pole. She was weeping bitterly, and the insurgent wanted to know what misfortune had happened to her. She told him how she had been ill-treated and plundered, when the Pole seemed to take pity on her, and said he would see that justice was done her. He accordingly led her to a spot in the wood where there were twelve insurgents, and inquired whether she could point out the one who had beaten her and stolen her three *gulden*. She knew the robber instantly, and showed him to the Pole who had promised to befriend her; but he, instead of punishing the wicked insurgent, caused

the poor woman who had recognised him to be seized and bound, and then, with the point of his sword, put her eyes out.

The peasants mention the name of the village where they declare the heroine of their story lived; and, after all, it is as true as many of the stories of the Polish insurrection told by the Russian official newspapers. I must add that the Poles believe these tales in which the insurgents are represented as brigands to be the deliberate invention of the Ruthenian Greek-Uniate priests; but it is more probable that they have grown up of themselves in the peasants' imagination, from seed sown partly by Ruthenian priests, partly by Austrian officials, and which in part also has been the natural fruit of a harsh system of task-work, leading the peasants to believe that the Polish proprietors and all who hold with them are really their enemies.

I have no means of judging whether the Greek-Uniate priests of Eastern Galicia are as corrupt as they are generally said to be by the Poles; but I can see that they are very poor, that their churches (as I have heard some of them complain)

are of wood, while the Roman Catholic churches in the same village are often of brick and stone; that they live little better than peasants; that they do not go into the society of their Polish superiors, for which, in the first place, their education and habits do not fit them, and where, moreover, they could not be received without distrust—so persevering has been their hostility towards the Poles in the Galician Diet and in the Reichsrath, so notorious is their leaning towards Russia, so openly are they accused of meditating at the earliest opportunity a return to the Greek ‘schism.’ The priests of the Greek-Uniate rite are, strictly speaking, of the same ‘religion’ as the Roman Catholic priests; but the thread which binds them to Rome is very slender, and all their traditions, their language, their form of prayer, their ancient church music, their mode of life (for it must be remembered that they marry) connect them with Kieff, their former religious metropolis. It is said by well-informed Poles who have studied this question fairly, that the great ambition of the Ruthenian clergy of Eastern Galicia is not to join the Russian Church, but to form with the Ruthenians

of Volhynia, Podolia, and the Ukraine a Ruthenian Church to depend, not from the Emperor of Russia and the Russian Synod, but from a patriarch having his head-quarters at Kieff. It is certain that in Moscow itself, the centre of Russian orthodoxy, there is a party which would gladly see the Russian Church made independent of the secular power; but these projects '*sont pour l'an trois mil,*' and probably most of the Ruthenian clergy in Galicia—being ambitious, as priests ought not to be, but sometimes are—think simply of the prizes which would be within their reach if, instead of belonging to a poor little Church counting only some two or three million peasants within its pale, they modified their belief as to the procession of the Holy Spirit, and joined the Church of the great Russian Empire.

Of the importance attached by Russians and Poles to the position of the Greek-Uniates—who are Poles or Russians according as they incline to the Roman or to the Greek Church—we have just had an example at Warsaw, where it is now said that Archbishop Felinski was arrested and ordered to St. Petersburg, less for protesting against the

execution of the priest Konarski, than for performing mass in the Greek-Uniate Church. The only Greek-Uniates left in the Russian dominions are found in the kingdom of Poland, where they inhabit the district of Chelm in the 'government' of Lublin, and one other district (I believe, in Augustowo). Even in the kingdom, where, in comparison with what has been done in the Polish provinces, but feeble attempts have been made to turn Poles into Russians, the Government has nevertheless tried to gain over the Greek-Uniates to the Russo-Greek Church; and I know for a fact that not long before the insurrection broke out an unsuccessful offer was made to the peasants of the Greek-Uniate rite on one estate to the effect that if they would forsake their religion they should be forgiven their rent—one of the beauties of this proposition being that the proprietor to whom the rent was due was not consulted about the matter at all.

In the Ruthenian provinces belonging to Russia the first act of the Polish insurrection is at an end, and the fall of the curtain leaves the

Polish insurgents in those regions in a very helpless state; or it may be said that the race between the Polish National Government and the imperial Government of Russia for the goodwill of the Ruthenian peasant has been run, and has been won with ease by the latter. The peasant who is called Russian by the Russians and Ruthenian by the Poles, and who calls himself *Ruski*, has shown that his sole wish is to be allowed to cultivate his garden in peace, and that, if his peace is disturbed, he is ready to take part with those who are most capable of restoring it. Now, in Polish poems and songs, the 'Ruthenian' peasant (which, for convenience, it is well to call him, in order to distinguish him from the peasant of Russia proper) may regret 'old times' and the Poland of the past, and look forward with hope to the Poland of the future; but in reality he knows nothing about the Poland of the past, except that then, as until quite lately, and until the Law of Emancipation published by the Emperor Alexander came into force, he had to perform taskwork for the right of holding land, and could be beaten by the proprietor if he did not perform

it properly. The fact that the Polish proprietors in the local dietines, and their representatives in the national Diet, passed measures in 1791 for abolishing serfdom throughout Poland, and that the adoption of the constitution by which these measures were solemnly legalised was the signal for the second dismemberment of the country—this important fact cannot be known to peasants who for the most part are unable to read, and who are not allowed to receive instruction of any kind except in the Russian language, and from teachers appointed by the Russian Government. I know several instances of proprietors both in the Ruthenian provinces and in the kingdom getting into trouble for having formed evening classes for their servants and peasants without the permission of the officials. In the kingdom, permission to establish Polish schools may be obtained under certain conditions—the first of which is that the teacher shall not be chosen by the person to whom the school belongs. But in Volhynia, Podolia, and the Ukraine, Polish schools cannot be formed under any circumstances, and a friend of mine resident in one of these provinces

has now an action pending against him because he employed a Polish master to teach his own domestic servants to read out of Polish spelling-books.

What must the feeling of dependents be who find that their superiors do not enjoy the smallest liberty of action, and that they are at the mercy of the first petty official or spy who likes to inform against them and get them punished, even for performing the most meritorious deeds? Those dependents who have been personally in contact with the proprietors feel for them—and for themselves—and have proved their readiness to fight on their behalf; but this sympathy seems to be confined to the house servants and to the stewards, forest-keepers, and other persons occupying responsible positions on the estates. The peasants appear only to consider that the Czar is omnipotent, and that their proprietor is as much his slave as they are, though not so loyal a one.

As to the emancipation question in modern times, the peasants have not been told that the Polish proprietors were the first to respond to the appeal for adhesion and cooperation made by the Emperor to the nobility of the Russian Empire,

when the project of emancipation was first announced, and that His Majesty publicly thanked them for their support, when he had nothing but reproaches to address to the nobility of Moscow. On the contrary, they are taught to believe that for the long-continued evils of serfdom they have only to thank the proprietors, and that for the recent improvement in their condition they are indebted solely to the Emperor. The sovereign who to the Polish nobility is a tyrant, is regarded by the Ruthenian peasantry as a liberator, and it is not likely that the latter will ever be induced to take up arms against him. The Poles know that the peasants of Galicia have the highest veneration for the Emperor of Austria, that in the purely Polish, as well as in the Ruthenian half of the province, they have forgotten their own name, and no longer call themselves Poles, but 'Imperialists,' and that even now, when there is no insurrection in Galicia, they arrest insurgents on their way to the kingdom and to Volhynia. Why, then, should they imagine that the Ruthenians of Volhynia and Podolia, after seventy years' contact with Russia, are better Poles than the Galicians?

The Russians are, at least, of kindred race, and have nearly the same customs and mode of life as the Ruthenians, and bring with them a language which the Ruthenian peasantry can understand up to a certain point—beyond which no language would be very intelligible to them; whereas the German soldiers and officials of Austria speak a tongue of which the Ruthenian and Polish peasants of Galicia can make nothing, and which they hold in abhorrence. At the present moment, although all the civilisation of the Ruthenian provinces is Polish, the Ruthenian peasantry, who as serfs never can have had any feeling of independence, are as much like Russians as they can well be. It is not flattering to them to say so, nor is it any compliment to the Russians either. To say that Russian soldiers behave like Ruthenian peasantry, or Ruthenian peasantry like Russian soldiers, comes to about the same thing. Without discipline, and excited and stimulated to violence and plunder, soldiers and peasants behave in Russia and Poland as they behaved in Spain during the war of independence, and in France during the revolution, and as under the same

circumstances they would behave almost everywhere. The worst and most unpardonable criminals are the generals and officials who tolerate the excesses committed under their eyes, and who in many instances have even provoked and directed them.

For some time past the unhappy rustics who till the ground in Volhynia, Podolia, and the Ukraine, have been objects of great interest to Russian and Polish publicists. How proud, how much 'too happy' they would be if they only knew what numbers of articles have been written about them! They have been proved on ethnological principles to be Russians and on historical principles to be Poles, and the contrary and also the converse; but they have not been consulted personally as to their notion of *patria*, and, judging them by their late actions, it seems to me that they may fairly be described as an uncivilised race, without patriotic ideas, and settled upon land which until the end of the last century formed part of Poland, but for the last seventy years has belonged to Russia. For the sympathy of this race a battle has been fought, and

if the comparison be not too trivial it may be said that the struggle between the Russians and Poles to get hold of the Ruthenian peasant has been very like a contest between two rival omnibus conductors to gain possession of a gaping countryman who does not quite know where either of them is going, but is assured by both that he has only to jump in and it will be all right. If in such cases the countryman mistrusts both his would-be benefactors, but finally allows himself to be carried away by the strongest, he does just what, according to the Poles, the Ruthenian peasant has done in the three south-eastern provinces of ancient Poland. The peasant has received offers from Poland and offers from Russia; but Russia has shown herself the most pressing and the most powerful, and Russia has carried him off.

Another view of the matter is that the Ruthenian peasant does not dislike the Russians and very much dislikes the Poles. I know that he ought to hate the Russians—first, for partitioning his country; and, secondly, for forcing him to change his religion. But, perhaps, he knows very

little about the partitions; and while some of the Ruthenians never left the Eastern Church at all, others were forced to rejoin it as long ago as the end of the last century; others again thirty years since, and very few, indeed, at a time so recent as to have left any bitter recollections in their breast as to the manner in which the change was brought about. If, moreover, these Ruthenians have such long memories, they may have preserved the tradition of the union with Rome forced upon them by their bishops at the end of the sixteenth and beginning of the seventeenth centuries; but it is to be presumed that they do not see or feel any very great difference between the Greek Church of Russia and the Greek United Church, or they would not allow themselves to be driven so easily, with or without sticks, from one to the other. In the fifteenth century they had nothing to do with Rome; in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries they were united to Rome; in the eighteenth and nineteenth they were disunited from Rome; and the last who were separated (during the reign of the present emperor) were not separated by brute force, though not without

threats that force, if necessary, would be employed. The Cossacks were too faithful and too independent to be compelled, even by the severest measures, to change their religion; and no one in the present day can imagine a village of Irish Catholics being turned into Protestants, or of Scotch Protestants being turned into Catholics, by any amount of ill-treatment. In short, it may be said that the Ruthenian peasant knows nothing about the past glories of Poland, nothing about the intention which the Poles of the last century certainly entertained of emancipating him, and little, if anything, about having been forced to change his religion either lately or upwards of two centuries and a half ago. On the other hand, he knows that the Emperor of Russia is *his* emperor, that the Russian priests are *his* priests, and that the landed proprietors whom he has been taught to hate, and whom for a long series of years he has, perhaps, not had any particular reason for liking, are Poles.

The Poles say that the Ruthenian peasant has proved in Volhynia that he will side with the Poles where the Poles are strongest, and where

the Russians are strongest with the Russians. This, however, is not precisely the case. He does not attack the Poles when he has no chance against them, and he may, even with the cunning of his class, pretend, under such circumstances, to be well disposed towards them; but as soon as the Russian troops have arrived he has always joined them, and has even welcomed them as protectors. One of my informants on this point (not a Russian, or in such a matter I should not quote his evidence) saw the wives of the peasants in the neighbourhood of Slawuta bring out food and drink to the soldiers who had arrived to attack the insurgents. The peasants assisted the soldiers voluntarily, helped to capture the Poles after they had been routed, chased them like wild beasts in the woods, maltreated even those who were wounded, and buried one alive—a feat which has since been multiplied by three, and attributed to the Russian soldiers, who have quite enough to answer for without that. Persons who were in a likely position to know the truth, as far as the truth can be known, about what took place in the middle of a wood, away from all observers except

those specially interested in keeping the proceedings secret, assure me that in this particular instance the savages who wounded and tortured unresisting Poles were the Ruthenian peasantry of the place.

All regular fighting is at an end, but the peasants have been armed, and they are ordered to arrest and search every man or woman whom they may suspect of carrying arms or ammunition. 'When I found that the peasants were empowered to lift up my wife's crinoline,' said a Polish proprietor the other day, who was escaping from Volhynia to Galicia, 'I thought it was time for us to start. I took all the money I could collect and all the plate, and shall go back when I hear of an armed intervention.'

The Polish National Government must have known all along that the support of the Ruthenian peasants of the Greek Church in the provinces incorporated with the Russian empire was not to be counted upon nearly so much as that of the Polish peasants of the Roman Church in the 'kingdom;' and the patriotism even of the latter has not shown itself very flourishing—patriotism

being, indeed, a kind of plant which cannot be grown and forced at a few months' notice to serve a pressing want, but must be allowed to spring up of itself under a variety of favourable circumstances which have never existed for the peasant in Poland. In Russia patriotism is replaced by a feeling of deep veneration and devotion for the Czar. This sentiment, for practical purposes, is a good substitute for the other, and at least makes the Russian peasant ready to sacrifice himself for his country, of which the Czar is the personification. The enemies of the Czar are his enemies, whereas the enemies and destroyers of Poland are regarded by the Polish peasant either with indifference or, as in Galicia and in part, if not the whole, of Ruthenia, with absolute devotion, akin to that felt by the Russian peasant towards the power which for centuries has 'upheld' his native land. In one district in Volhynia in which the insurrection made its appearance, and in which the insurgents 'took' a town—that is to say, they entered it when there were no Russian soldiers there—the peasants complained bitterly that the insurgents had removed their

portrait of the Emperor from the 'Chancery of the Volost' (a 'volost' being a group of villages), and made a target of it. I do not know whether they felt the indignity offered to their sovereign—and we should only deceive ourselves if we were to imagine that they doubt for one moment the legitimacy of his sway—but they at least regretted their picture, and one of them said within the hearing of a friend of mine, 'They make all sorts of promises, and the first thing we see them do is to destroy our property.' Of course the Poles had no wish or thought of destroying the property of the peasants, but they know that is what the Russians desire the peasants to believe concerning them, and they must have been mad to commit an act which gave to the Russian calumnies a certain aspect of truth. The insurgents take from the peasants a real picture in a gilt frame, and all they give them in return is a document in gold letters proceeding from the Polish National Government, and conferring upon them as a free gift all the lands for which they have hitherto had to perform taskwork. When one of these 'golden charters' was read to an assembly of peasants, and

the reading produced but little effect, they were asked whether they were not the friends of the Poles, to which they replied, with oracular ambiguity, that, 'they were the friends of all who wished them well.' I should have been glad to find, but cannot discover, that their love for Poland was expressed anywhere, even in words, in any warmer manner than this. In a village in Volhynia, where 200 Catholic peasants had positively promised to join the insurrection, they observed, at the last moment, with remarkable dulness and want of patriotism, but also, these deficiencies being admitted, with characteristic common sense, that if the Russians attacked them they should know how to defend themselves, but that if the Russians did not attack them they would rather not fight.

After the defeat of the insurgents the peasants in one place, to my certain knowledge, took their 'golden charters' to the Russian officials and delivered them up. I do not see how matter-of-fact peasants can attach value to them anywhere, considering that the persons who gave them out had to disappear as soon as the troops of the

regular government came up in any force. The insurgents fought with great bravery, according to the well-known habit of the Poles; but they knew that they were going to certain destruction unless they were supported by the long-expected army from Galicia, and the grand entry from Galicia into Volhynia was not effected, and has not yet taken place, though it is looked forward to from day to day.

CHAPTER VI.

GALICIAN-VOLHYNIAN FRONTIER : JULY, 1863.

THE preparations made for the seven or eight hours' fighting which took place last Wednesday before Radziwilow had occupied the Poles ever since the end of March. Some of the insurgents who were present had had considerable trouble in getting to Cracow, and found it still more difficult to continue their journey to Lemberg, while the general advance from Lemberg to Brody, on the Volhynian frontier, was made on a system of zig-zag approaches almost after the model of siege operations. Lemberg was so full of insurgents a month ago, that a circus was opened for their special benefit, when scenes from *Mazeppa* were performed for the instruction and amusement of men who were themselves bound for the Ukraine,

but who never, I may add, had the smallest chance of getting there. As the Ruthenian peasants around Lemberg were known to be even worse disposed towards 'the Poles' than the Polish peasants of Western Galicia, all sorts of precautions had to be taken in bringing the insurgents nearer and nearer to the frontier. Every country house between Lemberg and Brody, for many miles on each side of the main road, has served as a halting-place, and many proprietors have had twenty, thirty, and in one instance that I know of as many as 100 insurgents staying in and about their houses and grounds for periods varying from three days to two months. It is not from any want of kindness on the part of their entertainers that soldiers of the national army in concealment are sometimes put to sleep in trees. If the word 'revision' is whispered in the morning or afternoon, every one is on the look-out for the police in the evening, and as soon as they make their appearance on one side the objects of their search disappear on the other. If when the household retire to rest the revision has not taken place, there is nothing for the insurgent guests to do but to take to the woods,

by which every manor-house in Eastern Galicia is surrounded.

One wretched night, when a general revision was expected in a certain district, and all the hiding places were full, I went with a poor fellow who was destined to fall in Wysocki's affair before Radziwilow, to half a dozen houses, each a mile or two apart, before he could find a place to sleep in, or shelter of any kind from the terrible storm which was raging outside. Such trouble as this enthusiastic young man took to get shot through the heart—in a glorious cause, no doubt, but in a somewhat inglorious battle—can scarcely be imagined, and is worth describing. Stanislas Glisczinski, an officer on General Wysocki's staff, was actively employed in bringing up and placing the companies of tirailleurs, until, after having had two horses shot under him, he was struck down by almost the last bullet that was fired. Glisczinski, four months before, was a pupil of the artillery school of Metz, where he had just completed his military studies, when the Polish insurrection first began to assume an important character. He

was acquainted with Langiewicz, was an intimate friend of Padlewski, and as he had only entered the Academy of Metz (where, as a special favour, a certain number of Poles can gain admittance) in order to qualify himself for serving his country in an efficient manner, he thought at the beginning of March that the time had arrived, and hastened to Cracow to place himself at the disposition of the Central National Committee.

He was anxious to fight in his own part of the country—that is to say, in the province of Kalisch, where he had an estate, but being appointed to the Volhynian expedition he started, soon after Langiewicz's disaster, for Lemberg, where he was arrested as he stepped out of the train. He had committed no illegal act, even in a technical sense, and his passport was in proper order; but there may have been something about his look which the Austrian authorities did not like (on his side he certainly did not like them), and the result was, that he was thrown, unaccused, into a damp cell, and left there without society, without books, and without exercise, until he became seriously ill. In fact he never recovered from his prison illness. He

was in great pain when he started for the camp, and asked for some soothing medicine to be brought on to him, little thinking that before it could reach him he would receive from the Russians that which would quiet him for ever. He told me that during his confinement at Lemberg when he asked for a book, the gaoler gave him a volume of sermons, of the kind which men may be forced to listen to, but cannot read. He was also offered a child's story book. His application for a Bible, several times repeated, was met by a positive refusal: and, indeed, the sacred writings inculcate the virtue of patriotism in too many places to allow of their being placed with advantage in the hands of a Pole.

At the end of April, Glisczinski, after having been subjected to numerous unavailing interrogations, was ordered to be removed to Olmütz. At Oderberg, however, where the Cracow-Vienna Railway branches off into Moravia, he ran out of the station, was fired upon by the guard, but not hit, and succeeded in escaping into the woods, where he passed the first of many similar nights. At daybreak he went into the hut of

a Moravian peasant, and made a hopeless attempt to explain to the poor man who the Poles were, why they were fighting the Russians, and why in particular he, Glisczinski, was afraid of falling into the hands of the police.

At first all the peasant could understand was that a hungry and wild-looking man, without a farthing of money (Glisczinski's purse had been taken charge of by the prison authorities), and by his own confession an escaped prisoner, had come out of the forest and wanted assistance. At last, however, he understood that he had to deal with an honest man in distress. A Galician peasant would have given up his countryman to the Government. The Moravian brought out food, and sent for a functionary who he had heard was a Pole, and who turned out (like nearly all the Poles who can read and write) to be a good patriot. Ultimately Glisczinski, now without a passport, and under a false name, and with a false residence-card, contrived to get to Cracow, and thence to Lemberg in a luggage train. From Lemberg he moved forward from house to house, one proprietor sending him on to another,

until a few weeks ago I found myself quartered in the same house with him, at only a few miles' distance from the Volhynian frontier.

During the battle Glisczinski regained all his activity; the fire seemed to do him good; and at the close of the action, when the skirmishers, distributed in all sorts of positions in front of a very irregular line of wood, were called in, he was perfectly well, and had not been touched. Almost the last ball that was fired carried off one of the best officers, and one of the most amiable and accomplished men that the Polish army possessed. Domogalski, the Chief of the Staff, or, more properly speaking, of the service of aides-de-camp, got off his horse, and raised the dying man from the ground; and he had scarcely mounted again, when he was himself wounded—and this time mortally. I had no idea that Glisczinski had been in the least hurt until I saw him stretched out dead in the hospital at Brody, and I could not help thinking, as I looked at his lifeless body, that he might have been put to some better purpose than to serve as a sort of political target to the Russians, whom the Poles

had no more chance of conquering in the provinces of Volhynia, Podolia, and the Ukraine, than the Normans of France have of conquering England, or the English of conquering Normandy. I am not speaking of rights, but only of a matter of fact.

The Russians will call the Galician expedition an invasion of brigands. It was an invasion of patriots; but of so hopeless a character that one may question, not merely the prudence but the propriety, in a moral point of view, of having organised and sent it forth. There certainly is a point at which insurrection becomes something more horrible than madness, and more pitiable than folly; and it seems to me that this point is reached when a few handfuls of untrained men are encouraged to march against a strong army, in immense provinces, where the vast majority of the inhabitants are hostile to the cause the assailants wish to assert and defend. Indeed, in such a case as this attack upon the governing power in the Polish provinces of the south-east, I do not see how the word 'insurgent' can with any justice be used at all; for in Volhynia, Po-

dolia, and the Ukraine, there has been no insurrection, but only slight disturbances, followed by hideous massacres committed by the barbarous upon the civilised portion of the population. Had it been possible for the three detachments of the combined expedition to execute a sudden, simultaneous attack upon Radziwilow, the town, which does not appear to have contained more than 1,000, or at the utmost 1,200 troops, might have been taken, as any German town near Galicia might have been taken under similar circumstances. But Radziwilow could not have been held, and as soon as the Poles marched into the interior they would have been surrounded and cut to pieces. The object, however, of the expedition into Volhynia was not to gain possession of the province (which every one knew to be impossible), but simply to make a political demonstration, and to prove to Europe what Europe never doubted, but may begin to doubt now—that Volhynia, Podolia, and the province (not the city) of Kieff, are as much Polish as all the other portions of territory into which Poland was forcibly divided at the end of the eighteenth

century. If such a question was to be decided by force then it is now decided against the Poles. If, on the other hand, it was not to be decided by force, nor by the will of an ignorant and perverted majority (an argument which even the democratic Poles must now fall back upon), I cannot see on what ground the invasion of Volhynia can possibly be defended, for there is not a man in Poland whose opinions his friends would listen to on any ordinary political subject who did not know that it would lead to a terrible disaster. Before the expedition started I asked half a dozen proprietors of Volhynia—some of them men who had fled the province for their lives or for the lives of their families—what chance the expedition would have. The answer was always the same. The expedition could do no good, and it would be a fortunate thing if it did not lead to a general massacre of the Catholic Polish nobility by the Russo-Greek Ruthenian peasantry.

CHAPTER VII.

GALICIAN-VOLHYNIAN FRONTIER : JULY, 1863.

IN spite of terrible proofs to the contrary, the Poles still maintained that the Ruthenian peasantry would join them in the end, and that in order to gain their support it was only necessary to appear among them in great force. The insurrection in Volhynia had, it was said, failed in the first instance simply and solely because the long-meditated expedition from Galicia had not been ready to enter the province (as according to the plan of the National Government it should have done) while the insurrection was going on. It was resolved to try again, and this time to begin from without. The entrance of a strong, well-officered corps from Galicia was to be the signal for all the intending insurgents in Volhynia to rise, but the rising was, of course, not to take

place until the Galician corps had advanced some distance into the interior.

The scheme for invading Volhynia from Galicia was in some respects well conceived. The frontier was to have been crossed simultaneously at three points. Wysocki, with 1,200 men, was to have marched upon Radziwilow in front, while Horodycki and Minniewski, each with 650, were to have attacked it on the right and left. A day or two afterwards Wiszniewski was to have entered Volhynia farther north than Minniewski, and close to the right bank of the river Bug, while Rozycki, one of the best leaders who has yet appeared, was to have penetrated into the same province farther south than Horodycki and near the frontier of Podolia. Finally, another officer was to have taken a detachment of cavalry into Podolia itself, and thus from Podolia to Lublin, and along the whole line of the Galician-Volhynian frontier, the Russians would have been attacked; and though some of the detachments were sure to be destroyed it was thought certain that others would succeed in advancing far into the interior of Volhynia, and that once there they would either gain the

active support of the peasants or at least show themselves strong enough to insure their respect and, to a certain extent, their assistance. The chief appointed to direct the combined movement was General Wysocki, formerly the commander of the Polish Legion in Hungary, and the title given to him by the National Government was 'General Commanding in the Province of Lublin and in the Ruthenian Provinces.'

On the day fixed for the commencement of this important movement, in which, had all gone well, some 4,000 men would have been engaged, it was found that only two detachments, those of General Wysocki himself and of Colonel Horodycki, his immediate supporter on the right, were ready to start. This unreadiness could be attributed to no want of foresight on the part of the commissaries of the expedition. Arms had been purchased and confiscated, purchased and confiscated again, for three times the number of men composing the expedition; and, although many of these men were arrested and imprisoned, it turned out at the last moment that there were more insurgents than there were arms for them to carry. Fresh seizures

of rifles, bayonets, and revolvers were made on Sunday night and early on Monday morning; and on Monday afternoon, when Wysocki's and Horodycki's detachments were summoned to the woods, it was found impossible to equip for the field more than 750 of the former and 450 of the latter.

Staying in Eastern Galicia, I had witnessed the preparations made for the departure of these detachments for some weeks beforehand, and was much impressed by the unanimity and mutual confidence existing among and between all classes, except the very lowest, without which it would have been impossible ever to have got them to the frontier. I knew beforehand that the orders of the National Government were obeyed by the Poles in all parts of Poland; but it was something to *see* them obeyed, and something more to see the national cause systematically aided without any orders on the subject being transmitted at all. The rich have given willingly (and sometimes unwillingly) a great deal towards the expenses of the insurrection; but, as far as my observation goes, I am inclined to think that the poor, according to their means, have

given more. I never heard any poor man make such a remark, but, on the contrary, have heard it generally acknowledged that the great proprietors in Poland have done their best, as far as money contributions are concerned.

However, I found insurgents staying in the houses of the poor, as well as in those of the rich, and treated with a sort of paternal affection everywhere. Indeed the kindness and hospitality shown to all classes and conditions of men who called themselves insurgents were, if anything, carried to excess, for many persons received and entertained strangers on the understanding that they belonged to the Volhynian expedition, but without having any positive proof of the fact. Even the German officials in some places were touched by this general confidence, and when ordered to institute a 'revision' would give a hint beforehand that at such an hour their arrival might be expected. Then the men would go into the woods, the horses would be taken out of the stables and sent into the fields, while the saddles and bridles were buried in the garden. I have seen packets of saddles and boxes of arms

left at a house without any notification as to where they came from, or whither they were to be sent. In such cases the man who took them in put them in a place of safety, and a few days afterwards would receive a line of writing, or, more generally, a message by word of mouth, telling him to forward them to some house a few miles nearer the frontier. If the whole country (with the exception of the peasants) did not form one general association for promoting the interests of Poland, this unbounded trust from Pole to Pole would soon lead to the exposure and frustration of all the national schemes. As it is they are carried out up to a certain point, and have never once broken down from any bad faith or from want of faith on the part of those called upon to assist in executing them.

The district in which I was staying was filled with insurgents, appointed for the most part to the central detachment under the immediate command of Wysocki. Many of them belonged to the emigration, and had abandoned the little positions which, after many years striving, they had contrived to obtain in England, or more generally

in France, in order to see their country once more and strike one more blow on its behalf. 'The young men here are admirable,' they said, 'sacrificing themselves for a cause which is a very desperate one if we are never to be assisted from abroad. As for us it does not matter. We are old fellows, and would rather die in Poland than anywhere else; and then we have not led the sort of life which attaches men to this world.' One, an old soldier of the Polish army, told me that he had been for thirteen years working at a desk in an insurance office, and that he was not sorry to get a little fresh air and have an opportunity of riding on horseback. Another, an officer of the same army, had been keeping a shop, and was making humorous speculations as to how in his absence the business would be carried on. A third saw his native land for the first time, and was saying 'what nice people the Poles were.' This gentleman was full of the historical reminiscences of Cracow, whence he had just arrived, and I ventured to ask him how he felt on seeing that the funeral-mound of Kosciusko had been converted into a fort. He said that, on the whole,

he felt pleased, as such insults served to remind the Poles constantly of their intolerable position.

Among the insurgents belonging to Wysocki's corps I found a young lady so timid and so afraid of being looked upon as a wonder that she kept herself in almost perpetual seclusion, but so brave that on the day of battle she insisted on being placed in the first line, and greatly distinguished herself in the action. Her relations had done their utmost to persuade and even force her to remain at home, but she threatened to commit suicide if she were detained, and they feared that she might keep her word. She had changed her name from 'Marya' to 'Maryan' (the Christian name of Langiewicz), and was known in her company as 'Panna Maryan,' or, as Englishmen, if they had met her in the woods, would have called her, 'Maid Marian.' Maid Marian has now returned to her family, and I am sorry to have to add that this prodigal daughter—prodigal, at least, in acts of daring—is badly wounded.

I had been told that early on Sunday morning some one would call for me and drive me some-

where in the middle of a wood, where I should meet some friends, who would then show me where the detachment in which they were to serve was concealed, and enable me to accompany it on its march towards Radziwilow. The person expected came at the appointed time, mentioned a name, and then, instead of taking me to the heart of the forest, drove me through a beautiful woodland country to the house of a neighbouring proprietor, where, besides the host, I found one of the chief promoters of the expedition, two of the principal officers of Horodycki's corps, and a few other insurgents lying down on the lawn, and smoking. One of the officers took out the map of the country about to be entered (it was a photographic print from the private map of the Russian Staff), and pointed out to me the place of assembly in the forest, the spot at which the frontier was to be crossed, and the road by which it was intended to advance upon Radziwilow. Discussions on the interminable insoluble Polish question, together with pistol shooting, fencing, and other warlike amusements, filled up the time until dinner; after which the officers went singly to

visit our first place of encampment, and came back with the alarming news that an Austrian patrol had been seen hovering about the spot where most of the arms lay buried.

In the evening a 'revision' was announced. The house was cleared of insurgents, and two very suspicious-looking cases were placed where the police were likely to find them. One was empty. The other was labelled 'Vin de Bordeaux,' and contained wine. All through the night messengers were continually arriving, and the first news in the morning was that the arms had been seized, that the labour of three months had been lost, and that the expedition could not start. Ultimately it was discovered that about a hundred rifles had been taken, but that there was still nearly three hundred in a place of comparative safety. The question was raised as to whether it would be advisable to postpone the departure of the expedition until more arms could be procured, but it was soon decided not to risk, by further delay, the seizure of the whole stock.

At last, early on Monday afternoon, we got into a cart, built without springs for the same sort of

reason for which Highlanders are said not to wear trousers, and went into the wood. Turning from the high road into a cross road, from the cross road into a lane, and from the lane into a private path, we came, after many windings, to a little glade, where the long grass had been crushed and flattened as if by a roller. The former presence of human beings in this sequestered spot was indicated by an old boot, which Hoby would have disavowed, and a cask containing gin—from which, as it was not yet empty, it was presumed that the insurgents could not be far distant. They were so well concealed, however, that, although we had good guides (including one of the forest-keepers of the estate), it was not easy to find them. At last we burst upon a band of brothers, who were engaged in the difficult and to them evidently novel occupation of trying on boots. The boot so contemptuously abandoned in the first halting-place had apparently been the only one among some thirty men. The major was answering questions on all sorts of subjects from boots upwards, and was at the same time superintending a distribution

of pistols, which, being larger than any pistols ever seen before or afterwards out of a pantomime, looked very terrible, and produced (as they were intended to do) a fine and healthy effect on the Ruthenian village population.

The peasants looked a good deal scared as the insurgents marched through the fields, but were soon reassured, or pretended to be, when a few words were spoken to them in kindness. Of attacking or molesting the insurgents in any way there was, of course, no thought, more particularly as the half-detachment, consisting of two hundred men, looked in the moonlight, as it straggled along in double file, like a much larger force, and was pronounced by impartial spectators to be at least a thousand strong. Two peasants, however, were overheard whispering that they had a great mind to go off and tell the Austrians. They were arrested, asked if they wanted to be hanged, and, replying in the negative, were told how to avoid that fate so far as it was likely to be inflicted upon them by their Polish compatriots.

They were then put into a cart and driven along after the detachment, and were not liberated until

everything had been made ready for crossing the frontier.

We marched during nearly all the first night, passing from the moonlight into the darkness of the dense woods, where nothing but glowworms, and here and there in the insurgent column the light of a cigar, could be seen, and then again into the moonlight, until at last we came to a river, or mountain stream (running down from the Carpathians), and sat down by the side of the waters and supped. Most persons said that it was one of the best suppers they had ever had (of many poor fellows it was the last); and the breakfast to which a select number were invited was also much admired, especially some tea-soup made in a saucepan, and served out in saucepan-lids, wine glasses and wooden ladles.

During the halt, of which advantage was taken to eat a hurried breakfast, Horodycki, the commander of the detachment, joined us, bringing with him 200 infantry and from forty to fifty cavalry. The rifles, bayonets, and scythes were now disinterred, or pulled out of their hiding places in the brushwood, and I found that this particular

batch had all been concealed at about twenty paces' distance from a public road running through the middle of the wood. The Austrians had not found them because they had been hidden where the Austrians were sure not to think of looking for them.

As we were about to go away from the cottage where we had taken our early tea, a plain and shrill-voiced woman came out and complained that her husband had deserted her in order to go and fight the Russians. It was impossible not to understand that he had chosen the least of two evils. The poor man, who preferred his country to his wife, and death to his home, was in the cavalry, and now galloped to the front and was soon out of sight, and I hope out of hearing. Afterwards another patriot was pointed out to me who had deliberately abandoned his family, leaving them in great want, and all on the plea that he loved his native land. The great majority of the infantry, however, could have had nothing to leave. They were men who were evidently steeped in dishonourable poverty, and, when one of their officers afterwards told me that he had seen swarms of men like them lounging about

Whitechapel, Whitechapel was calumniated. One minor disadvantage of employing such men is that it is disagreeable, and even painful, for decent persons to remain in their neighbourhood. It must be with the view of avoiding them that so many of the sons of the proprietors go into the cavalry, which, composed as it is of all sorts of horses and all sorts of riders, is utterly useless, except for the service of the camp, and is scarcely ever employed in action. I saw that some of the new comers were quite dispirited at the idea of having such riffraff for their comrades, and one of the officers, noticing the fact, said to me, 'These young men have come to the camp under the impression that they would find every one here as good as themselves. I wish such were the case, but we must do our best, and we will try to make soldiers of them all when we get on the other side of the frontier.'

As for the officers, they were all men who had seen plenty of service in foreign armies, or who had distinguished themselves in the present Polish insurrection. Horodycki, the chief of the detachment, will be remembered by persons familiar with

the incidents of the Hungarian war of 1848-9 as having defended the bridge and the passage of the canal at Temesvar against an overpowering force while the Hungarian army was effecting its retreat. Major Horodycki lost half his battalion, but he succeeded in keeping the enemy at bay. He was a simple, straightforward man, a good deal sterner than the majority of Poles, and apparently not much given to seeing visions. Accordingly I could not help attaching importance to his words when about half an hour before he crossed the frontier he began speaking to me about the general prospects of the insurrection. He had been occupied all day in giving directions on one subject or another, and now, at half-past nine in the evening, sat down to take some refreshment. He had a little claret in his flask, and before drinking part of it wished prosperity to England, and said how glad he was to find that the English had so much sympathy for Poland. I answered that, although this sympathy existed, and was sincerely felt, it was by no means certain that it would lead to a declaration of war against Russia. He replied that the time for interven-

tion had not yet come; that he had never expected there would be any intervention before the spring; and that before then the Poles would make such efforts and prove themselves so strong that we should not refuse to give them a helping hand, and that no more would be necessary.

I do not think Horodycki shared the opinion of some of his countrymen as to the good will of the peasants towards the insurrection. At least, he turned some Ruthenian peasants out of the camp who had come there with gifts of fresh butter, sheep's-milk cheese, and potted cream. He feared these Greek Catholics *et dona ferentes*, and said, when I asked him whether their offering was not a good sign, 'They are with us now that we are here, they will be with our enemies when we are gone. I know them, and have sent them away.' I must add that a Ruthenian priest and his wife brought something more than butter and cheese; they brought their nephew. This was a testimony of sympathy which could not be mistaken, and the young man was accepted with thanks and sent across the frontier. Several ladies also visited the camp, and so inundated the place

with strawberries and cream that Horodycki, fearing no doubt that discipline would be relaxed and the forest of Nakwasha converted into a Capua, turned back and gave orders that no more women should be suffered to approach.

Then Horodycki had to preside at a trial, and though there was no execution I saw the executioner. A certain cavalry man, who spoke Polish, Russian, German, and French very imperfectly, and swore from time to time in what was supposed to be a sort of Moldavian *patois*, had got drunk on the march, and used his sabre in lieu of a riding whip. When remonstrated with, he said it was all right, and at the same time broke his weapon over the back of the unhappy beast ridden by the man who had dared to interfere with him. Sage beneath the Polish beech—in the notorious position of *Tityrus sub tegmine fagi*—reclined the chieftain when the culprit was brought before him in the custody of two sentinels and a third person, who I was given to understand had the functions of Provost-Marshal assigned to him. Outward appearances were decidedly against the offender, and when Horodycki drew himself up on

the grass, looked at the broken blade, and began to expatiate on his crime, I thought his last hour had arrived. The sentence, however, passed on the prisoner was simply that he should be turned out of the detachment. He entreated so earnestly to be allowed to remain that I thought he must be begging for his life, and ultimately the chief told him to go and lie down and get sober—the first part of which injunction was faithfully performed.

The second officer, the major commanding the infantry, was Synkiewicz, son of the historian of that name, and captain in the army of the kingdom of Italy. Synkiewicz, without knowing his country from personal observation, had fallen in love with it through imagination; but he said that he found the Poles what he had always imagined them to be. Some of the Poles do, indeed, come up to the ideal which their warmest admirers have formed of them, and these were the men that Major Synkiewicz habitually associated with. This does not alter the fact that the greater part of the detachment consisted of persons whom honest scavengers would have had a right to despise. It would have been inspiring

to many persons, but to me was saddening, to see the delight with which this officer looked forward to the hour fixed for entering Volhynia—for I knew that he must die there, or come back disheartened. He would not allow that anything was wrong in the detachment. If some one said that the arms were a little clumsy, he replied that the greatest battles of modern times had been gained with arms not nearly so good. As to the men, they were not prepossessing in appearance, but would know how to fight. As to numbers, if four hundred and fifty men were really determined to cut their way through an opposing force, they could do it, however large that force might be. As he was talking to me about the Opera, and of the invigorating effect which music, or even the recollection of music, had upon him, I said it was a pity (as it really was) that Mario could not see his costume, which was a sort of intelligent first tenor's version of the Garibaldian make-up. He was told that the Russians would be sure to pick him off; but he replied that he wished to be conspicuous for the sake of his men, and that the Russians, if they

aimed at him, would not hit him. They, however, sent a bullet through his long, chestnut-coloured beard, when he was inside Radziwilow, and afterwards brought his horse down—an unpleasant animal, which in the darkness of night it was all but impossible to saddle, and which ought not to be regretted.

‘Good-bye,’ said Synkiewicz, as he mounted his beast; ‘the Russians are close at hand. We shall attack them at three, and be in Radziwilow at four.’ I said I would look for him there. ‘Don’t do anything of the kind,’ he replied, ‘until you are quite sure the place is ours; and remember that we may be in the place one hour, and out of it the next.’

The first half of the detachment, consisting of two companies of infantry and an advanced guard of cavalry, had already been taken across the frontier by Captain Tchorszewski, an officer who served with Horodycki in Hungary, and who was attached to the British head-quarters during the Crimean war. Captain Jagninski, another of Horodycki’s comrades in Hungary, took charge of the second half, and was accompanied by Horodycki and

Synkiewicz. The rearguard (cavalry) followed some hours afterwards, under the direction of a Polish officer, late of the Russian army. The night, which, like the first night of the march, had been brilliantly beautiful until ten o'clock, suddenly darkened, just as the detachment was ordered to cross; and the rearguard went over the frontier in the midst of thunder, lightning, and such torrents of rain that after the lapse of a minute the dense wood afforded no protection whatever against it. The last man to leave was an enterprising and watchful Hungarian servant, who had brought nothing into the camp but an old horse with a piece of rope tied round his nose, and who galloped out on a magnificent charger, splendidly arrayed and equipped, and brandishing a long sabre.

We had had one alarm in the afternoon, when the outposts were attacked, and a general call to arms ordered, but without being followed by a regular engagement. Now, as the rearguard left the wood, it was fired upon by a party of Cossacks, and at the same time a messenger reached us from the Galician side with the news that the Austrians at Podkamin (a town about six miles

distant) had found out the position of the camp, and would be in the wood soon after daylight. It was getting on towards three in the morning, but still too dark to ride, drive, or even to walk, for there was no footpath through the slush, and had there been one it would have been impossible to see it. Our position was enlivened by two of the horses having broken loose, but it was only when the lightning shone through the wood from time to time that their proceedings became particularly objectionable. At last daylight broke, and we got into peasants' carts, and were driven rapidly towards the village of Nakwasha. After us came two other carts, containing the nearly lifeless bodies of two poor fellows who had sunk under the fatigue of twenty-four hours' nearly incessant marching. We had not proceeded many yards when a horse without a rider galloped after us. Next came a mounted guide, with the news that the rearguard had been not only fired upon, but charged and routed by the Cossacks. As we had not seen this, the man was told that he lied, but he persisted in his statement, which turned out to be true.

At Nakwasha we wrung the water out of our clothes, and then made by a roundabout road for Brody to seek the detachment of Wysocki, which, however, had already crossed the frontier, and was, we were assured, in actual possession of Radziwilow. This news we soon discovered to be utterly false. Horodycki arrived in the neighbourhood of Radziwilow at daybreak. Wysocki was late, but why Horodycki advanced at once instead of waiting for Wysocki, and why Wysocki waited two hours close to the frontier instead of advancing at once, has never been well explained.

It appears now that the 800 Russians who, after a desperate fight, drove Horodycki's little detachment out of the town, and completely routed it, were the same men who afterwards fought Wysocki and ultimately compelled him to cross the frontier. The Polish papers estimate the number of Russians who took part in these battles at several thousands. I say 800 on the authority of one of the Polish functionaries of Radziwilow. A Polish officer in the Austrian battalion, stationed at Brody, thinks there were 900. An insurgent, who was inside

Radziwilow and by the side of Horodycki when he fell, tells me that the Russians drawn up in the market-place numbered only 500 ; but there were many more concealed in the houses. On the other hand, Horodycki had only about three hundred men, armed with very inferior rifles, to oppose to this force. Of the four hundred and fifty in the wood, some thirty or forty of the most ill-conditioned had bolted when the outposts were attacked. Synkiewicz sent away about an equal number as unfitted for the desperate work before them. The rearguard had been dispersed on crossing the frontier, and the rest of the cavalry could not be employed inside Radziwilow.

Of the officers I have mentioned Horodycki and Jagninski are known to have been killed. Tchorzewski never returned. Synkiewicz, after two narrow escapes, had to take refuge in a large pond or lake, where he remained for eight hours, while the peasants, who had been pursuing him, stood on the banks armed with scythes, ready to murder him if he ventured to return to dry land. The major had swum to a little island of mud, and there remained concealed among rushes and weeds,

until he at last thought of taking his Italian hat off, sending it floating along the water. Then the peasants thought their victim was drowned, and went home to dinner.

The last I heard of the gallant Major Synkiewicz, was from a young lady (not to be confounded with 'Maid Marian') who is among the wounded in one of the hospitals at Brody. She told me that she was lying on the ground in a wood, when 'an Italian,' to her amazement, came out of the water close by, and helped to get her to the frontier. She said that 'the Italian' spoke Polish very imperfectly, and that he was the major who commanded the infantry in Horodyeki's detachment.

CHAPTER VIII.

GALICIAN-VOLHYNIAN FRONTIER: JULY, 1863.

WITH all the admiration which I sincerely feel for the Langiewiczs, Frankowskis, Narbutts, Padlewskis, Lelewels, Horodyckis, Glisczinskis, and so many other noble-minded soldiers who have given dignity to the Polish movement, and who are now for the most part in prison or in the grave, there is one class of Polish insurgents which I confess I cannot stand at all.* These are the men and boys who are to the true patriots of the insurrection what youths who enter regular armies for the sake of the uniform are to true

* Revolution does not 'open a career to talent' alone. It also makes the path easy for impostors of various kinds. The last Polish insurrection, though not a revolution, possessed a certain revolutionary character, and one of the effects of the general ferment that took place in Polish society, was to bring a great deal of scum to the surface.

soldiers. For six weeks you may see them strutting about the streets, and talking loud in the coffee-houses of Cracow and Lemberg, proud of their martial bearing, very proud indeed of their boots, and boasting of all sorts of things that they are going to do, but have not yet done. Houses are open to them, which at other times and under other circumstances they would not be allowed to enter, they have only to say that they are going into the cavalry to have excellent horses placed at their disposal, and there is scarcely anything they may not get by asking for it or hinting that they are in need of it.

Then they are allowed to pay, and even themselves receive an undue amount of attention from women, for the Polish ladies look upon patriotism as the first virtue, and are too patriotic themselves to imagine that those insurgents who are the most ferocious when they are a hundred miles from the frontier, can be among the mildest when they find themselves in presence of the enemy, and that while the bravest and most pure-minded men in Poland are literally sacrificing themselves beneath the Russian sword in

the supposed interest of their country, these theatrical personages are sniffing the battle very far off, and gracefully lounging on the Austrian barrier at least a mile from the scene of action. On the morning of the invasion of Volhynia, when Horodycki's detachment had already been defeated, the chief organiser of the combined expedition arrested in my presence more than twenty of these faint-hearted patriots as they were hurrying past him from Wysocki's detachment towards the Galician frontier. They had not the slightest idea who this gentleman was, but he threatened to report them to the National Government, took their names down, stopped new skulkers one by one as they came up, and did it all in such a tone of decision and with such an air of authority that when he ordered them to form, and marched them to a convenient little nook in the side of the wood which lines the road to Radziwilow, they proceeded like lambs to the ambuscade from which, if the opportunity presented itself, they, with some eighty more who afterwards joined them, were to fire upon the Russians. Then, as the Russians did not leave

the excellent cover they had found in a field of standing corn, and as Wysocki continued firing upon them from his position in the wood, the insurgents who had modestly retired from the front of the battle, soon became lions again, and boasted how they had held their ground to the last, and how the rest of their company had been destroyed, and they alone had lived to tell the story, which they certainly told in the nursery sense of the word. One of these heroes declared to me that at the beginning of the engagement he had brought down a Russian at 500 paces, and I really believe, if he fired at all, that it was at a considerable distance. Altogether I am sure they were convinced that they had done great things, and that they had fairly paid for their two or three months' military glory, taken on credit, by remaining five minutes under fire.

I must now explain that among the easily appeased insurgents who were twenty hours making their zigzag march from their encampment in the woods near the frontier to the frontier itself, and who were 'back again' from the front of the Radziwilow wood and within easy reach of the

Austrian barrier in about ten minutes, there was not one who could, by any cunning process, have been disguised as a gentleman, or who looked like a respectable apprentice, or an honest workman. The men of these classes, or this class—for, in considering its military merits, one need not divide it according to ordinary social distinctions—are lying in numbers in the hospitals and churchyards of Radziwilow and Brody, while the peaceful boasters are, no doubt, fighting their unfought battles over again in the taverns of Lemberg.

It must be sweet, if not altogether decorous, to enjoy the reputation of being ready to die for one's country without ever running the slightest risk, to walk surrounded by a shade of glory while carefully avoiding the substance of actual peril. But these cunning dogs, who aim at the shadow and get it, and keep to it, are often difficult to recognise beforehand, for there are insurgents who brag and run away, and insurgents who brag and make the enemy run away. Indeed, the chaff of the insurrection cannot always be sifted beforehand from the corn; but the

wind of battle soon separates it, and, as a considerable quantity of it was blown the other day just before my eyes, I cannot help mentioning, as a faithful chronicler, that the chaff exists, and that it is very dirty chaff indeed. For these theatrical personages are, after all, not the worst members of the Polish insurrection, and, at least, the recruiting agents cannot be blamed for accepting them. Some are as brave as can be, others are as brave as ordinary men, and if a certain number of the military street-walkers of Cracow and Lemberg run away, whenever they are seriously attacked, and have a fair chance of escaping to the Galician frontier, it may be that they would not do so if the insurgent regiments were better disciplined.

But what is to be said of the gentlemen without boots or shirts, and who come to the insurgent camps clothed in rags and vermin? And is there any excuse for making brave officers risk their lives and reputations in endeavouring to lead such miserable creatures—the refuse of the Polish towns—against Russian troops who are no more ‘demoralised’ in Volhynia than they were in the Crimea? At the risk of diminishing the distant

glories of what is called the Volhynian insurrection, I cannot help saying—simply and solely from sympathy for the courageous and devoted men who have been killed, wounded, or, if not wounded in a physical sense, utterly disheartened by the result of the Galician invasion—that this attempt to bring a rising about in a province where it was next to impossible was utterly unjustifiable. The Poles would have undoubtedly a right to try and get back their ancient provinces by force from the Russians if they had any chance of succeeding in such an endeavour. But the chances of success were not simply more or less against them; it was a positive certainty that they would fail, and fail in the most disastrous manner. If they had taken Radziwilow they could not have held it. If they had marched into the interior they would soon have been surrounded and cut to pieces. If, before coming to that inevitable end, they had got a number of Polish proprietors to join them, then the peasants would have been let loose, and we should have heard of fresh massacres and of newly emancipated Ruthenian serfs proving their love for Poland by flaying and cutting out the eyes of Poles.

Even if Volhynia had been eager for insurrection, whereas, as far as I can learn from the statements of numerous proprietors from different parts of the province, the general wish was that it should be let alone, and be allowed to limit its part in the Polish movement to paying a very large portion of the expenses—even then the men who were sent into Volhynia were, taking them altogether, quite unfit for the difficult and dangerous work assigned to them, and any man with eyes could have seen at a glance that many of them were fit for nothing in the world.

‘I thought,’ said one of Wysocki’s captains when I went to visit him in the hospital at Brody, where he was lying with a bullet in his leg, ‘I thought I should have found the same sort of men fighting here that I found in Hungary when I was in the Polish legion. It was too bad to give me such *rubbish* to command.’

‘If you could have seen your men beforehand,’ I inquired, ‘would you have left England and your wife and family to take charge of such soldiers?’

‘Of course not,’ he replied. ‘It is no use trying to lead men who cannot be got to follow. I

was not merely disappointed, but disgusted, when I saw what material I had to deal with.'

'What class of men had you in your company?' I continued. 'Do you think I could call them vagabonds?'

'Well, they were covered with lice, and were the sort of persons that you might find in swarms for any sort of work in Whitechapel. I should think "vagabonds" just the word for them.'

'And how long did they remain under fire?' I asked.

'Not long. I was hit about twenty minutes after the battle had begun, and already half my company had got away. I had only forty men left. When I was carried to the rear, I believe they followed me. People will be abusing the General,' he went on to say, 'but he did his best, and the officers, and a portion of the men, did their best to support him. The first and fourth companies were the only ones that did any real fighting. The two others had so many bad men among them that, taken altogether, they were quite worthless.'

Another distinguished officer, who had taken

part in all the great Italian battles, from Novara to Solferino, and who tried hard to persuade himself that the men he had to lead to the invasion of Volhynia might turn out first-rate soldiers, hinted to me at the last moment, that, considering they had, for the most part, never been under fire, and that they had not even learned to march, and certainly did not understand the use of the rifle—he might have some trouble in keeping them together if the Russians attacked them in any force. To send a good officer into action with such men, was like sending a good sailor to sea in a leaky ship.

As no one who took part in the Galician expedition received any pay, it is rather difficult, at first thought, to understand why any but true patriots joined it. It seemed to me at Cracow, at Lemberg, and at various country houses in Eastern Galicia, where I met insurgents under orders for Volhynia, that Wysocki would have an army under his orders really worthy of the name; that the soldiers would be of the same class or classes as the great bulk of our volunteers, while I knew that the officers were for the most part Poles who

had proved their worth in foreign armies, and who were now about to fight, not for Hungary or Italy, but for their own native land. A force so composed, however small, might have done great things. It might even have leavened a much larger force; but I had reckoned without the ragamuffins, who met my eyes for the first time in the woods, and who were past leavening. These curious patriots are the sort of men that no one sees anywhere—though, as Captain —, with a fine knowledge of London life, remarked, they may be hunted out in the slums of Whitechapel, and I think might also be discovered in the haunts of the *voyous* who infest the Parisian faubourgs. They were without pay, certainly, but then their great object is not to grow rich, it is simply to live idle. As for danger, there is not much danger in going into battle if you keep in a wood and run away directly the firing seriously begins. They receive money, too, for their travelling expenses; are provided week after week and month after month with gratuitous lodging, food, drink, and tobacco; are supplied before they go—for five minutes—into action with boots and shirts,

which, when they run away, they are not expected to return, and altogether lead the kind of life which a mean and cowardly 'vagabond' would enjoy. Between the Galician rabble who betrayed their officers before Radziwilow, and who now accuse General Wysocki of having betrayed *them*, and the twelve Lithuanian gentlemen who supported the wounded Narbutt in front of the battle until he and they were shot down, there is just the difference which exists between baseness and heroism; and I am almost inclined to add (in spite of many admirable exceptions) between the patriotism of the Galicians in general and the patriotism of the Lithuanians in general. No one says that the Galicians are bound to endeavour to drive the Russians out of Volhynia; but if they make the attempt they should make it in a becoming manner, and, for the sake of the men who mean to fight, abstain from sending as their supporters men who are not likely to do anything but run away. An insurrection of 'a whole country,' minus the immense body of the peasantry who are too unpatriotic, and the holders of landed property, who are too prudent to fight,

is nothing less than an absurdity. When the peasantry have forgotten their servile condition, and have received some measure of education, they will perhaps become as good Poles as their superiors. Otherwise, there is no hope for Poland. The only chance the Poles have of obtaining help from abroad depends on their ability to help themselves. I believe the expedition to Volhynia was undertaken at the suggestion of Polish advisers in Paris. Of course they meant well—who does not? They were convinced that there would be an intervention, and thought it desirable that, throughout Russian Poland, armed protests should be made against the Russian rule. The protest in Volhynia was so weak, that, for the sake of the Poles themselves, it ought never to have been thought of.

CHAPTER IX.

WARSAW : SEPTEMBER, 1863.

THE throwing of the so-called Orsini shell, the sacking of the Zamoyski house and palace, the exasperation of the inhabitants of Warsaw, the savage attitude of the Russian soldiers, and the possible consequences of this species of collision between Russians and Poles in the Polish capital, are still almost the only subjects of conversation in Warsaw. Of the 300 persons arrested in the two immense buildings belonging to Count Zamoyski, and of which one is inhabited by the Count's family, a few have now been set at liberty. Among the number is Prince Thaddeus Lubomirski, President of the Benevolent Society of Warsaw, and author of several highly esteemed works on the early history of Poland. The Prince was engaged in preparing a new edition of *Dlugosz*—better

known by his Latinised name of Dlugossius, and by the Latin equivalent for his name, Longinus—and had in his possession all the most celebrated manuscript copies of the work. These manuscripts, independently of their literary importance, as having been made directly from the original, were magnificent specimens of illuminated writing, and invaluable as heirlooms to the families from whose libraries Prince Lubomirski had borrowed them. They were of no use to the Russian soldiers, who could neither make them into *papirosses* nor into pipe lights. Could they have understood their value, they might of course have kept them back, and ultimately have sold them for large sums to their legitimate owners; but as it is, no trace can be found of them, and it appears certain that they must have been consumed in the glorious bonfire the flames of which were fed by Chopin's piano, and into which the best numismatic collection in Poland was thrown. A whole museum of ancient coins and medals, a whole library of ancient manuscripts, and the favourite instrument of one of the most graceful and poetical of composers, afforded such a variety of materials for destruction as

barbarians have seldom been fortunate enough to meet with in two ordinary dwelling-houses. Chopin's piano had become the property of his sister, whose husband is now in the citadel. The numismatic collection belonged to Prince Lubomirski, whose suite of apartments has been completely emptied of all its literary and artistic treasures.

Count Andrew Zamoyski's son is strictly confined in the citadel. The Count himself, as every one knows, has been in exile since the time when he was suspected of intending to present an illegal address to the Grand Duke Constantine. The papers of the Agricultural Society, of which Count Zamoyski was President, have been destroyed. So also have those of the Vistula Steamboat Company, which was founded by Count Zamoyski, and of which, since his exile, the affairs have been carried on under the general superintendence of his son Count Stanislas. A large sum, in bank-notes and other securities, was taken or somehow lost during the sacking of the Zamoyski palace. The notes and bills are supposed to have

escaped the flames, for the numbers are advertised in the Warsaw papers and payment of them stopped —by whose authority does not appear. The value of the two vast edifices confiscated, which cover an immense space of ground in the very heart of the city, and contained 2,000 residents (1,500 in the 'house' and 500 in the 'palace') is estimated at 8,000,000 Polish florins, or in English money, 200,000*l*.

Another great loser by the sacking of the Zamoyiski house is Professor Kowalewski, whose losses will not be felt by himself alone. Professor Kowalewski was one of the most learned Orientalists of the day, and the manuscripts of which he has been plundered, and which in all probability shared the fate of the Dlugosz histories, are said to have been of the highest importance. Almost every man of distinction in Poland has been exiled or imprisoned for proving himself a Pole, and the eminently Polish part of Kowalewski's life began when he was quite a child. He was one of the companions and intimate friends of the poet Mickiewicz at the University of Wilna, and with Mickiewicz was arrested and thrown into prison

charged with belonging to a society formed by the students for the maintenance of the Polish language and literature. In the drama in which Mickiewicz has portrayed the sufferings of the Wilna students, under the mild government of Alexander I., the young Kowalewski figures as 'Joseph'—his Christian name. When Mickiewicz was sent to the Crimea and began to write his Crimean sonnets, Kowalewski was exiled to the extreme east of the Russian Empire, and applied himself to the study of the Siberian languages. He was then intrusted by the Russian Government with a mission to China, and was afterwards appointed to a professorship at the University of Kazan, where the Oriental languages are specially cultivated. When the University of Warsaw, after having remained closed for thirty years, was reconstituted and reopened in accordance with the plan presented to the Emperor by the Marquis Wielopolski, and recommended for adoption by the Grand Duke Constantine, the Russian Government certainly did its best to collect at Warsaw the most eminent Polish professors until that time attached to the various Universities of Russia.

The Russian Government's attempts at good, however, are never successful, probably because it has no real faith in them, and therefore cannot persevere in carrying them out. It could bring together a few learned men in Warsaw for the instruction of the Polish youth, but it could not desist from irritating the Polish population in general until it had at last produced a general feeling of exasperation, in the midst of which it was next to impossible to introduce reforms in themselves highly beneficial. All that has resulted from the arrival of Kowalewski in Warsaw has been the destruction of his valuable manuscripts and books.

The whole of the library of the Zamoyski palace was burned ; and pictures, pianos, looking-glasses, and other objects of furniture, decoration, and art were thrown out of window, and the fragments heaped together and set on fire. The flames rose so high that the firemen of the town hastened with the engines towards the scene of incendiarism, but were not allowed to approach.

Besides arson, the defenders of order and property indulged largely in robbery. Among the

shopkeepers established in the 'Zamoyaki house,' who lost most in the general pillage, a jeweller, named Krupecki, is mentioned. He is also said to have suffered violence at the hands of those who were robbing him; but, however this may have been, he was thrown into such a state of excitement as to bring on an attack of apoplexy, from which he died the same night.* I have not seen anyone who can corroborate of his own knowledge the reports circulated as to personal outrages committed upon men, and worse still upon women, living in the upper part of the house, which from the first to the fifth floor is divided into suites of apartments. It is not very probable, however, that the 300 persons arrested and taken to the citadel were conducted there with any ceremony.

The Russian officers are said to have led their soldiers gallantly to the attack of the defenceless property and to have taken a full share of the spoil. If so, whatever the social acquirements of some of these gentlemen may be, it may be said

* See next chapter. Krupecki did not die. He lived to be exiled to Siberia.

that despotism in Russia, however much it may 'soften the manners,' develops at the same time a considerable amount of actual ferocity. In any case, the assault and the pillage were expressly ordered and directed, and accordingly, it is not the soldiers alone who ought to be held responsible for what was done. The Poles maintain that nothing was thrown or fired from the house belonging to, but not occupied by, the Zamoyiski family,* and the Russians know perfectly well that the Zamoyiski palace is the very last place from which it could be supposed that an attempt at assassination would be made. Indeed, it is not pretended that it was made from the latter building, only it is said now that the two buildings form but one, and, as this happens to be a simple untruth, an edict has been published ostensibly with a view to future occurrences, but in reality to give a semblance of legality to the flagrant wrong that has already been perpetrated. First, the *Official Journal* calls houses which are separate houses, and have no connection with one

* See next chapter.

another, except through the proprietor, 'the united houses;' and then the director of the police, perceiving that the falsehood of the *Official Journal* must soon be exposed, issues an order which makes proprietors of houses equally responsible with actual occupiers for whatever breaches of an improvised law may be committed within them. It would look strange in European eyes (and will have a curious appearance as it is) that Count Zamoyski, living in Paris, should be held responsible, and deprived of the greater part of his fortune, in consequence of an offence having been committed in the immediate neighbourhood of a house belonging to him in Warsaw; so to put as good a face as possible on the matter it is suddenly arranged that the punishment already inflicted upon him shall be made right and proper by a posterior order, framed, as far as possible, to suit the particular circumstances of his case.

The sacking of the Zamoyski house lasted from 6 P.M. until 10. Then, all that had not been carried away or thrown out of window and burnt

was left for the rightful owners. Probably not much jewelry remained. The Chopin piano had already been destroyed, and Professor Kowalewski is now advertising for his Oriental manuscripts in case they should have escaped the flames. The fate of books, manuscripts, pictures, and literary and artistic treasures of all kinds in Poland has not changed much for the last century. The library founded by the Zaluskis was plundered by the agents of that superior woman—the admiration of the writers of the period—Catherine the Great; and its contents form now the chief part of the Imperial library of St. Petersburg. There was renewed book stealing in 1830 under Nicholas, who was not over fond of literature. Now mere robbery of books has come to an end in Russian Poland, and literary arson has taken its place.

The most learned historian of modern Poland was consulted the other day as to the materials existing in the country for a life of Sobieski. Szainocha, who from excessive study has lost his sight, could only dictate in reply that abundant materials for such a work had existed in the ancient libraries of Warsaw and Cracow, but that, those

libraries having been plundered at various periods, the places richest in documents relating to the great Polish hero were not in Poland. This letter, addressed to a distinguished French Professor, was written without bitterness, and set forth the simple truth. What will Kowalewski say now if he is consulted as to the result of his five and thirty years' studies in Kazan, in the too familiar Siberia, on the confines of China, and in Peking itself? The Russian Government exiles a boy of genius from Wilna to the far east of its empire. The boy, finding that his fate is in strange lands, studies those lands and their languages. The Russian Government, with a passing gleam of intelligence, pardons him, turns his talent to account, and finally offers him a professorship in the capital of his native country, and endeavours, when it is too late, to make it understood that if for thirty years it has proscribed all public instruction of a superior kind in Poland, it has become alive to its error at last, and at last wishes really to promote the diffusion of knowledge among those whom it had until that time sought to reduce to a state of ignorance and

apathy. Kowalewski, coming from the east, could scarcely have thought he had reached the west when he arrived in Poland. 'Is this some part of Asia?' poor Sierakowski, wounded and captive, exclaimed when the sergeant of the detachment, that was conducting him to head-quarters, asked his officer if, in case of a sudden attack, he should kill the prisoners. Asia is made responsible by the Poles for a great deal of barbarism which is unfortunately, almost as much European as it is Asiatic; but Kowalewski, as an 'Orientalist,' must really have found himself at home in Warsaw. All that he could have missed there was peace and the opportunity of pursuing his studies without getting his papers burned.

The notion of burning Chopin's piano is, I suppose, not particularly Oriental. One significant thing in the work of destruction was that no portable articles of value were sacrificed. The children of Holy Russia did not allow their divine rage to go beyond certain limits, and it was only what could not be pocketed or conveniently carried away that the avengers of disturbed order devoted to the flames.

WARSAW: OCTOBER, 1863.

A barbarous scene has just been enacted here in the courtyard of a private house, which the Russians took upon themselves to turn into a place of execution. A workman employed at the iron factory of Messrs. Evans and Co., had been arrested in the street, and found to have in his pocket some hollow knobs of iron, one inch in diameter, and which, according to some, were screws for iron bedsteads, and according to others cases for grenades, but which, by all accounts, would not, had they been filled with fulminating powder, have been at all formidable missiles. Having positively refused, after numerous interrogatories, to state for whom these possible bed screws and probable grenade cases had been made, he was ordered to be shot, and at ten o'clock yesterday morning was deliberately executed in presence of his fellow-workmen, who were summoned by the police the night before and forced to attend. The poor fellow had contravened a Russian police decree, and it is likely enough that he may have meant the bits of iron

which he carried in his pocket to be used against the men with whom his country is at war. But, however that may have been, every Pole who can read and write has aided the present insurrection against Russia in some form or other, and hence the workman convicted of having carried grenades in his pocket is justly looked upon by his fellow-citizens as a man who, in the fullest sense of the words, has suffered for his country—as a man who had done the same sort of thing that every other Pole has done, and will continue to do, but who, having been found out, had to bear the penalties consequent upon detection. The courtyard of Messrs. Evans's factory for some hours before the execution was occupied and guarded from the outside by as many as 2,000 troops, and no one was allowed to go in or out of the place after eight o'clock. The prisoner, who has left a widow and several children, put on the condemned shirt himself, and died with the greatest firmness.

Where, I wonder, will the Russians do their hanging and shooting at last? In the dining-room of an hotel before the frequenters of the *table d'hôte*, summoned to be present under pain

of being hanged or shot themselves? Or in a private apartment, in presence of the family and intimate friends of the accused? They began at the Citadel, and executed prisoners as, after due conviction, they are executed in other countries. After the infamous attempt on General Berg's life (of which, by the way, it is idle to attempt to exculpate the National Government, since the National Government wishes to be held responsible for it), they made five of the National gendarmes suffer death in the principal places of the city. Afterwards, as if in consequence of the assassination of the Russian spy, Bertholdi, at the Hôtel de l'Europe, they change their scene of execution from the public square to the courtyard of a private establishment, and apparently fail to perceive that their punishments have no longer the character of terrible acts of justice, but of horrible acts of vengeance and retaliation. They were not able to convict one of their recent victims of murder or of an evident intent to murder. The offence for which they have executed so many persons of late has been that of carrying deadly weapons or missiles supposed to be deadly. The

Russians have numbers of men in the Citadel against whom there is similar presumptive evidence of their having been connected with the insurrection, and their plan seems now to be to take the blood of one or more of those in return for every act of violence committed by the Poles. For the murder of Bertholdi, one man; for the injuries done to the Cossack, the cavalry horse, the two carriage horses and General Berg's pale-tot, five.

Moreover, the strange principle that heads of families are liable for the acts of their servants, and owners of factories and shops for the acts of their workmen and apprentices, is now being introduced by the Russian Government in Poland. I know cases of proprietors of estates in Lithuania being imprisoned in consequence of their servants having joined the insurrection; and three days ago a fine of 15,000 roubles was imposed on Messrs. Evans and Co., in Warsaw, on account of the aforesaid unhappy workman of theirs having been found with supposed grenade cases in his pocket. As this fine was demanded in virtue of no law (though a special police edict, applicable

to Messrs. Evans's case alone, was published after the demand had been made), payment of it was, of course, refused. This more than probable result had been foreseen, and the Government had 'deigned to command' that until the fine was paid the works should be closed. The question then arose as to what would become of 400 workmen thrown idle upon the streets of Warsaw, and exasperated at the execution, in their forced presence, of one of their fellow-workmen, whom they looked upon, not as a criminal, but as a martyr? The proprietors of the factory were told that unless they paid the fine they must close their doors, and that if they decided to close their doors, they must still pay their workmen. The reply was that the fine being unjust and founded upon no conviction, or even accusation, it would not be paid; that the factory might be shut up, but that in that case the men would receive no wages. Finally, Mr. Evans, who is in England, having been consulted by telegraph, desired that a formal protest against the whole proceedings should be entered on his behalf as an English subject, and to-night a very becoming notice appears in the

Warsaw *Police Gazette*, to the effect that there has been some mistake, and that Messrs. Evans and Co. need not pay the fine of 15,000 roubles unjustly imposed upon them.

This result leads one to ask, how it happens that the Zamoyski palace, which the Russian Government must now be convinced has no connection with the Zamoyski house, is still held as confiscated property? If bombs were thrown from the Zamoyski house, then it is not astonishing that, in accordance with a police edict published last January, the house should have been confiscated. Indeed, Governments pretending to be more civilised than the Russian Government have before now, and without any previous regulation on the subject, bombarded houses from which it had been asserted that shots had been fired upon soldiers, and, more than that, have caused every inmate to be put to death. But this sort of thing is only done, even in France, in the face of insurrection, or pretended insurrection; and the Russians do not admit the possibility of any rising in Warsaw. They seized the Zamoyski palace under the belief

that it formed one building with the Zamoyski house. They must know by this time that they had been in error on this point.

It appears that the affair between the Russian Government and Messrs. Evans is not yet at an end. As if annoyed at having had to rescind one of its orders (though a Government so equitable as that of Russia ought to remember that it is never too late to be just), it has now published a formal edict, by which all proprietors of factories and workshops are made responsible for the acts of their operatives and servants, and condemned to have their establishments summarily confiscated in case of any contraband article, such as arms, ammunition, uniforms, or military equipments of any kind, being found on their premises. To carry on business under such regulations as these is, of course, impossible. The police of Warsaw can find bullets wherever they please; but even if it were certain that they would always conduct their researches in the fairest manner, the proprietor of a factory would still be liable at any moment to be ruined, and sure to be ruined if the

Government desired it. The workmen of Warsaw began the insurrection. Numbers of them are at this moment with detachments in the field, and those who remain at their ordinary occupations are at the same time doing all they can to help the insurgents. To pretend that their actions can be constantly controlled by their employers is more than unreasonable.

The ironworks of Messrs. Evans and Co. must necessarily be closed. Polish factory owners will, it is said, not be allowed to shut up.

I find that whenever any act of tyranny is performed or meditated here the Russians turn naturally to Imperial France, and ask what the French Government would have done, or would probably do, under similar circumstances. It is a favourite boast in France that French ideas penetrate everywhere, and they certainly have penetrated here. As the Russians, when they were trying to raise themselves, demanded in their assemblies the introduction of reforms based on the principles of the English Constitution, so, now that they are degrading themselves, they inquire what in their present case the Emperor of

the French would do. 'When Napoleon's troops were fired upon from a house in December 1851, he did not content himself with arresting the inmates and bringing them to trial,' they remark; and they are now considering whether he did not, in January 1852, cause employers of labour to keep their workshops open so as to prevent disaffected artisans from being turned out idle upon the streets. It is as easy to introduce such ideas as these from France as it is to put French forage caps upon the heads of Russian soldiers—a change, by the way, which has given to the old Muscovite bear somewhat the appearance of a monkey. Some day, perhaps, when the present madness of Russia has ceased, the Russians will discover that there is something better to imitate in France than its administrative despotism, which joined to the original Russian despotism of Oriental pattern gives a result that neither East nor West can stand.

The Polish newspapers published in Warsaw never mention or allude in any manner to Polish affairs. One might imagine from the contents of these sheets that no such place as Poland existed.

On the other hand, the Russian journals which arrive here from St. Petersburg and Moscow speak with considerable freedom, and though generally, yet not always, with admiration, of what is now taking place in this unhappy country. A letter from Warsaw published in one paper, gives an account of the sacking of the Zamoyski House, which is very like the accounts printed in the foreign papers with the adjectives and adverbs left out. Thus the writer tells us that the soldiers destroyed 6,000 volumes belonging to Professor Kowalewski, and that he heard a Pole at Piotrkow say that several persons were killed during the pillage, and that an infant in its cradle was thrown out into the street from a fourth floor window. Such words as 'infamous,' 'barbarous,' &c. are not once used in the description; nor, indeed, are they necessary.

The truth, by the way, as to the cradle story is that a cradle was thrown out of window, but there was no child in it.

CHAPTER X.

WARSAW: OCTOBER, 1863.

THE Russians in Warsaw are of opinion that the letter in the 'Times' of October 2, describing what actually took place at the sacking of the Zamoyiski House and partial sacking of the Zamoyiski Palace is 'horrible, shameful,' and so on. I find, indeed, that I made a mistake in saying that Krupecki, who occupied a shop on the ground floor of the Zamoyiski House, had been so troubled and terrified that he was struck with apoplexy and died. I did not mention this supposed fact out of regard for Krupecki (who, if he had allowed himself to be frightened to death, would not be worthy of much pity), but because this supposed fact, curious enough in itself, was believed by persons who I knew were perfectly well informed as to the more important incidents

in connection with the work of destruction and plunder. I did not think that the generally reported stories as to murder and violation having been committed were true, and spoke of them as reports unworthy of credence. I must now add that all the women who lived in the Zamoyski House (that is to say the house belonging to Count Zamoyski, adjoining the Zamoyski Palace) were allowed to remain there for the night, and that the soldiers behaved, not outrageously nor rudely, but kindly to them on the following morning, and willingly helped them to move their luggage away. This I am told by a Polish gentleman whose relatives lost largely by the sacking, and who saw the women going away from the Zamoyski House the day afterwards. Another Pole who was taken to the citadel, but has since been liberated, assures me that the discipline of the soldiers was strict enough, and that all they did was done by order; nor did he see any of them intoxicated. The men were called out by fives, and sent five by five into the houses to throw the furniture out of the windows. The order to commence the pillage

was given by General Korff, and the order to stop it by General Bebutoff. Several pianos of inferior Viennese make were cast out and smashed to pieces by the fall. Chopin's piano, however, died hard. 'It fell,' says my informant, who knew the instrument and watched its last moments, 'with a loud melodious sigh; and I could not help admiring the solidity of Erard's workmanship,' he added, 'when I saw that only its legs were broken.' Messrs. Erard ought to advertise their pianos as specially suited for Warsaw during a state of siege.

As the male inmates of the Zamoyiski House and Palace were being conducted to the citadel the soldiers who formed the escort were greatly excited and discussed the propriety of putting them forthwith to the sword. 'They are evidently a damned race, these Poles,' said one who was walking behind an acquaintance of mine. 'They are not Christians, and nothing can be done with them. The Emperor has pardoned them so often, and still they begin again. We ought to bayonet them and have done with them once and for ever.'

'No,' said another, 'they should be given over to the hangman. If we kill them we shall each have a soul to answer for. It would be better to leave the work to the executioner, but they ought all to die.'

'Silence!' interrupted an officer who had heard (as well as the prisoners) this agreeable conversation; 'remember that these are unfortunate men who have lost all they possessed;' and talking in the ranks was then put a stop to.

In short, the soldiers present at the sacking of the two houses (for if the Zamoyski Palace was not sacked in form the furniture in many of the rooms was broken to pieces, and a great quantity of plate and jewelry was stolen) showed that they were ready to make a general attack on the prisoners. The slightest inopportune occurrence might have caused their fury to explode; but, as it was, they were kept perfectly under control from the beginning to the end of the horrible and barbarous scene. The troops were convinced that the bombs had been cast from the Zamoyski House, and the Cossacks of General Berg's escort pointed, the moment after the explosion, to the

windows from which they supposed them to have come. One of the Cossacks took off his immense Circassian cap of black wool and dropped it on to a shell that had not yet exploded, and which burst in the cap without doing any harm. My informant, when he was taken outside, to be conducted to the citadel, saw the cap, which had been a good deal burnt. It would appear from this that at least some of the shells were not 'Orsini bombs' at all, but ordinary shells exploding by fusees.

The Poles in general seem convinced that some of the Russian officers took part in the pillage and pillaged on their own account. Others again, who were present, say that they saw nothing of the kind. It is certain, however, that a quantity of jewelry was stolen from the Zamoyski Palace. The Colonel who was accused of having taken a prominent part in the work of plunder and destruction, and who the day afterwards was assassinated by one of the 'national gendarmes,' was not a colonel in the army, but a colonel of police. At least one Russian officer, a captain in the Imperial Guard, behaved considerably and politely

in the affair, and when Prince Lubomirski was arrested drove the Princess immediately to the house of one of her relations. The same officer exerted himself the next day to procure the release of some of the prisoners, who, it was quite evident, could have had nothing to do with the murderous attack upon General Berg.

Rejecting and hating the theory of the Poles, that the Russians are a hopeless race against which Europe ought to turn its back, I should be glad, for that reason, to be able to contradict numerous terrible accusations brought against them which seem really to place them beyond the pale of European society. But I have seen and conversed with men who have been wounded and mutilated by them unarmed. I know a Pole who brought to a hospital in Galicia a wounded insurgent into whose bleeding breast earth had been stuffed, and I also know a Pole who was beaten in the Warsaw citadel until he fainted. On the other hand, Krupecki did not die of apoplexy after the seizure of his property, and only one (and not, as generally reported, two) of

Count Andrew Zamoyski's sons has been arrested. It is said that General Berg had only the best intentions in ordering the contents of the Zamoyski houses to be burnt. He wished, for the sake of discipline, to keep the soldiers from pillage, and thought it better that everything should be destroyed than that anything should be stolen. But whatever the Russians do they are sure to be blamed. If they plunder there is an outcry, if they burn there is also an outcry. In the Zamoyski houses they plundered in spite of orders, and in accordance with orders burnt, and still no one was satisfied. So, when they brought the half-dead Frankowski to life, and as soon as he was quite restored hanged him, they were accused of cruelty, while precisely the same charge was brought against them when they hastened to hang Sierakowski instead of leaving him to die of the incurable wounds he had received on the field of battle.

The story of a child having been thrown out of one of the windows of the Zamoyski House, and of the mother having been murdered for having

ventured to remonstrate against this too speedy mode of ejecting her infant, is one of those calumnies circulated so recklessly by the friends of Poland that, if they are not careful, they may at last convince people that the cause of Poland and the cause of truth are somehow or other opposed. I may mention for the benefit of those doubtful friends that the Russians, who cannot bear to hear the simple incontrovertible truth as to their misdeeds in Poland, do not at all object to falsehoods on the subject being circulated, provided only that they be of a sufficiently monstrous kind. It is a great advantage to the Russians in Warsaw that they should be accused of crimes which it is notorious in Warsaw they have not committed, and thus I am not astonished to find that in the last number received here of the 'Illustration,' the censor has respected a passage in an article treating of the sacking of the Zamoyiski houses, in which it is stated that other houses have been pillaged in the same manner and the persons inhabiting them 'shot or sent to Siberia.'

Every one must have heard of the summary

manner in which the Hôtel de l'Europe has been seized. Bertholdi, a Russian spy, who had taken up his quarters there, was stabbed in his own room at seven in the morning, as he was drinking his coffee. Immediately afterwards the house was given up to the soldiers, the lodgers ejected, and kept until the evening in the courtyard, and the whole building, furniture and all, confiscated, or at least, for the present, sequestered. The Russians, with the view of raising Bertholdi's character, had paid him a domiciliary visit the day before; but no one was deceived by it. I believe the man had been followed here from Cracow, as he had previously been followed to Cracow from Warsaw. The 'national gendarme' who stabbed him got safely away. The only person who seems to have thought of stopping the assassin was a Russian officer living in the next room to Bertholdi. Hearing a shriek, he rushed into the corridor with a revolver in his hand, but omitted to fire it. Something, it is said, was wrong with the trigger; at all events, the pistol did not go off.

The night after the seizure of the Hôtel de

l'Europe the perplexity of the officials at the railway station, when they asked the travellers where they meant to 'descend,' and were told by some that they intended to 'descend' at the inn in question, was rather amusing.

'There is no Hôtel de l'Europe,' was the first reply.

'I beg your pardon,' answered one traveller; 'I was at the Hôtel de l'Europe two years ago, and wish to go there again.'

'There is no Hôtel de l'Europe,' repeated the official; 'it is now a barrack.'

'That is impossible,' was the rejoinder. 'I know some one who was there only three days since.'

'A crime has been committed there,' was the ultimate explanation, 'and the place is now in the hands of the military.'

The traveller disappeared in the vain hope of finding an hotel in Warsaw from which there was no chance of his being suddenly ejected, and being compelled to wait for a dozen hours in the courtyard.

The general precautions against a rising in

Warsaw are now so great that there is no possibility of any such movement taking place on a large scale. That there may be a burst of despair ending in the sacrifice of some hundreds of lives is probable enough; for the population has not yet been terrified—it has only been exasperated. But the city is so thronged by infantry, and so continually traversed by cavalry, that an insurrection of any magnitude in Warsaw itself seems to me entirely out of the question. The Poles in Galicia, especially those who have never seen a Russian soldier, say that the Russian army of the present day is most contemptible. To my unimilitary eye the Russian troops in Warsaw have at least as warlike a bearing as any of the troops I saw in Russia two years ago, or even seven years ago, when many of the regiments just returned from the Crimea were in Moscow and St. Petersburg. Whether these troops would run away from inferior numbers of ill-armed, undisciplined insurgents, I, of course, cannot say; but, in the meanwhile, that is a result in which I cannot believe. The Poles, however, are in such a position that they are bound not to trust the evi-

dence of their own senses, and, as they have been in this position for a very long time, and are used to it, there is no reason for imagining that they will suddenly quit it. Say that there are nine chances out of ten against any intervention taking place in favour of Poland. Even then the Poles must cling to the tenth and last chance, for national ruin stares them in the face, whether they submit now or submit six months hence.

In the meanwhile many lives and much property will be sacrificed, but there are plenty of men prepared to make such sacrifices, and the Poles do not calculate these matters of profit and loss as nations in a happier position can afford to calculate them. It appears to me, however, that as a mere question of prudence it would be a grave mistake on their part to give in just now—as it was a mistake, never to be sufficiently deplored by the true friends of Poland, to begin the insurrection at all. Before the insurrection broke out the Poles were, no doubt, at liberty either to accept concessions which, had they been frankly made and frankly accepted, would have led to a reconciliation, or, at least, an understanding be-

tween Russia and Poland, or to reject them on the ground that a union of any kind between Poland and Russia was the thing least of all to be desired. But now that the insurrection has existed for months, and has called forth not only all the tyranny of the Russian Government, but also all the hatred of the Russian people, the Poles have not to choose between war with Russia on the one hand, and on the other administrative independence and a certain amount of political representation for the kingdom, with the prospect of these privileges being extended to Lithuania; but between continued war with Russia, and the Russification of all Poland, accompanied by the execution of the principal civil and military leaders of the insurrection, and the exile of many thousands of insurgents.

It is better not to die to-day if it be possible to live until to-morrow; above all, if in the meanwhile there is some even infinitesimal chance of rescue. The present state of things in Poland is lamentable in every respect, but not yet utterly hopeless; and even if the hopeless point had been reached, there would still be desperate

men who for a time would continue fighting, while as for the secret organisation, the Russians have as yet made no approach towards discovering it.* Even if the Russians had the best instead of the worst possible intentions towards Poland, they could not now re-establish a national administration in the country, because it has been clearly ascertained that the Poles will, for the present, have nothing to do with the Russian Government except in the way of undermining it and endeavouring to overturn it. I do not imagine that the Russians will introduce any reforms in Poland either before or after the suppression of the insurrection. It will be impossible for some time to come to govern the country otherwise than by military law; and if the Poles were offered not only all the places in the Administration, but also full representative and legislative rights, I do not think that they would accept them—indeed, for my part, I am perfectly

* After the failure however, both of the armed insurrection and of the diplomatic intervention, and under the pressure of Count Berg, the National Government suddenly collapsed.

sure they would not. To begin with, the elections would be impossible. The National Government would not allow electors to choose deputies for a Diet representing only the 'Congresowka,' or Congress kingdom; and a power that can levy taxes for itself, and cause the taxes demanded by the Russians to be withheld, could surely enforce such a very easy thing as abstention from voting. Warsaw has now been in a state of what may be called 'passive insurrection' for three years, and people live, get married, and die (now and then, it is true, by the bullet or the rope) in Warsaw as in other cities. Things may go on for some time in Warsaw and in all Poland as they are going now; and if in the meanwhile the Schleswig and Holstein question, or the Italian question, or the Eastern, or any other 'question,' should plunge Europe in war, the Poles might, perhaps, contrive to profit by it.

CHAPTER XI.

WARSAW: OCTOBER, 1863.

THERE are now some very curious regulations in Warsaw as to visiting and receiving visits. In practice, the rule on the subject is that every outer door (*porte cochère*) is kept shut, and that the porter, when you apply for admittance, asks where you are going, but not what your name is, nor your business, nor how long you are going to stay. The porters, then, are not much more inquisitorial in Warsaw than in any other city not in a state of siege. Even in London when you knock at a street door the servant who opens it asks who it is you want to see, unless you begin by supplying the necessary information yourself. In all the Warsaw houses that have double entrances, one entrance has been closed; and in case of a murder being committed in a house, and

of the murderer getting away, the porter would no doubt be held responsible for his escape.

The police regulation forbidding persons to remain more than ten minutes in cafés and pastry-cooks' shops is not enforced, and does not prevent the newsmongers of Warsaw from keeping the same journal in hand for half an hour.

The order of the National Government, on the other hand, forbidding Poles to walk in the Saxon gardens while the Russian bands are playing, is strictly observed. To a person arriving here from Galicia this command seems quite superfluous. There is nothing more sad than the remembrance of Austrian military music when one is listening to Russian. Many Russian officers, however, do listen to the strains of their inharmonious regimental orchestras, and try to look as if they liked them.

At the theatre, attended only by Russian officers and a few ladies, not in deep mourning, and the reverse of sad, the noisy little piece which has buzzed all over Europe under the title of *Orpheus in the Infernal Regions*, is played. The Poles call it *Orpheus in Warsaw*, and not even the

Jews (or 'persons of the old covenant,' or 'of the Mosaic confession,' as they are called here) go to see it. The classical personage, however, of whom one is chiefly reminded by the present aspect of Warsaw towards evening, is Diogenes. All Poles who are out at, or after dusk, have to carry lanterns, though they do not, it is true, waste their time in looking among the unilluminated class for honest men. At night the city seems inhabited by a whole population of Guy Fawkeses. Every person you meet has the air of a conspirator, and probably there are few of these Polish lantern-bearers who, if they found themselves with a few barrels of gunpowder beneath the Russian military club which performs just now the functions of a Parliament in Warsaw, would hesitate much about blowing it up. It is this despotic assembly in which all the measures of the Russian Government in Poland are freely and thoroughly canvassed, which pronounced the rule of the Grand Duke too mild, which considers that of General Berg not sufficiently severe, and whose idea of a Russian Governor is General Mouravieff.

With a little interest in official quarters cards

may, I believe, be obtained entitling the bearer to disregard the police regulations as to carrying lanterns. Otherwise, and unless armed with a formal permit, let no foolish virgin venture out at night with her lamp untrimmed, nor remain out after ten. In the latter case the warning voice of the police-soldier, 'Too late, too late! you cannot enter now!' will stop her almost before the hour has struck, and she will be forced to pass the night in the outer darkness of the citadel.

Sometimes if the aspect of a citizen be repugnant to the Russian police (whose looks are always prepossessing) he is maltreated first and asked to give an account of himself afterwards; then if he is found to have done nothing wrong, he is told to go about his business and be more careful in future. A groom who was exercising his master's horse near one of the barriers was mistaken the other day by some Cossacks for an insurgent, and knocked out of his saddle and beaten before he could explain who and what he was. Probably the Cossacks imagined his livery to be a uniform; for I remember a fearful massacre of house and farm servants which took place some months ago

on an estate in the Government of Lublin, in which a gaudily-attired footman was reserved for special tortures on the supposition that he must be an officer. It is said now that special permits for riding on horseback are to be issued. If so, a bearer of such a permit, if he should venture out on foot, will run the risk of being arrested for not having his horse with him. At all events, a French gentleman was arrested here the other day and taken to the nearest police station because he had only a night permit in his pocket, which it was maintained did not entitle him to go out during the day.

It is not in Warsaw itself, however, so much as in the country, and not in the kingdom of Poland so much as in Lithuania and the Western Provinces generally, that the cruelty of the Russians is made visible. No one ought to complain of the necessarily severe police regulations in Warsaw, the object of which is not to annoy the population, but to put a stop to murder, and to prevent that general rising which the Russian Government is said to desire, and as to which it may be truly asserted that many of the worst of the Russian officers wish

for it. Some such desperate movement was fully expected immediately after the sacking of the Zamoyski houses, and as the National Government knew what would be the consequence of the attack on General Berg, it may be supposed that the attack itself was intended as a signal. However this may have been, had General Berg been killed, such a result could not have paralysed the action of the Russian Government in Warsaw; while, on the other hand, the soldiers would without doubt have been excited beyond bearing, and could not have been restrained from massacring the inhabitants of the house from which the bombs were thrown. As it was, the pillage was ordered, and the troops did what few troops would have done when once let loose; they ceased pillaging at the word of command. But their desire was to kill the prisoners, as it was after the attack, last year, on the Grand Duke Constantine to fire on the crowd. Since the shameful attempt on the life of the Grand Duke the hatred of the Russian army for everything Polish has increased a hundred fold. The Polish insurgents have been represented to them as brigands and murderers, doing

worse things than the Russians' have actually done; and they know the Polish National Government only by its assassins. When the soldiers were conducting the male inmates of the Zamoyiski houses to the citadel, they were fully persuaded that they had the members of this Government in their power; and if any of the Poles were mad enough to desire (as I believe many of them were) that there should be some terrible carnage in the streets of Warsaw—such as would undoubtedly have excited the indignation of all Europe, but might not, all the same, have led to its active intervention—then they had only a very narrow escape indeed of having their wish fulfilled.

The executions for taxes continue in Warsaw, but I cannot hear of any sales by auction having taken place. I could hear of them when I was in Cracow; but every one here tells me that the arrears are paid as soon as possible after the entry of the soldiers to take possession. Some little delay always occurs, because the military authorities cannot receive the money, and it has to be sent to an office which is now so crowded that it is difficult to get attended to there. In the mean-

while, soldiers, in the proportion of two to each room, are billeted upon the occupiers of houses or apartments who have not paid up; and to avoid this inconvenience and expense, many persons settle accounts with the tax-gatherers before the arrival of the troops. The new and special tax of eight per cent. on income is payable before the end of the month, after which period an extra four per cent. will be required from defaulters.

The convents occupied two or three weeks since by the troops are still in the hands of the military. The buildings have not been turned into barracks, but a guard is stationed in each, and in each a strict search has been instituted. The Russian journals state that many important discoveries were made, and it seems to be generally admitted that in one convent a list of names was found. The search in the cemeteries led to nothing except horror and disgust on the part of the Polish population. No graves were dug open, but five vaults were either unlocked or broken into, and in the vaults thus violated several coffins were opened, but no arms discovered.

A new number of the *Independence*, the organ of the National Government, was brought out two or three days ago. It is rather melancholy in tone, speaks of numerous reverses sustained by the insurgents, especially in the province of Lublin, where their fighting was certainly not discreditable to them, and singling out a particular commander, who has left his detachment, and blames him, not merely for having abandoned his command, but also for the general result of the battles, which, I fancy was inevitable. The remarkable thing in the new number of the *Independence* is that for the first time this journal, instead of exaggerating the valour and success of the insurgents, upbraids them for their want of firmness, and tells them that far more is expected of them than they have yet done.

Several local orders have also appeared, signed by the chief of the town, in which certain arrears of taxes are demanded, and in which the people of Warsaw are enjoined to remain quiet.

Since the occupation of the Zamoyski houses and of the Hôtel de l'Europe, two other large houses have been taken possession of by the sol-

diers, though, as far as I can learn, they have not yet been confiscated. In one, if not both, of these, rifles and a considerable quantity of ammunition were discovered.

It is reported, on what authority I do not know, that 50,000 additional troops are being brought into the kingdom from Russia Proper, and people in Warsaw seem convinced that the new force is intended for the Galician frontier; if not, for the other side of it. It is a fact that two divisions, the 8th and 10th, have arrived, or are now arriving, in this city; but the entire strength of the two divisions, if complete, would only amount to 26,000 men, and they are being sent towards Posen, as well as towards Galicia. Seven battalions of the 10th division, said to be one of the best in the Russian army, and which was present at Sebastopol from the beginning to the end of the siege, were reviewed the other day in front of the castle. These battalions had come from Toula, *via* the Moscow and St. Petersburg and St. Petersburg and Warsaw Railway, and were stated to have performed the entire distance in the rather short space of twelve days. Much interest was excited

when it was discovered that the battalions of the 10th division included many of the recruits taken from Warsaw in the ill-famed conscription of January last. Numbers of them were recognised and spoken to by their relatives, and a general impression was produced that the Russian army must be very weak since the Government is obliged to send back to Poland to fight against the Poles the very men whose forcible seizure was the last touch of injustice that caused the Polish insurrection. On the other hand, the Russians, after the arrival of all the new troops, will have at least 150,000 men in the kingdom of Poland alone; some say 180,000, but at 150,000 the number is certainly not over-estimated.

The great incident here of the last few days has been the destruction of the Town Hall by a fire, which those who saw it, as I did, from close by, must know to have been the work of incendiaries. I cannot say who lighted the fire nor why it was lighted, but the Russians made the greatest exertions to put it out as quickly as possible, saved the archives, saved the furniture, and prevented

the flames from reaching a part of the building in which a number of political prisoners were confined.

Twice during the last week the word has been passed from mouth to mouth in Warsaw, that 'something' would take place in the evening, and that it would not be safe to be in the streets after seven—the anti-curfew hour. But everything passed off quietly, except that a few nights since a man named Dombrowski was attacked by 'national gendarmes' and left for dead (though he is still alive) in the street called 'Long.' On Sunday morning, however, at about twelve o'clock, the trampling of infantry, the galloping backwards and forwards of Cossacks, and the rushing to and fro of crowds of excited men and women, gave the thoroughfares in which all this movement took place the sound and aspect (so familiar to Continental travellers of the last fifteen years) of a coming disturbance. Insurrection in Warsaw at the present moment could only mean the exposure of a portion of the inhabitants to massacre and, perhaps, of the whole city to bombardment from the citadel. Nevertheless, a rising, in

the desperate position in which the inhabitants of Warsaw and the Poles generally now find themselves, is just possible; a rising has certainly been meditated, and though, owing to the precautions of all kinds taken by the Russians, it becomes more difficult every day to carry out the plan, whatever it may have been, there was some reason on Sunday for supposing that it was on the point of being put into execution.

Many persons here imagine that a cruel measure of repression, such as in the present temper of the Russian soldiers would undoubtedly be the result of any attack, or of any organised resistance, on the part of the Poles, might lead to an expression of indignation in France or England so decided as to leave the Government of these countries no option but to declare war against Russia. This appears to me the saddest of all political speculations, for, even if deliberately provoked, the Russians could scarcely do worse in Warsaw than they have already done, and are now doing daily, in the provinces. The Western Powers have shown that they can tolerate—not with complacency, nor without the strongest con-

demnation—but that they can tolerate, nevertheless, such acts of barbarism in Poland as might have called for their interference even if no distinct right on their part to interfere had ever existed. To be sure, one outrage in Warsaw does really cause a greater outcry abroad than a hundred similar ones committed in the country; but, at the same time, it is perfectly well known that estates are devastated, peasants raised against proprietors, and proprietors imprisoned, maltreated, and their property confiscated, even when they are only thought to have aided the insurrection, in which persons of all classes are well known to have taken an active part. If the indignation produced by the knowledge of such facts as these is not efficacious, what advantage is to be expected from a catastrophe in Warsaw, about which the only thing certain is that it would show us a defenceless city in the position of a city taken by storm?

No one not in the confidence of the National Government can say with what object the Town Hall of Warsaw was set on fire. In the meanwhile

it is certain that it did not take fire by accident. The official account of the affair simply sets forth that flames were first seen issuing from a room on the second floor, in which certain archives were stowed away, and that some time afterwards they burst forth from another part of the building in which the police records were kept. I am also told by an eyewitness that after the fire had been partly subdued it broke out again in quite a fresh place. The general rumour in the town was that the fire had begun in the roof, and in several places at the same time, and when I saw the building, the conflagration having then lasted about six hours, the whole roof was in a blaze, though in many of the rooms immediately beneath it there seemed to be no fire except what proceeded from the embers that had fallen from above. All the upper stories, however, of the right and left wings, as seen from the front, were in flames, and the left wing was also burning at the back.

Let no one hasten to say that the Poles did not set their own Town Hall on fire, for the National Government may be preparing, at this moment, some patriotic and sophistical justification of the

act. I heard numbers of respectable Poles deny with indignation the accusation brought against the National Government of having planned and directed the attack against General Berg, until at last the National Government coolly assumed the responsibility of the crime.

Do not, above all, let it be said that the Russians set the Town Hall on fire in order to have an excuse for increasing their measures of severity against the inhabitants of Warsaw. A similar unfounded and ridiculous explanation of the attack on General Berg was circulated for a few days, but the fact is, the Russians rule Poland in so arbitrary a manner that they want no excuses for any of their misdeeds. They have not, however, as yet taken to burning down Polish cities—as at least one portion of Warsaw might have been burnt down on Sunday had there been a little more wind and no Government fire-engines at hand.

The burning of the Warsaw Town Hall was not the result of accident. In considering what may have been the motive of this deliberate act of

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incendiarism, I can only think that it may have been meant as a protest against the imposition of the new tax—if not with the more direct motive of burning the lists of taxpayers. It was at the Town Hall that the 8 per cent. income-tax was to be paid, and I mentioned in a previous letter that from those who do not pay before the end of the month 12 per cent. will be required. Some twenty persons who had already settled with the Government on this score were publicly warned last week in a ‘proclamation’ issued by the ‘Chief of the Town.’ Their names were published, and they themselves summoned to appear before one of the ‘revolutionary tribunals.’ It is on this question of the 8 per cent. income-tax for war purposes that the great contest is now taking place between the National Government and the Government of Russia, and it will be curious to see whether the inhabitants of Warsaw will positively disobey the former or obey it, and by doing so render themselves liable to an extra payment of 50 per cent. in favour of the latter. The only thing certain about the matter is that, at least, no further payments will be made until

the very last day, and that for the next few days—as the Town Hall is destroyed—no payments will be made at all.

It was evident that the burning of the Town Hall caused the Russians considerable alarm, and if they really desired a rising in Warsaw they need only have kept the troops in barracks for an hour to have had it. The fire might have been a signal, but was apparently nothing of the kind; or it might have been lighted with the view of drawing a number of troops to one particular quarter of the town so as to leave the other quarters comparatively unoccupied; or, without any notion of a regular fight at all, and simply in the hope that it would lead to confusion, disturbance, and such bloodshed as would be sure to be talked about in the West. In any case the Russians did right in taking every possible precaution. All the soldiers were brought out into the streets, the squares, and the public gardens; and all day, all night, and until the next morning, the thoroughfares leading to the large open space on one side of which the Town Hall stands (its walls are standing still),

were closed to the public, and the approaches guarded by infantry and Cossacks.

It did not seem to be necessary, however, that the Cossacks should use their whips against the crowd, and even single out quiet and perfectly inoffensive persons for their assaults, as sometimes happened. A Warsaw crowd under existing circumstances would no doubt try the patience even of the proverbially patient British policeman, for the sympathy and applause of the public are reserved here for those who break the law, and the transgressor of the most necessary police regulation is a popular hero so long as he is actually transgressing, and a popular martyr if his transgression entails punishment upon him. I cannot, as a cold-blooded Englishman, see the slightest patriotic merit in disregarding orders issued with the view of saving a national building from destruction; but on the other hand, in the present state of the public mind in Warsaw, it is not to be expected that in a conflict or simple dispute between a Russian and a Pole the former will, under any circumstances, be allowed to be in the right. A light-heeled Pole

may dodge an infantry soldier, a light-headed one defy a Cossack; in either case the Pole insures the approbation of his countrymen, who, nevertheless, had they the direction of their own police, could not fail to treat such offenders with contempt.

In short, everything is for the worst in the worst-governed country possible. The Russians say that the Poles have no notion of obedience even of the most indispensable kind, and the Poles retort that the Russians have no conception of any rule except that of brute force. The truth is that the Russians, for the thirty years which preceded the present movement, had governed the Poles without any reference to their national character, or to the institutions which for centuries had formed part of their national life. They put a ready-made Russian collar on the neck of a nation not fitted to wear it, and never thought for a moment that if the collar were rendered less galling the nation condemned to support it might prove more tractable. The notion of governing either man or beast without considering the nature of the man or beast to be

governed is so preposterous that if there were no despotisms in Europe, and if it were not found necessary to keep up Societies for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, one might imagine that it was no longer entertained. The Poles, however, have, and will probably now have for many a year, to take such government of the true Russian pattern as Russia chooses to give them, and if they only submit to it as long as they are exhausted, and endeavour at the first favourable or unfavourable opportunity to shake it off, that will no doubt be looked upon by the Russians as a fresh proof that the Poles are a naturally ungovernable race.

At the present moment, however—a moment of exasperation and madness—the less that is said of the conduct of the Poles in Warsaw, if they are to be judged by their National Government, which of course claims to represent them, the better for them it will be. I do not know what the National Government will say to the burning of the Town Hall, nor whether it is really responsible for its destruction. It may have been set on fire without orders, but it was certainly fired

with intention. I have mentioned one explanation of this act of incendiarism which seems probable enough. It is also said, however, that it was not intended as a 'demonstration' against the 8 per cent. war-tax—far less as a signal for a disturbance; but that the building was burnt simply because there was no other way of getting rid of certain compromising papers which were concealed among papers belonging to the Russian Government, and could not with safety have been carried past the sentries at the gates now that every one is liable to be searched. The Russian official report merely states that the fire broke out in more than one place, without accounting for it. No Polish official report has yet appeared.

At six o'clock on Sunday afternoon, when the fire was at its greatest height, hunger and an engagement to dinner induced me to pass the Town Hall, which, by placing myself under the protection of a Russian officer, I was enabled to do without impediment and without danger from the Cossack whip. The contents of the building,

including records, portfolios, bundles of *paperasses* of all kinds, with tables, chairs, sofas, and such furniture of a lighter kind, were piled together in the middle of the square. Several companies of infantry were looking on, and the side streets were kept clear by Cossacks, who rode backwards and forwards, and hit a man now and then when they had a good chance. At the beginning of the day I saw many persons threatened and several struck with the whip, and this, for the most part, without the least necessity, and in mere wantonness. Certainly, I saw no severe blow given, but the great objection of the Poles is to being treated like dogs, and such is the treatment offered to them on the smallest provocation, and sometimes without any provocation at all.

It being Sunday the streets were crowded, and I had an opportunity of judging whether the population of Warsaw generally had been terrified or not by the recent measures of the Russians. If they had beaten the Russian in a dozen engagements they could not have worn a more confident and independent air than they presented

in face of the troops. On the other hand, all the troops, with the exception of the Cossacks, were as quiet and well behaved as London policemen, so that, as far as the proceedings of the day were concerned, there was no occasion for any serious alarm. As for the Cossacks their whipping propensity seems to be a disease, but as it is a disease of a very malignant nature it ought to be checked. Like boxers preparing to give a blow, these whipsters are perpetually practising the use of their long leather thongs. Sometimes they strike in order to drive back some one who has transgressed the bounds beyond which he ought not to have passed, but others, also, as if from mere habit, and from a wish to keep their hand in. The Pole who is struck grins with a contemptuous grin, and those around him mutter execrations; and I saw no blow taken except with an expression of disdain from the receiver, which, I must add, seemed entirely lost upon the giver. The Cossacks rode along the pavement as well as down the middle of the streets, and appeared to enjoy their wild liberty—with the exception of one whose horse, to the astonish-

ment of no one, slipped beneath him and fell close to the scene of the fire.

As I was leaving the neighbourhood of the Town Hall, I noticed a gentleman wearing the 'cylinder' of respectability engaged in an animated discussion with a Cossack, who wore the Circassian cap of the Kouban.

'I was brought here by one of your own officers,' said the proprietor of the cylinder hat.

'Then,' replied the Cossack, 'it was his duty to take you to the house you were going to, put you inside, and shut the door after you. Our orders are not to allow civil people to walk about here.'

'But,' pursued the cylinder-wearer, 'I have a big hat; you ought not to mind me.'

'There are very big hats worn by very big functionaries,' continued the disciplinarian of the Kouban; 'but I should flog them as civil persons just the same if I caught them here now.'

'Well, what are you going to do with me?' inquired the gentleman finally, to whom neither the cylinder hat nor the recent companionship of a Russian officer was any guarantee of safety.

‘Why, I shall flog you, that’s all,’ said the stern but not precisely savage Cossack, when suddenly the intervention of a second cylinder hat, to whom I have reason to believe the hero of the Kouban was under some slight pecuniary obligations, brought the discussion to a satisfactory conclusion.

One feels almost ashamed at finding amusement in anything that takes place at Warsaw during the present deplorable position of that city; but Englishmen have always been accustomed to an alternation of tragic with comic scenes, and there is a grim humour about the Cossack as well as absolute ferocity.

To complete my budget of Warsaw news I must add the common-place intelligence that two men on the national side have lately been hanged, and three on the Russian side murdered, or stabbed almost to death. One of the men hanged was a ‘national gendarme,’ in other words, an assassin at the command of the secret government, which, if it does not mend its ways, the honest men of Poland will have to disavow.

Like the pirates who went to sea with a Decalogue in which the eighth commandment had been marked out, the National Government thinks to get on without observing the sixth.

The second man hanged was a clerk in the post-office, and had been found guilty of having transmitted correspondence for the National Government—which nearly every man who has ever got a friend to take charge of a letter from Warsaw to Cracow or from Cracow to Warsaw has done. The offence of the post-office clerk executed last Monday was, of course, greatly aggravated by the fact that he was in the Government service; but at the same time his execution is a fresh proof that if the Russian Government cannot catch the men who have been found guilty of heinous crimes, it is determined, in lieu of them, to put to death such comparatively innocent ones already in its hands as it may think fit to make an example of.

The Russian Government in its notices of punishments to be inflicted does not go lower than capital ones. It must draw the line somewhere, and in announcing the coming execution of the

said post-office clerk publishes the following description of his crime :—

‘ Stanislas Swiezynski, clerk in the post-office, has been found guilty of high treason by court-martial, and by his own confession of having been connected with the revolutionary organisation known as the National Government, and of having accepted an appointment as agent to the said organisation ; and of having made use of his position in the post-office to forward parcels and messages to the insurgents, and even warlike implements ; and for his activity in furthering the views and objects of the insurrection.’

CHAPTER XII.

WARSAW : OCTOBER, 1863.

GENERAL TREPOFF, one of the directors of police, was recently attacked in the street by a 'National gendarme,' disguised as a peasant, and carrying an axe, with which weapon he struck the general on the neck, but did not seriously injure him. The general disarmed the man himself (or rather the boy, for he was only 18 years of age), and is reported to have said to the policeman into whose hands he gave him, 'You are the person most to blame in this affair, for you should have been on the watch. As for the prisoner, he is a fanatic, urged on by older persons, who keep themselves concealed.' General Trepoff was in the habit of walking about without an escort, and on the occasion in question was returning from church with his daughter and his daughter's governess.

If General Trepoff really uttered the words attributed to him, he at least understands the meaning of Polish assassination much better than the Russian journalists.

I heard some curious conversations respecting this affair between Poles, of which the following may be taken as a specimen: it will serve to give some notion of the excited and somewhat perverted state of the public mind in Warsaw.

‘Trepoff was on his way to church, accompanied by his daughter and her governess. He was in the habit of going there every day to say prayers for his wife who had lately died.’

‘The hypocrite!’

‘He was followed by four National gendarmes. One of them was dressed as a peasant, and carried an axe with which he had sworn to take Trepoff’s life.’

‘The scoundrel’ (meaning Trepoff)!

‘His companions kept between him and Trepoff, until at length, the street being tolerably clear, and no soldiers being in sight, he advanced and struck at Trepoff’s neck, but so awkwardly that the weapon turned in his hand.’

‘Poor fellow’ (meaning the assassin)!

‘And what did Trepoff do?’

‘Feeling himself wounded, he rushed at the man, wrested the axe from his grasp, and following him as he was attempting to escape, dealt him a terrible blow which laid his shoulder open.’

‘The villain’ (meaning Trepoff)!

General Trepoff’s only wrong did not, to be sure, consist in not holding his head in a convenient position for National gendarmes to strike it off. He was chief of the Russian gendarmes, or rather of the Polish gendarmes in the Russian service, and he had dispersed a procession by force some three years before, and it may have been for this that he was looked upon as a fit and proper person to be assassinated. On the other hand, his good offices had, of late, often been solicited, and obtained on behalf of Poles sentenced to imprisonment or exile; and from this and from the fact of his being the only Russian high in authority who ventured into the street without escort and on foot, I concluded that he at least had nothing to fear from the murderous attacks of the National gendarmes. He was chief, however, of the

Government gendarmerie, which was a crime; and he walked out alone, which was at least a mistake.

Whenever an affair of this kind—or indeed of any kind—takes place, Russians and Poles vie with one another in misrepresenting it, until at last two highly-coloured fables, one quite inconsistent with the other, spring out of it. The Russian journals maintain that the ‘National gendarmes’ murder for hire, and that for attempting general Trepoff’s life they received a rouble apiece and a cup of coffee. The Polish papers, on the other hand, represent them as patriots in the style of Brutus, and endeavour with success to enlist public sympathy on their behalf. The Russians enlarge upon Trepoff’s magnanimity in calling upon Count Berg to spare the assassin’s life on the ground that he, Trepoff, had arrested him, and moreover, by striking him, had taken the law into his own hands. The Poles expatiate on the bloodthirsty violence of the ‘Muscovite’ in attacking a man after he had disarmed him.

One of the worst effects of these revolutionary movements is, that they excite national and political feeling to such an extent that all other

feeling seems to be destroyed. Right and wrong get confused in the general ferment; and men, and above all women, become morally intoxicated. I once saw an amiable Polish lady—amiable at least in other respects—smile with delight on hearing that the son of a German functionary employed in Poland had been killed in fighting for the cause which his father hated. When shells were thrown at Count Berg, some appeared to think that such a proceeding was perfectly natural, and that Count Berg had no sort of right to resent it; others laughed at him, because in the accounts printed in the Galician newspapers it was stated that he looked frightened after the attack, and drove home to the castle very rapidly; others said that he had got agents of his own to throw the shells at him, that he might have an excuse for confiscating the house from which they were aimed! It seemed to strike very few that the murderous attempt was at all worthy of blame, though, at the same time, no one would admit that the National Government could have had anything to do with it, until at last, with wonderful cynicism and effrontery, it took upon itself the whole responsibility of the act, and

explained that it was intended as a warning to Count Berg in order to deter him from imitating the conduct of Mouravieff at Wilna.

What, I wonder, would Mouravieff have done if any one had shelled *him*? He would have done so much, that for that very reason care was taken not to touch a hair of his head. 'If they must assassinate some one, why do they not assassinate Mouravieff?' I have heard it asked in reference to the doings of the National gendarmes. Here we cannot fail to see the weak point in the revolutionary mode of action. The revolutionists of Poland no more dared fire at Mouravieff than they dared rise against the Emperor Nicholas after he had crushed the insurrection of 1830. They could attack with fire, steel, and poison their countryman the Marquis Wielopolski, who at least had gained for them important institutions, some of which they had been without for thirty years, while others (such as schools for the peasantry) they had never known before. They could shoot at and wound the Grand Duke Constantine, who had brought them good and not evil, and who had actually been only a few hours in Warsaw

when a fanatic was employed by the revolutionists to take his life. They could even throw shells at General Berg, whose rule, with all his ferocity, was mild and just compared to the execrable system of Mouravieff. But Mouravieff being really terrible had nothing whatever to fear, and was as safe, or indeed safer, at Wilna than the Emperor Napoleon is in Paris. In all this there is a lesson to tyrannical governments, which assuredly will not be lost upon them. Will they not naturally conclude that their only safeguard against unscrupulous revolutionists lies in the most implacable severity? The revolutionists speculate on the terror they can cause. Meet them with the terror they themselves provoke, and they are silenced.

Viewed at a distance, and judged by the diplomatic despatches that were written for it, the Polish National Junta or *Rzond* seemed really an admirable body. In the eyes of the Russians it was simply a band of assassins: and it seems, in truth, to have included in its vast organisation some very desperate scoundrels as well as men of high character and ability, capable of serving their country with distinction either in the cabinet or

in the field. How was it the latter could be got to work with the former? and how was it that a power of which one of the first public acts (when it existed in germ as the Central Committee) was to get a half-witted fanatic to fire at the Grand Duke, and one of the last to throw shells into the carriage of Count Berg, enjoyed the support of all the educated classes in the country? I once questioned a Pole on this subject, who, though an enthusiastic patriot, was, I knew, far too honourable a man not to disapprove of the odious measures so often resorted to by the Polish National Government, as it was then constituted.

‘Were you ever violently in love with a dancer?’ he said. ‘You hear all sorts of things said against her; things that are notorious, that you can’t deny, that you try in vain to explain away, and that finally all you can do is to shut your ears against. That is our position with the National Government. We will do anything for it, make any sacrifice for it, because it is a Polish Government, and because we adore everything that is Polish; and we try not to think of the numerous actions we wish it had never committed.’

‘Anarchy is very detestable, no doubt,’ said another Pole who was anything but a revolutionist; ‘but of the two we would rather have Polish anarchy than Russian tyranny,’ which is only anarchy under another name.

The Russians have always maintained that the Polish National Government secured obedience through terrorism. This may be to some extent true as regards its action in the villages, where the poor ignorant peasants were tormented and killed on both sides, the insurgents beating and hanging them if they favoured the Russians; the Russians beating them, shooting them, and burning their houses down if they helped their own countrymen. But in the towns, in the country houses and among all persons who had received even a tinge of education, the National Government was supported because, good or bad, it acted in the name of the country, and because it kept up the insurrection which, it was hoped, would sooner or later lead to foreign intervention. No conceivable system of terror could have made the landed proprietors obey an anonymous government if they had chosen to seek the pro-

tection of the Russian, Prussian, or Austrian Government against it. As it was it obtained implicit obedience in all parts of Poland, and even those who were the most opposed to the insurrection on the ground that it was an utterly hopeless movement, paid taxes to the National Government in order to show that at least they did not grudge their money. As a rule, the only fear it speculated upon was the fear that every Pole feels of passing for a bad patriot. I say 'as a rule,' for if, as the Pole says, the Marquis Wielopolski paid taxes to the National Government, he can only have done so because he, or rather the steward of his estate, was obliged to do so.

At the same time, it is not unnatural that the Russians should have looked upon the rule of the National Government as founded on a basis of terror; for whenever the insurgents took horses and provisions from an estate they gave a paper stating that the proprietor or his representative, having been required to give up certain things, had only done so on compulsion and in fear of his life. After going through this form, the insurgents generally stopped in a friendly manner to dine.

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Russians high in authority, and all really well-informed Russians, knew from the beginning that the papers left by the insurgents were mere 'blinds'; but the Government apparently thought that if it was called upon to treat them as serious documents at all, it might as well make the most of them. Accordingly, I found the Russian official papers stating, at one time, that the landed proprietors of Poland were the chief supports of the insurrection, and at another that they were opposed to it, and that it could be proved they only aided it from compulsion. It is well known now that the landowners were nearly all opposed to the project of armed rising, as a matter of reason; but when it had once taken place they could not, as a matter of feeling, help assisting their own countrymen. At the same time there must have been numerous cases in which the insurgents carried off what the proprietor would have liked to have been able to refuse them. A friend of mine had a hundred and fifty horses taken from his estate. They were all well bred, some of the best Polish, others of Arab blood. 'I should not have cared,' said the proprietor, 'if a couple of hours afterwards they had not fallen into the hands of the Rus-

sians.' When the insurgents managed to keep their horses they often rode them till their backs were sore, and by overwork and neglect soon spoilt them. They could get remounted wherever there were fresh horses to be had ; but, unless very patriotic indeed, I do not think the proprietors could have felt pleased at having to give them the pick of their stables.

As to the general conduct of the contending forces in the field, that of the insurgents (in spite of some infamous acts of violence on the part of certain 'chiefs of gendarmerie') has been incomparably better than that of the Russians. The excesses of the Polish gendarmerie have been committed against proprietors suspected of withholding supplies, or peasants suspected or convicted of having favoured the enemy ; and the treatment by the Poles of Russian prisoners, and especially wounded ones, has been almost invariably humane. Russians have undoubtedly been hanged by Czachowski, and other chiefs, but only in the way of reprisals, and after due notice. At the beginning of the insurrection nothing of the kind was ever done on the Polish side.

As for ordinary travellers not connected with the insurrection, no one ever hears of their being molested by the insurgents, whereas there have been numerous instances of travellers being attacked, beaten, and even killed by Russian troops. Any foreigner who was in any of the country districts in Poland during the insurrection, will, I am sure, admit that he would a thousand times rather have fallen in with a band of insurgents than with a party of Russian soldiers, and this general feeling on the subject is better evidence than any number of real or pretended facts on either side.

CHAPTER XIII.

WARSAW : NOVEMBER, 1863.

It is remarkable with what feverish anxiety the speech of the Emperor Napoleon has been looked forward to in Warsaw. The day before the opening of the French Chambers numbers of persons went to church and prayed that God would enlighten the Emperor, and turn his heart towards Poland. On the evening of the 5th the most curiously contradictory rumours were in circulation as to what His Majesty had said, and when the German papers arrived with the text of the speech equally opposite interpretations were given to it. On the whole, however, the speech is much admired, and is considered encouraging. Hope—the miserable have no other medicine, but only hope—still remains to the Poles; they cling now to the straw held out to them in the shape of a

projected Congress, which if it were to take place could scarcely fail to bring on war. No regular war could injure the Poles so much as the war against national and family ties, as well as against life and property, of which their unhappy country is now the scene. Even if the Polish nation were to perish in the conflict, it would at least perish arms in hand; but the fact is, it is difficult to think of any combination for war purposes by which it would not almost certainly profit.

No Pole imagines that the Polish question can be settled, as he would like to see it settled, by peaceful means; and the universal desire in Poland is, of course, that France should end by going to war with Russia. This does not prevent some of the Poles from reflecting that France is not likely to take such a step without an ally, nor from remembering that it is not very long since Russia and France were on remarkably good terms. More than that, when the Austrian Diet of Princes was convened, Poles supposed to have close relations with the French Government were of opinion that the friendly understanding might be renewed, and that if Russia could be tempted to make im-

portant concessions to the Kingdom by the promise of French assistance for projects of her own, Austria could be forced to give up Cracow, and Prussia might even be induced to part with a small portion of the Duchy of Posen—keeping, of course, for herself the city with its strong fortress. In forming this project of a restored Grand Duchy of Warsaw, in narrower limits and under a Russian Prince, its authors counted not only without Russia, but also without the Polish nation, which at that time was convinced that the insurrection would lead inevitably to a general war, or at least that the three Powers who had engaged in a hopeless diplomatic intervention would finally be compelled to assume a hostile and menacing attitude towards Russia, even if all did not go to the length of taking up arms. Of such a result the Poles must have ceased to think, and it is at least more possible now than it was two months ago that if France can gain nothing for them by the sword, they could as a last chance accept what France might be able to procure for them by good offices, and by coming to terms with their great oppressor on other questions.

The Poles, it must be remembered, take it for granted that the Emperor Napoleon, for the sake of his own position in France, *must* do something for them, and therefore it is argued that if he finds himself left to act entirely alone on their behalf he will have no course open to him but to offer the hand of friendship once more to Russia, and make the best possible friendly bargain for them, even at the expense of Austria. In thinking of such a solution as this, the Poles no doubt reflect that if Austria has not helped the Russians to suppress the present insurrection quite so openly as the Prussians, she has at least aided them to a very considerable extent, and of late to a greater extent than ever. Thus, every endeavour is made to prevent the Galician bands from reaching the frontier. They are fired upon as they go across, and their passage made known to the Russian troops on the other side; their numbers and position are telegraphed from Lemberg to the Russian authorities at Warsaw, and when they are driven back and seek refuge on Austrian territory, they are disarmed and imprisoned.

There is, however, this great difficulty in the

way of an arrangement by which Russia should make concessions to Poland in conformity with a friendly representation on the subject from the Emperor Napoleon—that any concessions made under such circumstances would help to maintain the Poles in their attitude of trust towards France and of distrust towards Russia. The Russian Government must wish, above all things, to diminish, and, if possible, put an end to, the political influence of France and of the Polish emigration in Paris upon her Polish subjects; and unless the French are thoroughly determined, sooner or later, to attempt the re-establishment of a Polish kingdom, sufficiently large to be able to exist by itself, it is to be hoped, for the sake of the Poles, that this influence will as soon as possible cease to be felt. As long as the Poles look to the Hotel Lambert, and, through the Hotel Lambert, to the Tuileries, for relief, they will not and cannot get it from St. Petersburg. Promises have been made them on both sides and not fulfilled, and, on the whole, they have been worse treated by their friends than by their enemies. However, nothing in the history of recent Polish events is more

certain than that, when the Grand Duke Constantine arrived in Warsaw, he came to benefit, not to injure, the Poles. They, of course, possessed the right of choosing whether to accept or reject what he had to offer; but, as it was, many of the principal men in Warsaw gave their support to the Grand Duke at first, and then, as soon as they were assured that there was a good chance of a foreign intervention, left him. The resignation of all the principal independent members of the Council of State was applauded by their fellow-countrymen in general as a protest against Russian rule in Poland, but to the Grand Duke it must have had another aspect;—and, whether the step was praiseworthy or not, it at least illustrated the immense difficulty of governing a nation which looks abroad for its guides, and the unhappy position of a nation which is so guided from abroad as to be conducted—now, as in 1831—to a very much worse position than that from which it had hoped foreigners might rescue it.

It is remarkable too that none of Poland's friends care what happens to it unless it be some

highly dramatic and particularly sanguinary calamity. The suppression of high schools and universities throughout Poland for thirty years was an incomparably greater evil and an incomparably greater crime on the part of the Russian Government than the dispersion of a crowd by armed force, and with considerable loss of life, on the lawless principle pursued by military governments in all parts of the continent of Europe. But there is nothing at all dramatic in a plan for depriving a whole people of national education. It does not appeal to the eye, and it cannot be made the subject of a picture in an illustrated newspaper. The Poles have often of late felt themselves compelled to get their misfortunes presented in a dramatic form, for they have thought it necessary, above all, to consider what would strike this used-up Europe. 'Europe,' they have said to themselves, 'does not mind a people being gradually extinguished if it will only die out quietly; but the massacre of Sinope roused the indignation of France and England, and the massacres in Syria led to armed interference. If we resist the Russians, as at any

time during the last thirty years we have had 'a right to do, we too shall be massacred, and then Europe'—that is to say, France and England, which constitute Europe in a moral sense in the eyes of the Poles—'will perhaps inquire what ails us.'

'What will Europe say to this?' is a question the Poles put to themselves at each fresh cruelty inflicted upon them. Hitherto Europe, for all practical purposes, has said to their sufferings what the world said to the paradoxes presented to it by the vicar's son. 'The world said nothing to my paradoxes,' and Europe has 'said nothing' to the sufferings of the Poles; or, rather, it has spoken a great deal, but without uttering any of those words that signify future action. Still, Europe is appealed to, and it has now been appealed to so often that it seems to be thought impossible to touch it except by tales of the most horrible and heartrending character. There is, unhappily, no need to invent such narratives.

On the other hand, the 'Official Journal' is of opinion that life in Moscow is becoming quite

agreeable, and assures us that the adoption of coloured clothes by the ladies of Warsaw, after nothing but mourning had been worn by them for nearly three years, has given the streets a gay and animated appearance. I do not see it myself. A grotesque and sad appearance is what is really presented. 'It was time to put an end to this masquerade,' says the correspondent of a Russian journal; but the fact is, the true masquerade has only just begun; for you may now see persons who are grieving for their nearest relations dressed as though they had no such loss to deplore, a funeral looking (if it were not for the coffin) like a shabby wedding procession, and women crying their eyes out at a secretly ordered service for the dead, attired in all the colours of the rainbow. To the men it does not matter much; but the women who have lost relations feel the effect of the order against mourning very acutely, and as it was against them that it was specially directed, its success may be considered complete. For brothers, fathers, and husbands mourning may, it is true, still be worn, but not without carrying a permit, which any policeman

may cause to be produced as often as he thinks fit. I find, too, that those who have lost relations in the insurrection do not consider it advisable to call the attention of the Government to the fact; and, on the whole, it may be said that the usual manifestations of domestic grief are now impossible in Warsaw.

CHAPTER XIV.

ST. PETERSBURG : NOVEMBER, 1863.

THE Polish insurrection has been accounted for by the Russians in a good many different and contradictory ways. When it first began it was usual to regard it as a selfish movement on the part of the nobility, or landowners, great and small, who were accused of aiming at the re-establishment of serfdom. This argument could only succeed with persons ignorant enough not to know that the worst features of serfdom were abolished by the Polish Diet more than seventy years ago, when the reform of the Polish Constitution was made the signal for the second partition of the country; that in the Grand Duchy of Warsaw the formation of the new State, and the cessation of serfdom were simultaneous; and that in the present day, when the nobility of the

Russian Empire were requested by the Emperor Alexander to send in their adhesion to his general project of emancipation, the nobles of the Polish provinces responded instantly, and as if spontaneously, while those of the Russian provinces held back. That His Majesty thanked the nobility of Lithuania, Volhynia, and Podolia for their willingness and readiness to cooperate in carrying out his great scheme, and that he reproached the nobility of Moscow for their obstinacy in withholding all support, are matters of contemporary history, inscribed in the infallible columns of the Russian official journals.

When it became notorious in Europe that the great proprietors of Poland were taking no part as combatants in the insurrection, and that the bands were for the most part commanded by men who in no way represented the aristocratic society of the country, the theory was started that the insurrection had a revolutionary and subversive character in a social sense, and that the enemies of order and property, and not merely of the Russian domination in Poland, were at the bottom of it all. Lately, however, so many of the prin-

cial proprietors have been arrested, some of whom have been executed, while others have been sent to Siberia, others again being still kept in strict confinement in Poland, that the argument drawn from the non-participation of the richer and more influential classes in the movement becomes no longer tenable. A Pole who knew the state of his country, of Russia, and of all Europe too well not to be opposed to the rising in the first instance, but who, when it became impossible to stop it, of course wished it all success, and did his best to support it, described the insurrection to me not long since as 'a patriotic eruption.' It, indeed, burst out spontaneously in all parts of the enfeebled and irritated national body, and soon spread over the whole like a rash. The insurrection has been little more than the symptom of a grave and terrible disease which time does not cure. What is called 'the movement' was almost an involuntary one, and if we take a broad view of it, was no more the result of deliberation than are the struggles of a tortured animal; but at least the whole body moved.

For my part, whatever others may think, I can

have no doubt on this point. The Polish nation certainly did not rise as one man against Russia. Had that been possible—had there been arms enough in the country to render such a rising at all practicable, the Russians would have been sent home long ago, and the whole of Russian Poland, if not perfectly free, would at least have been fighting under very advantageous conditions for its freedom. But every class, with the exception of the almost servile peasantry, has given unmistakable proofs of its hatred for Russia, and of its readiness to make all kinds of sacrifices with the view of freeing Poland from foreign dominion. At the beginning of the insurrection all the great, and most of the small, landed proprietors were entirely opposed to it for sound prudential reasons, and because the rising was evidently premature. This, of course, was not the opinion of the men escaping from the conscription, who, nevertheless, if they had possessed one more degree of courage than they exhibited when, armed with sticks, revolvers, and here and there an old musket, they attacked the Russian troops sent to arrest them in the forest of Kam-

pinos, might have rendered a great service to their country by submitting to be carried off to the army. This sad species of fortitude, however, is not in the nature of the Poles; and the last of the really distinguished Polish chiefs with whom I was once talking on this subject, was perhaps right in believing that the recruitment was a blow to which the nation was obliged to reply under pain of losing its self-respect.

‘The persecutions of thirty years,’ said this officer, ‘had engendered all sorts of venomous passions which required an outlet. Whatever be the result of this movement, it is better to have met the enemy openly in the field than that we should have gone on hating, reviling, and occasionally stabbing the Russians without once measuring ourselves against them. The country will be ruined, no doubt, but an agricultural country like Poland cannot be ruined for very long, and ten years hence we shall think better of ourselves, and Europe and even Russia will think better of us, than if we had submitted tamely to every indignity that our oppressors chose to put upon us.’

It is a fact that assassinations were of constant

occurrence in Warsaw before the insurrection broke out, and if they continued after the appeal to arms, it at least could no longer be said that the dagger was the only weapon the Poles dared to employ. But, though the views above expressed were held by numbers of men of high military spirit, it required no great sagacity to see that the insurrection, unless supported from abroad, had no chance of success; and all the men possessed of that rational calmness, which is sometimes a gift of nature, sometimes the result of study, and which sometimes, too, is one of the effects produced by the possession of large estates, held quite aloof from the movement until it had acquired such dimensions and had obtained so much active support among the more excitable classes that to have abstained any longer from assisting it would have been to incur the imputation of want of patriotism. It is possible even now to find 'reactionary' proprietors in Poland, who say, as they have said throughout, that the insurrection was an ill-considered outburst, so far revolutionary in its character that it was impossible to maintain it except by the employment of

violent and revolutionary means, and that for that reason it ought not to have been commenced; but among all the curiosities that the Russians are ready to show well-disposed travellers—such as half a prison, or one prison out of four, or a specimen prisoner's dinner, including all the delicacies of the season, or a prisoner who has been taught not to curse his gaolers—there is one that they have not been able to exhibit; namely, a Pole of any class or from any part of Poland who can read and write, and who does not abhor the Russian Government.

Any one knowing the subject who tries to classify the Poles that have joined and the Poles that have not joined the armed insurrection according to social rank, or even according to political principles, will soon get confused. It would be safer to adopt another kind of division, and to say that those in whom the feelings predominate over the intellect have gone out to fight, and that those in whom the intellect predominates over the feelings have stopped at home. At the same time, however, there have been special reasons for the appearance of some and the non-

appearance of others in the field. Men of all classes, conditions, and ways of thinking who had had military experience felt it their duty to give the benefit of that experience to the insurrection; and, on the other hand, influential proprietors, who were sure if they moved a step that their estates would be confiscated, have judiciously kept quiet, and have fed the insurrection with money instead of giving the Russians a pretext for depriving them of the source of all their wealth. The monks, and the great majority of the secular clergy, have supported the insurrection, whereas many of the prelates were, in the first instance, opposed to it.

In many cases the sons of rich landowners have taken up arms, while the fathers have observed an apparent neutrality; and the Imperial Government in the Polish provinces annexed to the Russian Empire has now published an edict, by which heirs to property who have joined the insurrection are deprived of their birthright by anticipation. 'Having taken into consideration,' says an order published in the 'Wilna Courier,' 'that the article of the military penal code above

mentioned is in full execution in Lithuania, where the property of insurgents is already being confiscated, it has been decided that the Article 176 of the same code must also be applied in the provinces of Kieff, Volhynia, and Podolia; and that all persons in those provinces convicted of rebellion, or of participation in the rebellion, must have their estates confiscated, *care being taken to confiscate the portions of sons which would fall to them by inheritance.*

The Russians may be taught to believe that the Polish insurrection has been, and is now, a movement against order and property directed by brigands, incendiaries, and assassins; and while they are told one day that the ranks of the insurgents are recruited exclusively from among the lowest classes, they may be told the next that the real object of the rising was to obtain the renewal of certain privileges for the Polish nobility which the Polish nobility were ready to abandon of their own accord long before any of the surrounding Powers had the least suspicion that there was anything wrong in retaining them. If the list

of Poles executed by the Russians tells sufficiently that all classes of Polish society, even to and including the peasantry, have been represented in the insurrection, the list of exiles, if it could only be published, would be found equally eloquent. From Lithuania whole villages of peasants (chiefly Catholics) have been banished, and in many of the districts under the rule of Mouravieff, not only in Lithuania, but also in the northern half of Augustowo (kingdom of Poland), every landed proprietor who has ventured to remain on his estate has been seized and imprisoned.

CHAPTER XV.

ST. PETERSBURG: DECEMBER, 1863.

LITHUANIA, the Russians will tell you, is now completely quiet. So it may be; but I should have been able to speak with more certainty on the subject if I had been allowed to stop at Grodno and Wilna, whereas I was expressly cautioned against doing so, and only permitted to go to St. Petersburg on the express understanding that I should go there direct. I must add that at Wilna I was eagerly questioned as to my motives in entering the refreshment-room, which travellers have to pass through on their way to the town. My interrogator could scarcely believe that I was intent only on dining, until I gave him practical proof that dining was at least one of my objects.

The only useful information I could acquire during my brief stay at, or rather outside, this

eminently Polish city was that the process of Russification was being applied in Lithuanian dining-rooms, and that eatinghouse-keepers were forced to give Russian names to Polish dishes. I had read that this was the case in the columns of my old friend the 'Czas,' in whose truthfulness, however, I have the best possible reasons for disbelieving. It is a fact, however—and a very foolish little fact it is—that in Lithuania the names of Polish soups and stews have now to be written in Russian characters. I don't think this will change the Lithuanian Poles who eat them into Russians. Mickiewicz and Kosciuszko would still have been Poles even had they been fed from the day of their birth upon Polish dishes with Russian names. If the Russians could replace Polish civilisation, by some kind of Russian civilisation, they might accomplish their laudable purpose of denationalising Lithuania. As it is, they will not succeed, even if they send into exile half the educated people of the country. The half who would remain would still be Poles, and would still represent all the civilisation of Lithuania.

If the word *bigos* be written in Russian characters.

acters, and if the curious hash called *bigos* be eaten under a Russian title, then the Pole so eating it becomes in the eyes of Mouravieff a Russian, and he becomes one just as much as do those Poles of Lithuania who are forced to put their names to loyal addresses of Russian manufacture, and couched in the Russian tongue. The Lithuanians cannot starve, and they cannot all submit to be sent into exile. It is wonderful how much importance the Russians attach to names. We all know to what, being neither human nor divine, Mouravieff may be compared; but, because he is called Michael, the Russians have discovered that he bears a wonderful resemblance to Michael the Archangel. His cruel and sensual face would not remind any one but a frantic Russian of the glorious St. Michael painted by Raphael; nor can an Englishman fancy an Archangel being Minister of domains and giving general and well-merited dissatisfaction in that capacity.

I remember with what joy the Russians, in Moscow as well as in St. Petersburg, received the news, now nearly two years ago, of the forced

retirement of Mouravieff from his post as Minister, and how his removal from office was spoken of as a concession to public opinion, which was then growing very fast, and which has grown now into something very detestable. But the Russians are a changeable people; at least as changeable in feeling as the Poles, and without those inherited principles which the Poles do not desert at all. If Mouravieff was looked upon as a species of dragon eighteen months ago, and if he is looked upon as an Archangel now, he will be regarded as something worse than a dragon before another year has passed.

Already a reaction has begun at St. Petersburg, and the better kind of Russians who have felt from the beginning that the revolutionary measures of Mouravieff were a disgrace to a country pretending to be civilised are now able to make their voices heard. The presentation to Mouravieff of images of St. Michael (bearing the blasphemous inscription, 'Thy name is victory'), and the foundation at Wilna, and in Mouravieff's honour, of a church dedicated to St. Michael (in which perpetual prayers, we are told, are to be

offered up by the Lithuanians for the executioner of the best men in Lithuania)—these unseemly and irreverent manifestations mark the climax of Mouravieff's popularity; the 'Archangel' will now begin to fall, and we may be sure will some day be spurned by those who at the present moment are prostrate at his feet.

Putting the question of reverence on one side, it is strange, as a mere matter of comparison, that a man who does not fight at all himself, and who encourages and directs others to fight unfairly, should be thought to resemble an angelic warrior. It was, in fact, by the dragon of social revolution that the heroic insurgents of Lithuania were vanquished. Mouravieff raised this dragon, and it is still rampant. Although I did not enter the towns of Grodno and Wilna, I travelled along the Lithuanian Railway, and saw not only the devastated forest land on each side of the line, but at several of the stations the peasants armed with pikes, whom the 'Archangel,' by appealing to their envy, cupidity, and fanaticism, incited to attack all who were not peasants like themselves. The Russian St. Michael certainly made the dragon his ally,

and this is already understood by many persons in St. Petersburg, though by very few, I believe, as yet in the more holy city of Moscow.

I do not know whether English readers have ever asked themselves how it is that Wilna and Kovno have shown themselves so much more Polish in feeling than other parts of Lithuania. In an ethnological point of view neither of these provinces is eminently Polish, and the number of Poles by race in the Government of Kovno does not amount to three per cent. on the entire population. But, on the other hand, if we classify the inhabitants of this Government by religion, we find that the enemies of Poland—that is to say, the members of what the Russians call the ‘orthodox’ and the Poles the ‘schismatic’ Church—are scarcely more than three per cent. strong (3·33, according to Busching’s statistical tables); and when the Russians ask, with real or affected indignation, how a province in which less than the thirtieth part of the population is Polish can be claimed as forming part of Poland, the answer to make to them is—because, with the exception of a little more than one thirtieth part of the popu-

lation, the whole population is Polish in feeling. This calculation is perhaps unduly favourable to the Russians ; for it is more than doubtful, as I will afterwards show, whether the members of the 'orthodox' Church in Kovno, Wilna, and, indeed, in Lithuania generally, do not regret their forced separation from the Latin Communion. But, admitting even that the 30,000 Russo-Greeks of the Kovno province, which contains altogether about 1,000,000 inhabitants, are sincerely attached to the Russian Church, the fact remains that in Kovno the movement in favour of Polish independence has been as general and as difficult to suppress as in any of the provinces of the kingdom of Poland where the Russians are willing to admit that a Pole is really a Pole.

As the inhabitants of England do not as a rule know whether they are of Celtic or Germanic race, but feel all the same that they are Englishmen, so the inhabitants of Poland and Lithuania, wherever they have not been brought under the influence of Russian priests, feel that they are Poles, without knowing or caring under what ethnological heading they may be classed in sta-

tistical tables. But where the Russian Church and Russian teaching predominate, and where hatred of Poles is inculcated as a primary virtue, there the cause of Poland is indeed hopeless. The Polish insurrection broke out first and in greatest force in the Catholic kingdom of Poland; it broke out secondly, and in less force, in Lithuania, where the Russo-Greeks are slightly in the majority; and it broke out thirdly and was at once suppressed by the inhabitants themselves in the Ruthenian provinces (Volhynia, Podolia, and Kieff), where the Russo-Greeks are to the Roman Catholics in the proportion of ten to one.

What holds good of the whole territory of the ancient Polish republic holds good also of Lithuania in particular; and thus it happens that the rising in favour of Polish independence has been most formidable, and has lasted longest in the Government of Kovno which is the most Catholic, but, in an ethnological sense, the least Polish of all the Lithuanian governments. The Russian Government has sufficiently Russianised the Ruthenian provinces for immediate fighting purposes, and if it had any spare civilisation to introduce

there, might in time make the peasants Russian in the full sense of the word ; but it has no hold whatever on the inhabitants of Kovno and Wilna or of any districts in the other Lithuanian governments where the Russo-Greeks are not greatly in the majority. In Lithuania, generally, it is easy to stop any demonstration on the part of the educated classes—who, with scarcely an exception, are Catholics—by raising up the Russo-Greek peasantry against them ; but this creditable plan cannot be applied to regions where all classes are bound together by a common religious faith, and receive the same religious teaching.

It would be an error to suppose that only the Catholic inhabitants of Poland feel as Poles ; but there is a positive anti-Polish feeling among all the peasantry who belong, of their own free-will, to the Russian Church, and are under the influence of the Russian clergy. In Lithuania, however, whatever may have been the case in the Ruthenian provinces, it seems by no means certain that the peasants forced to quit the Greek-Uniate for the Russo-Greek religion, have ever become sincerely attached to the latter. Russian evidence on such

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a subject as this is of the highest value, and in the secret report drawn up by General Nazimoff, Governor-General of Wilna, in October 1860, the following important passages occur : *—

‘ The orthodox religion was re-established in Lithuania by the reconciliation of the Greek Uniates to the orthodox faith. The masses, weak in the principles of that faith, *and even not understanding that they were returning to the religion of their forefathers*, required the guidance of sensible and indefatigable pastors. Their want of education (i.e., of the rural clergy of the orthodox faith) develops an inattention and even carelessness in the execution of their duties. Through their cupidity and the extreme poverty of their domestic life, not rendered independent by adequate salaries, while they are at the same time placed in exclusive relation to the impoverished peasants, necessarily dependent on them ; the village priests are thus reduced to the level of the lower orders, and, losing the dignity which should appertain to their office, exercise no moral or religious influence over their parish-

* See Appendix, vol. i. No. III.

ioners. With regard to the outward condition of the churches, it is impossible not to perceive that they are at present, as formerly, in a state of neglect and poverty, especially in the less populous districts. The contrast which the orthodox churches thus present in their exterior to the churches of the Roman Catholic faith, to which all the nobility and gentry of the western provinces [i.e., Polish provinces incorporated with the Russian empire] belong, and which are distinguished alike by their external grandeur and their internal magnificence, naturally suggests to the lower orders the supremacy of the Catholic religion. At the same time it is impossible for the poor peasant to add to the splendour of the orthodox churches.'

'During thirty years,' says the Governor-General of Wilna, in another part of the same report, 'notwithstanding the severe measures adopted towards the local population, which were a constant inducement towards reactionary movements—notwithstanding various privileges granted to Russian nobles in the leasing of estates and other advantages extended to them—these measures have, nevertheless, not had the effect of drawing

Lithuania closer to Russia, *of confirming among the Greek uniates the orthodoxy which has so feeble a hold on them*, of spreading a knowledge of the Russian language, or of increasing in the country the number of native Russians. The latter consideration is more especially important, because the chief authorities of the province are reduced to the necessity of confiding the execution of all administrative measures, whether official or secret, to functionaries belonging to the local population, and connected with it by their religion, their families, their language, and their relations generally.'

It would appear, in short, from this secret report, as well as from the one drawn up two years later on the same subject by the Minister of the Interior, that those Russians who have the best sources of information open to them agree with the Poles in not regarding the forced converts of Lithuania as very steadfast adherents to the Russian faith. Russia's title to Lithuania is recognised by every State in Europe, and is at least as valid as that of Austria to Venetia. But when Russian writers, and even the Russian Govern-

ment, pretend that Russia holds Lithuania in virtue of the will of the majority of its inhabitants, that statement may be fairly questioned; while any assertion to the effect that it is supported in any part of its Polish dominions by any section of the educated population must be met by a positive denial, based on the testimony of a Lithuanian Governor-General, and of the Minister of the Interior of the Russian Empire. The 'Polish minority' is justly described by the Minister of the Interior as 'consisting of the most educated classes of society—of the nobility, the clergy, and the Government officials, of the teachers and the taught.'

CHAPTER XVI.

ST. PETERSBURG : JANUARY, 1863.

IN reference to the general direction of the Polish movement I have often found it necessary to call attention to the manner in which the news department is conducted. The Polish news for the most part represents, not what has really occurred, but what the Poles would have liked to occur, and this is true even of acts of violence and cruelty attributed with or without foundation to the Russians. If the Russians had from the beginning done their best to suppress the insurrection, without hesitation and without cruelty, they would have been attacked anew all the same for the original crime from which the Polish insurrections spring ; but, at least, that additional amount of sympathy would not have been felt for the Poles that has now been called forth by the inhuman manner in which in this latest instance

they have been treated. The more the Russians have excited the indignation of Europe the better the Poles have been pleased, for the greater their chance has been of getting assistance; and strange and horrible as it may seem, it is nevertheless true that they expect and require for their own purposes a continuous series of cruel acts on the part of the Russians, and, if such acts are not wantonly committed, do not mind provoking them.

Proceeding a step further, I will not say that the directors of the Polish insurrection deliberately invent accusations against the Russians. I speak generally, for there may be exceptions to the rule, and if it is considered patriotic to publish accounts of risings in Podolia, where there has been no rising, and pictures of battles at places in Volhynia, where there have been no battles, it may be also considered patriotic to increase the general interest taken in the affairs of Poland by other means, and to add an additional blackness to the already sufficiently black reputation of Poland's great enemy. In any case the Poles are naturally delighted to accept and circulate without verification any rumours calculated to injure the Russians;

and once accepted, put into form, and sent about, either by telegraph or in a letter, the rumours penetrate into almost every journal in Western Europe.

As for the stories told from mouth to mouth in Warsaw concerning the misdeeds of the Russians in that very city, I found that not one in half a dozen was based on truth, while those that were not absolutely and entirely false were always false to some extent. For this the Russians have, in a great measure, to thank themselves. They will tolerate neither publicity nor free inquiry where they fancy that it is to their advantage to check it; and as people *will* have news of the Polish insurrection, and as rumours *will* get abroad, and acquire *vires* as well as *virus* in getting there, the West of Europe often forms a worse opinion of the Russians than the plain facts (if it were always possible to ascertain them) might justify. The Russians have done so much that is inexcusable in Poland that one does not feel inclined, or at all bound, to examine minor charges against them, which, if properly inquired into, would frequently, no doubt, turn out to be untrue.

Sometimes, when the same incident is related in one way by the Russians and in another by the Poles, it at least becomes evident that an incident resembling, more or less, either the Russian or the Polish version has taken place. Otherwise, no one who has himself witnessed incidents during the Polish insurrection, and has afterwards seen the conflicting and equally untrue accounts published of them by the Russians and by the Poles, can, as a rule, feel justified in believing either side.

At the same time, it would be a very easy, but would not be a just way to get out of the difficulty to say that because the Russians make false accusations against the Poles, and the Poles false accusations against the Russians, therefore it is impossible to decide which of the two have behaved the worst in Poland. The most the Russians can say for themselves is that they have not behaved more cruelly than their enemies—which for a regular Government carrying on war against bands of undisciplined insurgents is not a very proud boast. The Poles, it must be remembered, are obliged to look upon all insurgents who present themselves as good enough for the insur-

rection, and bands may no doubt have appeared in various parts of the country subject to no proper control, and composed of such vagabonds and marauders as the ferment of revolution is sure to bring to the surface equally with men of conviction and of true patriotism. It would not be quite fair to regard every troop of Kouban Cossacks as representing the Russian army, but it would be the grossest injustice to look upon every stray band of Polish insurgents as representing the Polish insurrection.

There is one class of stories which in the West of Europe is never heard of, but which forms the great bulk of the news from Poland published in the journals of St. Petersburg and Moscow. I mean the accounts of 'atrocities' alleged to have been committed by the Poles, and which, true or false, are quite as abundantly supplied to the Russian newspapers as similar accounts of Russian 'atrocities' are to the *Czas*. I never see any of these stories contradicted, for we have no Poles here likely to attempt the part that M. de Berg enacts in London. The Russians in England can profit by the English love of fair play to make

their voices heard in reply to attacks from the Poles ; but what would the position of a Pole in St. Petersburg be who should venture to deny even the foulest calumny uttered by the Russians against his defenceless countrymen ?

The Russians can say what they please about the Polish insurrection, and they will take care that no one shall contradict them in their own newspapers nor in any newspapers published in Russia. Therefore their statements on the subject are next to valueless, and they have been treated as such all over Europe. I do not suppose that in the Government newspapers of Russia official accounts are falsified by the editors ; but it is the same thing as if they were, for, however erroneous they may be, and whatever motives may exist on the part of their authors for falsifying them, no correction under any circumstances is possible.

The effect of printing in the Russian papers the most horrible accusations against the Poles, of which for the most part it is impossible to test the truthfulness, has of course been to irritate the Russian public against them beyond measure ; and, at first, one is somewhat astonished to find the

Poles spoken of here much as the Russians are spoken of at Cracow. Poland, according to the Russian press, would seem to be a country that produces nothing but liars, thieves, and assassins. Why such persons should have engaged in a desperate struggle for national freedom, which is not at all necessary for men who have only mean and bad objects to pursue, is of course not explained. The Russian papers content themselves with adducing real or pretended 'facts,' which in all probability are presented with as much fidelity as marks their translations of the letters on Polish affairs published in the English newspapers. Thus 'Le Nord' has learnt the art of rendering English into French so as to give it an entirely different signification from that of the original, and probably many of the Russian papers dress up their facts after the same fashion.

Another strange notion of the Russians on the subject of the Polish insurrection is that it was planned and prepared by the Marquis Wielopolski. This seems to be a very general belief, and there are many even who freely hint that the Marquis had an illustrious patron who aided him

in his curious enterprise. Political fancy can scarcely go further than this, and people who can believe that the Marquis Wielopolski planned the insurrection in Poland, which he, above all men, knew could not possibly succeed, and which he, above all men, really desired to prevent, must be capable of believing anything, except what is really credible. The Marquis Wielopolski has always had a horror of popular movements, and it was to avert the calamities which he, in common with nearly all the calmer and more educated portion of the Polish public, saw must be the consequence of an outbreak with little or nothing except sentiment to support it that the measure of the 'proscription' was adopted. That measure was an odious one, but its object was to weaken the class of men in all the Polish towns who were bent on insurrection, and, indeed, had already been sworn in by the agents of the Central Committee of Warsaw. The Russians conclude, merely from the result, that the Marquis must have wished the rising to take place, because it was he who, in spite of the Emperor's unwillingness to sanction it, persisted in introducing the very measure by which the rising was provoked.

It is assumed, too, that the administration of the kingdom was changed by the Marquis from Russian to Polish; but the fact is it was almost entirely Polish before. Nevertheless, the Russian notion on the subject is that the Marquis Wielopolski prepared the way for the National Government by getting rid of all the Russians in the administration, and that, at what he considered the proper moment, he ordered the arbitrary military recruitment, so as to drive the people to insurrection, and at the same time gave the rising a colourable pretext in the eyes of Europe.

All this is very ingenious, and if you do not admit that it gives the true explanation of the Polish outbreak, and of the remarkable success which for some time attended it, the Russians will ask you how it happened that when the first bands were formed in the close vicinity of Warsaw neither the Marquis, nor the Grand Duke, nor General Ramsay, the acting commander of the forces, could think of any plan for dispersing or capturing them? To this question no satisfactory answer can be given. The more enthusi-

astic Poles will tell you that their untrained and, for the most part, unarmed men were invincible. The more excitable and credulous among the Russians will declare that their troops were treacherously commanded to fire over the insurgents' heads. It does not seem to occur to either side that there may have been a sincere wish on the part of the authorities at Warsaw to avoid bloodshed as long as possible. The Russians regard the feeble action of the Grand Duke's Government, when the insurrection had once begun, as all of a piece with the measures which preceded and led to it; while the Poles, on the other hand, say either that the Russians did their best to put the insurrection down from the very beginning, but found it too much for them, or else that they allowed it to spread under the impression that it would never become very great, and that it would be a good thing to let it grow to its natural dimensions at once.

There are even Russians who are firmly convinced that the Marquis Wielopolski was a member, and, indeed, the prime director of the Polish National Government. According to this amus-

ing theory, the ignorant and unseemly attack made upon the Marquis in the French Senate by Prince Napoleon was only a feint, and the equally unbecoming reply from Count Sigismund Wielopolski a feint also. Yet nothing is more certain than that the Prince had been taught to regard the Marquis as a man who, for the sake of place and power, had betrayed his country to the Russians, and that the Count sincerely looked upon the Prince as the type of those 'friends of Poland' who lure the Poles with false hopes and urge them on in every possible manner to their own destruction. The duel between Count Sigismund Wielopolski and Count Branicki, if it took place at all, was of course a sham duel; but the dismissal of the Marquis Wielopolski (for the Russians maintain that he was dismissed) was a genuine act enough, and was caused by a tardy discovery on the part of the Imperial Government that he had been undermining its power from the beginning, and had been throughout in league with its enemies.

The Russian Ministers and high officials have a theory of their own as to the origin of the

Polish insurrection, which they do not attribute in any way to bad government in the ordinary sense of the term, but simply to want of vigour in repressing its first manifestations of the revolutionary spirit in Poland. The demon of 'cosmopolite revolution' had been for some time wandering about Europe, 'seeking,' like the raging lion of Scripture, 'whom he might devour,' when he at last found an entry into the ill-guarded Polish possessions of Russia. Under the mild rule of Prince Gortschakoff in the kingdom of Poland, and of General Nazimoff in Lithuania, the revolutionary and cosmopolitan demon did as he pleased, and, profiting by the power which the evil spirit is known to possess of transforming himself at will, appeared in the character and historical garb of a Pole. Foreigners were deceived, as the demon meant them to be, and thought they saw a real Pole indignant at his country's wrongs. Even Gortschakoff and Nazimoff did not know what to make of the apparition. They fired at it occasionally, but that only made it worse. Then, for six weeks, Prince Gortschakoff gave up Warsaw to it altogether, his

troops watching its strange performances from the citadel. Then he summoned up courage to fire at it again. At last the demon attacked tooth and nail those who had so incautiously admitted him into their territories; and it was not until a worse demon appeared against him in the shape of Mouravieff that he was cast out, at least from Lithuania.

It is not only in despatches written for the benefit of foreigners that the above theory as to the real meaning of the Polish insurrection is set forth. It is developed apparently in all sincerity by the Minister of the Interior in the secret memoir drawn up by him in October 1862, on the manifestations in Lithuania, of which several copies have got abroad, and from which there can be no harm in quoting the opening passage. 'The revolutionary movement long fostered in Germany,' says the memoir in question,— 'quelled energetically in France, and so remarkably successful in the Italian peninsula, soon extended itself to the principal portions of ancient Poland, to Posen, to Galicia, and to the present kingdom. While, however, Galicia and Posen,

restrained by the strong and regular action of the Austrian and Prussian Governments, limited themselves to weak demonstrations of sympathy for what was taking place in the South-West of Europe, Warsaw, the capital of the kingdom of Poland, encouraged by the mild rule of Prince Gortschakoff, commenced an open contest with its legal Government. Giving to their opposition the new and distinctive character of an unarmed insurrection, the chiefs of the revolutionary movement in the kingdom of Poland made every endeavour to strengthen their position abroad by engaging the sympathies of the Western Powers through the aid of the foreign press, and the publication of accusations against Russia; and in the interior of the empire by introducing a revolutionary propaganda, especially among the inhabitants of the Western Provinces, of Lithuania, Volhynia, Podolia, Kieff, and the two provinces of White Russia.*

Curiously enough, among the recommendations made by the author of the memoir for arresting the effect of the Polish 'revolutionary' propa-

* See Appendix, vol. i. No. III.

ganda is the following :—‘ Maintain constantly the antagonism between the nobles and the peasantry, and prevent by every possible means any fusion of those classes.’

It is known in what an atrocious manner this recommendation was carried out by Mouravieff, and it does certainly strike one at first as somewhat strange that the Russians, while manifesting such a holy horror of everything revolutionary, should pay such homage to a man who has only succeeded in checking a national and political insurrection by meeting it with social revolution.

I hear of a glimmer of reason, justice, dignity, even humanity, having appeared in Russia; and of a Russian gentleman occupying a high official position in St. Petersburg having spoken with disgust of Mouravieff, and with disgust still greater of those who subscribed to buy him an image of his supposed prototype St. Michael. Mouravieff’s friends have certainly done him a strange service in endeavouring to establish a resemblance between him and an archangel; and a few Russians already understand that to address to Mouravieff such words as ‘ Thy name is

Victory' is to confound the inhuman with the divine. But unfortunately—not so much for Poland as for Russia herself—the Mouravieff worshippers still form a crushing majority even in St. Petersburg, where people are thought, nevertheless, to be more sane on the subject of the Polish insurrection than in Moscow. The Russian who has had enough true patriotism to feel that the honours paid to Mouravieff are a disgrace to Russia is assailed in a manner which only proves that the assailants do not understand the remarkable distinction existing between the executioner and the soldier. Old Souvaroff, it is said, would not have hesitated to subscribe to the St. Michael testimonial, but, whether he would have done so or not, Mouravieff has shown none of Souvaroff's qualities, except what is called in Russia 'energy,' and in other countries 'ferocity.' Souvaroff was, at least, a great general, and one of the few men of original and native genius that Russia has produced; and to suggest even that Mouravieff is a man of the same type—well, after all, it is not much, considering that he had just before been compared to an archangel.

It is almost as puzzling to a foreigner to explain the frantic admiration with which Mouravieff is regarded in Russia as to make out the various Russian theories of the Polish insurrection. The more I think of it, however, the more I am convinced that Mouravieff is idolised here simply because he is execrated abroad, and that the adulation paid to him by his fellow-countrymen is the reply made by a proud and irritated nation to the reproofs, sometimes unmerited, and to the threats never meant to be carried out of foreigners. The conduct of Mouravieff has been publicly condemned in assemblies which the Russians feel have no right to interfere in the suppression of an insurrection in Lithuania; and Mouravieff acting with redoubled energy (or ferocity) at Wilna is to them the symbol of Russia defying the West of Europe. Though the Russians will not condescend to say so, I can scarcely believe that they take pleasure in hearing that men have been executed as criminals for having fought as patriots. No one can blame them for wishing to retain Lithuania, nor for rejoicing that the Lithuanian insurrection is suppressed; but, unless

they are really unable to perceive any distinction between the noble and the ignoble, it is impossible to understand their elevation of a cruel and unscrupulous governor into the position of a hero.

Paskievitch was not made the subject of any extravagant eulogiums when he took Warsaw ; yet Paskievitch was a brave soldier, and at least risked his life and his military reputation in fighting against the Poles—fighting against them, moreover, with clean weapons, and not with the foul arm of revolution. As for Mouravieff, he has only done what any official who 'dareth more' than 'doth become a man,' might have accomplished in an equally short space of time. The Russians say that he braved the condemnation of all Europe, and of 'false patriots' among his own countrymen. If it be some day admitted in Russia that Europe took a just view of Mouravieff's conduct, and that the 'false patriots' among the Russians were men who in the midst of great difficulties still kept the honour of their country in view, then it will be said of him, as of some other great criminals, that he braved the opprobrium of the civilised world.

CHAPTER XVII.

MOSCOW: JANUARY, 1864.

ALTHOUGH the Russian Government exiles men who have in no way broken the law, and whom it cannot convict of any species of offence, it nevertheless does not treat such men precisely as criminals. I know instances in which innocent persons thus exiled 'by administrative order' have been treated with consideration by the authorities of the kingdom of Poland as well as by those of Russia proper. Full notice of the hour of departure has been given them. Their relations have been allowed, if not to accompany them, at least to follow them immediately afterwards; and there have been cases even in which the original destination of a prisoner (of the class of perfectly innocent men, be it understood) has been changed to enable his friends to visit him with less inconvenience.

Russia is answering now for an old sin, from the effects of which she cannot recover unless she completely transforms herself, and for which she could not fully atone without committing suicide. I do not think the Russian Government wishes to add cruelty to cruelty and crime to crime. Being in a criminal position it cannot act with virtue. Leniency is not its aim ; but nevertheless it would be unfair not to admit that it punishes very differently those of whose culpability it has no proof, and those whom it has been able to convict of some positive offence.

We must not expect figs from thistles, or justice from the Russian Government, and in the meanwhile, that there may be no mistake as to its general conduct towards the innocent persons exiled 'by administrative measures,' I will quote the words of the 'Voice' on the subject, the 'Voice' (Goloss) being one of the most liberal journals published in St. Petersburg, where liberalism, even in speaking and writing, is not in fashion just now. The remarks of the 'Voice' on the pleasures of exile, as arranged by the Russian Government, are reproduced by the 'Journal de St. Peters-

bourg,' in order to show what 'absurdities' are spread by the foreign press in reference to persons transported from Poland to Russia 'without being allowed even to take farewell of their families,' &c. One Russian paper proves triumphantly by the aid of another that exiles *are* allowed to take leave of their families. The fact that they are banished upon mere suspicion is a detail to which no importance is attached. It is quite true that Poles, who are particularly disliked by the Russian Government, either as violent patriots or as patriots still more dangerous from their wisdom and moderation, are transported to Voroneje, to Perm, to the frontiers of Siberia; but it appears that some foreign journals have uttered calumnies in asserting that the innocent persons sent by administrative order into exile are not allowed to say good-bye to their friends. As a matter of fact, there is no great injustice in taking Poles at random and exiling them without trial or formal accusation, if to hate Russia and to wish every possible harm to the Russian Government be a crime on the part of a Pole; but as a matter of principle it is, perhaps, a mistake for a Govern-

ment which had begun to adopt legal forms in its dealings with its subjects to discard now all semblance of legality, and return to its own native customs of the sixteenth century (when, for example, thousands of families were transported from Novgorod to Moscow), while hypocritically pretending, through its defenders, to have borrowed the practice of expatriation, with all the other bad points in its actual system, from the west of Europe.

‘Formerly,’ says the ‘Goloss,’ ‘when the system of deportation was not yet in use among us—a system so well known in Western Europe, and above all in France, where, after the 2nd of December 1851, tens of thousands of persons distasteful to the new Government were deported—we had very few persons condemned to exile, especially at Warsaw; and they were always permitted not only to take leave of their parents and friends, but, as was the case with Epstein, the ex-Minister of Finance of the Central Committee, and many others, after sentence had been passed upon them, to reside for some time longer under inspection in the bosom of their families, for the settlement of

their affairs. Now that the measure of exile through administrative channels has been fully adopted—a measure as beneficial for the country as for the individuals themselves—the mode of transporting all persons temporarily exiled, we say it with our hand on our conscience (*sic*), does the greatest honour to our Government, and it is doubtful whether as much would be done in countries priding themselves on their so-called constitutional government.’

‘If,’ continues the writer, ‘the exiles belong to the class of public functionaries, they draw half-pay during the whole time of their banishment from the kingdom of Poland; while to those who are not in the public service either permanent allowances or allowances from month to month are made. The families of persons arrested in order to be transported’—not to be tried or examined, be it observed, but simply to be transported—‘receive immediately the money necessary for providing them with warm garments and other indispensable things. For interviews with persons sent off by the railway so many tickets are delivered that, according to eye-witnesses, the

spacious terminus of the Warsaw and St. Petersburg Railway, at the moment of departure, is so crowded that it is difficult to move about in it. The relatives, in taking leave of the exiles, do not, it is true, know their ultimate destination; but this cannot be avoided. Persons sent away from Warsaw are taken first to Pskoff, and it is there only that their place of residence is determined by a special commission. If the families of the exiles wish to accompany them, not only is no difficulty made about allowing them to do so, but there have been instances of whole convoys being delayed and the departure put off for several days in order to give the families time to prepare for the journey.'

All this is very polite on the part of the Russian Government, and must be charming for those who do not mind being punished without having committed any offence. In the meanwhile, leaving the Russians to console themselves for the renewed and redoubled, or rather centupled, arbitrariness of their Government by the reflection that numbers of persons were exiled in an arbitrary manner from France after the 2nd of December,

let us inquire how many of these unhappy Poles, with or without their families, have fallen victims to that 'measure of exile through administrative channels' which the 'Voice' declares is 'as beneficial to the country as to the individuals themselves'—a doubtful declaration by the way, inasmuch as the benefit of exile to the persons exiled is by no means clear.

After comparing calculations made at Warsaw with others made at St. Petersburg, I found in January 1864,* that on the average about 300 exiles a week had reached St. Petersburg during the previous ten months from Lithuania and the kingdom of Poland. This gave already a total of about 13,000 from the kingdom and the northern Polish provinces. From the south-eastern Polish (or south-western Russian) provinces the exiles did not pass through St. Petersburg; but from this portion of ancient Poland, where, whether or not the pure Russian element be strong, the pure Polish element is decidedly weak, the number of persons exiled, as also of those executed,

* The insurrection lasted some months longer, and the deportations have scarcely ceased now (July 1865).

has been comparatively small. It is for this reason, no doubt, that when after-dinner telegrams are sent to Mouravieff and Berg informing them that their health has been drunk, the same compliment is never paid to General Annenkoff. Reputation hangs upon such trifles. If General Annenkoff, besides exciting the peasants against the proprietors, had hanged half a hundred more insurgents at Kieff and Zitomir, and burnt a few thousand acres of wood, he still would not have been regarded as one of the saviours of the Russian dominion in Poland—for in the southern provinces the Russian dominion was never seriously threatened; but he might at least have been treated by courtesy as the equal of Mouravieff and Berg, the two great military saints of modern Russia—as St. Vladimir is styled by the orthodox Church ‘the equal of the Apostles.’

All the Russian papers are now speaking of a ball given at Warsaw, by General Berg, and it is mentioned as though there were something remarkable in the fact that no Polish ladies were present. On the other hand, what is very re-

markable indeed is the published report of a ball given at Lomza by Poles to Russians. Whatever the merits of the Russians may be in their own country, they are never admitted to Polish houses, except of course when they present themselves in order to institute a search or to make an arrest. This was the case before the insurrection broke out, and long before this particular insurrection was thought of. What, then, have the Russians done of late to make themselves so much beloved, or, at least, so much admired, by the Poles that these unhappy people, who have long ceased to dance themselves, and who would all be in mourning if the wearing of mourning were not punished as a crime, should give them a ball? As if to render the whole story incredible, even to their own sufficiently credulous readers, the Russian journals add that, 'according to the Polish custom,' the gentlemen and ladies who got up this very curious entertainment served their guests with their own hands.

We know how signatures are obtained to the sham addresses of loyalty sent from various parts of Poland to St. Petersburg. The signatures must

be affixed, or the reasons why stated; and the very reasons that every Pole has for detesting the Russian Government are precisely those which, if avowed, would cause his exile to Siberia or to the interior of Russia as a disaffected person. From extorting complimentary and adulatory addresses to extorting invitations is only a step; but it is strange, nevertheless, that Russian journalists should regard such invitations as serious and sincere.

It would, nevertheless, be interesting to know with what object these balls are got up in a country where executions are still of daily occurrence. Apparently the intention is to deceive the Russian public, who hearing of all sorts of peaceful entertainments being given, may fancy that the cities in which they take place are tolerably tranquil. When I was in Warsaw, two men were hanged in front of the theatre. Soon after the execution I passed through the square. The bodies were still hanging; hundreds of women were still kneeling on the ground, sobbing and praying for the fanatics whom they regarded as martyrs; and every building that

could be seen was closed except the theatre, of which the doors were doubtless kept open in order to prove that gaiety reigned in Warsaw. The bills announced a 'dancing *divertissement*,' for the evening; but when the evening came the performers (thinking, perhaps that the dancing *divertissement* of the morning was enough) refused to appear. They pleaded various excuses, and, among others, fear lest the building should be set on fire. The performance, however, ultimately took place before the usual number of Russian officers and of the sort of Polish women who, of their own free will, would be least unlikely to invite Russians to a ball. The entertainment at Lomza was no doubt as lively, as national, as respectable, and as spontaneous an affair as the ballet given as if by way of after-piece to the hanging scene at Warsaw.

CHAPTER XVIII.

MOSCOW: FEBRUARY, 1864.

THE 'Moscow News' did me the honour some weeks ago, to publish a long article on the subject of my letters from St. Petersburg. In one of these a mistake had been made, and a serious, and as it afterwards turned out, perfectly unfounded accusation brought against the Russians of Moscow. It may be pleaded in extenuation that the groundless charge was not made in malice. Knowing that in the more humane St. Petersburg there were men who disapproved the lawless and reckless manner in which the Polish insurrection was being suppressed, and who regretted the acts of necessary severity and condemned the acts of wanton cruelty committed by the Russian Governors, I thought there might be some such even in Moscow, and readily gave what was intended

for a favourable interpretation to a paragraph in a St. Petersburg paper, stating that certain professors and writers of eminence had not been present at the dinner of the Moscow University, from which the usual complimentary telegram was sent to Wilna. Hence much rage on the part of the journal to which several of the said writers and professors contribute, and indignant protestations against what is regarded as an unjustifiable reflection on their patriotism. The unintentional insult is one for which it is easy to make amends. If you fancy that a lady generally reputed ugly and vicious may yet have some redeeming points, and hint, for instance, that her eyes are not so bad and that she is not quite without heart, and she replies that she prides herself on her stony disposition and her squint, and that you only pay her compliments because you wish to ruin her; of course the only thing to do is to let her have her scolding out, and then agree with her on all points except the last. The most ferocious, and also the most inglorious of all the Russian generals engaged in suppressing the Polish insurrection, is really a man after the

Russians' own heart. So let it be. Only it is untrue that he is execrated in England (as patriotic Russians suggest) because the English wish to see the Polish insurrection indefinitely prolonged, with a view to the enfeeblement of Russia. He is judged by the general voice on his own merits, without any reference to the question whether the Russians would ultimately gain or lose by being driven out of Poland.

The 'Moscow News' is the great patriotic organ of holy and ferocious Russia, or, at least, is so considered by its numerous readers, who do not seem to reflect that, however meritorious it may be in other respects, it is scarcely 'patriotic' on the part of Russians to desire at all hazards—even to the injury of Russia Proper—to Russianise Lithuania. No Russian who holds a pen can, in his heart, look upon Lithuania as forming an integral part of his native land, or he must regard Mickiewicz and Kosciuszko as his fellow-countrymen, which he would scarcely pretend to do. Every blow that is struck in Lithuania is felt by the Poles, while the Russians rejoice over the sufferings of the Lithuanians and applaud the

devastation of the Lithuanian country. It requires no Solomon to decide to which of the rival mothers the tortured child naturally belongs, though if the question of natural right be not raised, it is also perfectly certain that conquest has made Lithuania one of Russia's legitimate possessions. The 'Moscow News' has all the same a special reputation for patriotism, and if it should some day find out that by encouraging the most violent abuses of arbitrary rule in Lithuania and in Poland generally it has strengthened the cause of despotism throughout Russia, it at least had made no such discovery up to Christmas-day last (old style).

But the perpetuation of arbitrary rule in Russia may be a patriotic idea? Without a strong military Government, the spy system, and secret tribunals, the Russians can never hold provinces in which all the educated class is Polish and animated by the most bitter hostility against everything Russian. Nor can it for a moment be supposed that Russia will ever, of her own accord, give up these provinces, some of which have now belonged to her for nearly a century,

and which all Russians for the last thirty or forty years have been systematically taught to regard as not Polish at all, but Russian. Russian writers and professors, under State guidance, have altered history to suit State policy, as Molière's doctors changed the position of the heart to suit their own ignorance. At the time of the first partition of Poland, Podolia, with the knowledge and consent of the Empress Catherine, was claimed by Austria as an ancient possession of the Hungarian Crown. Russians who doubt this fact may consult the collected manifestoes of the partitioning Powers, among which they will find an elaborate piece of historical lying, entitled '*Droits de la Couronne de Hongrie sur la Podolie et la Russie Rouge.*' Austria adjudged to herself an equivalent for her alleged rights over Podolia, and when, some twenty years afterwards, Podolia was seized by the Russians, the sole pretext for taking possession of it and other Polish provinces was that the Poles were an unruly set of people, unable to govern themselves, and that they ought, therefore, to be despoiled of their territory. No historical right to any portion of ancient Poland

was advanced by Russia at the time of the partition; and though it was asserted during the reign of Alexander I., no heed was paid to it by that well-meaning and well-informed monarch. It was not until after the accession of Nicholas, and, above all, after the Polish insurrection of 1830, that the Polish provinces incorporated with the Russian empire were officially declared to be Russian, and that the new historical theory was ordered to be taught in all Russian and Polish schools as the only one genuine.

The historical claims of Russia to provinces which were first won, and which are now kept by the sword, form a curious subject of study, no doubt, like those of Austria to Podolia, and of the Russia of the present day to Eastern Galicia. But in viewing the Polish question as it actually presents itself, the important matter to consider is not whether a regularly organised State called Russia existed in the fourteenth century, and whether the Russia of modern times has or has not a right to claim as Russian all territory that has ever been called White Russia, Black Russia, Red Russia, or Russia of any other colour; but

simply what the Russians of the present day *think and feel* on the subject of their asserted historical right to all Russian Poland not comprised in the Congress kingdom. It is a common remark in Russia that if the Poles had only demanded political freedom under the Russian Crown for that portion of the Grand Duchy of Warsaw which in 1815 was emphatically christened 'Poland,' it would have been possible to make some arrangement with them. Of course no thoroughly satisfactory arrangement would have been made, but it might have been to the advantage of the Poles all the same—if they *would* resort to arms—to have confined their efforts to an aim less unattainable than the one which they actually proposed to themselves. The Government would still have refused to treat with rebels, but at least the hostility of the whole Russian nation would not have been excited, and it would have been more difficult than it actually has been to persuade the Russian people that the true object of the Polish rising was to break up and subjugate Russia.

The insane attempt at insurrection in the neighbourhood of Kieff—the religious and political

capital of ancient Russia, and which has lawfully belonged to the modern Russian empire for nearly two centuries—raised the patriotic indignation of the Russians to the highest pitch. The news of this armed manifestation, which ended so tragically for the Polish students of the Kieff University, and the report that bands of insurgents had been seen not very far from Smolemsk (from which city many Polish residents were carried away to the east of Russia and to Siberia), made the inhabitants of Moscow think that the time had come, not only for the Government to suppress, without delay, a formidable insurrection, but also for the Russian people to join in resisting an invasion. It was then that Prince Shtcherbatoff, the newly elected Mayor of Moscow, went to St. Petersburg with his unacceptable proposition for organising a local guard, to be composed exclusively of volunteers—not, of course, that the Poles were expected at Moscow, but because it was the general desire to dispose at once of their claims upon Russian territory, and for that purpose to liberate as many troops as possible from service in the heart of Russia. The claims in question were no

doubt purposely exaggerated by the representatives of the Government; and it was easy to confuse in the popular mind the province of Kieff, which belonged to Poland until the second partition, with the city of Kieff, which was ceded by agreement long before. The desperately wild movement outside Kieff ought by all means to have been avoided. It could not by any possibility have benefited the Poles, being such a feeble and hopeless attempt that it scarcely even served to create a diversion in favour of the insurgents in other parts; and, on the other hand, it raised all the national and religious animosity of the Russians, an effect which the rebellion of 1830 scarcely produced at all.

Without speaking again of the various means employed by the Government to excite the hatred of all classes of Russians against the Poles, and to give to the suppression of the Polish insurrection the character of a national and religious war undertaken in self-defence, I may simply notice the result of this Government agitation, as shown in the determination of the Russians to maintain their dominion at all hazards over the

Poles. I am convinced, for my part, from all I have seen and heard on the subject in Russia itself, that it is a national resolution, and not simply a resolution on the part of the Government which the people having been ordered to adopt have adopted as a mere matter of form. The Poles find it hard to believe this; and the Polish newspapers, and after them the great majority of the journals published in Western Europe, have often asserted that the addresses of the Russian nobility, as well as those of the very pliable merchants and peasants, were written under dictation, and possessed no more real value than those extorted from the Polish inhabitants of Lithuania and the kingdom. It is as absurd, however, on the part of the Poles to believe that the Russians care nothing for what they have been taught (however falsely) to regard as their legitimate inheritance, as it is on the part of well-educated Russians to question the genuineness of Polish patriotism in respect to the whole of the Poland of 1772, including those Lithuanian and Ruthenian provinces from which the most distinguished men

in the history and literature of modern Poland have proceeded.

It is perfectly natural that Russians who have been taught from their childhood upwards that Lithuania is only another name for Western Russia should feel convinced that such is really the case, and that they should for that reason object to Wilna, its thoroughly Polish capital, falling into the hands of the Poles. Stranger things than that are believed by millions of Russians, and if the Government commanded that in all schools throughout the empire it should be taught that the sun goes round the earth, and if the Censorship systematically condemned the notion that the earth goes round the sun, as an anarchical idea introduced by the Pole Copernicus, could the Russians, as a nation, be blamed for rejecting or ignoring the truth and accepting the error? It is one of the articles of a Russian's political religion that Lithuania is Russian and not Polish land, and it is no more permitted to teach the contrary than to maintain tenets at variance with the creed of the 'orthodox' Church. A discus-

sion on this very point was, it is true, permitted some two years ago in the columns of a Moscow paper, but not until the editor, M. Aksakoff, had met with almost insurmountable difficulties in procuring leave from the Censorship to publish the arguments addressed to him on the part of the Poles. But at present, as formerly, no one wants to know the opinion of the Poles. The State has been declared in danger, and now, as in the days of Nicholas (when the State seems never to have been thought safe) everyone must maintain the orthodox political religion or be silent.

The Russians would, doubtless, have supported their Government under any circumstances, but the official historical education administered for so many years in all the Russian schools has had the effect of making them support it with enthusiasm against the claims of the Poles in Lithuania, or 'Western Russia;' and from the tone of the Russian press, which enjoys just now remarkable freedom (the sort of freedom, however, that is granted to a greyhound engaged in running down a hare, and of which the end can be foreseen), it is easy to perceive that the first wish

of the nation is to subjugate the Poles beyond the possibility of further resistance, and to dispose once and for ever of their pretensions to the so-called 'Western Russia.'

Polish writers are fond of placing the Russians in what at first looks like a very painful dilemma on the subject of Poland, and of telling them that they must choose between liberating the Poles or remaining themselves without freedom. But why should they not remain without freedom, being accustomed to that condition and never having known any other? and how is it possible that they should hesitate between continuing their traditions of domination in Poland under disadvantages which they scarcely feel, and consenting to a dismemberment of their empire on the mere chance that the political condition of Russia Proper might become better after the loss of Poland than it is now?

Even those Russians who formerly were most anxious on the subject of internal reforms seem quite careless about them now, though this carelessness undoubtedly will not last. Then, for the few men who have a sincere dislike to arbitrary

government, something like the dilemma put by the Poles will really exist. They must be prepared either to do without a representative system altogether, or to see Polish deputies elected in all the Polish provinces, where, whatever the mass of the rural population may be, the educated class, as the Russians themselves allow, is composed entirely of Poles. One means of escape alone seems possible, which would consist in giving a preponderance of votes to the newly liberated serfs, in the hope of annulling thereby the influence of their late masters, and also of the professional classes, the shopkeepers, and workmen; and, generally, those who can read and write. 'Patriotism,' or, in other words, the desire to maintain the Russian domination in Poland, has made Russia the most democratic country in the world; and though Mr. Herzen's journal, owing to its attitude on the Polish question, has lost all popularity in Russia, the Russian democratic belief as to the superiority of ignorant peasants over educated proprietors, and the desirability of transferring all political influence from the latter, as the least numerous, to the former,

as the most numerous class, have been fully adopted even by men who understand that such principles would be detrimental to Russia, but who hope at the same time that they may prove fatal to Poland.

‘What the small nobility and clergy understand by the Polish nation,’ says a Russian writer who discusses the question with fairness, and whose facts are, for the most part, as exact as the conclusions he draws from them are preposterous, ‘is, first of all, themselves, and afterwards all classes not belonging to the rural population—that is to say, merchants, writers, artisans, lawyers, functionaries, workmen, proprietors, and even domestic servants. For them, the labourers’ [that is to say, the peasants retained in serfdom by the Russian Government until the other day] ‘are not the people, *but are at most a variety of Pariahs, having neither rights nor even the faculty of speech.* From this point of view the small nobility regard as Poland not only the country in which the majority of the population is Polish, but also the country in which all the classes above cited are Polish.’

It is evident from this candid and really truthful admission that if Assemblies of any kind are introduced into Lithuania, they must either be Polish Assemblies, or must represent only that class of the community which, to adopt the expression attributed by the Russian writer to the Polish nobility, has not yet 'the faculty of speech.'

But a system placing even such slight political power as is likely to be granted in the hands of grossly ignorant serfs would not satisfy the educated classes of Russia Proper; and to suit, at the same time, the constructive and destructive wants of Russia, a system of representation would have to be devised, giving due weight to the civilising element in the Russian provinces of the empire, while crushing it in the Polish ones. Even then the peasant representatives in Lithuania would in time undergo the influence of their social superiors, as has already happened in Galicia, where, nevertheless, at the first meeting of the Diet, the peasants were thoroughly hostile to the deputies of the nobility, towns, and universities.

However, for the moment it is an interesting and comparatively important question in con-

nection with the provincial Assemblies about to be formed—important, at least, as an indication—whether much or little representative power will be given to the lowest and most ignorant class. Give it much, and the Polish element may perhaps for a short time be kept down in Lithuania; give it but little, and the Assemblies in Lithuania will be thoroughly Polish from the beginning.

If the Russians cared anything like as much for improving their own institutions as for keeping all necessary institutions from the Poles, there would be something like a general understanding among the educated classes of Russia as to the political wants of the empire, such as in fact did seem to exist when the meetings of the nobility took place two years ago, and when everything was pronounced rotten in the State of Russia, and a speedy dissolution of the empire predicted as inevitable unless innumerable abuses were swept away and a Constitution forthwith granted. The great cry now is that no Constitution must be given to the Poles of the Congress kingdom unless it be given at the same time to the whole Russian empire;

and certainly, if anything could produce a bad feeling in Russia between the Government properly so called and the classes corresponding more or less to what are termed 'the governing classes' in better organised States, it would be the concession of exceptional political advantages to the inhabitants of that annex to the Russian empire which, according to Lord Russell, has certain rights guaranteed to it 'by the same instrument to which the Emperor of Russia owes his title of King of Poland.' There is nothing astonishing in this. Russia cannot content the Poles without sooner or later abandoning Poland, and, not wishing to do that, will not give them the means of fortifying themselves, but, on the contrary, is bound by the traditions of previous injustice to keep them in as helpless a position as possible. The protests of Europe on the subject only amuse the Russians, and gratify their pride, because they are able to disregard and ridicule them now after having in the first instance listened to them in the most bitter anger, and then found them to be utterly meaningless.

The most fanatical of the Mouravieff worshippers do not, I believe, say that Poland ought not to

have a Constitution, but they maintain that the kingdom must not and ought not to have any concessions made to it that are not extended to the empire generally. A constitutional kingdom of Poland would, they think, exercise a more dangerous attraction than ever on the Polish provinces. Then, with a separate Constitution, there would be more chance than there is now of the kingdom separating itself entirely from the Russian empire, and becoming the Piedmont of Poland in general. But, above all, the Russians will not hear of rebels having favours granted to them which are denied to faithful subjects. They expect to be rewarded for their addresses of loyalty, and their offers of unconditional support. These offers were made at a time when the Poles, with characteristic ignorance of the Russians, imagined they would endeavour to extort concessions from their Government while it was struggling with a rebellion, and was being threatened—not in earnest, but threatened all the same—by the principal States of Western Europe.

If the Government is generous and feels really grateful, it may in due time concede, on trial,

some distant imitation of the Austrian Constitution. But if it should choose to take a lesson forthwith from the Russian reviewers and journalists—who, after all and in spite of the Censorship, are the only representatives of public opinion that the country possesses—it can profit by the fact that the doctrine of majorities is with nearly all of them a primary article of faith. This was by no means the case before the Polish insurrection broke out, but the destruction of Poland, or at least of all that constitutes the civilisation of the country, is now the foremost wish of all good Russians, and to bring that desirable end about it is absolutely necessary to place the dumb masses of the country above the educated classes—the body above the soul. The Russian Government then, acting in accordance with the views of the habitual representatives of public opinion, and also with those expressed exceptionally and specially by the nobility, merchants, small traders, peasants, postillions, Jews, Calmucks, and other corporations, communes, and tribes, can either declare the supremacy of numerical majorities in all systems of representation to

be a principle equally salutary for Poland and for Russia, or, taking its stand on the wishes of the great bulk of its own subjects, can simply maintain that the country in general wants no political representation at all.

The first step that has now been taken towards the introduction of a constitutional system into Russia will certainly not satisfy even the most moderate of Russian reformers. However constituted, the new assemblies will scarcely have more important functions assigned to them than parochial boards in England ; and even then, as there is to be no central assembly, the Russians feel that with provincial distinctions, however slight, new desires for provincial separation may manifest themselves. But what is to be done ? A central assembly would be too much like a Parliament to please the Government which knows how impossible it is to limit discussion within precise bounds, and that if opinions be asked on one minor subject they will be expressed on a dozen major ones concerning which the Government has, perhaps, no wish to hear advice. Besides, in an assembly

representing all the Russian empire, with the kingdom of Poland included (and the Constitutionalists and Russians in general will not hear of the kingdom receiving a separate representation of its own), the Polish deputies from the provinces as well as from the kingdom, with their inherited habits of discussion and their superior political training generally, would play a part out of all proportion to their numbers.

These Poles, in fact, are always in the way, and are a source of perpetual trouble. In that, perhaps, lies their best chance of some day getting a portion of their natural rights restored. The Russians have swallowed them, but the Poles have followed Rousseau's advice after the first partition, and have shown themselves very difficult indeed to digest. The Russians do not seem to think of keeping the Poles permanently in a position inferior to their own; that is to say, they do not advocate the continued maintenance of the state of siege; and the most determined Russian patriots say nothing against the extension to Poland of such privileges as may be accorded to the rest of the Russian empire. But here the difficulty occurs.

The feeling between peasants and proprietors is at least as bad in Russia proper as in any part of ancient Poland. In Poland, too, the trading class and all classes, with the exception of the recently liberated serfs, form one as regards sentiment with the nobility, while in Russia the nobility are regarded by all other classes with jealousy. Accordingly, even a very low rate of franchise would not injure the Poles of the Polish provinces so much as it would the educated Russians of the Russian empire.

But the great thing desired is an apparently uniform system which would act in two different and really incompatible ways; and the Russian Government seems bent just now on favouring to some extent the nobility in Russia, and at the same time raising the peasantry above the nobility and all the educated classes in Poland. It will be interesting to see how this double and contradictory system will work, especially in the Russian provinces adjoining the Polish ones incorporated with the Russian empire. Will the peasants of these provinces, for instance, be satisfied to pay half as much again for the redemp-

tion of their land as is paid by their Russo-Polish neighbours? Whether the Lithuanian proprietor will be contented to receive for his land about a ninth part of its real value (30 per cent. on the value as under-estimated by the Government) is not important; but it is really important not to cause discontent among any portion of the peasantry of the empire.

In short, the Government would settle the peasant question greatly to the advantage of the peasants on the right bank of the Dnieper, and much less to their advantage on the left. It would, in a small way, give a certain proportion of influence to the educated classes in Russia, while denying it altogether to those in Poland. Finally, it would Russianise the peasantry of the Polish provinces, so as to separate them as much as possible from those whose natural and constant influence would it is thought, elevate them gradually to the moral position of the inhabitants of the Polish towns; and it would do this while it leaves the peasantry of Russia Proper in a state of the most deplorable ignorance. To kill two birds with one stone is nothing. The Russian patriots would with the

same stone kill one bird and raise up another. The former of these aims, however, is looked upon as by far the most important for the Russian State—which it is felt will never be quite out of danger until all that now constitutes civilisation in Poland is destroyed.

THE END.

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
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